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FOREWORD
Geojur isprudence  provides  fo r  a merger o f  c u l t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
geography through the  s tudy  o f  t h e  p a t t e r n  and o rde r  o f  lega l  c u l t u r e s  
on the  e a r t h ' s  s u r f a c e .  I t  i s  concerned with the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among 
d i f f e r i n g  lega l  c u l t u r e s  and th e  o r i g i n  and development o f  the  p a t t e r n ­
ed r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  l ega l  c u l t u r e s  as they a r t i c u l a t e  with  th e  e a r t h ' s  
s u r f a c e .
Legal c u l t u r e s  embrace a complex o f  laws,  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and pro­
cedures  t h a t  o f t e n  c ross  c u l t u r a l  boundaries  and leave  t h e i r  impress ion 
in  d iv e r se  a r e a s .  Much o f  the  d i f f u s io n  and r e c e p t io n  o f  l eg a l  systems 
occurred  during and in consequence o f  the  expansion o f  European s e t t l e ­
ment and conques t .  The European systems o f  law f r e q u e n t ly  over lapped 
and in te rm ing led  with  o t h e r  lega l  c u l t u r e s .  These r e c e p t io n s  o f  Euro­
pean law, through a r t i c u l a t i o n  with the  laws and p r i n c i p l e s  o f  legal  
systems r e f l e c t i n g  o t h e r  c u l t u r e s ,  e f f e c t e d  the  formation o f  new na­
t i o n a l  lega l  c u l t u r e s .
This s tudy p r e se n ts  v a r ious  a sp ec t s  o f  geo ju r isp rudence  t h a t  a re  
r e f l e c t e d  in  a s tudy o f  global p a t t e r n s  o f  lega l  d i f f u s i o n .  A geo­
p o l i t i c a l  scheme o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  s e t  f o r t h  in o rd e r  to provide  a 
l ega l  map o f  the  world t h a t  shows the  global d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  major 
l ega l  systems and t h a t  emphasizes the  d i f f u s io n  o f  western  lega l  systems.  
C u l tu ra l  p re a d a p ta t io n  i s  in t roduced  to account  fo r  lega l  prevenience 
in the  r e c e p t io n  o f  c e r t a i n  lega l  forms.
This p r o j e c t  o f f e r s  n e i t h e r  a s tudy  in comparat ive  law nor in 
lega l  e thnology .  N e i th e r  does i t  p r e se n t  more than the  b r i e f e s t  i n t r o ­
duc t ion  to  the  h i s t o r y  o f  co lo n ia l  law or  ac tua l  lega l  impress on the 
landscape .  Thus, we s h a l l  l a r g e l y  r e l y  upon the  work o f  previous  
s c h o la r s  in t h i s  r e g a rd .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a p a r t  from secondary i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  
we s h a l l  leave  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  "law landscapes"  to  f u tu r e  e f f o r t s .
This work does ,  however,  propose a r e t h e o r e t i z a t i o n  fo r  the  s tudy o f  
comparat ive ju r i s p ru d e n c e  in  terms o f  geographic  and g e o p o l i t i c  r e l a ­
t i o n s .  In t h a t  way, th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  a new geographical  
s u b d i s c i p l i n e  i s  accomplished.
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ABSTRACT
Every c u l t u r e  must g e n e r a l ly  possess  an o rd e r  t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  c r e a t e d  (human des ign]  or  the  r e s u l t  o f  exper ience  
(human a c t i o n ) .  Two o r d e r in g  f o r c e s ,  Human Design and Human Action ,  
m an i fe s t  themselves  in  th e  form o f  laws and lega l  systems which 
govern the  i n d i v i d u a l s  who form the thus  ordered  c i v i l  s o c i e t y .  The 
Anglo-American Common Law family  o f  lega l  systems and the  Romano- 
Germanic Civi l  Law family  o f  lega l  systems b a s i c a l l y  r e f l e c t  the 
o r d e r in g  fo rces  o f  Human Action and Human Design, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Be­
cause laws and lega l  systems leave  the  im p r in t  o f  sovere ign  a u t h o r i t y  
on the  landscape ,  the  s tudy o f  the  c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y  and under ly ing  
phi losophy o f  d i f f e r i n g  lega l  systems i s  necessary  to an adequate  
unders tand ing  o f  man's e x i s t e n c e  in  a r eg io n .  Such a s tudy i s  wi th in  
the  realm o f  the  c u l t u r a l - l e g a l  sc ience  o f  g eo ju r isp rudence .
Geojur isprudence i s  f i r s t  and foremost  concerned with the  geo­
graphic  and g e o p o l i t i c  a sp e c t s  o f  lega l  phenomena. As such, i t  
emphasizes the  p a r t i c u l a r  themes o f  c u l t u r a l  geography, such as c u l t u r e  
a rea  and c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y ,  as th ese  r e l a t e  to  laws and lega l  systems.
I t  i s  thus  concerned with  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  expansion o f  laws across  the  
g lobe .  The general shape o f  such an h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  can be 
exp la ined  by d e l i n e a t i n g  c e r t a i n  general p r i n c i p l e s ,  such as legal  
p reven ience ,  a term t h a t  d e s ig n a te s  a c e r t a i n  advance preparedness  to 
a ccep t  an in n o v a t io n .
This s tudy p re sen ts  va r ious  a sp ec t s  o f  geo ju r isp rudence  t h a t  
a re  r e f l e c t e d  in  a s tudy  o f  global p a t t e r n s  o f  lega l  d i f f u s i o n .  A 
g e o p o l i t i c a l  scheme o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  s e t  f o r t h  in o rd e r  to  provide 
a lega l  map o f  the  world t h a t  shows th e  global d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  
major l ega l  systems and t h a t  emphasizes the  d i f f u s io n  o f  western  
lega l  systems.  Cu l tu ra l  p re ad a p ta t io n  i s  in t roduced  to  account  fo r  
lega l  prevenience in th e  r e c e p t io n  o f  c e r t a i n  lega l  forms.
CHAPTER I
PRINCIPLES OF GEOJURISPRUDENCE
I t  i s  one o f  th e  maxims o f  the  c i v i l  law t h a t  
d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  dangerous.  —  Samuel Johnson,  The 
Rambler, 1751.
Notes Toward a D e f in i t i o n  
Geojur isprudence i s  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a knowledge o f  the  lega l  
process  to  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  v a r io u s  e a r th  r e l a t i o n s .  I t  i s  a l so  
the  s tudy o f  th e  geographic  a s p e c t s  of  lega l  phenomena. G eo ju r i sp ru -  
dence i s  a formal ( a n a l y t i c a l )  lega l  s c ien ce  in the  sense t h a t  i t  en­
deavors  to  pe rce ive  th e  under ly ing  lega l  philosophy involved in  the  
p rocesses  by which laws and lega l  systems i n t e r r e l a t e  w ith  the  land .
I t  i s  a c u l t u r a l  s c ien ce  in  t h a t  i t  u t i l i z e s  the  concepts  and p r i n c i ­
p les  o f  c u l t u r a l  geography ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  in th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y ,  c u l t u r e  
h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r a l  p r e a d a p ta t io n )  in  e x p la in in g  i t s  sp e c ia l  s u b je c t  
a r e a s .
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  c i v i l  o rd e r  as i t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in lega l  systems,  
in d iv id u a l  laws, and j u r i d i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  leaves  an impress on the  
e a r t h ' s  su r f a c e  t h a t  can be seen as the  p o l i t i c a l  landscape ,  the  land ­
scape m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  law and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  t r a n sc e n d en t  o rd e r .  The 
philosophy of  law and th e  h i s t o r y  of l ega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  may be pro­
j e c t e d  in to  th e  realm o f  geography in an a t tem pt  to  gain a more adequate  
unders tand ing  of  p o l i t i c a l  landscapes .  Because the  a c t i v i t i e s  c h a rac ­
t e r i s t i c  o f  c i v i l  o rd e r  leave  t h e i r  im p r in t  upon the  landscape a re  c r u ­
c i a l  to  an adequate  unders tand ing  o f  man's e x i s t e n c e  in a r e g io n ,  the
1
s p e c i a l t y  to  g eo ju r isp ru d en ce  i s  e s s e n t i a l .
Legal systems m i r r o r  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  expansion and c o n t r a c t io n  
o f  c u l t u r e s  and t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  s t r u g g le s  f o r  space.  Ideas and i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  cannot move f a r  w i thou t  encounter ing  o th e r  ideas  and i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s ,  and un le ss  o u t r i g h t  r e j e c t i o n  takes  p la c e ,  th e  c o n ta c t s  thus 
e s t a b l i s h e d  r e s u l t  in varying degrees  o f  m o d i f ic a t io n  and a s s i m i l a t i o n  
(Wagner and M ik ese l l ,  1962, p. 206).  The o r ig i n  and d i s p e r s a l  o f  l e ­
gal c u l t u r e s  i s  the  c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y  o f  law. The c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y  of  
lega l  systems i s  w i th in  th e  realm of  g eo ju r isp ru d en ce .  An i n t e r f a c e  
o f  law and geography, geo ju r isp ru d en ce  in q u i re s  in to  the  l o c a l i z a t i o n  
o f  the  o r ig i n s  of  laws and lega l  systems,  the  way by which they occupy 
and i n t e r r e l a t e  with  t h e  l a n d ,  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  o f  lega l  systems t h a t  
o v e r lap ,  and th e  d e c l in e  and c o l l a p s e  o f  superceded systems of  law. I t  
i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  s tudy th e  geographic  p a t t e r n s  o f  systems of  law, t o ­
g e th e r  with  the  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n s  t h a t  they c r e a t e  in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  
with th e  landscape (such as laws a f f e c t i n g  the  use o f  land— proper ty  
r i g h t s ,  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  and survey systems—and n a tu ra l  r e so u rc e s —water  
r i g h t s ,  mineral and energy re sou rces  r e g u l a t i o n ,  environmental  p r o te c ­
t i o n  law). Areal d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  l ega l  systems exper ience  s h i f t s  o f  
c e n t e r s ,  change in th e  f u n c t io n  of  p e r i p h e r i e s ,  and changes o f  s t r u c ­
tu r e  (see  Sauer ,  1941). C u l tu ra l  energy ( c r e a t i v i t y )  and a d a p t a b i l i t y  
( r e c e p t i v i t y  to  acq u i re  new ways),  as well  as p read ap t iv e  s h i f t s  r e ­
vea l in g  a c o n t i n u i t y  in  l ega l  t r a n s i t i o n s ,  a r e  d iscovered  and expla ined  
in a study o f  the  geographic expansion o f  systems of  law.
Because th e se  lega l  r e l a t i o n s  leave  t h e i r  im pr in t  on the  e a r t h ' s  
s u r f a c e ,  the  s tudy of  g eo ju r isp rudence  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  geographers .
" to  the  geographer ,  th e  c u l t u r e  a rea  i s  th e  geographic express ion  o f  
c u l t u r e  p rocesses  and not the  c u l t u r a l  express ion  o f  a geographic  pro­
cess"  (K n if fen ,  as quoted in Haag and Walker,  1974).
Geojur isprudence versus  Legal Ethnology and Comparative Law
At the  foundat ion o f  c u r r e n t  e thnology i s  the  view t h a t  legal  
c a t e g o r i e s  a re  dependent  upon the  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  s o c i e ty  (Hoebel,  1946) J  
Legal e thnology begins with the  general d e f i n i t i o n  o f  law as r i g h t s  
and o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  s o c ia l  con t ro l  through th e  b inding  fo rce  o f  sanc­
t i o n  adm in is te red  by some c o n s t i t u t e d  a u t h o r i t y  (Radcl i f fe-Brown,  1952, 
pp. 205-11).  Socia l  con t ro l  may then be analyzed in to  a s e t  o f  bind­
ing r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s .  The s tudy  o f  lega l  ethnography thus 
emphasizes those  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c u l t u r e  t h a t  f u l f i l l  the  fu n c t io n s  o f  
m a in ta in ing  o rd e r  and s t a b i l i t y .
One o f  the  f i r s t  l e v e l s  o f  a n a l y s i s  in l ega l  e thnology i s  the
d i s t i n c t i o n  between law and custom. Diamond r e f e r s  to t h i s  as the
" r u l e  o f  law versus  the  o rd e r  o f  custom" (1971, p.  47) :
Law . . .  i s  symptomatic o f  the  emergence o f  the  s t a t e ;  
the lega l  s anc t ion  i s  no t  s imply the  c u t t i n g  edge of  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a t  a l l  t im e s ,  and in a l l  p la c e s .  . . Custom— 
spontaneous,  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  p e r so n a l ,  commonly known, c o r p o ra t e ,  
r e l a t i v e l y  unchanging— i s  the  m odal i ty  o f  p r im i t i v e  s o c i e ty ;  
law i s  the  in s t rum en t  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s o c ie ty  
sanc t ioned  by organized  f o r c e ,  presumably above s o c ie ty  a t  
l a r g e ,  and b u t t r e s s i n g  a new s e t  o f  so c ia l  i n t e r e s t s .  Law ( 
and custom both involve  th e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  beh av io r ,  but 
t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r s  a re  e n t i r e l y  d i s t i n c t ;  no e v o lu t io n a ry  balance 
has been s t r u c k  between developing law and custom, whether 
t r a d i t i o n a l  o r  emergent.
Legal e t h n o l o g i s t s  a l so  sometimes speak o f  the  " j u r a l "  community, 
a concept  t h a t  i n d i c a t e s  the  s o c ia l  con t ro l  fu n c t io n s  o f  the  r u l e s  to
lWe sh a l l  accep t  as given the  fo l low ing  a n th ro p o lo g ica l  concep ts ,  
with  f u l l  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  e x i s t .
4be obeyed in l i n e a g e  systems.  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  as 
s e t  f o r t h  by Hoebel (1942, p. 952-53) holds t h a t  the  " l e a s t  common 
denominator of  c i v i l i z e d  law i s  the  l e a s t  common denominator of  prim­
i t i v e  law."  Hoebel a l s o  recognizes  the  importance of  form in the  
s tudy of  p r im i t i v e  law. In f luenced  by A. L. Kroeber,  Hoebel r e l a t e s  
lega l  norms to  t h e  t o t a l  c u l t u r a l  system o f  s o c i e ty  (1954, pp. 15-16):
Legal norms a r e  s u b je c t  to  the  t e s t  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y  with 
th e  guid ing  p r i n c i p l e s  s e t  in th e  b a s ic  p o s tu l a t e s  o f  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  s o c i e t i e s ,  . . . The p o s tu l a t e s  . . . 
t h a t  a r e  used f o r  o p e ra t io n  in  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  lega l
p r i n c i p l e s  may be i s o l a t e d  f o r  s e p a ra t e  s tudy through
comparat ive j u r i s p r u d e n c e .
On a r e l a t e d  theme, S tone ,  who a l s o  in f luenced  Hoebel,  s a id  t h a t  j u r a l
p o s tu l a t e s  (1950, p. 337)
a r e  g e n e ra l i z e d  s ta te m en ts  o f  the  t e n d en c ie s  a c t u a l l y  
o p e r a t i n g ,  o f  th e  p re s u p p o s i t io n s  on which a p a r t i c u ­
l a r  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s  based . . . .  They a r e  i d e a l l y  
presupposed by th e  whole s o c ia l  complex, which can 
thus  be used to  b r in g  the  law in to  harmony with  i t  .
. . . They a r e ,  as i t  were,  d i r e c t i v e s  i s s u in g  from 
the  p a r t i c u l a r  c i v i l i z e d  s o c i e ty  to  th o se  who a re  
w ie ld ing  so c ia l  co n t ro l  through law in i t .
Hoebel,  t h e r e f o r e ,  seeks to  p lace  p r im i t i v e  law i n t o  the  framework of 
the  va lue  system o f  t h e  group. He d e f in e s  law in  terms of s an c t io n :
"A s o c ia l  norm i s  leg a l  i f  i t s  n e g l e c t  o r  i n f r a c t i o n  i s  met by the  ap­
p l i c a t i o n ,  in t h r e a t  o r  in f a c t ,  o f  the  a b s o lu te  c o e rc iv e  f o r c e  by a
so c ia l  u n i t  p osses s ing  the  s o c i a l l y  recognized p r i v i l e g e  o f  a c t in g "
(Hoebel,  1940, p. 45; and 1954, p.  28) .
In terms o f  methodology, Hoebel t r i e s  to  determine j u r a l  p o s tu l a t e s  
by which the  so c ia l  r e l a t i o n s  of  i n d iv id u a l s  possess  a normative c u l t u r ­
al p a t t e r n .  P o s t u l a t e s  thus  provide  a s e r i e s  o f  fundamental r e fe re n c e  
p o in ts  concern ing  the  o rd e r  of  c u l t u r a l  s o c i e ty  (Hoebel,  1965). Accord­
5ing to  H oebel ' s  view o f  s o c io lo g ic a l  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  p o s i t i v e  law does 
not  o b ta in  sa n c t io n  from in h e r e n t  power, but  through th e  e t h i c a l  con­
t e n t  o f  norms. C u l tu re  provides  th e  shared meanings and norms fo r  
o rd e r in g  the  in d iv id u a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  i t s  members. Thus, i t  i s  because 
a r u l e  i s  cons ide red  o b l i g a t o r y  by the  c u l t u r e  t h a t  a measure o f  co­
e rc io n  ensues .
Leopold P o sp i s i l  (1971),  a s o c ia l  a n t h r o p o lo g i s t s  t r a in e d  in the  
Civ i l  Law, a rg u e s ,  c o n t r a ry  to  Hoebel,  t h a t  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  
u n iv e r sa l  and i n v a r i a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  law renders  p o s s ib l e  the  
t r a n s f e r  o f  concepts  and forms among d i f f e r e n t  lega l  c u l t u r e s .  His 
method i s  to  i d e n t i f y  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  an a n a l y t i c a l  b a s i s  f o r  
law t h a t  lends  i t s e l f  t o  comparat ive s tu d y .  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  so iden ­
t i f i e d  in c lu d e :  a u t h o r i t y  ( th e  power to  induce o r  f o r c e  adherence to
a d e c i s i o n ) ,  i n t e n t  o f  u n iv e r sa l  a p p l i c a t i o n  ( i n t e n t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  to 
apply th e  r e s u l t s  o f  a d e c i s io n  to  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  in th e  f u t u r e ) ,  
o b l i g a t i o n  ( r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  o f  p a r t i e s  to  a d i s p u t e ) ,  and s a n c t io n  
( s e p a r a t i o n  o f  laws from non- legal  custom).  Unlike Radclif fe-Brown 
and Malinowski who emphasize s a n c t io n  and o b l i g a t i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
P o sp i s i l  f in d s  i t  necessa ry  to  use a complex o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  to 
d e l i m i t  the  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  lega l  o rd e r .
Another  a s p e c t  o f  le g a l  e thnology emphasized by Hoebel i s  the  l e ­
gal p ro cess .  Hoebel r e l i e s  p r im a r i l y  on th e  method o f  case  h i s t o r i e s .  
He b e l i e v e s  t h a t  the  n a tu r e  o f  law i s  to  be found in  lega l  d ec i s io n s  
(1940, pp. 6 -7 ) :
The case h i s t o r i e s  hold w i th in  themselves th e  j u i c e  of  
l i f e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  r e v e a l in g  th e  sway and co u n te r  p lay  of  
emotion and m ot ive ,  dem onstra t ing  the  broad range of
v a r i a b i l i t y  in conduct in given s i t u a t i o n s .  Case h i s ­
t o r i e s  give th e  n a t i v e ' s  c o lo r in g  to  the  r e p o r t .  T rans­
m i t t i n g  to  th e  read e r  th e  im ponderab i l ia  o f  n a t iv e  l i f e  
which Malinowski so a p t l y  i n s i s t s  be g iven.
To Hoebel,  th en ,  cases  o f f e r  a means f o r  d e s c r ib in g  th e  lega l  p rocess .  
The case  method se rves  to  r e c o n s t r u c t  ac tu a l  events  in the  p a s t  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  people .  From the  assembled c a s e s ,  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  concern­
ing the  lega l  p r i n c i p l e s  by which a s o c i e ty  was ordered may be d i s c e r ­
ned.
According to  Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941, p. 20) ,  t h r e e  "roads" 
e x i s t  i n to  th e  e x p lo r a t io n  o f  th e  " l a w - s t u f f  o f  a c u l t u r e : "  1) a b s t r a c t  
r u le s  o f  s o c i e t y ,  2) a c tu a l  p a t t e r n s  o f  b eh av io r ,  and 3) p r i n c i p l e s  
der ived  from d e c i s io n  o f  l ega l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Cochrane (1972),  on the
o th e r  hand, in t ro d u ce s  a "processual  model" no t  based on p r i n c i p l e s
o f  so c io logy ,  but  on ac tua l  lega l  t e c h n iq u e s .  He views law as a de­
c is ion-making  a c t i v i t y  (1972, p. 50):
I f  law i s  to  be viewed as a dec is ion-making  f i e l d  of 
a c t i v i t y  then . . .  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  types  o f  d e c i s io n  
must be examined . . . These d e c i s io n a l  types  a re :
1) th e  d e c i s io n  to  seek a lega l  remedy; 2) the  d e c i ­
s ion by a u t h o r i t y ;  3) the  d e c i s io n  on th e  p a r t  o f  ad­
m i n i s t r a t i v e  p e rso n n e l ,  o r  t h e  general  p u b l i c ,  to 
accep t  and en fo rce  th e  a u t h o r i t y ' s  d e c i s io n .  Any­
th in g  l e s s  than t h i s  number o f  d e c i s io n a l  types  . . .
would only g ive  a t r u n c a te d  account  of  lega l  p rocesses .
F i n a l l y ,  l i k e  P o s p i s i l ,  Gluckman and Bohannan use t e c h n ic a l  concepts  
der ived  from Anglo-American ju r i s p ru d e n c e  in  an a t tem p t  to  understand 
the  lega l  e thnology o f  any given group. They, to o ,  emphasize th e  l e ­
gal process  in t h e i r  s t u d i e s ,  t o g e th e r  w ith  such concepts  as " judge ,"  
" c o u r t , "  and " reasonab le  man," which tend to  c h a r a c t e r i z e  th e  Common 
Law t r a d i t i o n .  Like Hoebel,  Gluckman and Bohannan u t i l i z e  case  h i s ­
t o r i e s  to  determine g en e ra l iz ed  p r in c ip l e s  o f  lega l  o rd e r .  R e f l e c t in g  
h is  C iv i l i a n  t r a i n i n g ,  P o s p i s i l ' s  approach to  l ega l  e thnology i s  gen­
e r a l l y  one o f  seeking to  i d e n t i f y  those  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  a lega l  c u l t u r e  
which lend themselves  to  comparat ive s tudy .  Such a t t r i b u t e s  can be 
s tu d ied  on a c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  b a s i s  because t h e i r  ac tua l  occurrence  in 
l ega l  c u l t u r e s  r e v e a l s  c e r t a i n  general  f e a t u r e s  common to  a l l .
As in  the  case  o f  lega l  e thnology ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  many approaches 
to  the  s tudy o f  comparat ive law, such as a n a l y t i c a l ,  h i s t o r i c a l ,  and 
ph i lo soph ica l  (Pound, 1957, pp. 70-84) .  A b r i e f  review of  a few o f  
the  methods employed should s u f f i c e .  Zweigert (1972, pp. 465-74) pos­
t u l a t e d  a use o f  comparative method based on " fu n c t io n a l  e q u iv a le n c e , "  
j_.e_., th e  techn iques  o f  dec is ion-making .  Such an approach lends  i t ­
s e l f  to  s tu d i e s  in g e o ju r i sp ru d e n c e ,  but  r a i s e s  a q u es t ion  as to  the  
b a s i s  o f  comparison. For example, one might p r e f e r a b ly  r e l y  on Natu­
ra l  Law th e o ry ,  which emphasizes un iv e rsa l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r i g h t  o r d e r ,  
o r  one might use a comparat ive h i s t o r i c a l  approach as th e  under ly ing  
b a s i s .  Another approach to  comparat ive law d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between con­
cep ts  upon which legal  systems o p e ra te  and the  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  they pro­
t e c t .  This view o f te n  se rves  as an i n t e r f a c e  between comparat ive law 
and humanism (Yntema, 1960, pp. 493-9) .  Friedman (1967, p. 515),  con­
s id e r s  th e  comparat ive law approach to  in c lu d e  th e  comparison o f  the  
s u b s t a n t iv e  laws and o th e r  accepted  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  lega l  systems.
A r e l a t e d  view focuses  on the  search  f o r  concepts  common to  p a r t i c u l a r  
l ega l  systems o r  f a m i l i e s  o f  lega l  systems (Malmstrom, 1969; Dainow, 
1966).
Geojur isprudence uses the  methods and approaches of  both lega l
8ethnology and comparat ive law as the  b a s i s  f o r  the  s tudey o f  th e  geo­
graphic  a sp ec t s  o f  l e g a l  phenomena. I t  d i f f e r s  from both in t h a t  i t  
emphasizes geographic  r e l a t i o n s  r a t h e r  than e th n o lo g ic a l  o r  pure ly  
lega l  a sp ec t s  of  r e a l i t y .  As e th n o ju r i sp ru d e n ce  provides  an i n t e r ­
face  between lega l  e thnology and comparative j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  g e o j u r i s ­
prudence se rves  as an i n t e r f a c e  between comparat ive law and lega l  geo­
graphy,  i_._e., the  s tudy  o f  th e  geographic  a sp e c t s  o f  lega l  phenomena.
The H i s to r i c  S t ru g g le s  f o r  Space o f  Legal C u l tu res  
One o f  the  p r in c ip a l  concerns  o f  g eo ju r isp ru d en ce  i s  th e  d i s t r i ­
bu t ion  of  lega l  c u l t u r e s .  In o rd e r  to  account  f o r  p a s t  and p re se n t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  s tudy th e  geographic  expansion of 
lega l  c u l t u r e s ,  a m a t t e r  o f  c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y .  As Carl Sauer  (1941)
noted:
A c u l t u r e  t r a i t  o r  complex o r i g i n a t e s  a t  a c e r t a i n
time in a p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t y .  I t  ga ins  accep tance
— t h a t  i s ,  i s  le a rn ed  by a group—and i s  communi­
ca ted  outward, o r  d i f f u s e s ,  u n t i l  i t  encounters  
s u f f i c i e n t  r e s i s t a n c e ,  as from u n s u i t a b l e  phys ica l  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  from a l t e r n a t i v e  t r a i t s ,  o r  from d i s p a r ­
i t y  o f  c u l t u r a l  l e v e l .
So i t  i s ,  t o o ,  with Laws and legal  systems.  The o r i g i n s ,  d i s p e r s a l s ,
and com pet i t ion  o f  lega l  c u l t u r e s  in t h e i r  h i s t o r i c  s t r u g g le s  f o r  space
provide th e  very subs tance  o f  g eo ju r i sp ru d e n c e .
As lega l  c u l t u r e s  and lega l  systems expand beyond t h e i r  c u l t u r e
h e a r th s ,  the  process  o f  r e c ep t io n  occu rs .  P la n t s  growing in one s o i l
q u i t e  moderately and o r g a n i c a l l y  may, i f  t r a n s p o r t e d ,  e i t h e r  s h r iv e l
and d ie  or  grow, perhaps l u x u r i a n t l y .  So i t  i s  wi th  lega l  t r a n s p l a n t s .
Legal t r a n s p l a n t s  in th e  form of  in d iv id u a l  r u le s  o r  l a r g e  p a r t s  of
9l ega l  systems a r e  extremely common. This i s  t r u e  o f  both e a r l i e r  t imes 
and more r e c e n t  e v e n t s .  Such a t r a n s f e r  o f  laws and lega l  systems i s  
probably  the  most f e r t i l e  source  o f  development in lega l  c u l t u r e s .
Most changes in systems may be t r a c ed  to e a r l i e r  borrowing as can be 
seen ,  f o r  example, in the  overwhelming importance f o r  p r iv a t e  law o f  
the  Anglo-American Common Law and the  Romano-Germanic Civi l  Law t h a t ,  
as we w i l l  s e e ,  today encompass v i r t u a l l y  the  g lobe .  As F. W. Mait­
land (1909, p.  296) s a id :  "The forms o f  a c t i o n  we have b u r ie d ,  but
they  w i l l  r u l e  us from t h e i r  g rav es ."  Law i s  g e n e ra l ly  roo ted  in the  
p a s t .  Thus, we f in d  the  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r sp e c t iv e  a n e c e s s i t y  in the  
s tudy o f  lega l  d i f f u s i o n .
Voluntary r ec e p t io n  u s u a l ly  involves  a change in the  law t h a t  can 
be the  r e s u l t  o f  any o f  seve ra l  f a c t o r s ,  such as c l im a te ,  economic con­
d i t i o n s ,  r e l i g i o u s  c i r cu m stan ces ,  general  h i s t o r i c a l  t r e n d ,  o r  even 
chance.  G en e ra l ly ,  the  time o f  rece p t io n  i s  one when law can be r e ­
formed o r  made more s o p h i s t i c a t e d .  This i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  when the 
law system o f  the  r e c e iv in g  people i s  l e s s  advanced than t h a t  o f  the 
exp o r t in g  c u l t u r e .  A system t h a t  i s  in v e n t iv e  or  c r e a t i v e  may remain 
l a r g e l y  f r e e  from r e c e p t io n s  even when fo re ig n  in f lu e n c e  i s  g r e a t .
The most f r u i t f u l  a rea  f o r  s tudy in geo ju r isp rudence  i s  perhaps t h a t  
o f  th e  co lo n ia l  expansion o f  the  Western systems o f  law during  the 
e ig h te e n th  and n in e tee n th  c e n t u r i e s  and vo lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n s  during the  
e a r l y  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry .  Such a s tudy r e v e a l s  the  global  in f lu e n c e  o f  
what we may r e f e r  to  as  " lega l  a c c u l t u r a t i o n . "  Such a s tudy becomes one o f  
c o n s id e r in g  the  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  lega l  systems in evolving c u l t u r e s  which 
o v e r l a p .  Legal p lu ra l i sm  occurs as co lon ia l  laws a re  t r a n s p l a n t e d  in a reas
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with n o n-com pet i t ive  indigenous lega l  c u l t u r e s  and a re a s  where the 
t r a n s p l a n t e d  system i n t e r a c t s  with n a t iv e  r e l i g i o u s  systems o f  j u r i s ­
prudence and customary bodies o f  law. Voluntary  adopt ion  o f  lega l  
sy s tem a t ic s  fo r  purposes  o f  m odern iz a t io n ,  wherein e x i s t i n g  systems 
a re  g e n e r a l ly  r ep la ce d  with a n a t io n a l  legal  system, provides  f u r t h e r  
occas ions  f o r  a c c u l t u r a t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  when t r a d i t i o n a l  systems a re  
a b o l i sh ed  in  favo r  o f  an in t roduced  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  ideo lo g y ,  lega l  a c ­
c u l t u r a t i o n  again  provides  a new s t a t e  o f  lega l  p lu ra l i s m .  The 
geographic a s p e c t s  o f  th e se  f a c t o r s  a r e  c e n t r a l  to  th e  s u b - d i s c i p l i n e  
o f  g e o ju r i sp ru d en ce .
I f  le g a l  systems in broad o u t l i n e s  a r e  images o f  
the  reg ions  in which they  f u n c t io n ,  sometimes f a i t h f u l ,  
and sometimes d i s t o r t e d ,  -individual laws in d e t a i l  m i r ro r  
the  s o c i e t y  and the  h a b i t a t  by and in which they a re  
c r e a t e d .  Because humanity occupies  i t s  h a b i t a t  dynam ical ly ,  
laws tend to  become outmoded. When t h i s  occurs  they  a re  
u s u a l ly  revoked,  sometimes they  a r e  d i s r e g a r d e d ,  occa­
s i o n a l l y  they  a r e  given new meaning. (W h i t t l e s e y ,  1958, 
p .  565)
Legal systems r e f l e c t  the  c u l t u r e s  which spawned them and t h e i r  e x i s t ­
ence through t ime.
C u l tu re  and Order
The E terna l  works and s t i r s  in a l l ;
For All must in to  noth ing  f a l l ,
I f  i t  w i l l  p e r s i s t  in Being, ( d i s s e r t a t i o n  a u t h o r ' s  t r a n s l a t i o n )
Goethe, Elns und A l l e s , 1821
Every c u l t u r e  must possess  an o rd e r  t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
c r e a te d  (Human Design) o r  the  r e s u l t  o f  human exper ience  (Human A c t io n ) .
The implementation o f  t h i s  choice  w i th in  a s o c i e ty  r e s u l t s  in c i v i l  o r ­
d e r ,  the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  which i s  then  r e f l e c t e d  in laws and lega l  systems 
t h a t  leave  the  impress  o f  sovere ign  a u t h o r i t y  on the  e a r t h ' s  s u r f a c e .
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The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  laws and lega l  systems and th e  p rocesses  by which 
they i n t e r r e l a t e  with the  land a r e  p roper  s u b je c t s  o f  concern f o r  the  
s p e c i a l i z e d  a rea  of  p o l i t i c a l  geography t h a t  i s  here c a l l e d  " g e o j u r i s ­
prudence" ( E a s t e r l y ,  1977, p. 209).
For our purposes ,  the  p roper  s e t t i n g  f o r  d i s c u s s io n  concerning 
c e r t a i n  a sp ec t s  o f  c u l t u r e  and o r d e r ,  which a r e  c e n t r a l  to  t h e  s tudy 
o f  g e o ju r i sp ru d en c e ,  i s  provided in a b r i e f  review of  E r ic  V o eg e l in ' s  
ideas  on lega l  o rd e r .  A f te r  a l l ,  the  i n t e r f a c e  between c u l t u r e  and 
o r d e r ,  in a mundane s e n se ,  i s  lega l  o rd e r .  That i s  to  say ,  when the  
values  ( c u l t u r e )  o f  a group o f  men a r e  given e x p l i c i t  f o rm u la t io n ,  
they commonly t ak e  t h e  form o f  laws. Voegel (1957, p.  29) a s s e r t s  
t h a t  law " i s  the  subs tance  o f  o rd e r  in a l l  realms o f  b e in g ."  In the  
course  o f  h i s t o r y  can be seen "an o rd e r in g  substance  t h a t  pervades the  
h ie ra rc h y  o f  be ing from God, through the  world and s o c i e t y ,  to  every 
man" (Voegel in ,  1957, p. 31) .  Such an o rd e r in g  i s  in h e re n t  in s o c i e t y .  
The law-making process  becomes the  method f o r  s ecu r ing  th e  subs tance  
of  t h i s  o rd e r  by e x p l i c i t  r u l e s .  "The lawmaking process  p a r tak es  of  
the  n a tu re  o f  the  law in as much as i t  se rves  the  purpose o f  s ecu r ing  
th e  subs tance  o f  o rd e r  in  s o c ie ty "  (Voegelin ,  1957, p. 32) .
The legal  o rd e r  i s  th e  means o f  exp re ss ing  in "pe rvas ive  and con­
c r e t e  form the  l a s t i n g  o f  an o rd e r  o f  s o c i e ty  through time" (Voegelin ,  
1957, p. 53) .  True o r d e r  in  s o c i e ty  cannot  be simply c r e a te d  by man 
as p a r t  of  some preconceived p lan ,  bu t  could be e f f e c t e d  by th e  a c t s  of  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  men through an e v o lu t io n a ry  process  of  temporal exper ­
ience ( E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd ,  1951, p. 23; Gluckman, 1965a, p. 17).  These 
a c t s  performed by men take  p lace  in a s t a t e  o f  permanent t e n s io n  be-
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tween what ought  to  be and what a c t u a l l y  i s .  "Man has the  exper ience  
of  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  through h is  ex p e r ien ce ,  in an o rd e r  of  being which 
embraces, bes ides  h im se l f ,  God, the  world and s o c i e ty .  This i s  the  
exper ience  which can become a r t i c u l a t e  in the  c r e a t io n  o f  symbols of  
the  pe rv as iv e  o rd e r  o f  being" (Voegel in ,  1957, p. 59) .
In V o eg e l in ' s  view, the  Ought was " the  exper ienced t en s io n  between 
th e  o rd e r  o f  be ing and th e  conduct  o f  man" (1957, p. 59) .  Thus, one 
can c l e a r l y  see  th e  i n t e r f a c e  between c u l t u r e  and o rd e r  as law. The 
n o rm a t iv i ty  of  th e  r u l e  of  law embrace t h r e e  elements .  I t  i s  in tended 
as a t r u e  p r o p o s i t i o n  concerning  th e  c o n c re te  o rd e r  of s o c i e ty .  I t  
appeals  f o r  th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  i t s  i n h e r e n t  t r u t h  i n to  th e  l i v e s  of  
i t s  a d d re s s e e s .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  claims to  be heard (Voegel in ,  1957, p.
51) .
According to  Voegel in ,  the  making o f  laws i s  a process  t h a t  aims 
" to  p r o j e c t  and r e a l i z e  the  o rd e r  o f  s o c ie ty "  (1957, p. 67) .  Some 
e f f o r t s  in tend  to  r e a l i z e  through c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  such as p o l i t i c a l  ac ­
t i v i t i e s  from the  enactment of  s t a t u t e s  to  d o c t r in a l  debates  concern­
ing so c ia l  reforms;  o th e r s  in tend  to  i n i t i a t e  t ru e  o rd e r  by e s t a b l i s h ­
ing s t a n d a rd s ,  such as th e  c l a s s i c a l  approaches  to  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t h e ­
ory .  "The t r u e  o rd e r  o f  s o c i e ty  i s  the  o rd e r  in which man can f u l l y  
unfo ld  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  h is  na tu re"  (Voegel in ,  1957, p. 73) .
The em pir ica l  o rd e r  of  a s o c i e ty  i s  capable  o f  degrees 
o f  r e a l i t y  in  the  measure to  which i t  a r t i c u l a t e s  the  
t e n s io n  o f  th e  Ought in the  o n to lo g ic a l  s en se ,  t h a t  i s
th e  o b j e c t  o f  ph i lo so p h ica l  i n q u i ry .  The n o rm a t iv i ty
of  the  law i s  i t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  t r u e  o rd e r .
(Voegel in ,  1957, p. 76)
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Cosmos versus  Taxis
Order,  in th e  temporal sense  o f  th e  term, denotes
a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in which a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  elements 
o f  va r ious  kinds a r e  so r e l a t e d  to  each o th e r  t h a t  we 
may le a rn  from our acqua in tance  with some s p a t i a l  or  
temporal p a r t  o f  th e  whole to form c o r r e c t  e x p e c ta t io n s  
concerning th e  r e s t ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  ex p e c ta t io n s  which 
have a good chance o f  proving c o r r e c t .  (Hayek, 1973, 
p.  36)
The two sources  o f  intramundane o rd e r  t h a t  a re  m an i fe s t  in th e  ru le s  
governing th e  behav io r  o f  th e  i n d iv id u a l s  who form th e  o rd e rs  may be 
i d e n t i f i e d  by the Greek te rm s ,  cosmos and t a x i s . Cosmos denotes  a spon­
taneous o r d e r ,  th e  word e a r l i e r  meaning "a r i g h t  o rd e r  in  a s t a t e  of  
community." Taxis s i g n i f i e s  a made o rd e r ,  th e  r e s u l t s  of  human w i l l .  
Cosmos, or  spontaneous o r d e r ,  i s  a consequence o f  t h e  o rde r ing  fo rce  
o f  human a c t i o n .  Human des ign  r e s u l t s  in t a x i s , o r  made o rd e r .
In human s o c i e t y ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  human des ign  a r i s e s  from th e  be­
l i e f  in the  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  des ign  and c e n t r a l  p lanning  over  
the  spontaneous f o rc e s  in s o c i e t y .  Human a c t i o n ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  empha­
s i z e s  the  undesigned r e s u l t s  o f  in d iv id u a l  a c t i o n  and spontaneous o r ­
de r ;  i t s  exponents  conceive  o f  th e  growth and development o f  purposive 
c u l t u r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as th e  r e s u l t  o f  the  combined e f f e c t s  of  i n d i v i ­
dual a c t i o n ,  w i thou t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a des ign ing  and d i r e c t i n g  mind 
(Hayek, 1969, pp. 96-105).  Because human a c t io n  i s  the  cumulation of 
s e p a ra te  responses  to  the  p a r t i c u l a r  c i rcumstances  t h a t  a c t  on th e  i n ­
d iv id u a l s  composing th e  c u l t u r a l  e n t i t y ,  an o rd e r  g r ad u a l ly  emerges 
t h a t  i s  " p o ly c e n t r i c "  (Hayek, 1973, pp. 35-54) .  The r e s u l t i n g  o rde r  
i s  a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in  which th e  r e s u l t a n t  lega l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  pro­
duced through g ra d u a l ,  piecemeal change in the  law, r a t h e r  than  by sys-
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tem a t ic  des ign  and c e n t r a l  planning over a l a r g e  a r e a .  In o t h e r  words, 
th e  o rde r ing  process  in th e  vein  of  human a c t io n  recognizes  t h a t  "only 
a m in o r i ty  o f  so c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a re  co n sc io u s ly  designed whi le  the  
v a s t  m a jo r i t y  have j u s t  'grown' as the  undesigned r e s u l t s  o f  human ac ­
t io n "  (Popper,  1957, p. 65) .
Although n a tu re  e v o lv es ,  i t s  law emerges, and t h i s  emergence, as 
a p ro c e s s ,  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  d iscove ry  by man, no t  c r e a t i o n  by man. The 
process  by which Natural  Law i s  d iscovered  and a r t i c u l a t e d  i s  human 
a c t i o n .  This l o g i c a l l y  open system leaves  man r e c e p t iv e  to  those  En- 
gendering Experiences  by which th e  d iscove ry  of  Natural  Law p r i n c i p l e s  
occu rs .  This i s  a lo g i c a l  consequence of  the  u n iv e r sa l  human e x p e r i ­
ence of  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the  t im e le s s  while  e x i s t i n g  in  time.  The sym­
bols  t h a t  embrace Natural  Law p r i n c i p l e s  thus  "express  man's c o n sc io u s ­
ness o f  e x i s t i n g  in t e n s io n  toward the  d iv in e  ground o f  h is  e x i s te n c e "  
(Voegelin ,  1967, p. 271).  T h e re fo re ,  th e  idea  o f  exper iences  t h a t  en­
gender man's unders tand ing  o f  t r u e  o rd e r  d e r iv e s  from th e  very na tu re  
of  man's e x i s t e n c e .
Exis tence  has th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  In-Between, o f  the  
P la to n ic  metaxy, and i f  anyth ing  i s  c o n s ta n t  in the 
h i s t o r y  o f  mankind, i t  i s  the  language o f  t e n s io n  be­
tween l i f e  and d e a th ,  m o r t a l i t y  and im m o r ta l i ty ,  p e r ­
f e c t i o n  and im p e r f e c t io n ,  t ime and t i m e l e s s n e s s ,  be-
There e x i s t s  no b a s i s  f o r  exchange o f  r a t i o n a l  argument where 
t h e r e  i s  a profound d i f f e r e n c e  o f  a t t i t u d e  concerning fundamental 
q u es t io n s  o f  human e x i s t e n c e ,  such as th e  n a tu r e  of  man, h i s  p lace  in 
th e  world,  h i s  p lace  in  s o c i e ty  and h i s t o r y ,  and h i s  r e l a t i o n  to  God. 
"The un iv e rse  of  r a t i o n a l  d i s c o u r s e  c o l l a p s e s  . . . when the  common 
ground o f  e x i s t e n c e  in  r e a l i t y  has d isappeared"  (Voegel in ,  1967, p. 
143).
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tween o rd e r  and d i s o r d e r ,  t r u t h  and u n t r u t h ,  sense 
and s e n s e l e s s n e s s  o f  e x i s t e n c e ;  . . . between the  
v i r t u e s  of  openess toward the  ground of  being such 
as f a i t h ,  hope, and love and the  v ices  of  unfo ld ing  
c lo su re  such as hybr is  and r e v o l t ;  . . . between 
a l i e n a t i o n  in  i t s  double meaning of  a l i e n a t i o n  
from th e  world and a l i e n a t i o n  from God. I f  we s p l i t  
t h e se  p a i r s  o f  symbols,  and h y p o s ta t i z e  the  poles  
o f  the  t e n s io n  as independent  e n t i t i e s ,  we d es t ro y  
th e  r e a l i t y  o f  e x i s t e n c e  as i t  has been exper ienced  
by the  c r e a t o r s  of  th e  t e n s io n a l  symbolisms; we lo se  
consc iousness  and i n t e l l e c t ;  we deform our humanity 
and reduce o u r se lv e s  . . .  In the  language o f  Hera­
c l i t u s  and P la to :  Dream l i f e  usurps the  p lace  of
wake l i f e .  (Voegel in ,  1970, p. 220)
The exper iences  o f  e x i s t e n c e  and the  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  they-engender  
a re  the  subs tance  of  o r d e r  in  th e  in d iv id u a l  soul'*' and of  t r u e  o rd e r  
in s o c i e ty .  They provide  the  b a s i s  o f  cosmos and the  reason under ly ing  
human a c t i o n .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  spontaneous o rd e r  can be i n t u i t i v e l y  
perceived  by e x p e r ien ce ;  and not be ing a t h i n g ,  i t  cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y  
be sa id  to  have a purpose dependent upon man's w i l l  (Hayek, 1973, pp. 
36-52: Popper,  1957, pp. 64-70; A rendt ,  1978). The s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  
man's r e l a t i o n  to  the  r u l e s  of  conduct de r ived  from the  exper iences  
o f  Natural Law may be d esc r ib e d  as fo l low s :  In a so c ia l  o rd e r ,  the
p a r t i c u l a r  c i rcum stances  to  which each in d iv id u a l  w i l l  r e a c t s  w i l l  be 
those  known to  him. These in d iv id u a l  responses  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  circum­
s tanc es  w i l l ,  however,  r e s u l t  in an o v e ra l l  o rd e r  only i f  i n d iv id u a l s  
obey such ru le s  as w i l l  produce an o rd e r  (Hayek, 1973, p. 44) .
"Soul" i s  used here  in the  r e a l i s t ,  r a t h e r  than e i t h e r  th e  mate r ­
i a l i s t  o r  i d e a l i s t ,  metaphysica l  p o s i t i o n .  Such a choice  has the  advan­
tage  o f  making th e  l e a s t  sweeping assumption;  the  r e a l i s t  i s  not  r eq u i red  
to  a f f i rm  the  absence of  e i t h e r  s p i r i t  o r  m a t t e r .
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I f  they  obey o t h e r  r u le s  o r  i f  th e  r u le s  a r e  fo rce a b ly  imposed, 
then  a p o s i t i v i s t i c  s t a t e  of  man's r e l a t i o n  to  h is  fe l low  man e x i s t s .  
The r u le s  der ived  from man's exper ience  o f  the  Beyond a r i s e  from ob­
se rv ing  the  d u t i e s  due to o th e r s  as a consequence o f  p re se rv in g  r i g h t  
o rd e r .  Legal r u le s  a r e  p e r f e c t  in  p ro p o r t io n  as they conform to  the  
Natural Law. Without the  exper ience  and e x p e c ta t io n  o f  the  Natural 
Law, lega l  r u le s  a re  only b l in d  express ions  o f  e x a l t e d  reason and un­
e n l ig h ten ed  wordly expe r ience .  A f t e r  a l l ,  can man make lawful t h a t  
which i s  c o n t r a ry  to  th e  exper ience  of  Natural Law? Can man make t h a t  
unlawful which was once lawful or  i n d i f f e r e n t ?  In t n a t  e v e n t ,  law and 
t r u t h  would be in te rc h a n g e a b le  and r e p la c e a b le  a t  th e  w i l l  o f  th e  i n d i ­
vidual  o r  the  r u l i n g  power, with  a corresponding  lo s s  of  u n i v e r s a l i t y  
of  lega l  r u le s  and a red u c t io n  in th e  s t a t u s  of  t r u e  o rd e r  among men 
in s o c ie ty .
L ib e r ty  Defined
Liberty'*' i s  a c o n d i t io n  in which a l l  a re  allowed to use t h e i r  
knowledge f o r  t h e i r  pu rposes ,  r e s t r a i n e d  only by r u le s  of  j u s t  conduct  
of  u n ive rsa l  a p p l i c a t i o n  (Hayek, 1960). L ib e r ty  e x i s t s  l a r g e l y  as the  
product o f  a p r e v a i l i n g  r e s p e c t  f o r  the  fundamental p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Nat­
ura l  Law. The co n d i t io n  of  l i b e r t y  "can be preserved  only by fo l lowing  
p r in c ip l e s  and i s  des t royed  by fo l low ing  expedience" (Hayek, 1973, p. 
56).  L ib e r ty ,  t h u s ,  r e s t s  upon th e  idea  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a r b i t r a r y ,
As with  Hayek, I use the  words 1i b e r t y  and freedom in te rc h a n g e ­
ab ly .  To Hayek, t h e r e  appears  to  e x i s t  no a c ce p tab le  d i s t i n c t i o n  as to  
meaning between them (1960, pp. 11, 421 n. 1) .
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e t e r n a l  s tanda rd  f o r  de te rm in ing  which human a c t io n s  a r e  j u s t  and,
a c c o rd in g ly ,  b e n e f i c i a l  to  s o c i e ty  and which a r e  not  (Mises,  1966;
1969).
L ib e r ty  o r  freedom i s  n o t ,  as the  o r ig i n  of  th e  name 
may seem to  imply, an exemption from a l l  r e s t r a i n t ,  
bu t  r a t h e r  th e  most e f f e c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  every
j u s t  r e s t r a i n t  to  a l l  members o f  a f r e e  s t a t e ,
whether  they  be m a g i s t r a t e s  o r  s u b j e c t s .
I t  i s  under  j u s t  r e s t r a i n t s  only t h a t  every person 
i s  s a f e ,  and cannot  be invaded,  e i t h e r  in  the  f r e e ­
dom o f  h is  person ,  h is  p r o p e r ty ,  o r  innocen t  ac t io n  
. . . The e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a j u s t  and e f f e c t u a l  gov­
ernment i s  o f  a l l  c i rcum stances  in  c i v i l  s o c i e ty  the  
most e s s e n t i a l  to  freedom; t h a t  everyone i s  j u s t l y  
s a id  to  be f r e e  in p ropor t ion  as th e  government under 
which he r e s i d e s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  powerful to  p r o t e c t  
him, a t  t h e  same time t h a t  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e ­
s t r a i n e d  and l im i t e d  to  p reven t  t h e  abuse of  t h i s  
power (Ferguson,  1792, v. 2,  p.  258).
L i b e r t y ,  t h u s ,  p r e v a i l s  only i f  i t  i s  accep ted  as a general  p r i n c i p l e  
whose a p p l i c a t i o n  to  p a r t i c u l a r  in s t a n c e s  r e q u i r e s  no l e g i s l a t i v e  j u s t ­
i f i c a t i o n .  Even so ,  enforced  r u le s  of  conduct  r e s t r a i n i n g  undue i n t e r ­
f e re n c e  with  the  general  co n d i t io n  o f  l i b e r t y  may be necessa ry .
Two Sources  of  Order 
The two o rd e r in g  fo rc e s  of  c i v i l  s o c i e ty  a re  human a c t i o n ,  ground­
ed in ex p e r ie n c e ,  and human d e s ig n ,  based on w i l l  f u l l  ness .  These two 
sources  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  in d i f f e r e n t  concept ions  of  th e  r e l a t i o n  between 
law and l i b e r t y .  One h i s t o r i c  t re n d  involves  those  who m ain ta in  t h a t  
law and l i b e r t y  a re  i n s e p a ra b l e ;  from th e  a n c i e n t  Greeks and C icero ,  
to  such c l a s s i c a l  l i b e r a l s  as John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant,  
and th e  S c o t t i s h  moral p h i lo so p h e r s ,  down to  v a r ious  American s t a t e s ­
men of  t h e  n in e t e e n th  and tw e n t i e th  c e n t u r i e s ,  f o r  whom law and l i b e r t y
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could not  e x i s t  a p a r t  from each o th e r .  The o t h e r  p o s i t i o n  views law 
and l i b e r t y  as i r r e c o n c i l a b l e :  Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, many 
French t h i n k e r s ,  and th e  modern lega l  p o s i t i v i s t s  to  a l l  o f  whom law 
of  n e c e s s i t y  means an encroachment on freedom (Hayek, 1973).
Human Action
"We a s c r i b e  to  a prev ious  d e s ig n ,  what came to  be known only by 
ex p e r ie n c e ,  what no human wisdom could f o r e s e e ,  and what ,  w i thou t  the  
concurr ing  humour and d i s p o s i t i o n  of  h is  age ,  no a u t h o r i t y  could en­
ab le  an in d iv id u a l  to  execute"  (Ferguson,  1767, pp. 187-188).  The 
r i s e  o f  th e  e v o lu t io n a ry  approach to  reason as th e  b a s i s  o f  c i v i l  s o c i ­
e ty  grew in  p a r t  ou t  o f  an e i t h t e e n t h  cen tu ry  r e a c t i o n  to  c o n s t r u c t i v ­
i s t  r a t i o n a l i s m .  Among the  e a r l i e s t  to  a r t i c u l a t e  the  p o s i t i o n  of  hu­
man a c t io n  were Bernard Mandeville  and David Hume, who were in sp i r e d  
more by the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  the  Engl ish  Common Law than  by the  law o f  na­
t u r e .  They contend t h a t  the  fo rmat ion  o f  r e g u l a r  p a t t e r n s  in human r e ­
l a t i o n s  a re  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  or  commonly the  consequence of  the  conscious  
aim of  human a c t io n .  This  view was advanced and r e f in e d  dur ing  the  
l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  the  e ig h t e e n th  cen tu ry  by the  S c o t t i s h  moral p h i lo s o ­
phers ,  inc lu d in g  Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson (Campbell,  1967). I t  i s  
Ferguson (1767, p. 187),  perhaps ,  who enunc ia ted  the  e v o lu t io n a ry  approach 
to human reason in i t s  c l e a r e s t  and most s u c c i n c t  form: "Nat ions  stum­
b le  upon e s t a b l i s h m e n t s ,  which a r e  indeed th e  r e s u l t  o f  human a c t i o n ,
but  not  the  execu t ion  o f  any human des ig n ."
Under th e  premise o f  human a c t i o n ,  o rd e r  in human a f f a i r s  i s  the  
unforeseen r e s u l t  o f  in d iv id u a l  d e c i s io n s .  Such a view i s  grounded in
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th e  r e c o g n i t io n  of  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  man's knowledge, 
the  f a c t  t h a t  he cannot  know more than a small p a r t  o f  th e  whole so­
c i e t y  and t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a l l  t h a t  can e n t e r  i n t o  h is  motives a re  the  
immediate e f f e c t s  t h a t  h is  a c t i o n s  w i l l  have in th e  sphere  of  h is  im­
mediate  int imacy (Hayek, 1978, pp. 3-34 ;  Popper,  1957). From t h i s  
awareness o f  the  l i m i t a t i o n s  on in d iv id u a l  knowledge and from the  f a c t  
t h a t  no person o r  small group o f  persons can know a l l  t h a t  i s  known to  
somebody, th e  phi losophy o f  human a c t io n  d e r iv e s  i t s  primary p r a c t i c a l  
c o n c lu s io n ,  i t s  demand f o r  a s t r i c t  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  a l l  c o e rc iv e  o r  ex­
c l u s i v e  power. This demand, o f  co u r se ,  d r iv e s  s t r a i g h t  to  the  core o f  
th e  r e l a t i o n  between law and l i b e r t y .  Man must have r u le s  r e f e r r i n g  
to  ty p ic a l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  de f ined  in terms o f  what can be known to  the  
a c t i n g  persons and w i th o u t  regard  to  the  presumed d i s t a n t  e f f e c t s  in 
the  p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n c e ,  r u le s  t h a t ,  i f  they  a re  r e g u l a r l y  observed ,  
w i l l  in th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  cases  o p e ra te  b e n e f i c i a l l y  (Hayek, 1973). The 
emergence o f  so c ia l  o rd e r  depends on the  general  accep tance  o f  p r i n c i ­
p les  of  u n iv e rsa l  v a l i d i t y ;  t h a t  i s ,  a good s o c i e ty  depends on good 
w i l l  among the  den izens .  These p r i n c i p l e s ,  in  th e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t ,  
a r e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  ru le s  t h a t  p reven t  c la sh e s  between c o n f l i c t i n g  aims 
and not  a s e t  o f  f ix e d  ends. Men d i sco v e r  them through th e  exper ience  
t h a t  engenders an unders tand ing  of  the  Natural  Law'*'. Because s o c ie ty
■''Natural Law, when c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  a r e  used ,  approximates th e  med­
ieval  o r  s c h o l a s t i c  employment of  t h e  term. I have used small l e t t e r s  
to  i n d i c a t e  n a tu ra l  law in  th e  c l a s s i c a l  sense  (Bodenheimer, 1974). 
Although no t  a complete break with e a r l i e r  concep t ions  o f  Natural  Law, 
na tu ra l  law as developed dur ing the  seven teen th  and e ig h te e n th  c e n t u r i e s  
does process  c e r t a i n  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  q u a l i t i e s :  1) a s e p a ra t i o n  of  law 
from theo logy ;  2) an e l a b o r a t io n  of  d e t a i l e d  r u le s  b e l i ev ed  to  be d i r e c t ­
ly  deduc ib le  from human reason;  3) an emphasis on n a tu ra l  r i g h t s ;  and,
4) a g e n e ra l ly  em pir ica l  view of  human n a tu re .
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i s  composed o f  men, laws must be accepted and enforced  by men. Rule 
of  law may be th e  b e s t  o r  worst  r u l e  by the  b e s t  o r  worst  men accord­
ing to  the  b e s t  o r  worst  laws determined by th e  b e s t  o r  worst men.
Only in the  presence of Natural Law a r e  c r i t e r i a  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s t i n ­
gu ish ing  t h a t  which i s  b e s t  from t h a t  which i s  wors t  in the  lega l  r e ­
l a t i o n s  o f  men. Thus, through a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natu­
r a l  Law in  th e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  h is  c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  a man adds to  h is  
intramundane exper ience  p receden ts  t h a t  form p a r t  o f  h is  e x p e c ta t io n s  
concerning th e  con t in u in g  o rd e r  o f  a c t i o n s .  "The man who a c t s  accord­
ing to  th e  r u le s  of  p e r f e c t  prudence,  o f  s t r i c t  j u s t i c e ,  and o f  proper  
benevolence,  may be s a id  to  be p e r f e c t l y  v i r tu o u s "  (Smith, 1812, p. 
418).
Such a view o f  o r d e r ,  in t u r n ,  tends  to confirm the  ev o lu t io n  of  
law r u l e s .  This view has been h i s t o r i c a l l y  main ta ined  by Edward Coke, 
Mathew Hale, David Hume, Edmund Burke, F. C. von Savigny, H. S. Maine, 
and J .  C. C a r t e r ,  to  name but  a few of  the  d o c t r in a l  w r i t e r s  on the 
s u b je c t .  The under ly ing  p r i n c i p l e  o f  law, a r i s i n g  g rad u a l ly  from cus­
tom and p reced en t ,  i s  t h a t  the  law c o n s i s t s  of  purpose- independent  
r u le s  t h a t  govern the  conduct of  i n d iv id u a l s  towards each o th e r .  Fur­
t h e r ,  those  law r u le s  w i l l  apply to  an unknown number o f  f u tu r e  i n s t a n ­
ces and, by d e f in in g  a p r o te c te d  domain o f  each ,  w i l l  enable  an o rd e r  
o f  a c t i o n s  to  form i t s e l f  wherein the  i n d iv id u a l s  can make f e a s i b l e  
p lans  (Hayek, 1973, pp. 8 -3 4 ) .  Although grown law may r e q u i r e  c o r r e c ­
t i o n  by l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  r u le s  have evolved through man's exper ience  
of  e x i s t e n c e .  In t h a t  way, t r a n sc e n d e n t  o rde r  from Beyond becomes im­
manent. Thus moves th e  course  of  o b l ig a t io n  (Voegelin ,  1939; my t r a n s -
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l a t i o n ) :
J u s t  as the  c o n t r a c t s  and te s tam en ts  o f  the  s u b je c t s  
can a l t e r  t h e  ord inances  o f  th e  m a g i s t r a t e ;  as the  
e d i c t s  of  th e  m a g i s t r a t e  can not  a l t e r  those  o f  cus ­
tom; as custom can not a l t e r  the  laws o f  th e  sovere ign  
p r in c e ,  so too a re  the  laws of  the  sovere ign  p r ince  
unable to  a l t e r  the  laws o f  God and of  Nature.
The d e i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  e a r t h l y  r u l i n g  o r d e r ,  i t s  world-immanent formu­
l a t i o n ,  and th e  s imultaneous  d e c a p i t a t i o n  o f  n a tu ra l  o rd e r  by th e  r e ­
moval o f  th e  w o r ld - t r a n sc e n d e n t  God i s  t i e d  up with  a l a r g e  number of  
p r e c o n d i t io n s  m a n i fe s t  in the  o rd e r in g  f o rc e s  o f  human d e s ig n ,  but  not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  with  human a c t i o n .  The fundamental a t t i t u d e  o f  human ac­
t i o n  i s  one of  formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l  h u m i l i ty  toward the  p rocesses  by 
which man has achieved th in g s  t h a t  have been n e i t h e r  des igned nor un­
ders tood  by any i n d i v i d u a l ,  but a re  indeed g r e a t e r  than and beyond 
in d iv id u a l  minds (Hayek, 1948, pp. 1-32).
Human Design
The b e l i e f  in th e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of  d e l i b e r a t e  des ign  and c e n t r a l  
p lanning stems from a form o f  Gnosticism known as c a r t e s i a n  c o n s t r u c t i v  
i s t  r a t i o n a l i s m ,  a p ro p e n s i ty  to  a s c r i b e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of  c u l t u r e  to  
inven t ion  or  design by man's r ea so n ,  r a t h e r  than  to  the  spontaneous f o r  
ces of  c i v i l i t y  (Hayek, 1973, pp. 9 -11 ) .  G nos t ic -c reed  movements a t ­
tempt to  fu se  the  normative a u t h o r i t y  o f  law i n t o  the  a u t h o r i t y  of  pow­
e r  (Voegel in ,  1957). The r e s u l t  i s  an o f te n  p o s i t i v i s t i c  conception 
of  law der ived  f o r  "a f a c t u a l l y  un t rue  anthropomorhic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of  grown i n s t i t u t i o n s  as the  product  of  des ign" (Hayek, 1969, p. 102).  
This a t t i t u d e  leads  to  a view o f  the  r u le  of  law as a r u le  o f  conduct ,  
i n t e r tw in e d  with  ideas  o f  j u s t i c e  and m o r a l i t y ,  t h a t  i s  p r im a r i ly  de-
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termined by the  a c t i v i t y  of  lega l  s c h o la r s  and l e g i s l a t o r s .  The r e ­
s u l t a n t  c i v i l  o rd e r  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  upon laws t h a t  a re  the  f r e e  inven­
t io n s  of  the  des ign ing  mind o f  the  l e g i s l a t o r .  Laws, t h u s ,  d e r iv e  
t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  as ex p ress io n s  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l .  Accord ing ly ,  hu­
man design i d e n t i f i e s  with  the  e x p re ss io n ,  "What man has made, he can 
a l s o  a l t e r  to  s u i t  h i s  d e s i r e s . "  "Any c o n te n t  whatever  can be l e g a l ;  
t h e r e  i s  no human behav io r  which could not  f u n c t io n  as the  co n ten t  of  
a lega l  norm," and "Legal norms may have any kind of con ten t"  c rea ted  
by a l e g i s l a t i o n  (Kelsen,  1935, p. 517).  This c o n te n t io n  i s  only a 
l o g ic a l  r e s u l t  o f  the  view t h a t  "norms p r e s c r i b i n g  human behavior  can 
emanate only from human w i l l ,  not  from human rea so n ,"  grounded in the  
exper ience  o f  t r u e  o rd e r  (Hayek, 1976).
In i t s  most profound form, the  b e l i e f  t h a t  "norms p r e s c r ib in g  hu­
man behavior  can emanate only from human w i l l "  se rves  as the  b a s i s  f o r  
what i s  g e n e ra l ly  termed " lega l  po s i t iv i sm "  (Kelsen,  1967, p. 20) .  The 
modern h i s t o r y  of  lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  embraces the  view t h a t  law i s  a de­
l i b e r a t e  c r e a t i o n  of  human w i l l ,  which i s  th e  very essence  of  human 
des ign .  This view of  law i s  not  w i thou t  h i s t o r i c a l  a n tec ed e n ts .  Thom­
as Hobbes (1588-1679), an English  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo so p h e r ,  d e f in e s  law 
as " the  command of him t h a t  have the  l e g i s l a t i v e  power" (1681, p. 26).  
One of  th e  p r in c ip a l  proponents  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n  d o c t r i n e ,  Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832),  co n s t ru e s  law as e x i s t i n g  in two forms: 1) "Real law, 
r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  law, which i s  l e g i s l a to r -m a d e  law,"  such as modern codes 
in Civi l  Law j u r i s d i c t i o n s  and s t a t u t e s  in Common Law systems,  and 2) 
"The a p p e l l a t i o n  o f  u n r e a l ,  not  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g ,  imaginary ,  f i c t i t i o u s ,  
s p u r io u s ,  judge-made law,"  such as the  common law of  England (1827, p.
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8 ) .  Bentham, in t u r n ,  s t r o n g ly  in f luenced  John Austin  (1790-1859) , an 
English j u r i s t  who founded th e  a n a l y t i c a l  school of  law and who a s s e r t e d ,  
" th e re  can be no law w i th o u t  a l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t "  (1879, p. 555) .  The 
most a r t i c u l a t e  defender  of  lega l  p o s i t i v i s m  is  probably Hans Kelsen 
(1881-1973),  whose "pure theory  of  law" presumes to  view law as a norma­
t i v e  " sc ie n c e , "  in what Popper terms "methodological e s s e n t i a l  ism, 
j[.e.. th e  theory  t h a t  i t  i s  the  aim o f  s c ie n c e  to  reveal  e ssences  and 
to  d e s c r ib e  them by means o f  d e f i n i t i o n s "  (1963, p. 32) .  To Kelsen, 
law i s  a command o f  human behav io r ,  and "order"  i s  but  a system of  
r u l e s .  A f a c tu a l  o rd e r  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of a spontan­
eous o rd e r  of  a c t i o n s .  Order as t a x i s  i s  th e  only o rd e r  acknowledged.
The " so c ia l  o r d e r ,  termed ' l a w 1, t r i e s  to  b r ing  about  a c e r t a i n  behav­
i o r  o f  men, cons ide red  by the  lawmaker as d e s i r a b l e  (1957, p. 289).
By th e  1920s, lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  was so en trenched t h a t  " to  be found 
g u i l t y  of  adherence to  n a tu ra l  law t h e o r i e s  was a kind o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
d i sg race"  (Voegelin ,  1927, p. 269).  Legal p o s i t i v i s m ,  invo lv ing  an 
a s s e r t i o n  of  the  omnipotence of  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l ,  t r a n s l a t e s  as a form 
o f  c o n s t r u c t iv i s m ,  an ideology emerging from th e  d e s i r e  to  a t t a i n  com­
p l e t e  con t ro l  over  the  so c ia l  o r d e r ,  a b e l i e f  t h a t  man can d e l i b e r a t e ­
ly  de termine h is  d e s t i n y .
The under ly ing  phi losophy of  Human Design leads  man to  b e l i e v e  
t h a t ,  by h i s  unaided reason a lo n e ,  he i s  ab le  to  c o n s t r u c t  s o c ie ty  
anew. The lega l  o rd e r  embraced by any p o l i t i c a l  community i s  always 
ar ranged in  r e l a t i o n  to  man's exper ience  of  world and God, one in 
which the  l e g a l - p o l i t i c a l  sphere assumes in the  h ie ra rc h y  o f  Being a 
lower degree of  d iv in e  o rd e r .  The e x i s t e n c e  of  men in a p o l i t i c a l
24
community canno t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be a c c u r a t e ly  def ined  as a profane  sphere 
in which we only have to  deal with q u es t io n s  of  law as p o l i t i c a l  mobil­
i z a t i o n  of f o r c e s .  The community i s  a l so  a realm of  r e l i g i o u s  o rd e r ,  
and the  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  a lega l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i s  incom­
p l e t e  in one d e c i s iv e  p o i n t ,  i f  i t  does not  a l s o  embrace the  r e l i g i o u s  
f o rc e s  o f  th e  community. In V oege l in ' s  a n a l y s i s  (1939):  " I f
a c r e a t u r e  a t t r i b u t e s  something good to  h im se l f - - su c h  as e s s e n t i a l  
n a t u r e ,  l i f e ,  knowledge, r e c o g n i t i o n ,  a b i l i t y ,  in s h o r t ,  a l l  t h a t  t h a t  
one would have to  c a l l  good—as i f  th e  c r e a t u r e  were t h i s  th in g  o r  had 
i t ,  as i f  he belonged to  i t  o r  emanated from i t ,  then the  c r e a t u r e  
goes a s t r a y . "  To g ive  th e  argument B ib l i c a l  form, what e l s e  did the  
Devil do? "What e l s e  was the  Fal l  and r e n u n c ia t io n  fo r  him, o th e r  than 
t h a t  he presumed he too was something,  and claimed to  be Someone and 
to  be h is  Own." This presumption and his  "I" and "Me," his  " to  Me" and 
"My" — t h a t  was h i s  r e n u n c ia t io n  and h is  F a l l .  And so i t  con t inues  to 
be (1939, p. 69; my t r a n s l a t i o n )  .
P o l i t i c a l  C u l tu re  and Rel ig ion  
Yet,  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e s  a re  r e l i g i o u s ,  and each s e t s  one or 
more gods a t  i t s  head. In some, such as most modern t o t a l i t a r i a n  
s t a t e s ,  th e  s t a t e  i t s e l f ,  the  person o f  the  l e a d e r ,  th e  p a r t y ,  o r  the  
presumed purpose of  h i s t o r y  takes  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  a d e i t y .  Each c a se ,  
however, c o n s i s t s  of  an a p o th e s i s  o f  h u b r i s ,  the  overweaning p r id e  
t h a t  c l a s s i c a l  w r i t e r s  oppose to v i r t u e .  The placement o f  a d e i t y  w i th ­
in t h e  world ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  where t h a t  d e i t y  i s  the  s e l f ,  r e s u l t s  in a 
temporal (worldly)  r e l i g i o n .
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Temporal r e l i g i o s i t y ,  t h a t  o f  the  c o l l e c t i v i t y ,  be i t  mankind, 
th e  Volk, th e  c l a s s ,  the  r a c e ,  o r  th e  s t a t e ,  which i s  expressed as 
th e  Realissimum, i s  a f a l l i n g  away from t r u e  o rd e r .  The h u b r i s t i c  
b e l i e f  t h a t  man i s  th e  source o f  good and of  th e  be t te rm e n t  of  the  
world ,  such as dominated the Enlightenment (Voegel in ,  1975), and the  
b e l i e f  in  the  c o l l e c t i v i t y  as a o rd e r in g  fo rc e  i s  a r en u n c ia t io n  of 
t r u e ,  spontaneous o rd e r .
In t h i s  c o n te x t ,  p r i n c i p l e s  of  Natural Law a r e  severed  from t h e i r  
engender ing exper iences  by d o c t r i n i z a t i o n , an immanent render ing  through 
human d i s c o u r s e ,  the  t e x t s  o f  which assume an aura  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  There 
i s ,  however, no In-Between (metaxy) o f  e x i s t e n c e  as a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  
o b j e c t ,  r a t h e r  e x i s t e n c e  exper ienced  as a p a r t  o f  r e a l i t y  t h a t  extends 
beyond the  metaxical  r e l a t i o n .  This  exper ience  o f  the  Beyond, o f  ex­
i s t e n c e  exper ienced ,  t h i s  consc iousness  o f  the  Beyond, which c o n s t i t u t e s  
consc iousness  by reach ing  in to  r e a l i t y ,  i s  th e  area  o f  r e a l i t y  t h a t  be­
comes a r t i c u l a t e d  through th e  symbols of  mythical im ag ina t ion ,  i n c l u ­
ding the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natural Law. The Beyond o f  e x i s t e n c e  becomes 
p r e se n t  in e x i s t e n c e  as Tru th .  The h i s t o r i c a l  drama in the  metaxy, 
then  i s  a u n i ty  through th e  common presence of  the  Beyond in the  men 
who respond to  His "drawing" and to  one an o th e r  (Voegel in ,  1971).
De-formation
The t r u t h  conveyed by the  symbols (and t h e i r  in h e re n t  p r i n c i p l e s )  
becomes th e  source of  r i g h t  o rd e r  in human e x i s t e n c e .  When d o c t r i n a l - 
i z e d ,  however, the  u l t im a te  t en s io n  between a r e a l i t y  engender ing and 
th e  symbols engendered i s  l i a b l e  to d i s s o c i a t e  in to  a p iece  o f  informa-
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t i o n  and i t s  s u b je c t - m a t t e r  (Voegel in ,  1967), a process  c a l l e d  "de­
form at ions"  (Voegel in ,  1979). The a t tem pt  a t  th e  m e d i t a t i v e  recon­
s t r u c t i o n  of  the  engender ing r e a l i t y  through d o c t r i n e  has th e  r e s u l t ,  
o f te n  un in tended ,  of  s ev e r in g  man from the  engender ing ex p e r ien ces .
This l o s t  c o n ta c t  with  the  t r u t h  exper ienced  t h a t  has engendered the  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r i g h t  o rd e r  may, su b seq u en t ly ,  r en d e r  th e  der ived  doc­
t r i n e  s u s c e p t i b l e  to  m an ipu la t ion  by va r ious  i d e o l o g i e s ,  o r  c i v i l  po­
l i t i c a l  r e l i g i o n s  t h a t  appeal to  th e  r e a l i t y ,  not  o f  t r u t h  exper ienced ,  
but  o f  th e  world (Voegel in ,  1967a).  D o c t r in e ,  empty o f  i t s  engender­
ing e x p e r ien c e ,  t ransfo rm s  the  a p o c a ly p t i c  i n t o  the  id e o lo g ic a l  m i l l e n -  
ium and th e  e s c h a to lo g ic a l  m e t a s t a s i s  through a c t io n  from the  Beyond 
in to  the  world-immanent m e t a s t a s i s  through human w i l l  (Voegelin ,  1967a).
The process  o f  de - fo rm at ion  l i e s  a t  the  base of  the  "perennia l  
heresy" o f  u topianism (Molnar,  1972). The d e ra i lm e n t  of  t r u e  o rd e r  
through d o c t r i n a l i z a t i o n  in to  v a r ious  Gnostic  d e p a r t u r e s ,  such as s c i ­
en t ism ,  h i s t o r i c i s m ,  and p o s i t i v i s m ,  i s  a t  the  r o o t  o f  the s p e c u la t iv e  
systems of  the  Comtean, C a r t e s i a n ,  Hege l ian ,  and Marxian type (Popper,  
1957; Voegelin ,  1948, 1968, 1975; Hayek, 1955, 1960). These a re  a l l  
de - fo rm at ions  o f  th e  l i f e  o f  reason through the  magic p r a c t i c e  o f  s e l f -  
d i v i n i z a t i o n  and s e l f - s a l v a t i o n  (Voegel in ,  1971). The process  o f  de­
ra i lm en t  i n to  Gnostic ism i s  d o c t r i n a l i z a t i o n ,  o r  s t a t e d  in ano ther  
term, Human Design. Natural  Law i s  f i r s t  reduced to  a s e t  of  p r i n c i ­
p l e s .  Then, th e  s e t  becomes something t h a t  can be manipula ted as an 
" o th e r" .  This i s  d e - fo rm a t io n ,  and i t  i s  f a l l a c i o u s  because man the  
s c h o la r  cannot  in f a c t  ge t  o u t s id e  th e  s e t ,  no m a t t e r  how s o p h i s t i c a t ­
ed h is  models,  t h e o r i e s ,  o r  methods.
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Engendering Experience Severed
In i t s  legal  a s p e c t ,  engendering exper ience  i s  the  exper ience  in 
r e a l i t y  o f  t r u t h  t h a t  may be a r t i c u l a t e d  as r u le s  o f  r i g h t  o rd e r .
These ru le s  may then be l e g i t im a te d  as e i t h e r  customary or  p o s i t i v e  
law, accord ing  to  the  p r e v a i l i n g  lega l  philosophy of  e i t h e r  human a c ­
t io n  o r  human des ign .  Under the  philosophy o f  human d e s ig n ,  o rd e r in g  
p r i n c i p l e s  have been severed  from t h e i r  engender ing exper ience  and pro­
duce mere ru le s  t h a t  have no l e g i t i m a t e  b a s i s  beyond being a r b i t r a r i ­
ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  sovere ign  a u t h o r i t y ,  however, much he may sub­
s c r i b e  to  Natural Law as h is  personal  b e ! i e f . In perhaps th e  p u re s t  
form of  Human Design, law becomes d o c t r i n a l i z e d  through the  p r a c t i c e  
of  lega l  p o s i t i v i s m ;  t h a t  i s ,  u l t i m a t e l y  as law p re sc r ib ed  in th e  s e r ­
v ice  o f  a t r iumphant  ideology (Kuehnelt-Leddihn,  1974, p. 428).
The problems of  lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  have been adequa te ly  d iscussed  
e lsewhere ;  s u f f i c e  here to  say t h a t  i t  r e s u l t s  in lega l  o rd e r  t h a t  
takes  what passes  f o r  a pure ly  em pir ica l  a t t i t u d e  toward the  law and 
m ain ta ins  a d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  to  search  f o r ,  o r  even to  p o s t u l a t e ,  u l t i ­
mate values  in the  lega l  o rd e r  (Bodenheimer, 1974; Hayek, 1960, 1973, 
1976; Voegelin ,  1957). Perhaps,  l i k e  M i l to n ' s  L u c i f e r ,  the  p o s i t i v i s t  
b e l i ev e s  t h a t  i t  i s  b e t t e r  " to  re ign  in h e l l ,  than se rve  in heaven".  
Because lega l  p o s i t i v i s t s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i s  the  l e g i s l a t o r  t h a t  de­
te rmines  th e  c o n ten t  o f  the  law, lega l  r u le s  a re  severed from the  r e ­
s t r a i n t  of  Natural  Law c r i t e r i a  f o r  what i s  r i g h t  o r  wrong. Law as a 
product  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l  i s  not  l im i t e d  by concept ions  of j u s t i c e
^Wil1 i s  used in th e  c o n tex t  o f  Hayek's employment of  the  term to  
denote  " d e l i b e r a t e  design" o r  "designing  reason" .  Such render ing  of  
meaning i s  not  a l t o g e t h e r  incom pat ib le  with  A ren d t ' s  exp lana t ion  (1978, 
p. 205).
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and p i e ty  (see  Weaver, 1948, pp. 170-87).  The c o n ten t io n  i s  t h a t  the  
lawgiver  i s  the  c r e a t o r  o f  j u s t i c e .  As th e  p o s i t i v i s t  Kelson a s s e r t s ,  
a wrong of  the  S t a t e  must under a l l  c i rcumstances  be a c o n t r a d i c t io n  
in terms.  From Hobbe's "No law can be u n ju s t "  (1651, p t .  1,  ch. 13) 
to  Kelson 's  " J u s t  i s  only  a n o th e r  word f o r  lega l  o r  l e g i t i m a t e "  (1934, 
p. 482) ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  no c r i t e r i a  o f  j u s t i c e  in de termin ing  law r u l e s .  
Legal p o s i t iv i s m  succeeds in s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  th e  Natural Law p h i l o s ­
ophy t h a t  main ta ined  t r u e  c u l t u r a l  o r d e r ,  an ideology t h a t  p o s tu l a t e s  
a l l  o rd e rs  a r e  r e s u l t s  of  human des ign .
To the  p o s i t i v i s t ,  Natural Law must be e i t h e r  th e  des ign  o f  a 
super-human i n t e l l i g e n c e  o r  a d iscove ry  through expe r ience ,  a process  
o f  ev o lu t io n  and n a tu ra l  s e l e c t i o n .  At any r a t e ,  i t  i s  a process  not 
wholly dependent  upon any r a t i o n a l  human d es ign ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  be r e ­
j e c t e d .  "Natural Law i s — in th e  l a s t  a n a l y s i s —d iv in e  law because 
i t s  n a tu r e  i s  supposed to  c r e a t e  law i t  must have a w i l l  and the  w i l l  
can only be th e  w i l l  o f  God which m a n i fe s t s  i t s e l f  in the  n a tu r e  c r e ­
a ted  by Him" (Kelson, 1966, p. 2 ) .  This s e c u l a r ,  r a t i o n a l i s t  view o f  
Natural Law, devoid o f  such ideas  as " r e v e l a t io n "  and "engendering 
e x p e r ie n c es" ,  p repares  the  way f o r  lega l  c o n s t ru c t iv i sm  in i t s  p u re s t  
form.. At the  advent o f  p o s i t i v i s m ,  t h e r e  was a de-form at ion  o f  Nat­
ura l  Law. Law, w i th o u t  Natural  Law, as  de f ined  by th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  
has u n fo r tu n a te  consequences.  Even Kelson had to  admit ,  "From the  
p o in t  o f  view o f  t h e  s c ie n ce  o f  law, th e  law under the  Nazi-govern-  
ment was law. We may r e g r e t  i t ,  but  we cannot deny t h a t  i t  was law" 
(1963, p. 148).
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A Blurred  Dichotomy 
I t  becomes p o s s i b l e ,  in  any c a s e ,  to  c l a s s i f y  a l l  o f  the  w o r ld ' s  
lega l  c u l t u r e s  in to  two main s p e c i e s ,  with two o r  t h r e e  small r e s i d u ­
al s p e c ie s .  The bases f o r  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  inc lude  the  manner of 
handl ing h u b r i s ,  th e  formal s t a t u s  of  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the  s tand ing  in 
law o f  custom, th e  r o l e  o f  d o c t r i n e ,  and the  r e l a t i v e  s t a t u s  o f  the  
judge.  I t  must be remembered, however,  t h a t  a l l  modern lega l  systems 
a re  today i n f e c t e d  with  th e  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  design o f  l ega l  p o s i t i v ­
ism (Merryman, 1969). So, to o ,  does human a c t io n  su rv iv e  in most l e ­
gal systems through th e  su rv iv a l  o f  custom, o f  what i s  c a l l e d  "super-  
emminent p r i n c i p l e s "  (David,  1972), and i n a b i l i t y  of  the  s t a t e  f u l l y  
to  impose i t s  w i l l .  We canno t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c l a s s i f y  lega l  c u l t u r e s  
purely  on a b a s i s  o f  t h e  dichotomy between the  competing ph i lo so p h ie s  
o f  a c t i o n  and des ign .  The spectrum i s  not  one o f  b lack  and w h i te ,  
but  varying shades o f  grey.  N e v e r th e le s s ,  the  degree to  which the  
spontaneous o rd e r  o f  Human Design i s  dominant a t  the  time o f  recep­
t i o n ,  se rves  as a c r u c i a l  b a s i s  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c e r t a i n  f a m i l i e s  
o f  lega l  systems.
CHAPTER II
GEOGRAPHICAL CLASSIFICATION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
So speak y e ,  and so do, as they t h a t  sh a l l  
be judged by th e  law o f  l i b e r t y .
—James 2 :12.
For the  purposes o f  s c h o la r l y  exchange and general su rv ey s ,  we 
need a s y s te m a t ic  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  v a r ious  l ega l  systems o f  th e  
world.  This  need has prompted a number o f  a t tem pts  a t  o rde r ing  lega l  
systems in to  va r ious  groups and f a m i l i e s .  Any such a t tem pt  i s  i n ­
h e re n t ly  im p e r fe c t ,  however, and should "be cons ide red  merely as a 
p ro v is io n a l  means o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  and comparison o f  ex­
i s t i n g  lega l  systems" (Malmstrom, 1969). Each e f f o r t  o f  o rgan iz ing  
th e  w o r ld ' s  lega l  systems i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i f  i t  i s  accompli­
shes i t s  purpose.  Where t h a t  purpose i s  to  p repare  a lega l  map o f  
th e  w or ld ,  more than  one o f  the  p o s s ib le  schemes may be of  equal v a l ­
ue (Wigmore, 1929). Where th e  purpose i s  to  map th e  g e o p o l i t i c a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  lega l  systems,  to  determine th e  global p a t t e r n s  of  
lega l  systems,  o r  to  s tudy the  process  of  lega l  r e c e p t io n  and c u l t u ­
ra l  d i f f u s i o n  through law, va r ious  geographic  a f f i n i t i e s  and i n f l u ­
ences ,  as well  as th e  s t r i c t l y  lega l  c r i t e r i a ,  must be taken in to  
c o n s id e ra t i o n .
Systems o f  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
For our  purposes ,  lega l  system denotes  the  dominant lega l  s t y l e  
in n a t io n a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  Concern i s  wi th  th e  p r i v a t e  law t h a t  gov­
erns  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between in d iv id u a l s  and between i n d iv id u a l s
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and s t a t e  ( e x c lu s iv e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  law).  Because c o n s t i t u t i o n ­
al law develops independen t ly ,  i t  w i l l  not  be cons ide red  in de te rm in ­
ing th e  s t l y e  o f  l e g a l  systems.  Throughout t h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  I have 
c a p i t a l i z e d  th e  f i r s t  l e t t e r  o f  terms d e s ig n a t in g  lega l  systems ( f o r  
example, Common Law), and I have l e f t  not  c a p i t a l i z e d  the  terms f o r  
s u b s t a n t i v e  law o r  lega l  d o c t r in e s  ( f o r  example, common law when 
used as a body o f  case  law der ived  from a n c i e n t  usages  and cus toms).
Legal C u l tu re s  and Legal Systems 
Legal sys tems,  o r  leg a l  s t y l e s ,  embrace v a r ious  r u l e s ,  p r i n c i ­
p l e s ,  and procedures  from d i f f e r e n t  so u rces .  When d i s c u s s in g  lega l  
systems,  t h r e e  c r u c i a l  id eas  must be kept  in mind. To compare and 
group lega l  systems,  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  organized  in terms o f  the  p r e ­
v a i l i n g  n a t io n a l  sys tem s,  each co n ta in in g  in va r ious  degrees  elements  
of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and s u p ra n a t io n a l  law. Almost every lega l  system 
c o n s i s t s  of  seve ra l  l a y e r s  of  laws,  each l a y e r  being a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  
a d i f f e r e n t  per iod  o f  i t s  h i s t o r y .  These l a y e r s  may be the  products  
o f  an ev o lu t io n  t h a t  r e s u l t s  in s u ccess iv e  s t r a t a  o f  lega l  a c c r e t i o n  
o r  th e  outcome o f  v i o l e n t  upheaval ,  such as r e v o l u t i o n ,  conques t ,  o r  
massive immigrat ion;  and v i r t u a l l y  a l l  l ega l  systems a r e  hybrid  in 
t h a t  t h e i r  fo rm u la to rs  have borrowed from o th e r  lega l  systems (S ch le s -  
i n g e r ,  1970, p. 253) .  For example, the  lega l  systems o f  developing 
c o u n t r ie s  in  Asia and A f r ic a  a r e  so e c l e c t i c  t h a t  they  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  
to  c l a s s i f y  on th e  b a s i s  o f  s t y l e  o r  h i s t o r i c a l  development.  When 
lega l  systems blend with  v a r ious  bodies  of  s u b s t a n t iv e  law r u l e s ,  
d i f f e r i n g  blends  and composi tes  emerge, such as Anglo-Is lam ic  law or
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Civi l  Law with  submerged Is lam ic  Law; th e se  ac tua l  blends a r e  c a l l e d  
" legal  c u l t u r e s . "  (Note t h a t  in a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  c o n te x t ,  the  
term " lega l  c u l tu r e "  im pl ies  those  a sp e c t s  of  a c u l t u r e  which gives  
r i s e  to  a lega l  sys tem .)  These severa l  and va r ious  le g a l  c u l t u r e s  
provide the  subs tance  o f  n a t io n a l  systems o f  law, which in tu rn  com­
pose the  d i f f e r e n t  f a m i l i e s  o f  lega l  systems.  For example, Anglo- 
I s lamic  law and Anglo-Hindu law a re  both lega l  c u l t u r e s  embracing 
the  Engl ish  Common Law system and embraced w i th in  the  Angl ican 
Common Law family  o f  l e g a l  systems.
E a r l i e r  Attempts a t  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
In a Panorama o f  th e  World's  Legal Systems, John H. Wigmore, 
p r o fe s so r  o f  law a t  Northwestern U n iv e r s i t y ,  t r a c e d  some s ix t e e n  l e ­
gal systems in the  w o r ld ' s  h i s t o r y  (1928). Of th e se  s i x t e e n ,  e ig h t  
had d isappeared  ( th e  Egypt ian ,  Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, 
C e l t i c ,  Mari t ime,  and Canon Law sys tem s) .  The remaining e i g h t  were 
determined to  be s u rv iv in g  as l a t e  as the  e a r l y  tw e n t i e th  cen tury  
( the  Chinese, Hindu, Japanese ,  Germanic, S l a v i c ,  Mohammedan, Romanes­
que, A ngl ican) .  The p a r t i c u l a r  importance of  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
scheme i s  t h a t  i t  d e l i n e a t e s  lega l  c u l t u r e s ,  r a t h e r  than  lega l  sys-  
tems per  s e .
Wigmore, f o r  mapping purposes ,  a l so  provides  a scheme f o r  the  
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  of  v a r io u s  mixtures  of laws. The f i r s t  o f  fo u r  types  
o f  mixture  i s  t h a t  of  the  "pure" systems,  such as England o r  France. 
The second c l a s s  o f  systems a re  the  "n a t io n a l  b le n d s , "  where a peo­
ple  having a n a t iv e  system adopted in some degree o r  manner an a l i e n
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system, o f te n  by r e c a s t i n g  i t s  n a t iv e  system in a l i e n  c a t e g o r i e s ,  
thus  developing a s i n g l e  blended system under n a t iv e  s o v e re ig n ty ,  
such as J a p a n 's  use o f  th e  Civ i l  Law to  g ive  p o s i t i v e  exp ress ion  o f  
Japanese  customary p r a c t i c e .  In a b lend ,  va r ious  i n s t i t u t i o n s  from 
two systems t h a t  a re  combined in to  a s in g l e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  under 
na t io n a l  a u t h o r i t y .  Wigmore's t h i r d  type o f  mixture  was t h a t  o f  the 
"co lon ia l  composi tes" where an a l i e n  power holding fo re ig n  t e r r i t o r y ,  
imposes i t s  own lega l  system, bu t  al lows the  p r i v a t e  law of  the  na­
t i v e s  to  p e r s i s t ,  in whole o r  in p a r t .  Examples in c lu d e  Malaysia 
and A lg e r i a .  The f i n a l  type i s  t h a t  o f  the  "co lo n ia l  duplex compos­
i t e s "  where an a l i e n  power imposes i t s  own system, but con t inues  to 
enforce  two o r  more n a t iv e  systems f o r  s e p a ra te  c l a s s e s  o f  n a t i v e s .  
Ind ia  i s  th e  only country  p laced in t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (Wigmore, 
1929). The b a s ic  weakness o f  Wigmore's system of  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  i t  i s  based on l a r g e l y  inadequa te  so c ia l  and h i s t o r i c a l  c r i ­
t e r i a .  However, i t  i s  im por tan t  f o r  th e  same reason ;  i . e . ,  th e  un­
d e r ly in g  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n s  r e f l e c t e d  in the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  law.
Another  major e f f o r t  a t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  l eg a l  systems was t h a t  
of  Konrad Zweiger t ,  a German comparat ive law s c h o la r .  Zweigert (1961) 
a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  th eo ry  o f  lega l  f a m i l i e s  i s  s u b je c t  to  the  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t  th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f  a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  only r e l a t i v e  and r e s t r i c ­
ted  to  a given s u b je c t  m a t t e r .  Zweigert  (1961, p. 46 ) ,  t h u s ,  proposes 
th e  no t ion  of  lega l  s t y l e :
What i s  d e c i s iv e  a r e ,  r a t h e r ,  the fo l lowing e lements .  
Ind iv idua l  lega l  systems and e n t i r e  groups o f  sys ­
tems each have t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  s t y l e .  Comparative 
r e sea rch  must endeavor to  comprehend th e se  " lega l  
s t y l e s "  and to  accord to  the  element o f  s t y l e ,  the  
f a c t s  which make up a s p e c i f i c  s t y l e ,  a d e c i s iv e
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importance both f o r  the  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  groups of  
l ega l  systems and f o r  the  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  s in g l e  
systems to  such groups, (my t r a n s l a t i o n )
According to  Zweigert ,  t h e  fo l low ing  elements should be taken  i n ­
to  account  in de te rm in ing  a s p e c i f i c  s t y l e :  1) h i s t o r i c  o r i g i n ,  2)
a s p e c i f i c  h a b i t  o f  leg a l  t h in k in g ,  3) p a r t i c u l a r l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
l ega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  4) th e  n a tu re  o f  sources  o f  law and t h e i r  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n ,  and 5) id eo lo g ic a l  e lements .  Zweigert a r r i v e d  a t  th e  f o l ­
lowing c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  lega l  s t y l e s :  1) Romanischer R e c h t s k r e i s ,
2) Deutscher  R e c t s k r e i s , 3) Nord ischer  R e c h t s k r e i s ,  4) A nge lsachs is -  
che r  R e c h t s k r e i s , 5) Kommunistischer R e c h t s k r e i s , 6) F e r n o s t l i c h e r  
( n ich tkommunis t ischer)  R e c h t s k r e i s , 7) I s l am isch e r  R e c h t s k r e i s , and 
8) R ec h tsk re is  des Hindu-Rechts .
A d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  Z w e ig e r t ' s  o therw ise  admirable  approach i s  i t s  
l ack  o f  c o n s id e ra t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  g e o p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  and in f lu e n c e s .  
As a consequence o f  t h i s  shortcoming,  th e  laws o f  th e  r e c e n t l y  inde­
pendent c o u n t r i e s  o f  Asia and A fr ica  a re  e s p e c i a l l y  hard to  c l a s s i f y .  
Apparen t ly ,  c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r i e s  based on g e o p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  must 
be cons ide red  f o r  th e  purposes of  adequate  and convenient  c l a s s i f i c a ­
t i o n .
A f t e r  severa l  r e v i s i o n s ,  th e  scheme o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  presen ted
by the  French comparat ive law s c h o la r ,  Rene David, and h is  c o l l e a g u e ,
John B r i e r ! e y ,  r e s u l t s  in fo u r  broad c a t e g o r i e s  o f  lega l  systems 
( th r e e  f a m i l i e s  and one re s id u a l  c a te g o ry ) :  1) the  Romano-Germanic
Family, 2) th e  Common Law, 3) S o c i a l i s t  Laws, and 4) o th e r  concept ions
of  Law and Socia l  Order .  The l a s t  ca tego ry  embraces those  systems
in which t r a d i t i o n a l  and r e l i g i o u s  elements appear  as i n h e r i t e d  com-
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ponents in th e  modern law, t o g e th e r  with  p r i n c i p l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  have been imported from the  Occidental  world and t h a t  today 
have d e c i s iv e  importance in those  c o u n t r i e s .
Two success fu l  a t tem pts  a t  mapping the  w o r ld ' s  major lega l  s y s ­
tems have appeared in  th e  geographical  l i t e r a t u r e  of  the  Engl ish-  
speaking c o u n t r i e s .  The f i r s t  o f  th e se  e f f o r t s  appeared in The Geo­
graphica l  Review (Wigmore, 1929, pp. 114-20),  with  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
based on lega l  c u l t u r e s  as o f  t h a t  t ime,  r a t h e r  than lega l  systems 
wi th emphasis on the  source  o f  law and s t y l e  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  This 
map by James Wigmore, a law p r o fe s s o r ,  served fo r  decades fol lowing 
i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n  as the  s tanda rd  p o r t r ay a l  of  the  w o r ld 's  law.
With s l i g h t  m o d i f ic a t io n  i f  has appeared in books by W hi t t le sey  (1939, 
p. 560) and Jordan and Rowntree (1976, p. 144).  The second s u c c e s s ­
ful  ven tu re  a t  mapping ( see  Fig. 1) was a l so  publ ished  in The Geo­
g raph ica l  Review ( E a s t e r l y ,  1977, pp. 209-20).  This map was p a r t  of  
an e f f o r t  to  r e - i n t r o d u c e  geo ju r isp rudence  to geographers .  I t ,  to o ,  
has served as th e  b a s i s  f o r  subsequent  d e p ic t i o n s  of  global  d i s t r i ­
but ion of  lega l  systems (Jordan and Rowntree, 1979, p.  119).
Other  a t tem pts  by geographers  to  map the  w o r ld ' s  lega l  systems 
have g e n e r a l ly  proved d i s a s t e r o u s .  A lu d ic ro u s  example i s  provided 
in a tex tbook by Spencer  and Thomas (1978, pp. 158-59).  A subsequent  
r e v i s io n  has f a i l e d  e i t h e r  to  c o r r e c t  the  fundamental and f a c tu a l  e r ­
ro rs  o f  p o r t r a y a l  o r  to  remove th e  d i s c r e p a n c ie s  between th e  map and 
the  more c o r r e c t  accompanying t e x t  (1978, pp. 158-159). For example, 
such c l e a r l y  C i v i l i a n  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  as Spain ,  P o r tu g a l ,  West Germany, 
the  Scandinavian c o u n t r i e s ,  much of  La t in  America, Z a i r e ,  Japan and
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Taiwan a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  by Spencer and Thomas as modelled a f t e r  the  
Engl ish  Common Law. Futhermore,  the  map f a i l s  to  acknowledge the  
mixed c h a r a c t e r  o f  the  laws o f  E th io p ia ,  South A f r i c a ,  the  P h i l l i -  
p in e s ,  and Guyana; th e  in f lu e n c e  of  "Roman Law" in Egypt (which they 
c l a s s i f y  as a mixture  o f  Is lam ic  Law and English Common Law); o r  the  
presence of Engl ish  Common Law in th e  Sudan.
I t  i s  not  our  purpose to  d i sc u s s  th e se  previous  a t tem pts  in de­
t a i l ,  but  to  note  in  broad fa sh io n  th e  o u t l i n e s  o f  a few o f  the  more 
no ta b le  schemes f o r  the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  lega l  systems.  I t  i s  to 
be noted t h a t  t h e  g e o p o l i t i c a l  scheme o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i s  sug- 
below i s  in many r e s p e c t s  s i m i l i a r  to  i t s  a n t e c e d e n t s ;  indeed ,  i t  i s  
a m o d i f ic a t io n  and s y n th e s i s  o f  th e se  previous  e f f o r t s .  Yet,  th e  
g e o p o l i t i c a l  scheme o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  more than  a m o d i f i c a t io n  and 
s y n th e s i s ;  i t  i s  a l s o  a r e t h e o r e t i z a t i o n  (Voegel in ,  1952, pp. 1-26) 
based on under ly ing  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  human a c t io n  and human d e s ig n ,  as 
well as c e r t a i n  g e o p o l i t i c a l  elements  t h a t  permit  an in d iv id u a l  c l a s ­
s i f i c a t i o n  o f  each j u r i s d i c t i o n .
A G e o p o l i t i c a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
A g e o p o l i t i c a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (F ig .  2) o f  legal  systems s u i t s  
th e  purposes  o f  g e o ju r i sp ru d e n c e .  This scheme takes  i n to  c o n s id e ra ­
t i o n  both l ega l  and geographic  c r i t e r i a ,  with emphasis on those  
c r i t e r i a  t h a t  underscore  the  dichotomy between Human Action and Hu­
man Design: h a b i t  of  lega l  t h in k in g ,  th e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  the
judge and the  l e g i s l a t o r ,  and th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  the  j u d i c i a l  p rocess .
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The Occidental  Group 
Among the  Occidental group of  lega l  systems (Table 1 ) ,  d i f f e r ­
ences among them a re  fewer  than s i m i l a r i t i e s .  Each o f  th e se  systems 
i s  a product  o f  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  in  p h i lo s o ­
phical  background, however,  d i s t i n g u i s h  two s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
p r in c ip a l  f a m i l i e s  o f  lega l  systems (Anglo-American Common Law and 
Romano-Germanic Civi l  Law), and th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  
unders tand ing  c e r t a i n  a sp e c t s  o f  subsequent and consequent  lega l  r e ­
cep t ion  and legal  preven ience .
The Anglo-American Common Law
A people  w i th o u t  h i s t o r y  
I s  no t  redeemed from t im e ,  f o r  h i s t o r y  i s  a p a t t e r n  
Of t im e le s s  moments. So, whi le  th e  l i g h t  f a i l s  
On a w i n t e r ' s  a f t e rn o o n ,  in  a secluded chapel 
H is to ry  i s  now and England.
—T. S. E l i o t ,  The Four Q uar te t s
The. Anglo-American (Anglican)  Common Law family  o f  lega l  systems 
inc ludes  a l l  those  n a t io n a l  systems der ived  from the  Engl ish  Common 
Law (Fig.. 3 ) .  On an intramundane l e v e l ,  Natural  Law e n te r s  the  Com­
mon Law through human a c t io n  in r e l a t i o n  to  a c tu a l  cases  a t  i s s u e  be­
tween ac tua l  persons .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  Common Law i s  intramundane 
(wordly) in  t h a t  i t  i s  grounded in  man's exper ience  over  many gener­
a t i o n s .  This  accumulated ex p e r ien ce ,  case  upon c a se ,  amounts f o r  most 
p o in t s  a t  i s s u e  to  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y ,  but  one t h a t  r e ­
mains c o n s ta n t ly  open to  th e  un l im i ted  s u b t l i t y  and nuances o f  h i s t o r ­
i c a l l y  u n fo ld ing ,  novel exper ience  (Landes and Posner ,  1976). Be­
cause the  Common Law system evolves  through human a c t i o n ,  an h i s t o r -
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Table I .  A G e o p o l i t i c a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  Legal Systems
I .  The Occidenta l  (Euro-American, Western) Group
A. The Anglo-American Common Law Family (Human Action)
B. The Romano-Germanic ( C o n t in e n ta l ,  C iv i l  Law) family  of  
lega l  systems (Human Design)
1. La t in  sub-fam ily
2. L a t in  American sub-fam ily
3. Germanic sub-fam ily
4. Nordic sub-fam ily
C. Mixed J u r i s d i c t i o n s
I I .  The S o c i a l i s t  (Communist) Group
A. Sov ie t  Law (and P e o p le 's  Democracies fo l low ing  th e  S o v ie t  
l ega l  model) (Human Design)
B. The Law o f  th e  Chinese P eo p le ' s  Republic
C. The fam ily  o f  lega l  systems of  th e  P e o p le ' s  Democracies
not  fo l low ing  the  Sov ie t  lega l  model.
I I I .  The Category o f  Asian and Afr ican  Non-Communist Legal Systems
w i th o u t  Occidental Law.
A. Is lam ic  Law
B. Other
Fig. 3 Common Law (including Mixed Jurisdictions)
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i c a l  approach i s  necessary  f o r  unders tand ing  the  Natural Law e t h i c  
t h a t  inhe res  in th e  open system of  the  Common Law t r a d i t i o n .
As the  geomorphologist  must o f  n e c e s s i t y  be versed  in geology,  
so must the  geographer i n t e r e s t e d  in g eo ju r i sp ru d en ce  be f a m i l i a r  
w ith  v a r ious  a sp e c t s  of  j u r i s p ru d e n c e  and philosophy o f  law. I t  i s  
n ec e s sa ry ,  in o rd e r  to  g rasp  a proper  unders tand ing  o f  th e  Engl ish  
Common Law to  engage in a s e r i o u s ,  c a r e f u l ,  and e x te n s iv e  review of  
i t s  h i s t o r y .  This approach i s  e s s e n t i a l  because o f  th e  e v o lu t io n ­
ary  n a tu re  o f  the  Common Law, which can only be desc r ib ed  in an h i s ­
t o r i c a l  f a sh io n .
The C harac te r  o f  the  Common Law
The Common Law developed in  the  royal c o u r t s  (such as King 's  
Bench, Common P le a s ,  and Exchequer) and was ad m in is te red  through the  
r i g i d  Common Law forms o f  le g a l  a c t io n  t h a t  p r e sc r ib e d  th e  r e l i e f  to  
be given when c e r t a i n  f a c t s  had been e s t a b l i s h e d .  The emphasis o f  
t h i s  accumulat ion i s  e v id e n t  in the  ex te n s iv e  concern w i th  procedural 
law in th e  form o f  sp e c ia l  w r i t s :  c e r t i o r a r i , habeas c o r p u s , mandamus,
p r o h i b i t i o n ,  and quo warran to  (Hayek, 1960, pp. 218-19).  D i s s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  with  th e  r i g i d i t y  o f  Common Law remedies gave r i s e  to  e q u i t y ,  
a s e p a ra t e  body o f  law t h a t  was supposed to  r e p r e s e n t  th e  k i n g ' s  con­
s c ie n c e  ( C r ib b e t ,  1975). As a general  r u l e ,  e q u i ty  and common law 
were subsequen t ly  merged in most Common Law systems.  Because the 
c r e a t i o n  o f  Engl ish  co u r t s  was an immemorial p r e ro g a t iv e  o f  the  crown 
and because a l l  j u s t i c e  emanated from the  k ing ,  th e  Conmon Law dev­
eloped as an e s s e n t i a l l y  p u b l ic  law formed p r im a r i ly  by judges  in
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r e so lv in g  in d iv id u a l  c o n f l i c t s  (Lyon, 1960). The lega l  r u l e  i s  thus  
in tended to  provide  a j u s t  s e t t l e m e n t  of  an e x i s t i n g  i s s u e ,  r a t h e r  
than to  fo rm ula te  a p r o sp e c t iv e  r u le  of  conduct .  "The c h i e f  concern 
of  a common law judge must be th e  ex p ec ta t io n  which the  p a r t i e s  in 
a t r a n s a c t i o n  would have reasonably  formed on th e  b a s i s  of  th e  gen­
e ra l  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  th e  ongoing o rd e r  of  a c t io n  r e s t s  on" (Hayek, 
1973, p. 86) .  From th e  case law, judges  der ived  binding j u d i c i a l  
p recedents  t h a t  were f r e q u e n t ly  ap p l ied  according to  th e  d o c t r in e  of 
s t a r e  d e c i s i s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  dur ing  the  e ig h te e n th  and n in e te e n th  
c e n t u r i e s ) ,  the  po l icy  of  c o u r t s  to  abide by precedents  and not  d i s ­
tu rb  a s e t t l e d  i s s u e .  The d o c t r in e  o f  precedents  was based on the  
judgement o f  causes by p r i n c i p l e s  reached in d u c t iv e ly  from th e  j u d ­
i c i a l  exper ience  of  the  p a s t  and not  by the  sovere ign  w i l l  (Pound, 
1921). This  d o c t r in e  was tempered by the  use o f  lega l  f i c t i o n s ,  spe­
c i a l  w r i t s ,  and new j u d i c i a l  remedies.  In the  case  o f  economic mon­
o p o l i e s ,  f o r  example, i t  was contended t h a t  " i f  a g r a n t  be made to  
any man, to  have the  s o le  making of  c a r d s ,  o r  th e  s o le  d e a l in g  with 
any t r a d e ,  t h a t  g ran t  i s  a g a i n s t  the  l i b e r t y  and freedom of  the  sub­
j e c t ,  t h a t  befo re  d i d ,  o r  l a w fu l ly  might  have used t h a t  t r a d e "  and, 
c onsequen t ly ,  a g a i n s t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  l i b e r t y  embraced in  the  Com­
mon Law t r a d i t i o n  rega rd ing  commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s  (Coke, 1809, p. 
47) .
The Common Law emerges from looking to  p receden ts  o f  human ex­
p e r i e n c e ,  in co rp o ra ted  in to  the  j u d i c i a l  p ro c e ss ,  t h a t  provide  ru le s  
o f  u n iv e r sa l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  a re  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  new ca se s .  Emphasis 
i s  p laced  on p re se rv in g  a j u s t  c i v i l  o r d e r ,  r a t h e r  than on des ign ing
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a moral b a s i s  f o r  s o c i e t y .  The c i v i l  o rd e r  t h a t  i s  thus  main tained 
i s  not  a designed s t a t e  of  t h i n g s ,  but  the  r e g u l a r i t y  of  a process  
t h a t  r e s t s  on some of  the  e x p e c ta t io n s  o f  the  a c t i n g  persons f o r  
whom th e  law provides  p r o t e c t io n  from i n t e r f e r e n c e  by o t h e r s ;  t h a t  
i s ,  two p a r t i e s  argue th e  j u s t i c e  o f  some s p e c i f i c  a c t  or  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  between them se lves .  For t h i s  rea so n ,  i t  i s  a spontaneous o rd e r  
o f  a c t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  on laws t h a t  a r t i c u l a t e  a l r e a d y  observed p rac ­
t i c e s  o r  e s t a b l i s h e d  r u l e s .  This spontaneous o rd e r  o f  human a c t io n  
e x i s t s  independent ly  o f  the  w i l l  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  human o r  of  any 
c e n t r a l  d e s ig n ,  because i t  i s  grounded in a common c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n  
formed by the  s i m i l a r  responses  of  i n d iv id u a l s  to  p a r t i c u l a r  c ircum­
s tan c es  t h a t  g ive  r i s e  to  common ru le s  t h a t  d e l i n e a t e  some expec tab le  
outcome o f  t h e i r  behav io r .
The Common Law, t h e r e f o r e ,  c o n s i s t s  of  purpose- independent  r u le s  
t h a t  a f f e c t  the  conduct  of  in d iv id u a l s  and may be a p p l i c a b l e  to  any 
number o f  f u r t h e r  a c t i o n s  (Hayek, 1973). By d e f in in g  th e  p ro te c te d  
domain o f  each in d iv id u a l  o r  p a r t y ,  an o rd e r  o f  a c t i o n s  a r i s e s  w i th ­
in  which in d iv id u a l s  can make f e a s i b l e  p lans .  For th e  Common Law, as 
a r e s u l t ,  c i v i l  o rd e r  r e s t s  on a theo ry  t h a t  makes th e  undesigned r e ­
s u l t s  of  in d iv id u a l  a c t i o n  th e  c e n t r a l  concern ,  hence " the  r e s u l t  o f  
human a c t i o n ,  but  no t  o f  human des ign"  (Hayek, 1969). In o th e r  words, 
the  Common Law evolves  out  of  c e n t u r i e s  of  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  formu­
l a t e d  on the  b a s i s  of  what the  people be l iev ed  to  be j u s t .  "The foun­
t a i n  o f  j u s t i c e  r e p re s e n t s  n a tu r e ,  but  to  draw r u l e s  g ra d u a l ly  from 
t h a t  f o u n ta in  takes  a good deal o f  exper ience  and a r t "  (Wu, 1955).
On the  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  p a s t  c u l t u r a l  e x p e r i en c e ,  the  Natural  Law
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e t h i c  e n te r s  the  Common Law on a metaphysical  leve l  no l e s s  than in 
the  em pir ica l  leve l  in h e re n t  in th e  human a c t i o n .  One noted scho­
l a r  of  the  Common Law, John Wu, (1951, p. 4 0 ) ,  has even gone so f a r
as to  a s s e r t :  "The s p i r i t  o f  the  Common Law i s  th e  s p i r i t  o f  C h r i s ­
t i a n i t y . "  Indeed,  e q u iv a l e n t s  o f  Natural  Law o r  i m p l i c i t  Natural 
Law a re  found in the  teach ings  o f  C h r i s t  (Voegel in ,  1971; Wilder ,  
1945). "[W]hile  the  Roman Law was a dea th-bed  conver t  to  C h r i s t i a n ­
i t y ,  th e  Common Law was a c r a d l e  C h r i s t i a n "  (Wu, 1954, p. 14).  The 
s p i r i t  o f  the  Common Law i s  be l ieved  by some to  be the  s p i r i t  of  
C h r i s t i a n i t y  because C h r i s t i a n  t e ach in g  and exeges is  revea led  a gen­
e ra l  system of  m o r a l i t y ,  the  d e t a i l e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  which could be 
s e p a r a t e l y  d iscovered  by use of  reason in th e  c o n te x t  of  human ac ­
t i o n .  The Common Law is  a system whose deepes t  founda t ions  and l a ­
t e n t  p r i n c i p l e s  inc ludes  many a l s o  found in th e  C h r i s t i a n  phi losophy 
o f  the  Natural Law. E i th e r  in o r ig i n  or  in e s sen ce ,  t h e n ,  th e  Com­
mon Law i s  cons trued  by some s c h o la r s  to  be a system of  C h r i s t i a n  
ju r i s p ru d e n c e .
The Modern Emergence of  the  Common Law
During th e  r u l e  o f  Henry I I I  (1216-1272),  th e  main o u t l i n e s  of
th e  Common Law were drawn. I t  was in  t h i s  e ra  t h a t  Henry de Brac ton ,  
"Fa ther  of  the  Common Law," wrote the  c l a s s i c  l eg a l  t r e a t i s e  De Legi- 
bus Et Consuetudinibus  A n q l i a e , which has been d esc r ib e d  as " the  
crown and f lower  of  Engl ish  medieval ju r i s p ru d e n c e "  (Po l lock  and 
Mait land ,  1923, p. 174).  Bracton c o l l e c t e d  and s tu d ie d  th e  p as t  de­
c i s i o n s  of  the  King 's  Bench, and from them e x t r a c t e d  the  r u le s  of  law
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t h a t  were t h e r e i n  r e f l e c t e d .  From t h i s  case- law  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  Brac­
ton formulated  a t r u l y  C h r i s t i a n  philosophy o f  the  Common Law. He 
argued t h a t  the  fu n c t io n  of  th e  Common Law, a c t i n g  in conformity with 
the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natural  Law, was to  r e a l i z e  the  goal of  f r e e  men 
l i v i n g  in the  C h r i s t i a n  fe l lo w sh ip  of  a f r e e  community. As a conse­
quence,  the  king ,  as God's v i c a r  and m i n i s t e r  on e a r t h ,  has the  r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  doing j u s t i c e  to  a l l  so t h a t  h is  s u b je c t s  could l i v e  
h o n e s t ly ,  causing no i n ju ry  to  o t h e r s ,  each r e ce iv in g  h is  due and 
making h i s  reasonable  c o n t r ib u t io n  in r e t u r n .  Although the  king was 
above the  people ,  he was below God and under His Law. "There i s  no 
king where w i l l ,  and no t  the  law, w ie lds  dominion" (Brac ton ,  1268, 
p. 56) .  According to  Bracton ,  judgement and counsel of  j u s t i c e  were 
the  essence of  law, and not w i l l  o r  f o r c e .  T h e re fo re ,  the  "prudence 
of  law p e r c e iv e s ,  and j u s t i c e  renders  to  each what i s  h is  due. For 
j u s t i c e  i s  a v i r t u e ,  and prudence o f  law i s  a s c ience"  (Bracton ,  1268, 
p. 36) .  The w i l l  of  man cannot a l t e r  the  n a tu r e  of  t h i n g s ,  nor  can 
the  r u le s  o f  human law deroga te  from Natural Law. B rac to n ' s  d e f i n i ­
t io n  of  law and p r i n c i p l e s  of  sa n c t io n  i s  a s y n th e s i s  o f  what had 
gone on be fo re  his  t ime in  th e  development of the  Common Law and in 
the  growth of C h r i s t i a n  thought .
B ra c to n ' s  c o n t r ib u t i o n  to  the  d o c t r in e  o f  precedents  and th e  doc­
t r i n e  of  supremacy of law were, in them selves ,  i n f l u e n t i a l  in  th e  de­
velopment o f  the Natural  Law e t h i c  in the  evo lv ing  Common Law. Both 
d o c t r in e s  were based on an idea of  law as a ques t  f o r  the  j u s t i c e  
and t r u t h  o f  the  C re a to r .  The d o c t r in e  of  precedents  was based on
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on the  judgement o f  causes  by p r i n c i p l e s  reached i n d u c t i v e l y 1 from 
th e  j u d i c i a l  exper ience  of  the  p as t  and not  by the  deduct ion  from 
r u le s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a r b i t r a r i l y  by th e  sovere ign  w i l l  (Pound, 1921).
The d o c t r in e  o f  supremacy o f  law bound the  sover iegn  and h is  agents  
to  a c t  upon the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natural  Law and reason .
Between th e  t h i r t e e n t h  and f i f t e e n t h  c e n t u r i e s ,  lawyers who had 
been organ ized  in th e  Inns o f  Cour t ,  p r i v a t e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  lawyers 
t h a t  had the  ex c lu s iv e  p r i v i l e g e  o f  c a l l i n g  men to the  ba r ,  and 
Chancery, c o l l e g i a t e  bodies  s i m i l a r  to  th o se  of  Cour t ,  a s s i m i l a t e d  
the  e s s e n t i a l  d o c t r in e s  of  S t .  Thomas Aquinas i n to  the  course  o f  l e ­
gal s tudy .  While s t r e n g th e n in g  the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  the  Common Law as a 
system o f  r u l e s  preserved  in case d e c i s i o n s ,  the  Inns a l s o  r e - v i t a l ­
ized the  Natural  Law e t h i c ,  i n h e r e n t  in the  Common Law (Wu, 1954).
With th e  f i f t e e n t h  c en tu ry ,  t h e r e  came ano the r  h igh-w ate r  mark 
in th e  advance o f  the  Natural Law e t h i c  in  th e  Common Law t r a d i t i o n .  
John F o r te scu e ,  who had been educated a t  th e  Inns o f  Court and was a 
dec la red  d e s c ip le  o f  Acquinas , s t r e s s e d  the  supreme importance o f  the 
Natural Law as a fundamental law to  which a l l  o th e r  laws must conform. 
He r e j e c t e d  th e  o ld  Roman p recep t  t h a t  whatever  p leases  the  sovere ign  
has th e  fo rc e  o f  law, because the  Natural  Law, as revea led  in the  Old 
Testament and th e  Gospel,  was th e  supreme a u t h o r i t a t i v e  source  o f  law. 
"For no e d i c t  o r  a c t i o n  o f  a k ing ,  even i f  i t  has a r i s e n  p o l i t i c k l y ,
The in d u c t iv e  used here denotes  a summary and i n t u i t i v e  h i s t o r i c a l  
i n f e re n c e  by a judge t h a t  in no wise r u n ' s  afoul of  Popper 's  (1957, 1961) 
s t r i c t u r e s  a g a i n s t  induc t ion  in s c ien ce .
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hath ever  escaped th e  vengence o f  d iv in e  punishment;  i f  i t  hath  pro­
ceeded from him a g a i n s t  the  r u l e  o f  N a tu re ' s  Law" (F o r te scu e ,  quoted 
in Wu, 1954, p. 23).  Making e x te n s iv e  use o f  the  w r i t i n g s  of  S t .  
Thomas, For tescue  wrote  th e  monumental De Natura Legis N a tu ra e , in 
which he contends t h a t ,  in th e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  Natural Law i s  the  
f o u n ta in  o f  j u s t i c e  and the  source  of  a l l  j u s t  human laws.
During the  Tudor and S t u a r t  e ra s  began the  s t r u g g l e  fo r  th e  soul 
of  th e  Common Law. In the  r e ig n  o f  Henry VIII (1509-1547), th e  growth 
o f  Natural  Law and Common Law were s tu n t e d .  The Reformation P a r l i a ­
ment,  seeking to  d i v e s t  the  Pope o f  a u t h o r i t y  over  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  the  
Church in England, made th e  Crown the  Supreme Head o f  th e  Anglican 
Church, with  th e  power to  reform and r ed re s s  a l l  e r r o r s  and h e r e s i e s  
in the  kingdom. By s t a t u t e ,  i t  was made a t r e a s o n a b le  o f fen se  f o r  
anyone to  so much as ch a l len g e  th e  c i v i l  and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  p r i v i ­
leges  of the  king.  I t  was under  t h i s  enacted  law, in d e roga t ion  of  
Common Law, t h a t  Thomas More (1478-1535) was i n d i c t e d  and convic ted  
o f  t r e a s o n .  In h is  d e fe n se ,  More condemned the  a c t  o f  Par l iam ent  as 
c o n t r a ry  to  th e  Natural  Law e t h i c  of Common Law. Acts of  P a r l iam en t ,  
under the  gu ise  of  th e  Engl ish  Reformation,  assumed a p o s i t i o n  of  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  supremacy and were thus  s e t  a d r i f t  from Natural  Law.
The r e s u l t  i s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  summarized by Mait land (1907, pp. 192-93):
In 1535, t h e  y e a r  in which More was done to  d ea th ,  
t h e  Year Books come to  an end; in o th e r  words, the  
g r e a t  s tream of  Law Reports t h a t  has been flowing 
f o r  near  two c e n t u r i e s  and a h a l f ,  e v e r  s in c e  the  
days o f  Edward I ,  becomes d isco n t in o u s  and then  runs 
dry .  The ex ac t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  ominous event  
has never y e t  been f u l l y  exp lo red ,  but  ominous i t  
s u r e ly  i s .  Some words t h a t  f e l l  from Edmund Burke 
occur  to  us: " to  put an end to  the  Reports i s  to  
put an end to  the  law o f  England."
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Even though the  s ix t e e n t h  cen tu ry  w i tnessed  th e  near  f a t a l  blow 
to  th e  p resence of  Natural  Law in the  Common Law in consequence of 
th e  Par l iam en ta ry  a s s e r t i o n  o f  law as an exp ress ion  of  sovere ign  
w i l l ,  the  fo rc e  of  Richard Hooker (1554-1600) p repared  th e  way f o r  a 
renascence of  Natural Law thought  in the  fo l low ing  c e n t u r i e s .  From
h is  c l a s s i c  t r e a t i s e ,  Of the  Laws o f  E c c l e s i a s t i c a l  P o l i t y , came a
resounding pronouncement on Natural  Law (1593, Vol. I ,  p. 6; I I I ,  
p. 9) :
This [N a tu ra l ]  law we may name E t e r n a l ,  being t h a t  
o rd e r  which God, be fo re  a l l  ages ,  has s e t  down with  
Himself to  do a l l  th in g s  by. The [ N a tu ra l ]  laws do 
bind men a b s o lu t e l y  even as they  a re  men, a l though
they  have never  any s e t t l e d  f e l lo w s h ip ,  nor  any s o l ­
emn agreement among themselves what to  do o r  not  to  
do. Human laws a re  measures in r e s p e c t  o f  men whose 
motions they must d i r e c t .  Such measures have a l s o
t h e i r  h igher  ru le s  to  be measured by: which r u le s
a re  two, th e  law o f  God and the  Law of  Nature .  So
t h a t  laws must be made according to  the  general  law 
of  n a tu r e .
The Renascence o f  Natural Law as an a r t i c u l a t e  Common Law t r a ­
d i t i o n  was l a r g e l y  embodied in th e  person of  Lord Edward Coke, who 
r e a s s e r t s  th e  claim t h a t  Crown and P ar l iam ent  a re  s u b je c t  to  and l im­
i t e d  by the  Natural Law. Furthermore,  .Common Law judges  have both 
the  power and the  duty to  con t ro l  and annul a c t s  o f  P ar l iam en t  de­
termined to  be " a g a in s t  common r i g h t  and reason" (Coke, 1610b). The
dimension o f  Coke's in f lu e n c e  in th e  r ev iva l  of  the  supremacy o f  Nat­
u ra l  Law over sovere ign  w i l l  j u s t l y  earned f o r  him th e  p r a i s e  t h a t  
"what Shakespeare has been to  l i t e r a t u r e ,  Coke has been to  the  pub l ic  
and p r iv a t e  law o f  England" (Holdsworth, 1938, p. 132).  In C a lv in ' s  
Case , Coke proclaims t h a t  " the  law of  n a tu re  i s  p a r t  of  the  law of  
England,"  " the  law o f  n a tu re  was befo re  any j u d i c i a l  or  municipal
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law,"  and " the  law o f  n a tu r e  i s  immutable" (Coke, 1610b). To Coke,
the  Natural  Law i s :
That which God a t  th e  time o f  c r e a t i o n  o f  the  n a tu re  
o f  man in fu sed  in to  h is  h e a r t ,  f o r  h is  p r e s e r v a t i o n ;  
and t h i s  i s  lex  a e t e r n a , th e  moral law, c a l l e d  a l so  
the  law of  n a tu r e .  And by t h i s  law w r i t t e n  with  the  
f i n g e r  o f  God in th e  h e a r t  o f  man, were th e  poeple 
o f  God a long time governed, b e fo re  t h e  law was w r i t ­
ten  by Moses, who was th e  f i r s t  r e p o r t e r  o r  w r i t e r  
o f  law in  t h e  world.
In i t s  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  dur ing  th e  c o lo n ia l  e r a ,  th e  Natu­
ra l  Law emerged as th e  dominant a s p e c t  o f  t h e  Common Law: "Conquered
heathen c o u n t r i e s  a t  once lo se  t h e i r  r i g h t s  o r  laws by conques t ,  f o r  
t h a t  they  be not  only  a g a i n s t  C h r i s t i a n i t y  bu t  a g a i n s t  the  law o f  God 
and o f  n a tu re  con ta ined  in  t h e  Decalogue" (Coke, 1610b). This d e c i ­
s ion  would have a f a r  reach ing  e f f e c t  in th e  g lobal  d i f f u s s i o n  o f  the  
Common Law dur ing  the  coming age o f  B r i t i s h  im per ia l i sm .
From th e  view of  th e  judge ,  Coke m a in t a in s ,  c i v i l  and cr iminal  
cases  a re  t o  be determined in  a c o u r t  o f  j u s t i c e  accord ing  to  th e  law 
and custom o f  th e  realm, in c lu d in g  th e  i n h e r e n t  Natural  Law e t h i c .  In 
r e so lv in g  in d iv id u a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  t h e r e  was the  r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  Natu­
ra l  Law must be supplemented by human law, hence the  need fo r  a body 
o f  common law.
Arguing from a Thomist ic  p o s i t i o n ,  Coke m ain ta in s  t h a t ,  while  the 
under ly ing  n e c e s s i t y  o f  th e  general  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natural Law e x i s t e d ,  
remoter  conc lus ions  and th e  p a r t i c u l a r  d e te rm in a t io n s  o f  th e  Natural 
Law a r e  a m a t t e r  o f  human law, which depends upon th e  exper ience  and 
s tudy o f  human a c t io n  embodied in  th e  Common Law. For Coke, th e  Nat­
u ra l  Law (law of  reason)  and the  Common Law (law o f  t h e  land)  form a 
cont inous  s e r i e s .
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G rea t ly  in f lu en c ed  by Coke, Lord Holt  extended th e  Natural Law 
e t h i c  in h e re n t  in the  Common Law, in v a r ious  d e c i s io n s  concerning co­
l o n i a l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  of Engl ish  j u s t i c e .  I l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  H o l t ' s  
approach i s  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between a p p l i c a t i o n  of  Engl ish  Common Law 
in s e t t l e d  c o lo n ie s  o f  B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s  from i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  in con­
quered lands  a l r e a d y  s e t t l e d  by o t h e r  people .  In th e  s e t t l e m e n t ,
"All laws in fo rc e  in England a r e  in fo rc e  t h e r e "  (H o l t ,  1694).  In 
conquered t e r r i t o r y ,  however, " the  laws of  England do not  take  p lace  
t h e r e ,  u n t i l  d ec la red  so by the  c o n q u e ro r ; " and,  i f  pagan, " t h e i r  
laws by conquest  do no t  e n t i r e l y  c e a s e ,  but  only such as a r e  a g a i n s t  
the  law of  God; and in  such c a s e s ,  where t h e i r  laws a re  r e j e c t e d  or  
s i l e n t ,  the  conquered country  s h a l l  be governed accord ing  to  th e  r u le  
o f  n a tu r a l  eq u i ty "  (H o l t ,  1694). This c o n s id e ra t i o n  f o r  th e  customs 
o f  a f o lk  in an a l i e n  land i s  compatib le  with  th e  B r i t i s h  co lo n ia l  
po l icy  of i n d i r e c t  r u l e  and i s  one o f  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  of  th e  Natural  
Law e t h i c  t h a t  emphasizes the  Common Law's t o l e r a n c e  f o r  d i v e r s i t y  
among th e  laws o f  man not  in de roga t ion  o f  Natural  Law.
By th e  e ig h t e e n th  c e n tu ry ,  the  concept ion  o f  Natural  Law as rooted 
in the  o rd e r  o f  the  u n iv e r se  and a p p l i c a b l e  to  man as a component of  
t h a t  o rd e r  was f i rm ly  entrenched in  t h e  form and subs tance  of  the  
Common Law. I d e n t i f y i n g  th e  ius  n a t u r a l e  (Natura l  Law) with  ius  
gentium (law o f  n a t i o n s ) ,  Lord Mansf ield (17 -18 ) ,  extended the
customs and usages of the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  merchants  as Natural  Law 
a p p l i c a b l e  in Common Law c o u r t s  (M ansf ie ld ,  1759). Recognizing the  
ac tua l  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  the  world in which th e  law performed, Mansfield 
ac ted  in the  s p i r i t  o f  the  Natural  Law when he in co rp o ra ted  usages of
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n t o  the  Common Law. A f te r  a l l ,  the  Natural Law 
e t h i c  holds t h a t  th e  Common Law should c o n s ta n t ly  adapt  to  the  chang­
ing co n d i t io n s  of c i v i l i z a t i o n .  Lord Mansfield f u r t h e r  a r t i c u l a t e d  
th e  Natural  Law e t h i c  o f  t h e  Common Law in the  a rea  of  q u a s i - c o n t r a c t s  
(Mansf ie ld ,  1769). The o b l i g a t i o n  a r i s i n g  from such a r e l a t i o n  i s  
invoked by a breach o f  Natural  Law. Mansf ield sought to  extend the  
e x i s t i n g  forms o f  a c t i o n  to  new s i t u a t i o n s  when a p p r o p r i a t e  on th e  
b a s i s  o f  "na tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and e q u i t y . "
The e ig h te e n th  cen tu ry  was a l so  t h e  age of  William Blacks tone ,  
Edmund Burke, and Adam Ferguson. B lacks tone ,  Oxford 's  f i r s t  p ro­
f e s s o r  o f  Engl ish  law, wrote t h e  lead ing  t e x t  f o r  Inns of  Court ,  p ro­
f e s s o r s  o f  law a t  Oxford and Cambridge, and lea rned  ju d g es ,  e n t i t l e d  
Commentaries on th e  Laws o f  England. To Blacks tone ,  the  Common Law 
was the  n e a r e s t  approch,  however im p e r f e c t ,  to  Natural Law because 
i t  had grown ou t  o f  t h e  exper ience  and o b se rv a t io n s  o f  many genera­
t i o n s  o f  wise men.
The S c o t t i s h  e v o lu t io n a ry  r a t i o n a l i s t s  (Ferguson and Thomas Reid, 
among o th e r s )  and t h e i r  English co l leag u es  (Blackstone and Burke, among 
o th e r s )  dur ing  the  e ig h t e e n th  cen tu ry  t em pora r i ly  d e f l e c te d  the  on­
s la u g h t  of  Cont inen ta l  Gnostic ism in lega l  though t ;  bu t  th e  ominous 
r i s e  of  lega l  p o s i t i v i s m  dur ing  th e  n in e te en th  cen tu ry  r e s u l t e d  in a 
renewed s t r u g g l e  f o r  th e  soul o f  th e  Common Law, a con t inu ing  s t r u g g l e  
t h a t  o f te n  f in d s  the  Natural  Law t r a d i t i o n  a t  bay. The c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  
approach a t t a i n e d  a c e r t a i n  measure o f  ascendency in the  a n a l y t i c a l  
ju r i s p ru d e n c e  of  John A us t in ,  to  whom every r u le  of  law must be d e r i v ­
ab le  from a conscious  a c t  of  l e g i s l a t i o n .  A u s t in ' s  a n a l y t i c a l  p o s i t i v -
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ism p a r t l y  de r ived  from Bentham's u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  o f  the  e a r l y  n ine­
t e en th  cen tu ry .  During the  tw en t i e th  c e n tu ry ,  lega l  p o s i t iv i s m ,  
s o c io lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s m ,  and po l icy  sc ience  have g r e a t l y  eroded the  
degree  o f  Human Action p re se n t  in th e  Anglo-American Common Law.
The Common Law Judge
The primary a u t h o r a t iv e  source  o f  law r u le s  in a Common Law s y s ­
tem l i e s  in j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  t h a t  se rve  as p receden ts  drawn from 
human exper ience .  In t h a t  way, r u le s  o f  j u s t  conduct  emerge from the  
e f f o r t s  o f  judges  in dec id ing  d i s p u t e s .  The c o n s ta n t  p r a c t i c e  of  
a r t i c u l a t i n g  r u le s  in o rd e r  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between the  e s s e n t i a l  and 
the  a c c id e n ta l  in th e  precedents  t h a t  guide him, produces in the  
Common Law judge a c a p a c i ty  f o r  d i sco v e r in g  general  p r i n c i p l e s  r a r e l y  
acqu ired  by a judge who o p e ra te s  in the  C iv i l  Law t r a d i t i o n  with  a 
supposedly complete c a ta lo g u e  of  a p p l i c a b l e  r u l e s  be fo re  him (Hayek,
1973). Because he i s  c a l l e d  on to  c o r r e c t  d i s tu r b a n c e s  of  o rd e r ,  the  
judge form ula tes  r u le s  as an i n s t i t u t i o n  of  a spontaneous o rd e r .  The 
judge ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  always f in d s  such an o rd e r  in e x i s t e n c e  as an a s ­
pect  of  a continuous flow o f  events  in which th e  in d iv id u a l s  a re  ab le  
to  pursue t h e i r  plans because th e y  can form p l a u s i b l e  ex p ec ta t io n s  
about the  a c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  f e l lo w s .  Judge-made law n e c e s s a r i l y  Pos" 
sesses  c e r t a i n  a t t r i b u t e s  t h a t  the  decrees  o f  the  l e g i s l a t o r  need
not p o ssess ,  except  i n s o f a r  as th e  l e g i s l a t o r  takes  judge-made law 
f o r  h is  model.
Through d e c i s io n s  in case a f t e r  c a se ,  judges  develop a body of  
ru le s  o f  conduct t h a t  e f f e c t s  and n u r tu re s  an e f f i c i e n t  o rd e r  of  ac-
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t i o n s .  The judge a r t i c u l a t e s  and p re se rv es  an undesigned o rd e r  t h a t  
i s  based on the  e x p e c ta t io n s  of  i t s  s u b j e c t s ,  r a t h e r  than  the  w i l l  
o f  a u t h o r i t y .  These judges  co n f ro n t  novel cases  by the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  p r i n c i p l e s  d i sce rn ed  from the  r a t i o  decidendi  of  prev ious  j u d i c i a l  
d e c i s io n s .  The j u d i c i a l  process  thus  helps  to  adapt  th e  s o c ia l  o rd e r  
to  c i rcumstances  upon which the  spontaneous o rd e r  grows. By uphold­
ing those  r u le s  t h a t  have worked in the  p a s t ,  judges  ren d e r  more c e r ­
t a i n  th e  e x p e c ta t io n s  o f  the  members o f  t h a t  s o c i e ty .  The outcome 
o f  j u d i c i a l  e f f o r t  w i l l  be a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  in s t a n c e  o f  those  "pro­
ducts  of  human a c t io n  but  not  o f  human des ign"  in  which th e  c o l l e c t e d  
exper ience  gained by th e  u n f e t t e r e d  exper im en ta t ion  of  g en e ra t io n s  
embodies g r e a t e r  knowledge than  was possessed by any one person or  
coheren t  committee o f  persons a t  one s i t t i n g  (Hayek, 1969). The 
judge i s  committed to  upholding the  p r i n c i p l e s  on which th e  e x i s t i n g  
o rd e r  i s  founded. "The t r a i n e d  i n t u i t i o n  o f  th e  judge con t inuous ly  
leads  him to  r i g h t  r e s u l t s  f o r  which he i s  puzzled to  g ive unimpeach­
ab le  lega l  reasons"  (Pound, 1936, p.  52) .  In th e  words o f  the  eminent 
American j u r i s t ,  O l iv e r  W. Holmes, J r .  (1963, p. 52):
The l i f e  o f  law has not been l o g i c ,  i t  has been e x p e r i ­
ence. The f e l t  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  th e  t im e ,  th e  p re v a le n t  
moral and p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  pub l ic  
p o l i c y ,  avowed o r  unconsc ious ,  even the  p r e ju d ic e s  which 
judges  sha re  w ith  t h e i r  fel low-men, have a good deal 
more to  do than sy l log ism s  in determin ing  the  r u l e s  by 
which men should be governed. The law embodies the  
s to r y  of  a n a t i o n ' s  development through many c e n t u r ­
i e s ,  and i t  cannot be d e a l t  with as i f  i t  con ta ined  
only the  axioms and c o r o l l a r i e s  of a book o f  mathemat­
ic s  .
And, in terms o f  l i b e r t y ,  Roscoe Pound (1926, p. 97) had t h i s  a s t u t e  
o b se rv a t io n  concern ing  the  j u d i c i a l  process  and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  s o c ie ty :
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The problem of  law i s  to  keep conscious  f r e e - w i l l i n g  
beings from i n t e r f e r e n c e  with  each o th e r .  I t  i s  so 
to  o rd e r  them t h a t  each s h a l l  e x e r c i s e  h is  freedom in 
a v a y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  freedom of  a l l  o t h e r s ,  s in ce  
a l l  o th e r s  a r e  to  be regarded e q u a l ly  as ends in them­
s e lv e s .
To r e c a p i t u l a t e ,  th e  law t h a t  emerges from j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  
c o n s i s t s  o f  a’5body o f  r u le s  r e g u l a t i n g  the  conduct o f  i n d iv id u a l s  t o ­
wards each o t h e r ,  a p p l i c a b l e  to  an in d e te rm in a te  number o f  f u t u r e  
cases  and d e l i m i t in g  th e  boundary of  the  p r o te c te d  domain of  each 
person.  These r u le s  d e r iv e  from th e  co n d i t io n s  of  a spontaneous o r ­
der  t h a t  no man made. They a re  d iscovered  in t h a t  they  a r t i c u l a t e  a l ­
ready e s t a b l i s h e d  r u le s  of  o rd e r .  They a r e  independent  o f  any p a r ­
t i c u l a r  human w i l l ,  thus  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  human a c t io n .
Under t h i s  concept  o f  c i v i l  o r d e r ,  s t a t u t e s  tend to  vary old 
r u l e s .  Common Law s t a t u t o r y  enactments  a r e  g e n e r a l ly  regarded as en­
croachments on the  coirmon law and,  a c c o rd in g ly ,  seldom abroga te  the 
p r e e x i s t i n g  law (Smith,  1975). As a r e s u l t ,  th e  judge cons ide rs  l e g ­
i s l a t i o n  along with th e  e x i s t i n g  r u le s  o f  common law, a techn ique  
t h a t  recognizes  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s t r i c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of s t a t u t o r y  
law, tempered by th e  idea t h a t  a s t a t u t e  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  only a d e c l a ­
r a t i o n  of  a common law r u l e  (Fordham, 1950). When th e  technique  i s  
placed  to g e t h e r  w ith  th e  fu n c t io n  of  th e  d o c t r in e  of  s t a r e  d e c i s i s , 
s t a t u t o r y  law becomes immersed in  the  sea of  common law with  co n s id ­
e r a b l e  lo s s  o f  i t s  i d e n t i t y  as l e g i s l a t i o n  (B ay i tch ,  1965).
S i m i l a r l y ,  Common Law " c o d i f i c a t i o n s "  a re  a c t u a l l y  c o n s o l id a t io n s  
of  law a l r e ad y  in  fo rc e  r a t h e r  than products  o f  c r e a t i v e  o r ig i n a l  l e g ­
i s l a t i o n .  Codes a re  in  e f f e c t  sy s tem a t ic  co m p i la t io n s ,  o r  d i g e s t s ,
58
t h a t  p e rp e tu a te  the  e x i s t i n g  common law. They u s u a l ly  o r i g i n a t e  
from s t a t i c  c o n s id e r a t i o n s ,  such as the  p r a c t i c a l  need f o r  a r e l i ­
a b le  com ila t ion  of s t a t u t e s  in f o r c e ,  spo t  c o d i f i c a t i o n s  of  a reas  of  
law because of  t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l  importance,  the  r e c o g n i t io n  of  uniform­
i t y  in f e d e r a l l y  organ ized  c o u n t r i e s ,  of  sy s tem at ic  o rd e r in g  of  un­
o f f i c i a l  but  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  c o d e - l ik e  s ta tem en ts  of  the  law in fo rce  
(Bayi tch ,  1965). The lack  of  r a d i c a l ,  dynamic elements in the  h i s ­
to ry  o f  Common Law c o d i f i c a t i o n s  r e s u l t s  from the  general i n e f f e c t i v e ­
ness in England and th e  United S t a t e s  of  r a d ic a l  id eo lo g ic a l  move­
ments t h a t  exploded as  d ramatic  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  upheavals .  The b u i l t -  
in  mechanism of  case law a d j u s t s  the  law to  changed economic and po­
l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  r ender ing  the  r e s o r t  to  o r ig i n a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  ac­
t i o n  l a r g e l y  unnecessary .
The in h e re n t  a d j u s t i n g  mechanism of  the  Common Law appears  v i v ­
id ly  in  the  economic u n i ty  in Common Law systems (Posner ,  1972). The 
c h a r a c t e r  o f  Common Law l i t i g a t i o n  provides  a forum f o r  a c o n f ro n ta ­
t i o n  on economic i s s u e s ,  because th e  j u d i c i a l  process  r e l i e s  p r im a r i ­
ly  on in d iv id u a l s  mot iva ted  by s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and p r a c t i c a l  c o n s id e r ­
a t io n s  r a t h e r  than on a l t r u i s t i c  reasons  or  l e g i s l a t i v e  o r  b u r e a u c ra t ­
ic  w i l l .  The adversa ry  system i s  c om pe t i t ive  by n a tu r e ,  f u r t h e r  ac ­
c e n tu a t in g  the  f u n c t io n  of  the  lega l  system in re sou rce  a l l o c a t i o n .
In dec id ing  c a s e s ,  th e  judge should f i r s t  determine what outcome i s  
d i c t a t e d  by p r i n c i p l e s  o f  n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e  and of  good common sense 
(Reid, 1814) and then  j u s t i f y  the  r e s u l t  in terms o f  preceden t  and 
s e t t l e d  lega l  p o l i c i e s .  The judge thereby  g e n e r a l ly  views th e  p a r t i e s  
to  the  l i t i g a t i o n  as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  a c t i v i t i e s  and aims to  r e so lv e
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the  c o n tex t  in terms o f  th e  comparative value  o f  th e  competing a c t i v ­
i t i e s .  The Common Law system o f  re so u rce  a l l o c a t i o n ,  thus  d e sc r ib e d ,  
i s  more e f f e c t i v e  in i t s  r e s u l t s  than comparable l e g i s l a t i v e  systems 
of  a l l o c a t i o n  (Posner ,  1972).
The importance o f  custom--immemorial, l o c a l ,  and commercia l - -1 ies  
in i t s  forming the  bases  f o r  the  e x p ec ta t io n s  t h a t  guide p e o p le ' s  a c ­
t i o n s .  Those p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  i n d iv id u a l s  depend on being observed ,  
and have thus  become th e  c o n d i t io n  f o r  the  success  of  most a c t i v i t i e s ,  
w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be regarded  as b in d in g ,  i n s o f a r  as they  do not  con­
f l i c t  wi th  fundamental n o t ions  o f  n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and e q u i ty .  Again, 
the  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  which th e se  customs secu re  i s  
not th e  r e s u l t  o f  any human w i l l  ( C a r t e r ,  1907, p. 331):
The g r e a t  general  r u l e  governing human a c t io n  a t  the  
beg inn ing ,  namely t h a t  i t  must conform to  f a i r  ex­
p e c t a t i o n s ,  i s  s t i l l  the  r u l e .  All forms of  conduct 
complying with  t h i s  r u l e  a re  c o n s i s t e n t  with  each 
o t h e r  and become the  recognized customs. All those  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  i t  a re  s t ig m a t i z e d  as bad p r a c t i ­
c e s .  The body o f  custom t h e r e f o r e  tends  to  become 
a harmonious system.
The process  by which exper iences  engender  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Natural 
Law i s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p reserved  in the  j u d i c i a l  process  of  th e  Com­
mon Law system. The j u d i c i a l  process  i s  a l o g i c a l l y  open system, 
which provides  a method f o r  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  of  lega l  q u e s t io n s  r a t h e r  
than s u b s t a n t i v e  r u l e s  to  be a p p l ied  in  a l l  c i rcum stances .
The techn ique  of  Engl ish  law i s  not one of  i n t e r p r e ­
t i n g  lega l  r u l e s ;  i t  c o n s i s t s ,  beginning with  those  
lega l  r u le s  a l r e ad y  en u n c ia ted ,  in d isco v e r in g  the  
lega l  r u l e - -perhaps  a new lega l  r u l e — t h a t  must be 
a p p l ie d  in t h e  i n s t a n t  case .  This s te p  i s  taken by 
paying very g r e a t  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  f a c t s  of  each 
case  and by c a r e f u l l y  s tu dy ing  the  reasons  f o r  d i s ­
t i n g u i s h in g  the  f a c tu a l  s i t u a t i o n  in the  case  a t  hand
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from those  in  previous  c a s e s .  To a new f a c t u a l  s i t ­
u a t i o n ,  t h e r e  c o r r e s p o n d s - - th e r e  must correspond in 
t h e  English  lega l  m e n t a l i t y - - a  new lega l  r u l e .  The 
f u n c t io n  o f  t h e  judge i s  to  render  j u s t i c e ,  no t  to  
fo rm ula te  in general  terms a s e r i e s  of  r u le s  the  
scope of  which may well exceed the  terms o f  the  d i s ­
pute  b e fo re  him (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p. 335; 
i t a l i c s  o r i g i n a l ).
The emphasis i s  on d i s t i n c t i o n s  between l i t i g a n t s ,  r a t h e r  than the  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  p o s i t i v e  law r u l e s .  Or, in th e  words o f  E r ic  Voe- 
g e l in  (1979),  "Law i s  d iscove red  by the  judge .  Law e x i s t s  a t  the  
p o in t  th e  judge a p p l i e s  th e  law; one cannot  c o n c e p tu a l i z e  an a b s t r a c t  
law in advance of  the  c o n c re te  c a s e . "  On th e  o t h e r  hand, l ega l  sy s ­
tems based on Human Design o f te n  tend to  be c losed  systems in which 
the  lega l  q u es t io n  i s  r e so lved  by an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  an e x i s t i n g  
p o s i t i v e  r u l e  o f  law.
The Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law
The Romano-Germanic (Romanesque) C iv i l  Law family  o f  lega l  s y s ­
tems (F ig .  4) d e r iv e s  from Roman law and developed as an e s s e n t i a l l y  
p r i v a t e  law t h a t  p u rp o r t s  to  r e g u l a t e  the  p r i v a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be­
tween i n d i v i d u a l s .  The c u l t u r e  h ea r th  o f  t h i s  f a m i ly ,  Cont inen ta l  
Europe, remains th e  c e n t e r  of  th e  Civ i l  Law world today .  Through d i f ­
fu s io n  and r e c e p t i o n ,  th e  Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law has spread th rough­
out  th e  modern world.
Within th e  Romano-Germanic fam ily ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  d iv id e  th e se  
Civ i l  Law systems f u r t h e r  by no t ing  th e  r e l a t i v e  importance o f  Roman 
o r  Germanic e lem en ts ,  thereby  c r e a t i n g  a La t in  subfamily (with France 
the  p r in c ip a l  lega l  system, plus  Belgium, Holland,  I t a l y ,  and S p a in ) ,  
and a German subfamily  ( in c lu d in g  West Germany, S w i tze r la n d ,  and Aus-
Fig. ^ Civil Law (excluding Mixed Jurisdictions and Soviet legal model)
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t r i a ) .  The lega l  systems o f  La t in  America should g e n e r a l l y  be r e ­
garded as p a r t  of  the  La t in  subfamily o f  the  Romano-Germanic lega l  
fam ily .  However, the  Anglo-American Common Law ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  of  
th e  United S t a t e s )  has so profoundly  a f f e c t e d  the  development of  the  
pub l ic  law o f  th e  L a t in  American systems t h a t  they may be suggested  
as s e p a ra t e  ca tegory  in  t h i s  g e o p o l i t i c a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  S im i l a r l y ,  
th e  lega l  systems o f  Scandinavia  a re  c l o s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  th e  Germanic 
subfamily  of  the  Romano-Germanic f am ily ,  but  important  d i f f e r e n c e s  
a r i s i n g  from c u l t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  c i rcumstances  j u s t i f i e s  a s e p a ra t e  
subfamily  o f  Nordic lega l  systems.
The O r ig ins  of  th e  Modern C iv i l  Law
The Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law i s  l a r g e l y  a conf luence  o f  fo u r  
h i s t o r i c a l  s treams o f  thought :  1) th e  p resence  o f  th e  Natural  Law
as embodied in Roman C a th o l ic  d o c t r in e  and Enlightenment though t ;  2) 
the  c u l t u r a l  ca taclysm o f  the  French Revolut ion of  1789 as a p o l i t i ­
cal  express ion  of  C a r te s ia n  c o n s t ru c t iv i sm ;  3) th e  modern c o d i f i c a t i o n  
movement as an a d ju n c t  to  th e  r i s e  o f  n a t io n a l i s m ,  and, 4) the  a s c e n ­
dancy o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o s i t iv i sm  as a dominant p o l i t i c a l  ideology o f  the  
modern, n a t i o n - s t a t e .
The t r u e  Natural  Law h e r i t a g e  o f  th e  C iv i l  Law i s  embraced in the  
d o c t r in e  t h a t  surrounds  th e  s u b s t a n t i v e ,  p o s i t i v e  law. The o n t o l o g i ­
cal  concept ion  of  the  Natural  Law re fu s e s  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  
" i s "  and th e  "ought" on the  ground t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a fundamental r e ­
l a t i o n  o f  being and oughtness .  I t  p o s tu l a t e s  the  idea of  an "order  o f  
r e a l i t y "  o f  which human, p o s i t i v e  laws a re  bu t  a p a r t  and from which
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alone they d e r iv e  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  ( d 'E n t r e v e s ,  1972). Perhaps ,  the  
c l e a r e s t  form of  d o c t r in e  exp ress ing  t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  was a s so c ia te d  
with the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  Natural Law enuncia ted  by S t .  Thomas Aquinas.
In the  view o f  S t .  Thomas, Natural  Law i s  the  r a t i o n a l  c r e a t u r e ' s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  E terna l  Law, which i s  th e  d iv in e  reason and w is ­
dom t h a t  d i r e c t s  a l l  movements and a c t io n s  in the  u n iv e r se .  The Nat­
ura l  Law i s  thus  r e a l l y  th e  d iv in e  reason ,  o r  E terna l  Law, i n s o f a r  as 
i t  a p p l i e s  to  man and i s  knowable to  him through e x e rc i s e  of  h is  r a t ­
ional f a c u l t y .  The most fundamental p recep t  o f  t h i s  Natural Law is  
t h a t  good i s  to  be done and e v i l  to  be avoided.  According to  S t .  
Thomas, i t  i s  the  vo ice  o f  reason in man t h a t  enab les  him to  glimpse 
the  Eterna l  Law and thus  make i t  p o s s ib l e  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between mor­
a l l y  good and bad a c t i o n s .
In the  Thomist ic  view, human laws a r e  "an ord inance  o f  reason 
f o r  th e  common good, made by him who has th e  ca re  of  th e  community, 
and promulgated" (Aquinas, qu. 90, a r t .  4 ) .  However, in o rde r  f o r  a 
l e g i s l a t i v e  decree  to  possess  the  q u a l i t y  of  law, i t  must conform to 
the  Natural Law, o the rw ise  i t  i s  bu t  a pe rve rs ion  of  th e  law. Laws 
t h a t  a re  repugnant  to  the  Natural Law m ain ta in  no leg i t im ac y  as law.
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  t h i s  C a th o l ic  view o f  Natural  Law was s e c u l a r i z e d  
as i t  passed through th e  Enlightenment.  The new school o f  n a tu ra l  law 
conceived of  c i v i l  law as the  law of  Reason. Only the  sovere ign  was 
capable of  d e f in in g  and reforming law; i t  was the  sovere ign  who pos­
sessed  th e  o s t e n s i b l e  power to  enu n c ia te  p r i n c i p l e s  of  n a tu ra l  law.
As Cambaceres (1753-1824) , th e  p r in c ip a l  lega l  a d v i s e r  to  Napoleon, 
observed,  i t  was easy to  change t h i s  purpose,  and l e g i s l a t o r s ,  o u t s id e
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any c o n s id e ra t io n  f o r  Natural Law, were to  use t h i s  power to  t r a n s ­
form th e  b a s is  of  s o c i e ty  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, pp. 60-61) .
This s e c u l a r i z a t i o n  o f  Natural  Law rece ived  g r e a t  impetus from 
the  French Revolution of  1789 and from the  p r e s t i g e  of  Napoleonic 
expansion.  Natural  Law p r i n c i p l e s ,  which were a r t i c u l a t e d  in the  
Roman C a th o l ic  d o c t r in e s  and ap p l ied  as customary law, were preserved 
only in so f a r  as they  served "Reason", th e  new god o f  the  E n l ig h te n ­
ment; and they  were in  any case  severed from t h e i r  Engendering Exper­
iences  by the  excesses  of  the  French Revolut ion and i t s  a f te rm ath  of  
lega l  c o n s t ru c t iv i sm  and o th e r  d e p a r tu re s  from th e  t r u e  o rd e r  o f  ex­
p e r ien ce .  As Napoleon i s  r ep o r ted  to  have remarked concerning the  
p r o j e t  ( d r a f t )  o f  the  French Code c i v i l  (Napoleonic Code),  "Who has 
the  p lace  of  God on e a r th ?  The lawmaker." Accordingly ,  th e  same 
French pa r l iam en t  t h a t  d r a f t e d  the  Napoleonic Code a l s o  l e g i s l a t i v e l y  
decreed t h a t  God did  not  e x i s t  ( S c o t t ,  1827, v o l .  1, ch. 17).  The 
English p a r l ia m e n t ,  two c e n tu r i e s  e a r l i e r ,  a t  l e a s t  l im i te d  i t s  urge 
to  hubr is  to  k i l l i n g  th e  l e g a t e  o f  God ( S t .  Thomas More) r a t h e r  than 
d ispos ing  of  God Himself.
The French Revolut ion was a t ime of  c r e a t i v e  t e n s i o n ,  an in t e n se  
cataclysm t h a t  swept th e  old o rd e r  be fo re  i t ,  so t h a t  those  who had 
prepared p a t i e n t l y  could  b u i ld  according  to  t h e i r  own design (Camus, 
1956, pp. 112-32).  The Revolut ion of  1789 presumed the  idea l  o f  a 
r a t i o n a l  so c ia l  o r d e r ,  a necessary  p r e - c o n d i t io n  f o r  success fu l  cod­
i f i c a t i o n  (David, 1972, p. 12) .  The i n t e l l e c t u a l  f o rc e  was t h a t  of 
s e c u la r  na tu ra l  law, reason and r a t io n a l i s m  (Merryman, 1969, pp. 16- 
17).  " Ideo log ica l  pass ion  d isp la ce d  reason ;  r e v o lu t io n a ry  ideas  be­
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came dogmas; the  r e v o lu t io n  became u top ian"  (Merryman, 1969, p. 19).
As with subsequent  democrat ic  r e v o l u t i o n s ,  t h e  b e l i e f  was f o s t e r e d
t h a t  the  law was made by people a s p i r i n g  to  t h e i r  des igns  and d e s i r e s
(D ie tze ,  1973, p. 162):
Only law made by th e  people  was recognized  as n a tu ­
ra l  law, be i t  made through t ra n sm u ta t io n  o f  h igher  
law in to  p o s i t i v e  norms o r  what happened more f r e ­
q u e n t ly ,  through th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  such norms i r r e s p e c ­
t i v e  o f  h ig h e r  law.
P o s i t i v e  law, t h e r e f o r e ,  approximated s e c u l a r i z e d  n a tu ra l  law, to  the
e x te n t  t h a t  i t  d e f e r r e d  to  Natural Law to  a l l .
Relying on s e c u l a r  t h e o r i e s  o f  n a tu r a l  law, l e ad e r s  in the  French 
Revolu tion sought to  d e v i s e  a l o g i c a l  code,  the  p ro v is io n s  of  which 
were to  embody r a t i o n a l  ru le s  o f  idea l  j u s t i c e .  The Napoleonic Code 
c ap tu re s  in c o d i f i e d  e x p ress io n  th e  concepts  o f  th e  French Revolu t ion .  
The Code r e l i e s  on n a tu r a l  law concept ions  o f  l i b e r t y  and p ro p e r ty ,  
but the  i n f lu e n c e  of  th e  Enlightenment led  to  a re fo rm u la t io n  o f  t r a ­
d i t i o n a l  Roman law e lem en ts ,  C h r i s t i a n  i d e a s ,  and customary p r a c t i c e s  
along i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  l i n e s .  This  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  was accomplished 
with th e  a id  o f  d o c t r in a l  c o n t r ib u t i o n s  from the  Renaissance and the  
Enlightenment (Cueta-Rua,  1976-77, p. 651).
The r e d a c to r s  ( d r a f t e r s )  o f  the  code perce ived  no in h e re n t  c o n t r a ­
d i c t i o n  between p o s i t i v e  law and n a tu ra l  law. "There was then and 
th e r e  i s  s t i l l  today ,  a d i a l e c t i c a l  t e n s io n  between P o s i t i v e  Law, the  
law enac ted ,  p o s i t , by the  s t a t e ,  and th e  Natural Law, th e  law based 
on human re a so n ,  o r  in th e  n a tu re  o f  t h i n g s ,  o r  r evea led  to  men by 
God. That d i a l e c t i c a l  t e n s io n  i s  to  remain fo re v e r"  (Cueta-Rua, 1976- 
77, p. 655).  A r t i c l e  I of  the  p r o j e t  of  the  Napoleonic Code af f i rm ed
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the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  Natural  Law, which, as n a tu r a l  r ea so n ,  was co n s id ­
ered the  source  of  a l l  p o s i t i v e  law (D ie tze ,  1971, p. 149).  This 
a r t i c l e  was omit ted  from th e  f i n a l  v e r s io n  of  the  code,  a l ap se  t h a t  
was, perhaps ,  no mere o v e r s i g h t .  The opponents o f  Natural  Law may 
have cons idered  i t s  absence to  mean t h a t  a "h igher"  law than  the  
p o s i t i v e  law was no lo n g e r  to  be presumed to  e x i s t .  The p roponents ,  
perhaps n a iv e ly ,  assumed t h a t  th e  l e g i s l a t o r  could a c t  in  no o th e r  
way but  in  conformity  w ith  Natural  Law. L e g i s l a t i o n ,  they b e l i e v e d ,  
would c o n s t i t u e  a t r a n sm u ta t io n  o f  Natural  Law.
I f  law i s  made by the  people through t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  i t  
could n o t ,  in Revo lu t ionary  th e o ry ,  be c o n t r a ry  to  Natural  Law. Dem­
o c r a t i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  was thus  l e f t  unchecked by c o n s id e ra t i o n  o f  a 
law beyond t h a t  of  man. I t  i s  t e l l i n g l y  i r o n i c  in r e t r o s p e c t  the  
French code, which was l a r g e l y  the  product  o f  the  school of  n a tu ra l  
law in which p r i n c i p l e s  were der ived  from human reaso n ,  l a t e r  was so 
r e a d i l y  a p p ro p r i a t e d  by the  lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s t s .
The C iv i l  Law and L e g i s l a t i o n
God needs time j u s t  as much as your  o r  I 
To ge t  th in g s  done, Reformers f a i l  to  see  t h a t .
— Robert F r o s t ,  Masque o f  Reason.
Although Civ i l  Law l e g i s l a t i o n  f r e q u e n t l y  r e f l e c t s  in  i t s  sub­
s tan ce  th e  law t h a t  preceeded i t ,  i t  i s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  in e s sen ce ,  a 
new d e p a r tu r e .  The idea  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  as th e  supreme source  of  law 
was a b a s ic  p rec ep t  o f  th e  Jacobins  dur ing  th e  French Revolu tion and 
was a r t i c u l a t e d  by them in f i v e ,  s u c c e s s iv e ,  l e g i s l a t e d  codes .  The 
Jacobins  contended t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  no t ions  could be b e s t  promoted by
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the  e x e r c i s e  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  power a t  the  expense o f  o t h e r  sources  of  
law t h a t  were thought  to  be founded on the  idea o f  th e  in h e re n t  i n ­
e q u a l i t y  of  s o c ia l  c l a s s e s  (Yiannopoulas , 1971). For example, e g a l ­
i t a r i a n  spokesmen n a t u r a l l y  sought to  b r ing  about a more n ea r ly  equal 
d i v i s i o n  of  p ro p e r ty ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  through the  e l im in a t io n  o f  the  cus­
tomary feudal  t en u re s  o f  the  ancien  regime (which were b e l ieved  to  
have prevented i n d i v i d u a l s  from a c q u i r in g  p roper ty )  and through the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  fo rced  h e i r s h i p .
In the  C iv i l  Law, l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  the  "one and only a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
source  o f  [ p o s i t i v e ]  law to  which a l l  o th e r s  a re  subord ina ted"  (Dainow, 
1974, p. 7 ) .  C i v i l i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  l i b e r a l l y  cons trued  through a n a l ­
ogy, d o c t r i n e , and ju r i s p ru d e n c e  (Dainow, 1974; D ie tze ,  1973). La 
d o c t r in e  i s  fo rmula ted  by lega l  s c h o la r s  f o r  th e  purpose of  working 
f o r  th e  p rog ress  o f  leg a l  sc ie n ce  and the  advancement of  law (Dainow,
1974). What C i v i l i a n s  c a l l  "j u r i s p r u d e n c e " i s  fo rmula ted  in th e  course  
o f  the  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  and a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  law, which i s  
p r i n c i p a l l y  th e  p rovince  o f  the  c o u r t s .  Inasmuch as the  c o u r t s  a re  
su b o rd in a te  to  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  in the  C iv i l i a n  system, i t  i s  an inev­
i t a b l e  consequence t h a t  sometimes l e g i s l a t i o n  becomes an important  
tool  o f  c e n t r a l i z e d  government.  This u t i l i t y  o f  the  Civi l  Law in cen­
t r a l i z e d  reform produces an e v e r - i n c r e a s in g  bulk of  l e g i s l a t i o n  and 
ever  more d e t a i l e d  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  in to  a l l  f a c e t s  o f  
th e  s u b j e c t s '  l i v e s .  Such pe rv as iv e  governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n  through 
l e g i s l a t i o n  f r e q u e n t l y  i s  s a id  to  be j u s t i f i e d  in the  name of  eq u a l ­
i t y  and n a t io n a l  s e c u r i t y  (Mises, 1969). The o b je c t i v e s  o f  a c o l l e c ­
t i v i s t  government,  such as a t o t a l i t a r i a n - s o c i a l i s t  o r  w e l fa re  s t a t e ,
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a re  only a t t a i n a b l e  through massive l e g i s l a t i o n .  A l lo c a t io n  of  r e ­
sources  by l e g i s l a t i o n  r e q u i re s  no accep tance  o f  the  guidance pro­
vided by the  e f f i c i e n c y  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  the  ad­
v e r sa ry  system. As a r e s u l t ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  t o o l s  f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  
wealth  a re  much more f l e x i b l e  and powerful than the  j u d i c i a l  (Posner ,  
1972; Mises,  1977).
The Civ i l  Law and th e  C o d i f i c a t io n  Movement
In th e  l a t e  e ig h t e e n th  and e a r l y  n in e te e n th  c e n t u r i e s ,  v a r ious  
c o u n t r i e s  began to  co d i fy  th e  Civ i l  Law. By the  end of  th e  n in e t e e n th  
c e n tu ry ,  c o d i f i c a t i o n  and n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  law had become t y p i ­
cal o f  C iv i l  Law systems.  P r i o r  to  th e  c o d i f i c a t i o n  movement in  Eur­
ope,  the  laws o f  any s t a t e  commonly c o n s i s t e d  of a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of  
loca l  and customary laws.  From the  e ig h te e n th  cen tu ry  on, t h e r e  ap­
peared a dec ided and e f f e c t i v e  t re nd  toward n a t io n a l  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  
d iv e r s e  loca l  laws through c o d i f i c a t i o n .
By c o n t r a s t  to  t h e  gradual growth o f  the  Common Law, th e  Civi l  
Code was th e  product  o f  the  age o f  r a t io n a l i s m  and c o n s t ru c t iv i s m .
The codes o f  t h i s  t im e ,  such as the  French Civi l  Code (1804) and the  
A us t r ian  C iv i l  Code (1811),  were not  d i g e s t s  o r  r e s ta te m e n ts  o f  law, 
but  a means o f  innova t ion  by which p r i n c i p l e s  based in  "reason" were 
to  form th e  b a s i s  o f  law. The r e s u l t  was a sys tem a t ic  and a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e  code marking a new s t a r t  f o r  the  lega l  l i f e  o f  an e s t a b l i s h e d  
n a t i o n - s t a t e  by g iv ing  e f f e c t  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  phi losophy.
The n a tu ra l  law d o c t r in e  merged in th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  with  
the  h i s t o r i c a l  and programatic  elements  o f  th e  law in fo rc e  in the
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e ig h te e n th  cen tu ry  c o d i f i c a t i o n s .  This i s  ev id en t  in the  a b i l i t y  of 
the  Civ i l  Law to  absorb  r a t i o n a l  and id eo lo g ic a l  elements  (Cueta-Rua, 
1976-77, pp. 647-48).  The p r a c t i c a l  success  of  th e  n in e te e n th  cen tury  
Napoleonic Code animated and encouraged th e  modern c o d i f i c a t i o n  move­
ment and an ons laught  by lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  (Hayek, 1976). The Aus­
t r i a n  C iv i l  Code o f  1811 presen ted  a formal exp ress ion  o f  the  l in k ag e  
o f  reason with  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l  (Cueta-Rua, 1976-77, pp. 651-52).
The lega l  p o s i t i v i s t s  had p r e v a i l e d .
An a t tem pt  was made to  r e c o n c i l e  the  n a tu ra l  law d o c t r in e  with  
t h e  German h i s t o r i c a l  school o f  F r i e d r i c h  Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) . 
The e f f o r t  a c t u a l l y  d iminished  the  r o l e  o f  Natural Law because d i r ­
e c t in g  n a tu ra l  law d o c t r in e  toward so c ia l  aims d i f f e r s  l i t t l e  from 
the  d i r e c t  use o f  p o s i t i v e  law in r e a l i z i n g  such aims. Savigny a r ­
gued th e  dangers o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  in h i s  deba te  with  T h ibau t ,  a l e a d ­
ing proponent f o r  the  c o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  German law (D ie tz e ,  1971, p.
157).  That S av igny 's  h i s t o r i c a l  sch o o l ,  with i t s  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  law 
o f  people was an h i s t o r i c a l l y  determined product  o f  a p e o p le ' s  d ev e l ­
opment, was doomed to  f a i l u r e ;  a contemporary remarked, "A simple 
s t ro k e  o f  the  pen by th e  l e g i s l a t o r ,  and whole volumes o f  lea rned  com­
m enta r ie s  become o b so le te "  (Herman von Kirchman, quoted by D ie tze ,
1971, p.  157).
The h i s t o r i c a l l y  o r ie n te d  German Civ i l  Code o f  1896, prompted by 
th e  u n i f i c a t i o n  in 1871 of  the  Deutsches R e ich e s , r e f l e c t e d  th e  i n f l u ­
ence of  Savigny. The c o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  h i s t o r i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
German law in an e f f o r t  a t  lega l  u n i t y ,  however, r e q u i re d  l e g i s l a t i v e  
supremacy. I t  i s  r a t h e r  i r o n i c  t h a t  even in th e  y e a r  o f  ac tua l  pro­
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mulgat ion o f  the German Code, i t  was 1e q i s l a t i o n  t h a t  r eq u i red  the  
monarch and l e g i s l a t u r e  to  a c t  in conformity with p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s ­
t i c e  and n a tu ra l  law (D ie tz e ,  1971, p. 150).  By th e  time of  the  f o r ­
mation of  the  democrat ic  Weimar Republ ic ,  however, lo g i c a l  p o s i t iv i s m  
e x p l i c i t l y  dominated German lega l  c u l t u r e .  L e g i s l a t i o n  was no long­
e r  r e s t r i c t e d  by Natural Law (D ie tze ,  1971, p. 151).  Gesetz ueber  
Recht! ( " L e g i s l a t i o n  above th e  Law!). The R e c h t s t a a t  had become 
the  S t a a t r e c h t ; the  law no longer  preceded the s t a t e ,  but the s t a t e  
came befo re  the  law. The "Lawful S ta te "  became the  " S ta te  Law."
Codes and Modern Reform Movements
C i v i l i a n  codes u s u a l ly  emerge from s t r o n g l y  id eo lo g ic a l  p o l i t i ­
cal movements and bear  the  im pr in t  of  th e se  reform programs t ransposed  
in to  s t a t u t o r y  language.  C o d i f i c a t io n  i s  one o f  th e  most po ten t  wea­
pons of  law re fo rm ers .  The French C iv i l  Code, f o r  example, was r e ­
ceived  in Belgium, th e  N e the r lands ,  the  Rhenish P rov inces ,  Luxembourg, 
Baden, Poland, and I t a l y ,  j u s t  to  name a few of  th e  r e c e iv in g  coun­
t r i e s  in  Europe. The law o f  t h e se  codes was, a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y ,  de­
r ived  from a b s t r a c t ,  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  made in times when 
new id eo lo g ie s  had e rup ted  in r e v o lu t io n s  t h a t  essayed to  change the  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic s t r u c t u r e  of  the  e x i s t i n g  c i v i l  o rd e r  by the  
im posi t ion  o f  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l  o f  the  dominant p o l i t i c a l  power 
(Bay i tch ,  1965). The r i s e  o f  t h e  s e c u l a r  r e l i g i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  with 
the  Code c i v i l  has been desc r ibed  r e c e n t l y  in e loquen t  terms by a Civ­
i l i a n :
I f  r a t i o n a l i s m  was the  mother o f  th e  Code Napoleon, then
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h u b r is  was i t s  f a t h e r .  By means of  the  C a r t e s ia n  
method, men might become masters  and p o ssesso rs  
o f  n a t u r e ,  bu t  i m p l i c i t  in  such an achievement 
was the  p o t e n t i a l  u su rp a t io n  o f  God's a u t h o r i t y .
D esca r te s '  ph i losophy ,  because i t  s t r e s s e d  s e l f -  
r e l i a n c e ,  s u b je c t i v e  c e r t i t u d e ,  and th e  u n t r u s t ­
wor th iness  o f  the  v i s i b l e  n a tu ra l  o r d e r ,  c o n s t i ­
t u t e d  a manual f o r  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .  Men would 
become godl ike  as they  genera ted  n a tu r e  from 
t h e i r  own mental p rocesses  and forced  i t  to  change 
as they  w i l l e d .  For th e  French r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ,  
t h i s  view o f  man's un l im i ted  power implied  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a b o l i sh in g  the  complex feudal  r e ­
s t r a i n t s  o f  th e  Ancien Regime by means o f  a co­
he ren t  body o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  de r ived  from th e  p re ­
sumably immutable p r i n c i p l e s  o f  human i n t e r a c t i o n .
The Code C iv i l  was th e  consequence o f  u top ian  v i s ­
ion THerman, i g 7 9 s pp. 389-90).
Every c o n s id e ra b le  so c ia l  r e v o lu t i o n  produces i t s  crop o f  laws
a f f e c t i n g ,  f o r  example, land h o ld ings .  In th e  case  of  r e v o lu t io n s
based on e q u a l i t a r i a n  ideology and a s t rong  c e n t r a l  government,  such 
laws, whether  c a l c u l a t e d  o r  n o t ,  break up o r  p reven t  th e  r i s e  o f  l a r g e  
e s t a t e s ,  r e s t r i c t  ho ld ings  to  small a c r eag e ,  and l i m i t  th e  a g r i c u l ­
t u r a l  occupance to  th o se  modes in which small ho ld ings  pay (W h i t t l e ­
sey ,  1935, p. 457; see  a l s o ,  W i t t fo g e l ,  1957). Indeed,  th e  most im­
p re s s iv e  c o d i f i c a t i o n s  (pu t  forward as exp ress ions  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  de­
s ign)  emanate from a u t h o r i t a r i a n  regimes t h a t  deny freedom o f  p o l i t i ­
cal and economic a c t i o n ,  and tak in g  in s t e a d  th e  form o f  one,  a l l - e m ­
b rac in g ,  o f f i c i a l  d o c t r i n e ,  such t o t a l  ism f in d s  p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n  in an 
a b s o lu te  r u l e r ,  an unb r id led  l e g i s l a t i v e  body, t h e  dominant ( o f t e n ,  
so le )  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ,  or  the  government 's  b u r e a u c r a t i c  agencies  
(Bay i tch ,  1965).
Because C iv i l i a n  codes a r e  o r ig i n a l  and "break" with  the  p a s t ,  
they  can se rve  as t o o l s  f o r  the  p e r f e c t i o n  o f  s o c i e ty  through l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  d e s ig n ,  as models f o r  the  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  c i v i l  o rd e r .  Be­
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cause codes a l s o  f u n c t io n  as symbols o f  so v e re ig n ty  and o f  a new geo­
p o l i t i c a l  a l ignm ent ,  c o d i f i c a t i o n s  have a l s o  a t tended  changes in the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  p o s i t i o n  o f  n a t i o n s ,  such as the  achievement of  
n a t iona l  independence; sh a r in g  a code gives  t a n g i b l e  form to  the  s h a r ­
ing of  an ideo logy .  The lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  t h a t  o f te n  reposes  in a 
code, betokens a change in which "law ceased to  be i d e n t i f i e d  with 
j u s t i c e  and was now a s s o c i a t e d  with  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  
each na t ion"  (David and B r i e r ! e y ,  1978, p. 63) .
L e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  th e  pr im ary ,  a lmost  e x c lu s iv e ,  source 
of  law r u le s  in the  p r e se n t  day C iv i l  Law. In t h e i r  sea rch  f o r  lega l  
r u l e s ,  C i v i l i a n  j u r i s t s  look f i r s t  to  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The q u es t ion  i s  
n o t ,  "Does th e  p o s i t i v e  law ap p ly ?" ,  b u t ,  "What law to  apply?"  "Their  
t a sk  seems to  be e s s e n t i a l l y  one o f  d i s c e r n i n g ,  by means o f  v a r i e d  
methods o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  the  s o lu t i o n  which in each case  corresponds 
to  the  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t o r s "  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p.  94) .
Supplements to  L e g i s l a t i o n  Under the  C iv i l  Law
L e g is l a t i o n  i s  n o t ,  however,  d e s p i t e  i t s  primacy, the  ex c lu s iv e  
C iv i l i a n  source  o f  the  law. Custom i s  a secondary a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
source o f  law r u l e s .  The p o s i t i v i s t s  r e l e g a t e d  custom to  a low l e v e l .  
Custom may e n t e r  i n to  a lega l  r e l a t i o n  in two ways, 1) to  i n d i c a t e  to  
the  j u r i s t  a j u s t  s o lu t i o n  in th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and 
2 ) to  apply as th e  law r u l e  when s p e c i f i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  ab sen t  on 
the  p o in t  in  q u e s t io n .  In th e  C i v i l i a n  c o n te x t ,  custom has been de­
f in e d  as the  r e s u l t  o f  "a long s e r i e s  o f  a c t i o n s  c o n s ta n t ly  r e p e a te d ,  
which have by such r e p e t i t i o n ,  and by u n in t e r r u p t e d  acqu iescence ,
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acqu ired  the  f o r c e  o f  a t a c i t  and common consen t"  (La. C iv i l  Code,
A r t .  3 ) .  Said d i f f e r e n t l y ,  custom amounts f o r  th e  C i v i l i a n  to  what 
might be c a l l e d  " p re -p a r ! ia m e n ta ry  l e g i s l a t i o n "  and in t h a t  l i e s  i t s  
l e g i t im a c y .  In any c a s e ,  th e  C i v i l i a n  lega l  framework i s  a l o g i c a l l y  
c losed  system in t h a t  i t  den ies  fundamental s t a t u s  to  custom and 
p o l i t y .  The code i s  viewed in a formal se n se ,  as an a c t  of  l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  w i l l ;  the  law -g iv e r  may ( a t  l e a s t ,  to  the  p o s i t i v i s t )  w i l l  any­
t h in g  t h a t  he l i k e s  w i th in  the  co d e ' s  t e r r i t o r i a l  boundar ies .
The two p r in c ip a l  pe r su a s iv e  sources  (as d i s t i n c t  from a u th o r ­
i t a t i v e  sou rces )  o f  t h e  law a r e  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  and d o c t r in e .  De­
c ided  cases  do not  c r e a t e  r u l e s  of  law; t h a t  i s  th e  e x c lu s iv e  province  
o f  the  l e g i s l a t u r e .  They a r e  im por tan t  in two r e s p e c t s :  1) they may
be used to  a s s i s t  in t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and 2) they 
se rve  as an a id  to  m ain ta in in g  a c e r t a i n  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  in th e  p o s i ­
t i v e  law. L e g i s l a t i o n  i s  supplemented by th e  c o u r t s .  Judges a re  p e r ­
m i t te d  l i t t l e  d i s c r e t i o n  in i n t e r p r e t i n g  laws. They must apply only 
th e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  French judges  a r e ,  indeed,  r eq u i re d  to  c i t e  th e  t e x t  
o f  laws on which t h e i r  d e c i s io n s  a re  based (David and DeVries,  1958, 
p. 15).  The absence o f  j u d i c i a l  review (under  which, laws can be n u l ­
l i f i e d  by th e  judge)  lea v e s  no t e s t  f o r  a la w 's  le g i t im a c y  in terms 
o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r  some o t h e r  h ig h e r  law. J u r i sp ru d e n c e  i s  thus  not  
a source  o f  C iv i l  Law r u l e s ,  but  r a t h e r  a p e r su a s iv e  so u rce ,  an i n f l u ­
ence on the  judge  in th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  law r u l e s .
A continuous l i n e  o f  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  may, however, assume the  b ind­
ing q u a l i t y  of  a j u d i c i a l  p r a c t i c e ,  a process  i d e n t i f i e d  as j u r i s p r u -  
dence c o n s ta n te .
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Doctr ine  i s  lega l  w r i t i n g  by s c h o la r s .  I t  may in f lu e n c e  the  
judge in much the  same way as j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  (David and DeVries,  
1958, pp. 104-07).  There seem a l s o  to  be "supereminent p r i n c i p l e s "  
t h a t  help f i l l  th e  gaps in  l e g i s l a t i o n  and, in excep t iona l  c a s e s ,  may 
r e o r i e n t  o r  o the rw ise  modify t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  so as to  
conform with  th e  l a w 's  in tended  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  so c ia l  o rd e r  and j u s ­
t i c e  (David and DeVries,  1958, p. 117) .  They a r e ,  perhaps ,  ev idence 
of  the  lega l  p o s i t i v i s t ' s  i n a b i l i t y  to  escape Natural  Law e n t i r e l y .
In c o n c lu s io n ,  in  C iv i l  Law systems,  th e  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  sources  
o f  th e  law no lo n g e r  d e r iv e  from t h e i r  engendering e x p e r ien ces .  They 
have been reduced to  a body o f  d o c t r i n e  through l e g i s l a t i o n .  The 
code only i n d i r e c t l y  d e r iv e s  from th e  Engendering Experience of  the  
people being governed by th e  code. There i s ,  however an o th e r  engen­
der ing  ex p e r ien ce ,  one t h a t  t r a n s p i r e s  in  v i t r i o , so to  speak; t h a t  
exper ience  i s  th e  l e g i s l a t o r ' s  exper ience  o f  h is  own h u b r i s ,  and the  
code bears  the  mark o f  i t s  f a t h e r ' s  l u s t s .  When the  Engineering Ex­
per ience  i s  s e p a ra ted  from th e  sources  o f  o rd e r  by becoming d o c t r i n a l - 
i z e d ,  the  lega l  p rocess  tends  to  be p red isposed  to  id e o lo g ic a l  change. 
In th e  i n i t i a l  phase o f  d o c t r i n a l i z a t i o n ,  much o f  t h e  engendering 
exper ience  t h a t  unfo lds  the  Natural  Law (Human Action) may be p re ­
served in the  verbal  co n te n t  ( subs tance )  o f  th e  code, even though the  
connect ion has been broken by a tu rn  to  lega l  c o n s t ru c t iv i sm  (Human 
Design).  A f te rwards ,  i t  i s  a com para t ive ly  easy s te p  from an i d e o l ­
ogy t h a t  embraces a n a tu r a l  law d o c t r in e  to  an ideology based on 
Marxism o r  most any o th e r  d o c t r in e .
75
The Sov ie t  C iv i l  Law
The S o v ie t  C iv i l  Law fam ily  inc ludes  the  lega l  systems of  the  
Union o f  Sov ie t  S o c i a l i s t  Republics  and those  p e o p le ' s  r e p u b l ic s  
t h a t  fo l low the  S o v ie t  lega l  model (F ig .  5 ) .  The Sov ie t  lega l  s y s ­
tem i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  on the  founda t ion  of h i s t o r i c a l ,  d i a l e c t i c a l  
m a te r ia l i sm  (Hayek, 1955; Popper ,  1957). Under th e  c o l l e c t i v i s t  
ideology o f  Marxism, S o v ie t  Law i s  viewed as an in s t rum en t  f o r  the  
reform of  product ion  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  and f o r  t h e  reform of  man in 
the  l i g h t  o f  the  M arx is t  p r o sp e c t iv e  image o f  him. Within th e  Marxis t  
lega l  s t r u c t u r e ,  law f u n c t io n s  to  a s s i s t  in t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  norms o f  
thought  and a c t io n  by prov id ing  an a p p r o p r i a t e  environment and by 
making enforcement  o f  t h e  law an occas ion  f o r  i n s t r u c t i o n .  This con­
d i t i o n i n g  r o l e  o f  S o v ie t  Law underscores  th e  concern f o r  th e  c r e a t i o n  
of  a "Sov ie t  m o r a l i t y . "  As a consequence,  S o v ie t  Law i s  focused ,  
not  on r e so lv in g  c o n f l i c t  between in d iv id u a l s  o r  competing i n t e r e s t s ,  
but on b r in g in g  people c l o s e r  to  an o s t e n s i b l y  c l a s s l e s s ,  c o l l e c t i v i s t  
s o c i e ty .
As p a r t  o f  th e  d o c t r in e  of  d i a l e c t i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m ,  law i s  viewed 
by the  Marxis ts  as a r e f l e c t i o n  of  economic c o n d i t i o n s .  Law i s  thus 
a form o f  c l a s s  r u l e .  Marx w r i t e s  in h is  Communist Manifes to  (1954, 
p t .  I I ,  p. 47 ) ,  "Your ju r i s p ru d e n c e  i s  bu t  the  w i l l  o f  your  c l a s s  made 
in to  a law f o r  a l l ,  a w i l l  whose e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r  and d i r e c t i o n  a re  
determined by the  economic c o n d i t io n s  o f  e x i s t e n c e  o f  your  c l a s s . "  
F r i e d r i c h  Engels (1934, p. 53) obse rv es ,  " I f  the  S t a t e  and pu b l ic  law 
a re  determined by economic r e l a t i o n s ,  so to o ,  o f  c o u r se ,  i s  p r i v a t e  
law, which indeed in essence  san c t io n s  only the  e x i s t i n g  economic r e -
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l a t i o n s  between in d i v i d u a l s  which a re  normal in the  given c i rcum stan ­
c e s . "  That such views o f  law a re  s t i l l  p r e se n t  in the  Sov ie t  m en ta l ­
i t y  i s  e v id e n t  in the  words of  contemporary w r i t e r s ,  such as Stuchka 
and Vyschinsky. Stuchka a s s e r t s  t h a t  law i s  "a system (o r  o rde r)  o f  
so c ia l  r e l a t i o n s  which corresponds to  the  i n t e r e s t s  of  the  dominant 
c l a s s  and i s  safeguarded  by the  organized fo rc e  of  t h a t  c l a s s "  (Ha­
z a rd ,  1951, p. 20) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Vyshinsky, who.was once the  A t torney-  
General o f  the  U. S. S. R . ,  sees  law as a system o f  norms des igned 
" to  guard,  s ecu re  and develop s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and s o c ia l  o rde rs  
advantageous and ag re ea b le  to  the  dominant c l a s s "  (1948, p. 50).
The s o c i a l i s t  concept  o f  law can be d i r e c t l y  t r a ced  to  the  move­
ment o f  l eg a l  p o s i t i v i s m ,  which views law as an express ion  o f  l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  w i l l  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p. 94) .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  i t  
i s  not p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  both Karl Marx and Vladimir  I .  
Lenin rece ived  t h e i r  l eg a l  educa t ions  in c o u n t r i e s  o f  Romano-Germanic 
Civ i l  Law. "The danger o f  r u p tu re  w i th in  th e  [Romano-Germanic] family  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  g r e a t  when a regime i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  in one country 
which a s p i r e s  to  being t r u l y  r e v o lu t io n a ry  and which, not  c on ten t  
with merely remodeling th e  c o u n t r y ' s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  may go so f a r  as to  
r e p u d ia te  our  [ C i v i l i a n ]  b a s ic  ph i lo so p h ica l  concept  of  law" (David 
and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p. 68) .  Before the  Russian Revolut ion o f  1917, 
Russian law was in  th e  Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law fam ily .  To the  Rus­
s ian  j u r i s t ,  th e  lega l  r u l e  was, e s s e n t i a l l y  a r u le  of  conduct  p re ­
s c r ib e d  f o r  i n d iv id u a l s  and formulated  by l e g i s l a t o r s ,  not by judges .  
Even though Russian law was incomple te ly  c o d i f i e d ,  the  seeds o f  lega l  
p o s i t i v i s m ,  and hence,  of  Human Design, had been sown. This prepared
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the  way f o r  an id e o lo g ic a l  s h i f t  enhancing Marxis t  views o f  law.
"In a p p r a i s in g  th e  world-wide in f lu en c e  o f  the  C iv i l  Law, i t  
must be remembered, f i n a l l y ,  t h a t  c e r t a i n  C iv i l  Law elements  remain 
a l i v e  in the  lega l  systems o f  those  n a t io n s  which today belong to  the  
communist o r b i t "  (S c h le s in g e r ,  1970, p. 266).  A C i v i l i a n  technique  
used in a S o v ie t  lega l  system, however,  f r e q u e n t ly  undergoes a s u b t l e  
change o f  purpose .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  a lawyer t r a i n e d  in th e  C iv i l  Law 
may d i s a g r e e  with  th e  ideo logy ,  in  l i e u  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  Natural Law, 
t h a t  permeates th e  t e x t  o r  with  the  implementation of  th e se  codes; 
but  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e ,  te rm s ,  and techn ique  w i l l  be reasonably  f a m i l i a r  
to  him ( S c h le s in g e r ,  1970, p. 266).  The forms o f  lega l  systems t h a t  
a r t i c u l a t e  a c i v i l  o rd e r  based on Human Design a r e  p red isposed  to 
fu n c t io n  in a new c o n te x t  when a change in th e  p o l i t i c a l  ideology ex­
t e r n a l  to  the  le g a l  process  r e s u l t s  in th e  i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  any new 
lega l  system t h a t  i s  a l s o  based on human des ign .
T h e i r  lega l  philosophy o f  Human Design and l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l  p re ­
d ispose  C i v i l i a n  systems to  fo l low  the  S o v ie t  lega l  model when they  come 
under Communist, o r  " S o c i a l i s t " ,  r u l e .  This lega l  p revenience appears  
in the  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  concept ion  o f  lega l  codes in both the  C iv i l  Law 
and Sov ie t  Law as models o f  s o c ia l  o r g a n iz a t io n .  Both systems aim a t  
the  c i v i l  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  man and s o c i e ty  through l e g i s l a t i v e  des ign  
and c e n t r a l  p lann ing .
In th e  S o v ie t  Union, the  r e v o lu t io n a ry  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  of  s o c ie ty  
through l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  p resen ted  as being imposed by th e  "n a tu ra l  laws" 
of  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m .  The w i l l  to  t ransfo rm  s o c ie ty  i s  found a t  
the  very h e a r t  o f  Human Design. Communists o f  the  M a rx i s t -L e n in i s t
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persuas ion  w i l l  only q u a l i f y  as law those  ru le s  o f  conduct l a i d  down 
and sanc t ioned  by the  s t a t e .  Such l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  b e l iev ed  to  be con­
d i t i o n e d  by the  h i s t o r i c  un fo ld ing  o f  law in i t s  s o c ia l  o r  n a tu ra l  
c o n te x t .  The Marxis t  theo ry  o f  law i s  g e n e r a l ly  a v a r i a n t  o f  p o s i t i ­
v i s t  d o c t r in e  t h a t  r e j e c t s  Natural  Law. But a c l e v e r  semantic  i l l u s i o n  
i s  p r e s e n t .  Even though in p r i n c i p l e ,  Marxism appears  to  d i f f e r  from 
a pure p o s i t i v i s m  in  t h a t  i t  i s  w i l l i n g  to  acknowledge th e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  h i s t o r i c a l  l i m i t s  to  l e g i s l a t i v e  power; in p r a c t i c e ,  i t  remains a 
t r u l y  p o s i t i v i s t i c  concep t ion  o f  law and human des ign  p r e v a i l s  as the  
under ly ing  lega l  and p o l i t i c a l  philosophy.
The only  r ea l  source  f o r  S o v ie t  Law is  the  Supreme S o v ie t ,  which 
i s  l e g i s l a t i v e  in n a tu re  and which cons t rues  c i v i l  o rd e r  as designed 
accord ing  to the  c u r r e n t  concept ion  o f  "Sov ie t  t r u t h . "  The preemi­
nence o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  has been e x p l i c i t l y  d e c la r e d .  This view is  r e ­
f l e c t e d  in the  Sov ie t  a t t i t u d e  towards c o d i f i c a t i o n .  Codes a r e  con­
ce ived of  as models o f  c i v i l  o r g a n iz a t io n  t h a t  aim a t  th e  p e r f e c t io n  
o f  s o c i e ty  no l e s s  than  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  through c e n t r a l  p lanning  and l e g ­
i s l a t i v e  des ign .
J u d ic i a l  proceedings  s e rv e  as o p p o r tu n i t i e s  to  a d m in i s t e r  a u th o r ­
i t a t i v e  i n s t r u c t i o n  in the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  S o v ie t  
Law and i t s  "utopian"  purpose.  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  s t a t u t e s  i s  in 
the  l i g h t  o f  i t s  purpose as env is ioned  by the  a u th o r s .  J u d i c i a l  de­
c i s i o n s ,  in r e a l i t y ,  have only an educa t iona l  f u n c t io n .
S o v i e t - s t y l e  lega l  systems may be d iv ided  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  
pre-Communist lega l  h e r i t a g e .  Thus, t h e r e  would be one sub-fam ily  
based on a Western t r a d i t i o n  s i m i l a r  to  the  C iv i l  Law h e r i t a g e  of  Ger-
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many, A u s t r i a ,  and France,  and in c lu d in g  th e  lega l  systems o f  Hun­
gary ,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia ,  S lo v en ia ,  and C ro a t i a .  The second 
would be a Balkan sub -fam i ly  with  a lega l  h e r i t a g e  s i m i l a r  to  Russia  
in t h a t  they  were a t  f i r s t  su b jec te d  to  Byzantine r a t h e r  than a 
Western European i n f l u e n c e ,  thus  render ing  weaker th e  a t tachm ent  to  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  law. This  group inc ludes  A lban ia ,  B u lg a r i a ,  Rumania, 
and Yugoslavia .
The Non-Occidental Group 
Because th e  focus  o f  t h i s  s tudy i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  th e  d i f f u s i o n  and 
global  p a t t e r n s  o f  Occidental  lega l  sys tems,  we w i l l  no t  c o n s id e r  th e  
non-Occidental  group a p a r t  from in  t e x t  d i s c u s s io n s  as a p p r o p r i a t e .  
The global  in f lu e n c e  o f  Occidenta l  lega l  systems-Common Law, Civi l  
Law and S o v ie t  Law-reduces th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  non-Occidental 
Law. The former  inc luded th e  law o f  t h e  Chinese P e o p le ' s  Republic 
and those  lega l  systems o f  the  P e o p le ' s  Democarcies no t  fo l low ing  the  
S ov ie t  lega l  model,  such as Albania  and Cambodia (F ig .  5 ) ;  the  l a t t e r  
group i s  v i r t u a l l y  conf ined  to  I s lam ic  Law (F ig .  6 ) .  As a t r u e  lega l  
system, I s lam ic  Law i s  today the  n a t io n a l  s t y l e  o f  only fo u r  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n s ,  A fg h an is tan ,  the  Maldives ,  Saudi Arab ia ,  and Yemen.
Fig. 6 Islamic Law (and submerged Islamic Law)
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CHAPTER III
THE CULTURE HISTORY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS BASED ON HUMAN ACTION:
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW
European, s p e c i f i c a l l y  Channel European, c o u n t r i e s  a t  the  c e n t e r  o f  the  
land hemisphere,  s u c c e s s f u l l y  implanted t h e i r  laws in the  whole wor ld.  Those 
c o u n t r ie s  a r e  England, France,  and Holland. The Engl ish  Channel s e p a ra te s  
the  Common Law realm o f  England from th e  C iv i l  Law o f  Cont inen ta l  Europe. 
C i v i l i a n  Europe approximates  W h i t t l e s e y ' s  Western Europe, l e s s  B r i t a i n  (Whit­
t l e s e y ,  1958, p. 89, f i g .  9 ) ,  i . e . ,  roughly the  t r i a n g u l a r  a rea  from Rome to 
Lisbon to  Stockholm and back to  Rome. Before the  m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  ad­
vantage o f  North Sea l o c a t i o n ,  Ib e r i a n  C iv i l  Law migrated  to  much o f  La t in  
America, p repar ing  th e  way f o r  l a t e r  North Sea-focused  French C iv i l  Law. Af­
t e r  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  the  North Sea advantage ,  S o v ie t  Law fo llows  an o th e r  C i v i l ­
ian  t r a i l  t o  world i n f lu e n c e .
The Anglo-American Common Law family  o f  lega l  systems owes i t s  e x i s t e n c e  
to  Engl ish  law and to  laws p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  t h a t  of  England (Rober ts-Wray, 
1966). Apart  from England ( th e  p r in c ip a l  h ea r th  o f  the  Common Law family  i n ­
c ludes  a l l  the  laws o f  E n g l i sh -speak ing  c o u n t r i e s  ( in c lu d in g  the  Commonwealth 
with i t s  31 member s t a t e s  and 30 dependencies)  and some o f  those  c o u n t r ie s  
t h a t  have been p o l i t i c a l l y  l in k ed  with  England o r  the  United S t a t e s .  Indeed, 
a b r i e f  review o f  th e  g lobal  p a t t e r n s  r e f l e c t e d  on a map o f  the  w o r ld ' s  major 
le g a l  systems r e v e a l s  t h a t  a reas  o f  Common Law p reva lence  a r e  u s u a l ly  e i t h e r  
former t e r r i t o r i e s  t h a t  were p r i n c i p a l l y  s e t t l e d  by Eng l ish -speak ing  e th n ic s  
o r  p r e se n t  o r  former t e r r i t o r i e s  t h a t  were e i t h e r  ceded to  o r  conquered by 
Great  B r i t a i n  o r  the  United S t a t e s .  Thus, the  Common Law has extended from 
i t s  p lace  o f  o r ig i n  to  embrace a reas  g e o g ra p h ic a l ly  remote from England. This 
d i f f u s i o n  o f  th e  Common Law was accomplished by means of r e l o c a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t
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( c o lo n iz a t io n  in the  c l a s s i c  sense of  th e  term, where people  of  th e  same c u l ­
t u r e ,  language,  and laws s e t t l e d  in an area  sep a ra ted  by a c o n s id e ra b le  d i s ­
tance  from a motherland)  o r  c i v i l  c o lo n iz a t io n  of  an area  in h a b i te d  by r e l a ­
t i v e l y  numerous indigenous people of  a "m an i fes t ly  lower c u l t u r e  and c i v i l i ­
z a t io n "  than  the  motherland o r  whose p o pu la t ions  had a c u l t u r e  and c i v i l i ­
z a t i o n  as old as t h a t  o f  t h e  mother land but  " p o l i t i c a l l y  s tag n a n t"  (Kuennelt-  
Leddihn, 1974, pp. 341-343).
In th e  case  o f  s e t t l e d  c o l o n i e s ,  the  r e c ep t io n  of  th e  Common Law by such 
a rea s  as Canada and A u s t r a l i a  takes  th e  form o f  r e l o c a t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  in t h a t  
th e  t r a n s p l a n t  r e s u l t s  from the  m ig ra t ion  of  e t h n i c s .  On the  o t h e r  hand, in 
the  ceded and conquered c o l o n i e s ,  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  the  Common Law from England 
o r  th e  United S t a t e s  to  such p laces  as Kenya or  L ib e r i a  i s  by means of  a v a r i ­
e ty  o f  expansion d i f f u s io n  t h a t  may be d esc r ib ed  as in v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n s .
In th e se  ways, the  geographic  e x t e n t  of  the  Common Law has expanded to  assume 
i t s  global  p a t t e r n s .
Volk Migrat ions
The d i s p e r s a l  o f  Common Law t r a d i t i o n s  by means o f  r e l o c a t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  
(m ig ra t ion )  i s  l a r g e l y  the  consequence o f  th e  s e t t l e m e n t  of  a Common Law Volk 
in to  an a rea  with  i n e f f e c t u a l  r e s i s t a n c e  to  th e  lega l  t r a d i t i o n s  of  the  s e t t ­
l e r s .  (Volk, in t h i s  c o n te x t ,  d e s ig n a te s  a people who s h a re . a  common myst ica l  
exper ience  r e s u l t i n g  from p a s t  c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s .  This ex p e r ien ce ,  in ad d i ­
t i o n  to  being encouraged by r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n ,  i s  i n i t i t a t e d  by f e e l i n g s  
and sen t im en ts  t h a t  develop the  c o n s t i t u e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s '  b e l i e f  t h a t  they a re  
r e l a t e d  o r  bound to  o th e r s  by a common a n c e s t ry  (Mises, 1966, pp. 166-69; 
Newton, Newton, and E a s t e r l y ,  1976). Laws a re  thus  t r a n s m i t t e d  to  p rev io u s ly  
vacant  o r  s p a r s e ly  s e t t l e d  f r o n t i e r s  occupied by indigenous peoples  possess ing  
a non-com pet i t ive  lega l  system. Otherwise ,  i f  upon a r r i v a l ,  the  s e t t l e r s  found
a land in h a b i t e d  by a people  having an "en l igh tened  and s o p h i s t i c a t e d "  lega l  
system coupled with  p o l i t i c a l  power, then they would be only immigrants in a 
country  whose laws a p p l i e s  to  them as w e l l .  Even so ,  mere claim to  t i t l e  un­
de r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law o f  an a rea  w i thou t  e f f e c t i v e  occupat ion would p r e se n t  
no bar  to  the  e f f e c t i v e  occupat ion  would p re se n t  no bar  to  the  e f f e c t i v e  r e ­
cep t io n  o f  Common Law by means o f  m ig ra t io n  and s e t t l e m e n t .  In Campbell v.
Hall (I  Cow p. 204, 1774), f o r  example, Jamaica was t r e a t e d  as a s e t t l e d  co lo ­
ny r a t h e r  than  one o f  c e s s i o n ,  because th e  an te c ed en t  Spanish s e t t l e r s  had d i s ­
appeared by the  time of  B r i t i s h  a c q u i s i t i o n .
Upon m ig ra t ion  to  a new l a n d ,  B r i t i s h  s e t t l e r s  c a r r i e d  English Common Law 
with  them as p a r t  o f  t h e i r  b i r t h r i g h t  as B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s .  Indeed, from a 
p r a c t i c a l  and pragmatic  s t a n d p o i n t ,  t h e r e  e x i s t e d  no v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  where 
no adequate  system o f  law f l o u r i s h e d  in th e  land p r i o r  to  t h e i r  a r r i v a l .  These 
English s e t t l e r s  c a r r i e d  as p a r t  o f  t h e i r  c u l t u r a l  baggage the  unw r i t ten  com­
mon law, the  concept and body o f  e q u i ty ,  and the  s t a t u t e s  o f  general  a p p l i ­
c a t io n  in fo rce  a t  the  time of  s e t t l e m e n t .  In a very r e a l ,  almost t a n g i b l e ,  
way, Engli.sh c o l o n i s t s  " c a r r i e d "  t h e  law. I t  was t h e i r  personal  possess ion  by 
r i g h t  and o b l i g a t i o n  as they  l e f t  B r i t a i n ,  and they remained "under" an o th e r  
law. I f  no o th e r  law was encoun te red ,  they n e c e s s a r i l y  remained B r i t i s h  sub­
j e c t s  with t h e i r  o r ig i n a l  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  as Englishmen. In so much as
i t  could s c a rc e ly  be o th e rw ise ,  t h e  law possessed a c e r t a i n  t a n g i b i l i t y  t h a t
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n e c e s s a r i l y  had geographic  consequences.  Even so ,  the  c o l o n i s t s  c a r r i e d  with  
them "only so much o f  the  Engl ish  law as [was] a p p l i c a b l e  to  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  
and the  con d i t io n  o f  an i n f a n t  colony" (B lacks tone ,  1765, p. 106).  Such was 
the  s i t u a t i o n  with  th e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s  in such p laces  as Canada, 
A u s t r a l i a ,  and New Zealand.
Before reviewing a few co n c re te  cases  of  Common Law t r a n s p l a n t  by r e l o c a ­
t i o n ,  a few words a re  in  o rd e r  concerning te ch n ic a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  law. In
the  s e t t l e d  la n d s ,  common law a p p l ie d  un less  i t  was demonstrated to  be en­
t i r e l y  u n s u i t a b le -  An i n t e r e s t i n g  example o f  such u n s u i t a b i l i t y  as a con­
sequence of  geographic  c i rcum stances  i s  provided in the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  law 
concerning w ater  r i g h t s  in  the  United S t a t e s .  The Engl ish  Common Law doc­
t r i n e  o f  r i p a r i a n  w ater  r i g h t s  (based on r i g h t s  in h e re n t  in lands  contiguous 
to  the  water )  was ap p l ied  with l i t t l e  m o d i f ic a t io n  in the  more humid p a r t s  
o f  th e  e a s t e rn  United S t a t e s .  When the  same d o c t r in e  was a p p l ied  to  a r i d  
reg ions  o f  the  western  p a r t  o f  th e  c o u n t ry ,  however i t  r e s u l t e d  in th e  p re ­
ven t ion  of  widespread  development o f  i r r i g a t e d  farming.  In the  San Joaquin  
Val ley  o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  l i t i g a t i o n  between landho lde rs  who wished to  m ainta in  
r i p a r i a n  r i g h t s  and th o se  who d e s i r e d  to  d i v e r t  w a te r  f o r  i r r i g a t i o n ,  r e -  
t a r t e d  f o r  decades th e  ev o lu t io n  of  Mediterranean a g r i c u l t u r e  in C a l i f o r n i a  
(W h i t t l e sey ,  1935, p. 97 ) .  Finding th e  r i p a r i a n  d o c t r in e  no lo n g e r  u s e f u l ,  
th e  s e t t l e r s  of  th e  sou thwestern  United S t a t e s  e v en tu a l ly  abrogated  p a r t s  
o f  the  i n h e r i t e d  w a t e r - r i g h t s  regime and developed th e  a p p r o p r ia t io n  d o c t r in e ,  
which determined r i g h t  by p r i o r i t y  o f  d iv e r s io n  and use.
Another example from th e  lega l  h i s t o r y  of  the  United S t a t e s  involved an 
owner 's  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  th e  damage caused by his  l i v e s t o c k  to o th e r  persons 
or  t h e i r  p ro p e r ty .  In th e  e a s t e rn  s t a t e s ,  an in d iv id u a l  was r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  
h is  c a t t l e ,  as provided by the  t r a n s p l a n t e d  English  common law of  the  co lon­
i a l  e r a .  However, th e  method o f  handl ing  c a t t l e  on th e  v a s t  expanses o f  the  
Great  P la in s  was d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  o f  fa rm steads  to  the  e a s t .  Open range 
and c a t t l e  d r iv e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the  " c a t t l e  c u l t u r e "  which spread no r th  from 
Texas dur ing  the  e a r ly  and middle n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  (Webb, 1936, pp. 245-47; 
K nif fen ,  1953). The per iod  between 1850 and 1875 was the  heyday of  the  c a t -  
t l e - k i n g s  on the  open range.  Accord ing ly ,  in Wagner v. B i s s e l l  (3 Iowa 396, 
1856), the  common law r u l e  imposing s t r i c t  l i a b i l i t y  upon the  owners o f  t r e s ­
pass ing  c a t t l e  was held no t  to  extend to  the  p la in s  s t a t e s  where v a s t  ex-
panses o f  g ra ssy  land encouraged d i f f e r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  in  l i v e s t o c k  a g r i c u l ­
t u r e .  One can only s p e c u l a t e  whether  cont inued a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Common 
Law l i a b i l i t y  a g a i n s t  t r e s p a s s i n g  c a t t l e  would have r e t a rd e d  the  growth of  
c a t t l e  d r iv e s  and open range g raz in g .  S pecu la t ion  may a l so  be d i r e c t e d  to 
the  q u es t ion  of  the  degree  to  which den ia l  of  th e  Common Law r u le  impeded 
the  f r o n t i e r  expansion o f  fa rm steads  on th e  p l a i n s .
By c o n t r a s t  to  t h e  general  accep tance  o f  t h e  common law, s t a t u t e s  ( l e g ­
i s l a t i o n )  d id  not  apply  u n le s s  shown to  be s u i t a b l e  (Unlacke v. Dickson, 2 
N.S.R. 287, 1848; Wallace v. R- , 20 N.S.R. 283, 1887). Even so ,  any r u l e  of  
law, even s t a t u t e s ,  should  be cons ide red  a p p l i c a b l e  to  loca l  c i rcumstances  
except  on some s o l i d  ground t h a t  c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  in c o n s i s t a n c y  (Leonq v. 
Lim Beng Ch.ye, A.C. 648, 1955). In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  even indigenous laws may 
a t  t im e s ,  be viewed as " lo ca l  c i rcum stances"  a f f e c t i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  im­
por ted  law (Nana A t ta  I I I  v. Nana Bonsra I I , A.C. 95, 1958). Of co u rse ,  any 
law in f o r c e  by reason only  o f  th e  f a c t  o f  s e t t l e m e n t  may be' a l t e r e d  o r  super ­
seded by the  l e g i s l a t u r e  o f  t h e  colony o r  former colony,  p rovided ,  of  cou rse ,  
t h a t  such new laws do not  cen t ravene  n a tu ra l  law and eq u i ty  and t h a t  the  c o l ­
on ia l  regime remains t r u e  to  the  Common Law. For example, the  rece ived  com­
mon law p r a c t i c e s  o f  p r im ogen i tu re  and e n t a i l  were abo l i sh ed  by s t a t u t e  in 
the  severa l  s t a t e s  of  the  United S t a t e s :  Georgia (1777),  North Caro l ina
(1784),  V i rg in ia  (1785),  Maryland (1786),  New York (1786),  South Caro l ina  
(1791),  Rhode I s land  (1798),  Massachuset tes  (1801),  and Pennsylvania  (1810) 
(Morr is ,  1930, p. 81) .  Exp lana t ions  f o r  t h e  demise of  th e se  p r a c t i c e s ,  which 
i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  were more p r e v a l e n t  in the  sou thern  c o lo n ie s ,  have been given 
as 1) th e  abundance o f  land on th e  f r o n t i e r ,  a consequence o f  t h e r e  r a t i o  
o f  the  number of  men to  sha re  a l a r g e  amount of  land ,  and 2) the  r i s e  of  fee  
simple possess ion  as an exp ress ion  of  the  idea  t h a t  o r d i n a r i l y  men should be 
a b le  to  d isp o se  of  t h e i r  land accord ing  to  t h e i r  d e s i r e s  (Webb, 1951, pp.
87
269-275).
In such a reas  as r ece iv ed  th e  Common Law by means of  s e t t l e m e n t ,  the  
common Law w i l l  m ain ta in  con t inued  accep tance  in p ro p o r t io n  to  the  degree 
t h a t  c e r t a i n  c r i t e r i a  a re  s a t i s f i e d .  The m ig ra t in g  Volk must have a shared 
h e r i t a g e ,  in c lud ing  the  same language (Kocourek, 1936). There i s  a l so  an 
eventual  need f o r  law books and th e  t r a i n i n g  o f  a lega l  p ro fe s s io n  in the  
laws der ived  from th e  shared  customs and a n c i e n t  usages o f  the  people (Wig- 
more, 1928). The r i s e  and p e r p e tu a t io n  o f  th e  Common Law under such ci rcum­
s ta n c e s ,  depends on the  development and su rv iv a l  of h i g h l y - t r a i n e d ,  p r o fe s ­
s iona l  lawyers ( Z a j t a y ,  1975). I f  th ese  c r i t e r i a  a re  s a t i s f i e d ,  even where 
changed co n d i t io n s  in the  n a tu r a l  environment d i c t a t e  a perce ived  need f o r  i n ­
novation in the  law, th e  m ig ra t io n  o f  such a people w i l l  s t i l l  r e s u l t  in the  
d i f f u s io n  of  the  p r e - e x i s t i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  of  law as developed in t h e i r  common 
c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e .
The American Example
When the  American co lo n ie s  were f i r s t  s e t t l e d  by our a n c e s t o r s ,  
i t  was held as well  by th e  s e t t l e r s ,  as by th e  judges  and law­
y e r s  of  England, t h a t  they brought  h i t h e r  as t h e i r  b i r t h r i g h t  
and i n h e r i t a n c e ,  so much of  th e  common law as was a p p l i c a b l e  
to  t h e i r  loca l  s i t u a t i o n  and change o f  c i rcum stances .  ( S ta t e  v. 
Campbell,  1808)
The recep t io n  of  th e  Engl ish  Common Law by the  American co lo n ie s  was l a r g e ­
ly  a consequence o f  the  shared  c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e  of  th e  dominant E n g l i sh -sp eak ­
ing Volk. However, th e  con t inued  growth and development of  th e  Common Law was 
p r i n c i p a l l y  determined by ex te rn a l  i n f l u e n c e s :  1) a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  case  r e p o r t s
and law t r e a t i s e s ,  2) l eg a l  t r a i n i n g  o f  th e  b a r ,  and 3) common English language 
(Kocourek, 1932). These e x t e r n a l i t i e s  not  only r e s u l t e d  in th e  cont inued  main- 
t a in an ce  of  the  Common Law i n h e r i t a n c e  o f  the  s e t t l e r s ,  but  provided the  sub­
s ta n c e  f o r  r e s i s t i n g  Benthamite c o d i f i c a t i o n  e f f o r t s  and the  nourishment  f o r
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i t s  t r a n s p l a n t i n g  to  th e  American f r o n t i e r .
To th e  c o l o n i s t s ,  t r a d i t i o n  was in l a r g e  p a r t  embodied in the  common 
law, which was in essence  a s e t  o f  personal  r i g h t s  in the  form o f  procedures  
t h a t  governed the  e x e r c i s e  of  sovere ign  power (McDonald, 1979, p. 310).  I t  
was t h i s  view o f  conmon law as t r a d i t i o n  and custom, th e  in h e re n t  b i r t h r i g h t  
o f  th e  Engl ish  s e t t l e r s ,  t h a t  became preserved  in th e  form o f  j u d i c i a l  d e c i ­
s io n s  and s t a t u t e s .  However, t h i s  enshrinement o f  th e  Common Law h e r i t a g e  
would have perhaps ,  succumbed to  e x te rn a l  p o l i t i c a l  movements f av o r in g  c o d i ­
f i c a t i o n ,  but f o r  the  p re se rv in g  in f lu e n c e s  o f  a p ro fe s s io n a l  bar  and a body 
o f  lega l  l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  enunc ia ted  th e  Common Law t r a d i t i o n  (David and B r i e r ­
l e y ,  1978, pp. 370-373).
Of c o u r se ,  th e  e a r ly  c o lo n ia l  America had no r e g u l a r  school o f  law. Un­
l e s s  American lawyers were so f o r t u n a t e  as to study in England with  i t s  Inns 
o f  Cour t ,  p r o fe s so r s  o f  law a t  Oxford and Cambridge, and le a rn ed  ju d g e s ,  they 
en te red  p r a c t i c e  with  l i t t l e  formal law ed u ca t io n ;  i . e . ,  they  only "read" law. 
For t h e i r  i n s t u r c t i o n ,  t h e s e  c o lo n ia l  lawyers depended upon such l i t e r a r y  sou r ­
ces as William B lac k s to n e ' s  Commentaries on th e  Laws o f  England. One cannot 
underes t im a te  the  i n f lu e n c e  o f  B la c k s to n e ' s  Commentaries on the  e a r l y  bar  of 
the  United S t a t e s .  From t h i s  work, American lawyers acquired  knowledge of  
n a tu ra l  law, common law, e q u i t y ,  and " the  c h a r t e r  r i g h t s  of Englishmen." In­
deed, th e  Commentaries were probably more i n f l u e n t i a l  in  America than  in the  
B r i t i s h  I s l e s .  As Edmund Burke once t o l d  the  Engl ish  House of  Commons only a 
decade a f t e r  th e  Commentaries1 appearance in 1765, n e a r ly  as many cop ies  of  
Blackstone were so ld  in  th e  T h i r t e e n  Colonies  as in England, d e s p i t e  d i s p a r i t y  
in popu la t ion  (Kirk ,  1974, p. 368).
Through h is  w r i t i n g s ,  B lacks tone ,  who was Oxford 's  f i r s t  p ro fe s so r  o f  Eng­
l i s h  law and l a t e r  a judge of  Common P lea s ,  i n f lu e n c e  gen e ra t io n s  o f  American
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lawyers dur ing  and a f t e r  t h e  American Revolu t ion .  B la c k s to n e ' s  Commentaries 
rendered p o s s ib l e  the  t a s k  o f  th e  American lawyer in d i s c e rn in g  some o rd e r  
in th e  tremendous mass of  p receden ts  accumulated over  the  c e n t u r i e s  o f  Eng­
l i s h  Common Law h i s t o r y .  And what was t r u e  fo r  the lawyer was a l s o  t ru e  
f o r  " the  gentleman and th e  sch o la r"  ( B la c k s to n e ' s  p h ra se ) .  B lac k s to n e ' s  
t r e a t i s e s  remained th e  s tan d a rd  manual o f  law f o r  Americans u n t i l  th e  p u b l i c ­
a t i o n ,  in  1826-30, of  C hance l lo r  James K en t ' s  Commentaries on American Law. 
Because Kent and th e  o t h e r  p r in c ip a l  w r i t e r  on j u r i s p ru d e n c e  in th e  e a r ly  
Republ ic ,  Joseph S to ry ,  were both h e av i ly  in f lu en c ed  by B lacks tone ,  a comment 
on th e  Commentaries i s  here i n d i c a t e d .
B la ck s to n e ' s  Commentaries began w i th  an a f f i r m a t io n  o f  the  Natural Law, 
which confirmed Americans in  t h e i r  appeal to  a j u s t i c e  beyond l e g i s l a t i v e  de­
c ree .  In B lacks tone ,  two s treams o f  Natural  Law d o c t r in e  flow to g e t h e r :  one
of  Cicero and Richard Hooker, and th e  o t h e r  o f  th e  seven teen th  cen tu ry  scho­
l a r s  Gro t ius  and Pufendorf .
This law of  n a t u r e ,  being co-eval  with  mankind and d i c t a t e d  
by God h im se l f ,  i s  o f  course  s u p e r i o r  in o b l i g a t i o n  to  any 
o t h e r .  I t  i s  b inding  over  a l l  o f  th e  g lobe ,  and in a l l  coun­
t r i e s ,  and a t  a l l  t im es ;  no human laws a re  of  any v a l i d i t y  
i f  c o n t r a ry  to  t h i s ;  and such o f  them as a r e  v a l id  d e r iv e
a l l  t h e i r  f o r c e ,  and a l l  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y ,  m ed ia te ly  o r  im­
m edia te ly  from t h i s  o r i g i n a l  (B lacks tone ,  1765, pp. 27- 
28).
With B la c k s to n e ' s  view of  law as grounded in Natural  Law, the  i n f l u e n t i a l  
Commentaries "depr ived  c o lo n ia l  lawyers o f  the  dangerous tem pta t ion  o f  making 
t h e i r  code" (B o o r s t in ,  1958, p. 203).  B lacks tone was "a champion of  a n c ie n t  
p recedent  and lo n g -san c t io n ed  usage;  had the  l i t t l e - s c h o o l e d  American lawyers 
not been r e s t r a i n e d  by him, much of  enduring va lue  in the  t e s t e d  Engl ish  r u le  
o f  law might have been l o s t  through ignorance or  has ty  im prov isa t ion"  (Kirk ,  
1974, p. 370) .  B la c k s to n e ' s  Common Law was a t  once h igh ly  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  ground­
ed in precedents  o f  ex p e r ie n c e ,  and capab le  o f  growth and a d a p ta t i o n ;  t h u s ,
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t h e r e  e x i s t e d  no perce ived  need f o r  a comprehensive,  w r i t t e n  code. Even 
though th e r e  were repea ted  a t tem pts  a t  c o d i f i c a t i o n ,  a l l  f a i l e d  ( e x c e p t ,  o f  
co u r se ,  in Louis iana  where a previous  l ega l  h e r i t a g e  p re v a i l e d  be fo re  th e  en­
t r y  o f  the  Common Law; David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, pp. 369-373).
The view o f  Blacks tone and h is  p r in c ip a l  American d i s c i p l e s ,  Kent and 
S to ry ,  t h a t  the  Common Law was th e  n e a r e s t  approach (however im perfec t )  to  the  
Natural Law a rose  from the  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  had grown ou t  o f  the  e x p e r ie n c e s ,  
o b s e rv a t io n s ,  and consensus  o f  many g e n e ra t io n s  o f  wise men and had been t e s t ­
ed r e p e a te d ly  f o r  i t s  conformity  to  n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e  (Kirk ,  1974, p. 371).
This view was p a r t  o f  the  lega l  exper ience  and i n h e r i t a n c e  o f  American lawyers
and ju d g es ,  and by way o f  e x t e n s io n ,  th e  American people .  I f  i t  had not  been
f o r  th e  w r i t i n g s  o f  th ese  e a r l y  ph i losophers  o f  the  Common Law, Blacks tone ,
Kent,  and S to ry ,
American law might have l o s t  i t s  u n i ty .  Had i t  l o s t  i t s  u n i t y ,  
th e  movement f o r  a premature  Benthamite code might well  have 
swept the  country  as the  French codes swept Europe. I f  the 
f lood  o f  s t a t u t e s  which poured from our l e g i s l a t u r e s  from the  
beginning had been tu rned  upon a system o f  pure ly  loca l  r u l e s ,  
as th e  country  became u n i f i e d  economically  we should very l i k e ­
ly  be seeking r e l i e f  in codes ,  i f  we had not  done so long ago.
(Pound, 1938, p. 153)
The lawyers and ju d g e s ,  h e r i t o r s  of  B la c k s to n e ' s  defense  of  the  Common Law,
composed what Alexis  de To c q u ev i l le  d esc r ib ed  as a "p ro fe s s io n a l  a r i s t o c r a c y
of  lawyers ,  r e s p e c t f u l  of  p receden t  and lo n g - e s t a b l i s h e d  r i g h t s  and customs,
h o s t i l e  toward rash  democrat ic  impulses a t  c o d i f i c a t i o n .
I f  you ask me where th e  American a r i s t o c r a c y  i s  to  be found,
I have no h e s i t a t i o n  in answering t h a t  i t  i s  no among the  
r i c h ,  who have no common l i n k  u n i t i n g  them. I t  i s  a t  the  bar  
or  the  bench t h a t  the  American a r i s t o c r a c y  i s  found. An Amer­
ican judge ,  armed with  th e  r i g h t  to  d e c l a r e  laws u n c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l ,  i s  c o n s ta n t l y  i n t e rv e n in g  in p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .  He 
cannot  compel th e  people to  make laws,  but  a t  l e a s t  he can 
c o n s t r a in  them to  be f a i t h f u l  to  t h e i r  own laws and remain 
in harmony with themselves .  (De T o q u e v i l l e ,  1969, pp. 268- 
69)
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De T o q u e v i l l e ,  well  exper ienced  in the  C iv i l  Laws of  France,  as well as the  
events  of  th e  French Revolu t ion and the  Napoleonic per iod  seems q u i t e  impressed 
with the  Common Law judge .
As Americans s e t t l e d  west  o f  th e  o r ig i n a l  t h i r t e e n  s t a t e s  of  the  young 
Republ ic ,  no t  only did they  c a r ry  the  Common Law with  them, but  they  o f te n  
found t h a t  i t  had preceeded t h e i r  a r r i v a l .  The Northwest  Ordinance of  1787, 
f o r  example, provided f o r  " j u d i c i a l  proceedings  according  to  the  course  of  th e  
common law."  S h o r t ly  t h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  governor and th e  judges  of  th e  Northwest 
T e r r i t o r y  adopted the  V i rg in ia  Act o f  R a t i f i c a t i o n  (1788),  which d e c la red  to 
be in  fo rce  the  common law o f  England and a l l  Engl ish  s t a t u t e s  of  general  ap­
p l i c a t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  when the  M is s i s s ip p i  T e r r i t o r y  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1798, 
i t s  law embraced many o f  t h e  p ro v is io n s  o f  the  Northwest Ordinance as regards  
the  Common Law.
That t h e  f r o n t i e r  lawyers brought  with  them th e  Common Law, and did  n o t ,  
a cco rd in g ly ,  make t h e i r  law, i s  e v id en t  in the  f a c t  t h a t  " the  e a r l i e r  lawyers 
and judges  were . . . bookish people ,  in both th e  Northwest and Southwest" 
(Hamilton, 1968, p. 251).  As Judge Thomas Rodney of  th e  M is s i s s ip p i  T e r r i t o r y  
wrote (Hamilton, 1968, p. 253):  "Special P leading  i s  adhered to  in our  Courts
with  as much S t r i c t n e s s  Elegance and p r o p r i e t y  as many of the  S t a t e s ,  so t h a t  
Even the  young Lawyers a r e  ob l iged  to  read t h e i r  books and be very a t t e n t i v e  
to  t h e i r  bus iness  o r  want b r e ad ."
In a d d i t i o n  to  the  t r e a t i s e s  and d o c t r in a l  w r i t i n g s  o f  B lacks tone ,  Kent,  
S to ry ,  and o t h e r s ,  th e se  f r o n t i e r  lawyers a p p a re n t ly  had access  to  an abundance 
of  both English and American case r e p o r t s  (Hamilton,  1968, pp. 250-251), ev iden t  
in t h e i r  f r eq u e n t  c i t a t i o n  o f  Engl ish  and e a r l y  American case  p reced en ts .  In 
t h a t  way, th e  English Common Law was t r a n s m i t t e d  westward across  the  American 
f r o n t i e r  to  Oregon and Hawaii,  p laces  f a r  removed from English c o lo n ia l  exper-
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ience  (Blume and Brown, 1962-1963). S i m i l a r l y ,  the  American Common Law was 
t r a n s p l a n t e d  to  L ib e r i a  l a r g e l y  by th e  immigrat ion of  emancipated American 
Negro s l a v e s ,  who mainta ined  c lo se  t i e s  w ith  the  United S t a t e s .  A ppl icab le
law in th e  L ib e r ian  Republ ic  inc ludes  the  common law and usages of  the  c o u r t s
o f  England and the  United S t a t e s  "as s e t  f o r t h  in case  law and in B lac k s to n e ' s  
and K en t ' s  Commentaries and o th e r  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t r e a t i s e  and d i g e s t s "  (L ib e r ­
ian Code o f  Laws, t i t .  16, ch. 3,  sec .  40, 1956). The p r i n c i p l e  of  s t a r e  de­
c i s i s  has f u r t h e r  r e s u l t e d  in  the  growth o f  a body o f  L ib e r ian  common law.
As one s c h o la r  (Hamilton, 1968, p. 260) e lo q u e n t ly  observes :
All - th is  [ t h e  common law] came s t r a i g h t  from the  f r o n ­
t i e r s  of  the  Pa lace  of  W estm in is te r ,  t h e  Thames flowed in to  
the  muddy waters  o f  th e  m a je s t i c  M is s i s s ip p i  and t ransformed 
them, engulfed them, A ngl ic ized  them forevermore .  The e v i ­
dence tends  to  show as a r e s t r a i n e d  judge might say ,  t h a t  
the  o ld ,  o r  c i s - M is s i s s i p p i  f r o n t i e r ,  i f  i t  fash ioned  anew 
with  the  w i ld e r n e s s ,  d id  not  do so with such a p e rv a s iv e ,
fundamental i n s t i t u t i o n  as the  law. I t  imported i t  from En­
gland and the  A t l a n t i c  c o a s t  on which English law had been 
d e p o s i t e d .  In th e  e a r ly  days ,  i t s  law was c o n t i n u a l l y  r e ­
f re sh ed  by r eco u rse  to  th e  English books, f o r  they were a l l  
the  f ron t ie r sm en  had.
The Engl ish  Common Law was conveyed through American m ig ra t ion  westward, de­
cades a f t e r  the  independence of  th e  United S t a t e s .  In t h a t  way, th e  English 
Common Law became the  b a s i s  o f  th e  American lega l  system.
The A u s t r a l i a n  Example 
The general  p a t t e r n  o f  American exper ience  in th e  r e ce p t io n  of  English 
Common Law d e sc r ib e s  as well  t h a t  law 's  r e c e p t io n  in o t h e r  co lo n ie s  s e t t l e d  by 
Eng l ish -speak ing  Volk. Although the  t r a n s f e r  o f  English law by r e l o c a t i o n  d i ­
f fu s io n  a l so  occurred  in Canada, New Zealand,  and,  to  an e x t e n t ,  South A f r i c a ,  
we sh a l l  now conf ine  o u rse lv e s  to  A u s t r a l i a .  Because the  A u s t r a l i a n  co lo n ie s  
were acqu ired  by occupat ion  and s e t t l e m e n t ,  th e  Engl ish  s e t t l e r s  brought with 
them as much of  t h e i r  Common Law h e r i t a g e  as was a p p l i c a b l e  under  loca l  condi-
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t i o n s .
I n i t i a l l y  founded as a penal s e t t l e m e n t ,  i t  was not  u n t i l  1823 t h a t  t h e r e  
was e s t a b l i s h e d  in  A u s t r a l i a  a Supreme Court having c i v i l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  (La t ­
ham, 1960). Unti l  t h a t  t im e ,  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t y  p r e v a i l e d  and enforced law 
in the  l i g h t  o f  Engl ish  law. In 1828, an Engl ish  s t a t u t e ,  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
Courts Act (9 G. 4,  c.  8 3 ) ,  a s su red  th e  dominance o f  Common Law:
[A ]l l  laws and s t a t u t e s  in fo rc e  w i th in  th e  realm o f  England 
a t  t h e  time o f  t h e  pass ing  o f  t h i s  Act . . . s h a l l  be ap p l ied  
in th e  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e  in th e  c o u r t s  o f  New South 
Wales and Van Diemen's Land r e s p e c t i v e l y , so f a r  as the  same 
can be ap p l ied  w i th in  the  s a id  c o lo n ie s .
Thus was the  Common Law of  England assu red  i t s  s t a t u s  a t  th e  b a s ic  law of  New
South Wales, Tasmania (Van Diemen's Land), and a l so  those  provinces  t h a t  were
formed from p a r t s  o f  New South Wales subsequent  to  1828: V i c t o r i a ,  Queensland,
the  Northern T e r r i t o r y ,  and th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Capi ta l  T e r r i t o r y .
No s t a t u t o r y  p ro v is io n  f o r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Common Law e x i s t e d ,  however, 
in a reas  t h a t  had never  been p a r t  o f  New South Wales co lony ,  i . e . ,  in  South 
A u s t r a l i a  and Western A u s t r a l i a .  There ,  the  Common Law was a p p l ied  on th e  ba­
s i s  t h a t ,  in  a colony acqu i red  by s e t t l e m e n t ,  the  s e t t l e r s  took with them the  
law o f  England then  in f o r c e ,  i n s o f a r  as a p p l i c a b l e .  This  p o s i t i o n  was r e i n ­
fo rced  through a s e r i e s  of  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s  (Roberts-Wray,  1966, pp. 873-79).  
On the  ques t ion  of  the  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  English s t a t u e s ,  the  Colonial Laws Va­
l i d i t y  Act o f  1865 provided t h a t  they  not  only  a p p l i e d ,  bu t  even served  as a 
b a s i s  f o r  th e  voidance of  c o lo n ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a s t a t u s  no t  revoked u n t i l  
1931.
As in th e  United S t a t e s ,  th e n ,  the  b a s i s  o f  th e  law in  A u s t r a l i a  i s  the  
Common Law of England. The Common Law system i s  f i rm ly  implanted in A u s t r a l i a ;  
and i t s  lega l  d o c t r in e s  and general  p r i n c i p l e s  t h r i v e  in a form almost  i n d i s ­
t i n g u i s h a b le  from t h a t  of  England.
The Laws o f  Indigenous Peoples
The laws o f  indigenous peoples who l i v e  in a reas  s e t t l e d  by Eng l ish -  
speaking Volk dese rve  mention because they occupy a d i s t i n c t  p la ce  in th e  p re ­
v a i l i n g  Common Law. Although the  t r a n s p l a n t i n g  of  the  Common Law from England 
fol lowed s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n s  in  each o f  the  s e t t l e d  c o lo n ie s  because o f  a shared 
common h e r i t a g e  in  Engl ish  law, t r e a tm e n t  o f  indigenous  peoples  was marked by 
d i f f e r e n c e s .
In th e  United S t a t e s ,  f e d e ra l  p o l i cy  towards t h e  American Indian has been 
through v a r io u s  degrees  o f  s e p a r a t i o n ,  p r o t e c t i o n ,  and a s s i m i l a t i o n .  One spe­
c i a l  com pl ica t ion  of  th e  Indian problem r e s id e s  in the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
s t a t e  and f e d e ra l  government on such q u e s t io n s  as r e s e r v a t i o n s , t r i b a l  sover ­
e i g n t y ,  land t i t l e s ,  and water  r i g h t s  (S u t to n ,  1976). In fo rm ula t ing  a ba­
s i c  n a t io n a l  p o l i c y ,  the  c o u r t s  v a s c i H a t e d  in  t h e i r  approach.  In Worcester  
v.  Georgia (31 U.S. 515 [1 8 3 2 ] ) ,  the  c o u r t  viewed th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  t r i b e s  
to  th e  f e d e ra l  government as  one o f  guardian  to  ward: "The Indians  a re  in a
s t a t e  o f  pup i lag e ;  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  United S t a t e s  resembles t h a t  of  a 
ward to  h is  g u a rd ian ."  Viewing th e  Ind ians  as wards of  th e  United S t a t e s ,  
p laces  th e  seve ra l  t r i b e s ,  a t  l e a s t  in th e o r y ,  under  th e  purview o f  f ed e ra l  
c o u r t s .  T r ib a l  se lf -governm ent  was thus  s u b je c t  t o  f e d e ra l  laws,  e s p e c i a l l y  as 
regards  land and w a te r  r i g h t s .
The degree to  which f e d e ra l  involvement a f f e c t e d  t r i b a l  land and w a te r  i s  
r e f l e c t e d  in  the  Deser t  Land Act of  1877, which had th e  e f f e c t  o f  seve r ing  the  
land  and the  w ate r  r i g h t s  t h a t  had p rev io u s ly  ap p e r ta in e d  in  cases  invo lv ing  
In d ia n s .  In t h i s  A ct ,  th e  Common Law r i p a r i a n  d o c t r in e  was rep laced  by the  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  d o c t r i n e ,  which placed w ate r  r i g h t s  under  th e  co n t ro l  of  s t a t e  
and loca l  laws ( M i l l e r ,  1957).
In A u s t r a l i a ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  Aborigines  were d ec la red  a t  the  t ime o f  s e t t l e -
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ment to  be " B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s "  and,  hence, s u b je c t  to  the  common law as i t  
a p p l ie d  in th e  colony.  The government p o l ic y  o f  a s s i m i l a t i o n  did n o t ,  how­
e v e r ,  always succeed in p r a c t i c e .  "Attempts to  make th e  b lack  amenable to 
B r i t i s h  law make a mockery of  the  p r e te n s io n  t h a t  he had the  f u l l  s t a t u s  of  a 
B r i t i s h  s u b je c t .  The q u es t io n  of  the  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  lega l  remedies to  him 
shows f u r t h e r  ab s u rd i ty "  (Hasluck,  1970).
Recen t ly ,  t h e  n a t iv e s  u n s u c c e s s fu l ly  argued " the  d o c t r in e  o f  communal 
n a t iv e  t i t l e "  by con tending  t h a t  under  th e  common law, n a t iv e  law and custom 
o f  indigenous communities t o  land w i th in  t e r r i t o r y  acqu i red  by th e  Crown were 
ac tua l  r i g h t s  t h a t  must be recognized  by th e  c o l o n i s t s  and s u b je c t s  o f  England, 
u n t i l  such time as those  r i g h t s  were v a l i d l y  t e rm in a ted  (Gove Land Rights  Case, 
1971). This case  brought  two n o tab le  in nova t ions  i n t o  A u s t r a l i a n  law. In 
fo rm ula t ing  i t s  judgement,  th e  c o u r t  r e l i e d  on a u t h o r i t i e s  from o u t s id e  A u s t r a l ­
i a ,  a u t h o r i t i e s  form Canada and New Zealand. The c o u r t  a l s o  recognized t h a t  
evidence p resen ted  by a n t h r o p o lo g i s t s  as admissable  as e i t h e r  an excep t ion  to  
t h e  hearsay  r u le  o r  as e x p e r t  op in ion .  In consequence, such m a t te r s  as  loca l  
and t e r r i t o r i a l  o rg a n iz a t io n  now have a d i r e c t  lega l  r e levance  in A u s t r a l i a n  
c o u r t s .
In c o n c lu s io n ,  t h e r e  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  s t a t u s  of  
indigenous peoples  in a Common Law regime r e s u l t s  in  an i n e v i t a b l e  f e a t u r e  of 
th e  lega l  landscape .  I f  t r i b e s  a r e  t r e a t e d  as having some type of  sovere ign  
c a p a c i t y ,  as in the  United S t a t e s ,  t r i b a l  lands  and r e s e r v a t i o n  may be s u b je c t  
to  laws d i f f e r i n g  from th o se  o f  th e  s e t t l e r s  and t h e i r  su c c e s s o r s .  On th e  o th e r  
hand, i f  members o f  indigenous groups a re  a s s i m i l a t e d  as B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t s ,  o s ­
t e n s i b l y  having f u l l  r i g h t s  accorded under the  Common Law, t r i b a l  lands  may 
know no o th e r  r i g h t s  than  th o se  accorded th e  s e t t l i n g  f o lk .
In vo lun ta ry  Receptions  
" I t  was always a c a rd in a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  p o l icy  to  give 
e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t io n  to  th e  claims o f  such immemorial customs and usages as 
bore the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  r u le s  of  law, as understood and ap p l ied  in the  i n ­
digenous communities" ( E l i a s ,  1962, p. 184). Thus does the  expansion o f  the  
Common Law in i t s  i n t e r a c t i o n  with  the  severa l  bodies  o f  r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p r u ­
dence and n a t iv e  customary law provide an e x c e l l e n t  s tudy of  a c c u l t u r a t i o n .
Engl ish  Common Law ap p l i e d  to  overseas  dependencies  o f  the  severa l  Com­
mon Law c o u n t r i e s  to  the  f u l l e s t  p o s s ib le  e x t e n t  a l lowing due r e c o g n i t io n  of  
loca l  c i rcu m stan ces ;  t h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  inc ludes  not  only c o l o n i e s ,  but  a l so  
p r o t e c t o r a t e s  and mandates.  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between ceded and conquered c o l ­
on ies  and a reas  s e t t l e d  l a r g e l y  as a consequence o f  Volk m ig ra t ion  i s  one of  
h i s t o r i c  f a c t ;  th e  law in f o r c e  in a land a t  the  time o f  i t s  ce s s ion  o r  con­
qu es t  remains in f o r c e ,  un le ss  a l i e n a t e d  o r  a l t e r e d  by a u t h o r i t y  of  th e  a c q u i r ­
ing sovere ign  ( Campbell v.  H a l l , I Cow p. 204, 1774; Lyons [Mayor] v. E. Ind ia  
C o . , 1836). N a t u r a l l y ,  t h e  ex tens ion  o f  English law to  the  newly acqu i red  t e r ­
r i t o r y  n e c e s s a r i l y  a f f e c t e d  the  e x i s t i n g  law ( Rudinq v. Smith , 1921); and na­
t i v e  laws found to  be repugnant  to  th e  fundamental p r i n c i p l e s  of  Engl ish  Com­
mon Law were a u to m a t i c a l l y  abrogated  ( Fabriqas  v. Mostyn, 1773-74; P i c t o n 1s 
Case , 1804-12).  In the  family  o f  Common Law systems,  in v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n s  
o f te n  proved to  be occas ions  marked by a t tem pts  to  c r e a t e  new, n a t io n a l  legal  
systems t h a t  used the  procedures  of  Common Law and much of  the  subs tance  of  
indigenous r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  and loca l  customary laws.
B r i t i s h  Colonial  Law 
The in v o lu n ta ry  r e ce p t io n  o f  Common Law through c o lo n iz a t io n  or  o th e r  ex­
t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  f o rc e  took the  form o f  th e  B r i t i s h  co lo n ia l  po l icy  o f  i n d i r e c t
r u l e ,  which encouraged the  c o n t in u a t io n  of  loca l  indigenous law.
Adapting f o r  th e  purposes o f  loca l  government the  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s  which the  n a t i v e  peoples  have evolved f o r  themselves ,  
so t h a t  they  may develop in  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  manner from 
t h e i r  own p a s t ,  guided and r e s t r a i n e d  by the  t r a d i t i o n s  and 
s a n c t io n s  which they have i n h e r i t e d  and by the  proceedures 
and con t ro l  of  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  (Morris ,
1972, p. 1)
The im posi t ion  of  law through a c o lo n ia l  po l icy  based upon i n d i r e c t  r u l e  r e ­
s u l t e d  in n a t io n a l  lega l  systems t h a t  blend Engl ish  law with  indigenous law. 
These loca l  blends a re  th e  d i r e c t  consequence of  the  n a tu r e  o f  th e  j u d i c i a l  
Common Law, e s p e c i a l l y  i t s  tendency to  in c o rp o ra te  as an teced en t  j u d i c i a l  f i n d ­
ings much of  th e  domest ic ,  cus tomary,  and r e l i g i o u s  law in to  th e  cases  of  the  
new j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The B r i t i s h  system of  i n d i r e c t  r u l e  not  only encouraged the  
p r a c t i c e  and development o f  customary law through th e  loca l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
( E l i a s ,  1967), but  a l s o  embodied th e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  " i n t e r f e r e n c e  with n a t iv e  
customary law, which may be r e l i e d  on to  adap t  i t s e l f  to  changing c i rcum stan ­
c e s ,  i s  much to  be dep reca ted"  (Lugard, 1965, p. 312).
As in the  case  of  the  s e t t l e d  c o l o n i e s ,  the  Engl ish  law was a p p l ied  to 
the  f u l l e s t  e x te n t  p o s s ib l e  in th e  ceded o r  conquered c o lo n ie s ,  but having r e ­
gard f o r  loca l  c i rcum stances .  This  Engl ish  law, c o n s i s t i n g  of  the  common law 
of th e  realm, the  d o c t r in e s  o f  e q u i t y ,  and th e  s t a t u t e s  of  general  a p p l i c a t i o n  
as they  e x i s t e d  a t  a s p e c i f i e d  d a t e ,  was o f te n  cons ide red  the  most enduring 
and v a lu a b le  h e r i t a g e  o f  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  r u le  (Read, 1972). In th e  words o f  
S i r  Kenneth Roberts-Wray (1966, p . 6 6 ) ,  the  Legal Adviser  to  the  S e c re ta ry  of 
S t a t e  f o r  the  Co lon ies ,  " B r i t i s h  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  in  overseas  c o u n t r ie s  has con­
f e r r e d  no g r e a t e r  b e n e f i t  t h a t  Engl ish  law and j u s t i c e . "
Even though n a t iv e  c o u r t s  were allowed to  c o n t in u e ,  t h e i r  d e te rm in a t io n s  
o f te n  came under the  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  common law through the  a p p e l l a t e  process  
in which d i sp u te s  were decided by B r i t i s h  judges .  By the  r e c u r r e n t  in f lu e n c e
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o f  th e  a p p e l l a t e  p ro c e s s ,  the  common law guided the  n a t iv e  co u r t s  toward a 
f u l l e r  implementat ion o f  th e  Common Law. In th e  Sudan, B r i t i s h  co lo n ia l  
judges  and Sudanese judges  t r a in e d  in the  common law decided cases  in terms 
o f  " j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty ,  and good co n sc io u s ,"  a concept  which soon became synon­
ymous with "common law, p r i n c i p l e s  o f  eq u i ty  and English s t a t u t e s  of  gener­
al a p p l i c a t i o n s "  (Guttman, 1957).
S i m i l a r l y ,  Engl ish  d o c t i r n e s  of  eq u i ty  were in t roduced  in  th e  same de­
gree  and measure as th e  common law. Colonial  c o u r t s  o f te n  r e l i e d  in the  doc­
t r i n e  of  eq u i ty  in r e so lv in g  cases  where the  n a t iv e  l i t i g a n t s  argued t h e i r  
cases  on the  b a s i s  o f  t r i b a l  o r  personal  law. This a p p l i c a t i o n  of  English 
law was p a r t i c u l a r l y  im por tan t  in m a t te r s  of  family  law, i n h e r i t a n c e ,  and 
land t e n u r e ,  concerning which the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s  g e n e r a l ly  a p p l ied  th e  p e r ­
sonal law o f  the  p a r t i e s .  Native personal  law was a b ro g a ted ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  
only where repugnant  to  n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e .
There were t h r e e  ways by which Engl ish  a c t s  ap p l ie d  to  the  colony. S ta ­
t u t e s  in fo rc e  in  England as  o f  some d a te  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  each colony may have 
been c a r r i e d  to  th e  ceded colony by Engl ish  s e t t l e r s  as p a r t  of  t h e i r  person­
al law. The English s t a t u t e s  may have been in t roduced  as s t a t u t e s  of  general 
a p p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  ap p l ied  to  a l l  co lo n ie s  and dependencies  o f  B r i t a i n ,  no l e s s  
than to  B r i t a i n .  F i n a l l y ,  in d iv id u a l  a c t s  o f  Pa r l iam en t  may have been l o c a l ­
ly  adopted as the  law of  t h e  colony.
B r i t i s h  Common Law and Re l ig ious  Ju r i sp ru d en ce
We sh a l l  co n s id e r  th o se  na t io n a l  lega l  systems o f  th e  Common Law family  
t h a t  have blended with indigenous systems o f  r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  as a c a t ­
egory s e p a ra t e  and a p a r t  from those  t h a t  have in co rp o ra ted  n a t iv e  customary law. 
Common Laws re c ep t io n s  t h a t  over lap  n a t iv e  r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  have s e v e r ­
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al common f e a t u r e s  t h a t  s e t  them a p a r t .  Upon e s t a b l i s h i n g  a B r i t i s h  j u d i ­
c i a l  system and t r a n s p l a n t i n g  the  Engl ish  Common Law system, th e  in co rp o ra ­
t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  began on a piecemeal b a s i s  in  a manner ch a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c  of  th e  Engl ish  lega l  process  of  Human Action.
The s e l e c t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  r u le s  of  law had the  e f f e c t  of  
d i s t o r t i n g  th e  indigenous j u r i s p ru d e n c e  in t h a t  t h e i r  r educ t ion  to  case  law 
n e c e s s a r i l y  s ep a ra ted  the  c o n te n t s  ( subs tance)  o f  those  ru le s  from t h e i r  
o r ig i n s  in  holy w r i t  o r  r e v e l a t i o n .  F u r th e r ,  because the  n a t iv e  r e l i g i o u s  
ju r i s p ru d e n c e  was g e n e r a l ly  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  c o u r t s  as only a b s t r a c t e d  t e x t s  
and t r e a t i s e s '  prepared by lega l  s c h o l a r s ,  the  r e l i g i o u s  ru le s  were o f te n  su­
perseded by th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  custom. Again, the  d i s t o r t i o n  lay  in l a r g e  
p a r t  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  a b s t r a c t e d  t e x t  r u le s  had been s e p a ra te d  from t h e i r  
under ly ing  bases o f  s o c ia l  o b l i g a t i o n .  For example, in Hirabae v. Sonabae 
( Ind .  Dec. O.S. 4 .1 0 0 ) ,  t h e  Supreme Court a t  Bombay upheld the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  
Hindu customs in the  case  o f  Khoja and Cutchi Memons, who were Moslem who 
p r a c t i c e d  Hindu customs o f  i n h e r i t a n c e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  in Mussammat Sardar  Biki 
v. Hag Nawar Khan ( I .L .R .  15 Lah. 425, 1934), h e i r s  contended t h a t  the  e s t a t e  
was to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  accord ing  to  Is lam ic  law because th e  de cu jus  had de­
c la r e d  in fav o r  o f  I s lam ic  law befo re  h is  d e a th ,  the reby  ab roga t ing  the  cus ­
tom t h a t  would o therw ise  have a p p l i e d .  The c o u r t  re fused  such a d i s p o s i t i o n  
in fav o r  o f  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  a t  custom. Custom was thus  given p re fe ren ce  over  
the  r e l i g i o u s ,  p o s i t i v e  law.
The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Engl ish  lega l  p r i n c i p l e s  gave enhanced credence to  
the  indigenous a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  law to th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  those  ru le s  
d id  not  t r a n g r e s s  repugnancy c l a u s e s .  This d i f f e r e n t i a l  acceptance of  r e l i g ­
ious  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  by common law c o u r t s  had th e  a d d i t io n a l  e f f e c t  of  conform­
ing th e  r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p ru d e n c e  to  n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and e q u i ty  in  so f a r  as i t
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had a t  the  p e r t i n e n t  t ime been d iscovered  and expounded in B r i t i s h  j u r i s ­
prudence g e n e r a l ly .  In Ma K.yn M.ya v. Maung S i t  Han (R.L.R.103,  1337), f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  the  co u r t  in Burma r e j e c t e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Chinese custom in  de­
te rmin ing  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  a marr iage  between a Burmese Buddhis t  woman and a 
Chinese Confucian because to  do so would a t t a i n  a r e s u l t  c o n t r a ry  to  j u s t i c e ,  
e q u i t y ,  and good consc ious .  The marr iage was held to be v a l id  under Burmese 
customary law, as the  law o f  th e  forum.
In C o l l e c to r  o f  Masulipatum v. Cavaly Vencata Narra inapah ( M.I.A. 529, 
1861), th e  co u r t  a p p l ied  Engl ish  law in  d i r e c t  p re fe r e n c e  to  Hindu law in a 
m a t t e r  invo lv ing  th e  landed p ro p e r ty  o f  a Brahmin. S im i l a r  cases  involve  p re ­
f e ren ce  o f  Engl ish  law r e l a t i n g  to  t e s tam en ta ry  beques ts  and th e  a l i e n a t i o n  
o f  undivided i n t e r e s t s  in p ro p e r ty  ( D e r r e t t ,  1968, pp. 311-12).
F i n a l l y ,  th e  in c o r p o ra t io n  of  r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p ru d e n c e  through i t s  ex­
p re ss io n  in case  r e p o r t s  and s t a t u t e s  and as p receden ts  of  n a t iv e  j u d i c i a l  ex­
p e r ien ce  has preserved  much o f  th e  form and subs tance  o f  the  n a t i v e  r e l i g i o u s  
j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  d e s p i t e  the  modern r i s e  and preva lence  of  s e c u l a r  i d e o lo g ie s .
The Common Law system with  i t s  precedents  and b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e s  has g e n e r a l ly  
p e r s i s t e d  a f t e r  the  end o f  the  co lo n ia l  per iod  to  s e rv e  as th e  lega l  system 
o f  th e  independent n a t io n .  Upon ga in ing  independence,  most o f  t h e  formerly  
c o lo n ia l  c o u n t r i e s ,  as they  modernize t h e i r  law in  th e  i n t e r e s t  of  economic 
development ,  e l im in a te  much o f  the  customary and r e l i g i o u s  elements  and s t r e n g ­
then the  English o r  E n g l i s h - in f lu e n c e  components o f  t h e i r  lega l  systems 
( S c h le s in g e r ,  1970). In o t h e r  words, independent  n a t iv e s  move the  law o f  t h e i r  
independent  c o u n t r ie s  i n to  even g r e a t e r  conformity to  the  law of  England than  
t h e i r  English maste rs  had. They put down the  White Man's Burden o f  recon­
c i l i n g  n a t iv e  p r a c t i c e  to  n a tu r a l  decency.
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Common Law and Is lamic  Law 
" Ju r i sp ru d en ce  in Islam i s  the  whole process  of  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a c t i v i t y  
which a s c e r t a i n s  and d i s c o v e r s  th e  terms of  the  d iv in e  w i l l  and t ransfo rm s  
them in to  a system of  l e g a l ,  en fo rc e a b le  r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  (Coulson, 1969, 
p. 1) .  However, th e  I s lam ic  j u r i s p ru d e n c e  in a rea s  former ly  under B r i t i s h  
dominion e x i s t s  w i th in  th e  l i m i t s  of  an Anglo-Is lam ic  Common Law system. 
Indeed,  to  some deg ree ,  most former  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  p o sses s io n s  in Asia and 
A f r ic a  embrace p a r t  o f  th e  geographic  expanse of  Islam.
Anglo-Is lam ic  law i s  a body o f  law formed by th e  Common Law processes  and 
p r i n c i p l e s .  I t  inc ludes  th e  c l a s s i c a l  sources  of  Is lamic  law (such as th e  
Koran),  t h e  S h a r i ' a t ,  and the  body of  r u le s  a p p l ied  by th e  c o u r t s  to  Moslems 
as p a r t  o f  t h e i r  personal  law. To unders tand t h i s  process  o f  lega l  a c c u l t ­
u r a t i o n ,  i t  i s  probably b e s t  to  review on a r e g u l a r  b a s i s  th e  process  by 
which the  Common Law a r t i c u l a t e s  with  I s lam ic  ju r i s p ru d e n c e .
Anglo-Is lamic  Law in India
The Indian su b -c o n t in e n t  proper  provides  the  s e t t i n g  f o r  th e  most com­
p l e t e  development o f  Anglo-Is lam ic  law. The e a r l y  per iod  o f  the  Engl ish  ad­
m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  India  began with  the  founding of  t r a d in g  s t a t i o n s  in Madras, 
Bombay, and C a lc u t t a .  During t h i s  t im e ,  the  law was adm in is te red  in  a loca l  
and i r r e g u l a r  b a s i s .  This e a r l y  phase ended with the  C h a r te r  o f  1726, g r a n t ­
ed by George I to  the  East  Ind ia  Company. That c h a r t e r  s e t  up a system of  
Mayor's Courts  based upon the  English municipal  model and apply ing  Engl ish  
law. Even so ,  the  emphasis remained on avoiding involvment in  l o c a l ,  r e l i g ­
ious  a f f a i r s .  In 1765, t h e  East  India  Company was g ran ted  the  Diwani o f  Ben­
g a l ,  B iha r ,  and O r i s s a ,  which were adm in is te red  under the  a d a l e t  system (Rob- 
e r t s -W ray ,  1966; Kilbourne ,  1973). Acting in  the  c a p a c i ty  o f  the  Diwan, the
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Company was r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  law.
In accordance with t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  Warren Hast ings  e s t a b l i s h e d
in 1772, a system o f  c o u r t s  t h a t  followed the  p r i n c i p l e :
In a l l  s u i t s  r eg a rd in g  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  m a r r ia g e ,  c a s t e  and 
o t h e r  r e l i g i o u s  usuages and i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th e  laws o f  
the  Koran with  r e s p e c t  to  the  Mohamodans and those  o f  
th e  S h a s te r  with  r e s p e c t  to  the  Gentoos s h a l l  i n v a r i a b ly
be adhered t o .  (Art .  27 o f  Regula t ion  I I ,  1772)
This  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  r u l e  remained the  fundamental p r i n c i p l e  th roughout  the  
c o lo n ia l  p e r io d .  A second p r i n c i p l e  enunc ia ted  in th e  1772 r e g u l a t i o n  e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g  th e  c o lo n ia l  lega l  s t r u c t u r e  was t h a t ,  in  d i f f i c u l t  c a s e s ,  t h e  judge
was to  a c t  accord ing  to  " j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty ,  and good c o n sc ie n c e ."  These two
p r i n c i p l e s  guided th e  development o f  Anglo-Is lam ic  law dur ing  the  e n t i r e  sub­
sequent  exper ience  of  c o lo n ia l  j u d i c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
In the  view o f  the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s ,  I s lam ic  law in Ind ia  was not " the  ab­
s o lu t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a b s t r a c t  p recep ts  taken from the  mouth o f  t h e  Prophet"
(Abu! Fata v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhury, 22 I.A. 196, 1894). The b a s ic  p r i n c i ­
p le  f o r  de te rm in ing  the  I s lam ic  law to  be ap p l ied  was enunc ia ted  in Baker A1i 
Khan v. Anjuman Ara Begum (30 I.A.  94, 1903, a t  111-12):
In Abul Fata v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhury, in the  judgment of  
t h i s  Committee d e l i v e r e d  by Lord Hobhouse, th e  danger  was 
po in ted  ou t  o f  r e l y i n g  upon a n c i e n t  t e x t s  o f  Mohomedan law
and even p rec e p ts  of  t h e  Prophet  h im se l f ,  o f  tak in g  them l i t ­
e r a l l y ,  and deducing from them new r u le s  o f  law, e s p e c i a l l y  
when such proposed r u l e s  do no t  conduce s u b s t a n t i a l  j u s t i c e .
That danger  i s  e q u a l ly  g r e a t  whether  r e l i a n c e  be placed upon 
f r e s h  t e x t s  newly brought  to  l i g h t  or  upon lo g i c a l  i n f e r ­
ences newly drawn from old  and undisputed  t e x t s .  T he ir  
Lordships th in k  i t  would be extremely dangerous to  accep t  as 
a general  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  new r u l e s  o f  law a re  to  be i n t r o ­
duced because thay  seem to  lawyers of  the  p r e s e n t  day to 
fo l low  l o g i c a l l y  from a n c i e n t  t e x t s ,  however a u t h o r i t a t i v e ,  
when the  a n c i e n t  d oc to rs  o f  law have not  themselves  drawn 
those  c o n c lu s io n s .
S i m i l a r l y ,  in  Veerankutty  v. Kutty Umma (Mod. 1004, 1956; a t  1009),  th e  c o u r t  he ld :
We have, t h e r e f o r e ,  to  a d m in i s t e r  w i thou t  in any way circum­
v en t ing  o r  d e v ia t i n g  from the  o r ig i n a l  t e x t s ;  th e  law, as
promulgated by th e  I s lam ic  Law-givers to  s u i t  the  p r e s e n t -  
day c o n d i t i o n s ,  and,  in doing so ,  i t  has to  be remembered 
t h a t  Courts a r e  not  a t  l i b e r t y  to  r e fu s e  to  a d m in i s t e r  
any p o r t io n  o f  th o se  t e n e t s  even though in c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  
they  may no t  sound q u i t e  modern.
Whether th e  c o u r t s  should apply Is lam ic  law was a m a t t e r  o f  the  person­
al law of  th e  l i t i g a n t s .  I f  th e  p a r t i e s  to  a s u i t  were Moslems, then Islam­
ic  law ( in  the  l i g h t  o f  Common Law procedures  and p r i n c i p l e s )  was used in de­
termin ing  the  outcome; a f t e r  a l l ,  th e  reasonab le  ex p e c ta t io n s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s  
to  an ongoing o rd e r  o f  a c t i o n s  was most l i k e l y  grounded in t h e i r  personal  
law. In th e  view of  the  c o u r t s ,  any person p ro fe s s in g  th e  Is lam ic  r e l i g i o n  
was a Moslem and cou ld ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  appeal to  Is lamic  law ( N aran tan taka th  v. 
P a r a k k a l , 1922, 45 mad. 986).
Is lam ic  law could a l s o  be a p p l ie d  as a customary law in c e r t a i n  i n s t a n ­
c e s ,  even when th e  c la im an t  was no t  Moslem. For example, some communities 
were not s u b j e c t  to  I s lam ic  law as a m a t t e r  o f  r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  but  
were governed by custom der ieved  from Is lam ic  law, e . £ . , t h e  Khojas,  Sunni Go- 
haras  o f  G u ja r a t ,  Moplahs o f  Madras and Malabar ( D e r r e t t ,  1968a; Fyzee, 1963). 
The s i t u a t i o n  o f  the  Khojas (an I s l a m a i l i  S h i ' a s  s e c t  co n c en t ra te d  in Bombay) 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  in t h a t ,  be fo re  1937, they were governed by Hindu 
laws o f  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  which they  had r e t a in e d  by custom, and by Is lamic  law in 
a l l  o th e r  m a t t e r s .  The q u es t io n  o f  custom in r e l a t i o n  to  Is lam ic  law i n t r o ­
duced the  problem o f  a p ro fuse  number and v a r i e t y  of  loca l  customs and p rac ­
t i c e s .  Such a s i t u a t i o n  was f i n a l l y  addressed  by the  c o u r t s  in  Abdul Hussein 
v. Sona Dero (45 I.A. 10, 1917) in  which i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t ,  f o r  a c u s ­
tom to  be ad m i t ted ,  i t  must be a n c i e n t  and i n v a r i a b l e .  The c o u r t s  would not  
presume th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  such a custom t h a t  had not  been c i t e d  in  previous  
d e c i s io n s ;  newly in t roduced  customs had only p e rsu as iv e  s t a t u s .
In 1937, the  Muslim Personal  Law (S h a r i a t )  Act p laced emphasis on the
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S h a r i ' a t  r a t h e r  than custom, by a b o l i sh in g  loca l  custom based on r e l i g i o u s  
law ( a p a r t  from t h a t  a c t u a l l y  in co rp o ra ted  as p a r t  o f  the  common law ) ,  ex­
cep t  in the  S t a t e  o f  Jammu and Kashmir (XXVI o f  1937). As a r e s u l t ,  the  
presence of  I s lam ic  law g r e a t l y  r e s t r i c t s  custom. N e v e r th e le s s ,  in such 
p laces  as Malayasia  and N ig e r i a ,  loca l  custom s t i l l  takes  precedence over  
I s lamic  laws o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  in o rd e r  to  p reven t  ex ce s s iv e  s u b d iv i s io n  of  
land.
Anglo-Is lamic  Law in P ak is tan
Of a l l  the  Common Law systems,  Is lamic  law i s  most prominant in P ak is tan .  
A f te r  1947, when P ak is tan  was e s t a b l i s h e d  as an independent  s t a t e ,  th e  s h a r i -  
' a t  was o f f i c i a l l y  p r e sc r ib e d  as de te rm in ing  th e  subs tance  o f  both p u b l ic  and 
p r i v a t e  law. Then, in  1948, P ak is tan  adopted th e  S h a r i a t  Act o f  the  formerly 
B r i t i s h  Ind ia  (Fyzee,  1964, pp. 460-62).  However, i t  must-be remembered t h a t  
I s lam ic  law was a p p l ied  w i th in  an Anglo-Is lamic  Common Law System.
The s t a t u s  o f  Islam and I s lam ic  law in  P ak is tan  was preserved  in p r o v i ­
s ions  of  the  C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  emergent n a t i o n .  One of  th e  e a r l y  p ro v is io n s  
o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  law in P ak is tan  was th e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  " sovere ign ty  over  the  
e n t i r e  un iv e rse  belongs to  Allah  Almighty a lone"  ( "O b jec t ives  R e so lu t io n ,"  
1949). Fur thermore,  th e  C o n s t i t u t io n s  o f  1956 and 1962 con ta ined  such phrases  
as " Is lam ic  p r i n c i p l e s  of  s o c ia l  j u s t i c e "  and "no law should be repugnant  to 
Islam" (A rt .  204: l b ) .  A 1964 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendment r eq u i red  a l l  laws be 
in "conformity  with the  Holy Q ur ' ran  and the  Sunnah".
In pos t- independence  P a k i s t a n ,  the  development o f  p r i v a t e  law supplemented 
the  dominance o f  the  S h a r i ' a t .  Yet,  a t  the  same time t h a t  I s lam ic  ascendency 
rendered I s lam ic  p r i n c i p l e s  of  law as pr imary ,  th e  na t io n a l  c o u r t s  a t tempted  
a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  I s lam ic  law in the  l i g h t  of  modern c o n d i t i o n s .  Simul­
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t a n e o u s ly ,  t h e r e  was a l so  an e f f o r t  on the  p a r t  of  the  c o u r t s  to t r y  to make 
concepts  of  th e  modern world conform to  the  t e n e t s  of  Is lam ic  r e l i g i o n  (An­
derson ,  1967; Binder ,  1958).
The apparen t  supremacy o f  th e  S h a r i ' a t ,  however,  i s  tempered by th e  con­
t inued  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  Moslems of the  Anglo-Is lam ic  law, which su b jec te d  the  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t e x t s  of  r e l i g i o u s  law to  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  p receden ts  and loca l  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  D esp i te  an expressed  i n t e n t i o n  to  o p e ra te  w i th in  th e  t r a d i t i o n ­
al lega l  framework, th e  Muslim Family Laws Ordinance e l im in a te d  th e  d e t a i l e d  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  th e  Koran on m a t t e r s  of  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  p a r t l y  in an e f f o r t  to  
p reven t  excess iv e  land su b d iv i s io n  and f ragm enta t ion  (1961, Sec. 4 ) .  Addi­
t i o n a l l y ,  j u d i c i a l  p r a c t i c e  main ta ined  the  Anglo-Is lamic  Common Law t r a d i t i o n  
o f  p r e s c r ib in g  the  l i m i t s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Laws may be e s t a b l i s h e d  in o rd e r  
to  accomodate p rece ived  needs o f  so c ia l  j u s t i c e ,  but such law must not  t r a n s ­
g re ss  e i t h e r  th e  d i c t a  o f  d iv in e  command o r  th e  Engl ish  s tan d a rd  o f  " j u s t i c e ,  
e q u i ty ,  and good co n sc ien c e ."  This  i s  th e  b a s ic  process  t h a t  determines  the  
p rogress  of  I s lam ic  law w i th in  the  P ak is tan i  Common Law system.
Anglo-Is lamic  Law in the  S t r a i t s  o f  Malacca
In the  former c o lo n ie s  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t lem en ts  (S ingapore ,  and the  
s t a t e s  of  Malacca and Penang in  M alays ia ) ,  Engl ish  law was in t roduced  through 
the  medium o f  Char te r s  o f  J u s t i c e .  These c h a r t e r s  s e t  up j u d i c i a l  systems,  
provided t h a t  Engl ish  law was to  be th e  law of  th e  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  and dec la red  
t h a t  Engl ish  law a p p l ie d  t o  n a t iv e  peoples  "so f a r  as t h e  seve ra l  r e l i g i o n s ,  
manners and customs o f  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  w i l l  admit" (B ra d d e l l ,  1931; Rober ts -  
Wray, 1966).
In the  Federated and Unfederated Malay S t a t e s ,  the  law to  be ap p l ied  as
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the  b a s ic  law of  th e  co lo n ie s  was English law t h a t  ap p l ied  a t  the  time of  
the  assumption of  B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l .  In th e  Federated  S t a t e s  (Perak ,  S e lan ­
gor ,  Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) , loca l  l e g i s l a t i o n  was a l s o  passed in the  
form o f  Orders in Council and Enactments.  In r e f e r e n c e  to  I s lamic  law, how­
e v e r ,  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  was of  l i t t l e  importance .  In the  Federated S t a t e s ,  
th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  Is lam ic  law was e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same as t h a t  found th rough­
out  Malaysia ,  but  with th e  added p ro v is io n  t h a t  i t  was s u b je c t  to  th e  a u th o r ­
i t y  o f  th e  j u d i c i a r y  to  r e fu s e  i t s  admission i f  found to  be e i t h e r  "not  r e a ­
sonable" o r  "co n t ra ry  to  n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e . "  A f te r  independence, the  p o s i ­
t i o n  of  t s lam ic  law in r e l a t i o n  to  the  n a t io n a l  Common Law system remained 
unchanged. Today, t h e r e  e x i s t s  some l e g i s l a t i o n  on Is lam ic  law r e g u la t io n  
o f  family  law and i n h e r i t a n c e ,  but  o th e rw ise ,  th e  co lo n ia l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  en­
dure (Bartholomew, 1964; 1968). The most im portan t  o f  th e se  enactments 
a f f e c t i n g  Is lam ic  law was the  Courts o f  J u d ic a tu r e  Act (1964, Sec. 4 ) ,  which 
c a l l e d  on s e c u l a r  c o u r t s  to  enfo rce  p ro v is io n s  of  Malay ada t  (custom),  even 
where t h i s  d ep a r t s  from th e  s t r i c t  r u le s  of  Is lam ic  law, e s p e c i a l l y  in mat­
t e r s  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  (Hooker,  1972, pp. 228-38; Hujah v. Fatimah M.L.J.  63) .
In the  Unfederated S t a t e s  ( P e r l i s ,  Kedah, K e lan t in ,  and Trengganu) , 
each was governed by the  i r r e g u l a r  laws o f  S t a t e  Counci l ,  in  a d d i t io n  to  the  
Engl ish  cormion law; and,  in  Johore ,  English law was adopted on grounds of 
comity w ith  the  laws o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t lem en ts  and th e  Federated  Malay S t a t e s .
Anglo-Is lamic  Law in A f r ica
As f o r  the  p lace  o f  I s lam ic  law in  former B r i t i s h  A f r i c a ,  a few g e n e r a l ­
i z a t i o n s  w i l l  s u f f i c e  to  i l l u s t r a t e  i t s  p lace  as e i t h e r  personal  o r  customary 
law. Only in the  S u l t a n ' s  c o u r t s  of  Zanzibar  and in the  Aden P r o t e c t o r a t e  
was Is lam ic  law d ec la red  to  be th e  fundamental law. I t  ap p l ied  on th e  b a s is
of  s p e c i f i c  enactments  in  the  B r i t i s h  co u r t s  o f  Zanz ibar ,  where Bombay Regu­
l a t i o n  IV o f  1827 (Sec. 26) provided t h a t  th e  "usage o f  the c o u n t ry ,"  i n ­
c lud ing  Is lam ic  personal  laws in t h e i r  myriad lo ca l  v a r i a t i o n s ,  should app ly .
In th e  former  p r o t e c t o r a t e s  o f  Uganda and Nyasaland and in th e  colony 
of  Kenya; I s lam ic  law was a p p l ied  by the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s  as a "n a t iv e  law and 
custom". However, in  Kenya, th e  1934 case  o f  Khamis v. Ahmed (1 E.A.C.A.
130) noted t h a t  I s lam ic  law was not  r e a l l y  a n a t i v e  law "merely because i t  
i s  th e  law a p p l i c a b l e  to  many o r  even a l l  o f  th e  n a t iv e s  of  the  Kenya Pro­
t e c t o r a t e . "  In t h i s  r u l i n g ,  th e  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f  I s lam ic  law to  a v a r i e t y  o f  
loca l  c o n d i t io n s  was recognized  only as custom. "Nat ive law and custom" 
the reby  went beyond indigenous  law to  become t h a t  which has become e s t a b l i s h e d  
usage in any s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t io n  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n .  In the  words of  th e  P r i ­
vy Counc i l ,  " I t  i s  the  a s s e n t  o f  th e  n a t iv e  community t h a t  g ives  a custom i t s  
v a l i d i t y ,  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  barbarous  o r  m i ld ,  i t  must be shown to  be recog­
nized by the  n a t i v e  community whose conduct i t  i s  supposed to  r e g u la t e "  
( Eshugbayi v. N iger ian  Government, A.C. 662, 1931). F u r th e r ,  s p e c i f i c  o r d in ­
ances r e q u i r e d  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  S h a r i ' a t  among indigenous Moslems in 
family  law d i s p u te s  (Anderson, 1970).
True,  t h e  Moslem s u p p l i c a n t  co n s id e rs  I s lam ic  law as a b s o lu te  by reason 
of  d iv in e  command, r a t h e r  than  as e i t h e r  n a t i v e  law o r  custom, but  our  con­
cern  i s  with  t h a t  l a w 's  a p p l i c a t i o n  in the  B r i t i s h - e s t a b l i s h e d  c o u r t s .  The 
idea does ,  however, p r e c i p i t a t e  consequences in c o n f l i c t - o f - l a w s  s i t u a t i o n s .  
T e r r i t o r y  in which I s lam ic  law i s  t r e a t e d  as th e  fundamental law (such as 
Zanzibar)  a p p l i e s  I s lam ic  law as a u t h o r i t a t i v e ,  not  as n a t i v e  law and custom, 
except  to  th e  l im i t e d  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  S h a r i ' a t  a l lows custom. On the  o th e r  
hand, in a reas  where I s lam ic  law i s  th e  personal  law o f  the  m a jo r i ty  o f  the  
popu la t ion  (such as in p a r t s  o f  N iger ia  and p a r t s  of former  Tanganyika) ,  but
regarded by the  c o u r t s  as n a t iv e  law and custom, loca l  customs d i f f e r i n g  
from th e  S h a r i ' a t  a r e  adm it ted  (Anderson, 1970).  F i n a l l y ,  in  th o se  p laces  
where Is lam ic  law a t t a c h e s  only  to  Moslems as i n d i v i d u a l s  (Gold Coas t ,  
Nyasaland,  Uganda, and p a r t s  o f  Kenya, N ig e r i a ,  and Tanganyika) ,  loca l  cus ­
tomary law i s  dominant (Anderson, 1964; 1970). Throughout former B r i t i s h  
West A f r i c a ,  I s lam ic  law i s  viewed as an e x c lu s iv e ly  n a t iv e  o r  customary 
law.
Since  independence,  I s lam ic  law p e r t a i n in g  to  fam ily  and i n h e r i t a n c e  
has g e n e r a l ly  con t inued  in f o r c e .  On account  o f  modern, s e c u l a r  id e o lo g ie s  
in th e  newly emerging n a t i o n s ,  however,  sometimes r a d ic a l  changes a re  a t t e m p t ­
ed. An e x c e l l e n t  example o f  t h i s  occurred  in Ghana.
"In [some] r e g io n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  some communities whose customary law of  
success ion  i s ,  in  many r e s p e c t s ,  very s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  under  Mohammedan law, 
which i t  r e a l l y  i s ,  and no t  as  I s lam ic  law qua I s lam ic  law" (Ollennu,  1966, 
p. 238) .  That i s  to  s ay ,  I s lam ic  law i s  not a c t u a l l y  a p a r t  o f  the  law of  
Ghana and w i l l  be admit ted  on ly  on the  b a s i s  of  custom o r  s t a t u t e .  For exam­
p le ,  the  Ghanaian view i s  t h a t  th e  family  i s  "a sp ec ia l  c o nno ta t ion  depend­
ing upon t r i b e ,  and i t  i s  around t h i s  fundamental p o in t  t h a t  I s lam ic  law 
must conform as j u s t  one o f  a number o f  p a r t i c u l a r  customar laws" (Ollennu,  
1966). The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  " s p e c ia l "  conno ta t ion"  becomes r e a l i z e d  when 
one remembers t h a t  th e  indigenous u n i t  f o r  th e  ownership and p osses s ion  o f  
p ro p e r ty  in Ghana i s  th e  fam ily .
Common Law and Hindu Law
As in  th e  case  o f  I s lam ic  law, Hindu law i s  an a n c i e n t  and complex body 
o f  r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  as well  as  a r e l i g i o n  embracing a very old and 
widespread so c ia l  system. The r e ce p t io n  of  Engl ish  common law in a reas  where
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Hindu law ap p l ied  to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  segment o f  the  n a t iv e  p o pu la t ion  occurred  
mainly on th e  Indian s u b -c o n t in e n t ;  b u t ,  a l s o ,  in East  A f r ic a  (Kenya, Ugan­
da, and Tanganyika) ,  th e  West I n d ie s ,  Ceylon, Malayasia ,  and S ingapore .  Be­
cause ,  th e  primary p lace  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  between Engl ish  common law and Hin­
du law as a r e l i g i o u s  system o f  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  was I n d ia ,  we w i l l  co n f in e  our 
d i s c u s s io n  to  t h a t  coun try  (with  f u l l  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  a p p l i c ­
ab le  to  th e  Indian s u b -c o n t in e n t  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  o t h e r  a reas  
where a p o r t io n  o f  th e  popu la t ion  p r o fe s se s  the Hindu r e l i g i o n ) .
Our concern ,  o f  c o u r se ,  i s  wi th  the  way in which Hindu j u r i s p ru d e n c e  
a r t i c u l a t e d  with  t h e  Engl ish  c o lo n ia l  common law in  such a way as to  become 
a p a r t  o f  t h a t  law in forming a p r e v a i l i n g  n a t io n a l  l ega l  system. In o th e r  
words, we a re  here  concerned with  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  Hindu law as a 
s e r v i e n t  system, a p p l i c a b l e  to  Hindu people as t h e i r  personal  law b e fo re  the  
common law j u d i c i a r y .
Anglo-Hindu Law in India
Hindu law was never  only a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  r u le s  o f  law, but  a l ­
so custom as w e l l .  For example, Punjab was ru le d  almost  e n t i r e l y  by custom­
ary law; and only in th e  absence o f  customary law did  t h e i r  personal  law ap­
p ly .  The personal  law o f  adheren ts  o f  Hinduism was Anglo-Hindu law: j_._e., 
Hindu law as developed by the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s  and tempered with  Engl ish  com­
mon law p r i n c i p l e s  and p rocedures .  The Punjab Laws Act (1872, Sec. 5) e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  th e  r u l e  o f  d e c i s io n :  "!) '  any custom a p p l i c a b l e  to  the  p a r t i e s  con­
ce rned ,  which i s  not  c o n t r a ry  to  j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty  o r  good consc ience ,  and has 
not  been dec la red  to  be void by any competent a u t h o r i t y ;  and 2) Hindu law in 
cases  where the  p a r t i e s  a r e  Hindu" ( P r e n t e r ,  1924). Hence the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between personal  law and custom i s  v a r i a b l e .
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Of c o u rse ,  in determ in ing  whether  Hindu law c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  pe r ­
sonal law o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ,  th e  co lo n ia l  c o u r t s  had to  f i r s t  d e t e r ­
mine whether  t h a t  in d iv id u a l  should be c l a s s i f i e d  as Hindu. A Hindu 
was one no t  a Moslem, P a r s i ,  C h r i s t i a n ,  o r  Jew; t h u s ,  one to  whom 
Anglo-Hindu law a p p l i e d .  Lack of  b e l i e f  and observance of  r e l i g i o u s  
r u le s  d id  not  p rec lude  a person from being a Hindu; b u t ,  convers ion  
to  C h r i s t i a n i t y  o r  Is lam negated an a p p l i c a n t ' s  appeal to  Anglo-Hindu 
law. Even so ,  Hindu law was o f te n  a p p l ie d  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  people 
had adopted i t  as t h e i r  custom. This  was t r u e  r e g a rd l e s s  o f  whether  
they could appeal to  i t  as t h e i r  personal  law ( D e r r e t t ,  1963a).
To determine what th e  Hindu law to  be a p p l ied  a c t u a l l y  s t a t e d ,  
t h e  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  c o u r t s  engaged in  s a s t r i c  s tudy and appointed 
e x p e r t s  in t h e  s tudy  o f  the  s a s t r a s ,  to  whom th e  c o u r t s  might  have 
recou rse  ( D e r r e t t ,  1968a).  The f i r s t  d i g e s t  o f  Hindu law, A Code of  
Gentoo Laws, was pub l i shed  in  1775.
The Act o f  S e t t l e m en t  (1781, Sec. 17) e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  th e  Su­
preme Court  in  C a lc u t t a  had j u r i s d i c t i o n  in de te rm in ing  th e  Hindu 
laws and p r a c t i c e s  to  be a p p l ied  between Hindus. This  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
was a l s o  extended to  Bombay and Madras. The Act o f  S e t t l em en t  of  
1781, in  i t s  use o f  t h e  phrase  "laws and usages" of  Hindu law, a l so  
r a i s e d  th e  q u es t ion  o f  th e  p lace  of  custom based on Hindu p r a c t i c e s .  
This  problem was addressed  by the  Supreme Court  in Bombay, in the  
case  o f  Hirabae v. Sonabae ( c i t e d  s u p ra ) ,  in which the  c o u r t  de­
c l a r e d  th e  a c t  to  be a p o l i t i c a l  document to  p re se rv in g  e x i s t i n g  law 
and usage and t h a t  th e  Act d id  not  imply adopt ion  o f  s t r i c t  p r i n c i ­
p les  o f  any r e l i g i o n  as law superceding  a u th e n t i c  custom. F u r th e r ,
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in  Deb v. Beerchunder (1868),  i t  was found t h a t  custom, where proved, 
r ep laced  th e  general  r e l i g i o u s  law.
In th e  m id -n in e teen th  c e n tu ry ,  a t tem pts  to  co d i fy  non-personal  
laws produced a Code o f  C iv i l  Procedure in 1859, a Code of  Criminal 
Procedure in 1860, and an Indian Penal Code in  1861. Although p re ­
pa red ,  in p a r t ,  to  p rov ide  r u l e s  where e x i s t i n g  law was s i l e n t ,  the  
codes did  not  in c lu d e  personal  laws (such as those  invo lv ing  family  
law and i n h e r i t a n c e  o r  c a s t e  and r e l i g i o u s  p r a c t i c e s  
codes r e p re s e n t  any a t tem p t  a t  fu s io n  o f  Engl ish  law and n a t iv e  p e r ­
sonal law. Code in f lu e n c e  on th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  a sp e c t s  o f  Hindu law 
as developed by the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s  was p r a c t i c a l l y  n i l .
B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  c o u r t  proceedings  r e s u l t e d  in the  imposi t ion  
o f  Engl ish  law forms. As a consequence o f  t h e  r e l i a n c e  on p r e ce d e n t s ,  
the  h i s t o r y  o f  Hindu law in B r i t i s h  India  i s  to  be found in the  form 
o f  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s io n s .  B r i t i s h  j u d i c i a l  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  abo l i shed  
th e  lega l  s t a t u s  o f  indigenous c o u r t s ,  which t h e r e a f t e r  lacked  gov­
ernmental suppor t  and r ec o g n i t io n  (G a la n te r ,  1963).  The B r i t i s h  r e ­
o r g a n iz a t io n  of  th e  j u d i c i a r y  p r e c i p i t a t e d  a f lood  o f  l i t i g a t i o n .
The presence of  c o u r t s  with power to  compel a t t en d en ce  and enforce  
decrees  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e  "contagion o f  th e  Engl ish  system o f  law" 
(Maine, 1895, p. 74) .  The adversa ry  process  thus  embraced the  Anglo- 
Hindu law.
Another consequence o f  th e  im posi t ion  o f  t h e  common law forms 
o f  procedure through th e  B r i t i s h  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  c o u r t s ,  concerned 
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Hindu law. "The Hindu law on the  s u b je c t  which 
th e  Court should endeavor to  a s c e r t a i n  i s  the  e x i s t i n g  l i v i n g  law 
which i s  to  be sought no t  merely in a n c ie n t  t r e a t i s e s  and commentar-
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i e s ,  but  in the  consc iousness  o f  th e  people  and the  p r a c t i c e  of 
everyday l i f e "  (Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Sinqha T e va r , 3 mod. 
309, 1879, p. 310).  The Common Law assumption t h a t  any legal  system
comprehended a de te rm inab le  body o f  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t e x t s  of  Hindu law,
but th e  s a s t r a  and o t h e r  ind igenous ,  coustomary law l e f t  v a s t  gaps 
in th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  law o f  In d ia .  In such c a s e s ,  the  c o u r t  was not 
o b l ig a t e d  to  apply Engl ish  law, bu t  in  " j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty ,  and good 
co n sc ien ce ,"  i t  ought to  be governed by p r i n c i p l e s  of  English law 
a p p l i c a b l e  in  s i m i l a r  c i rcum stances  (Varden Seth Sam v. Luckpathy,
9 M.I.A. 303, 1862). In such c i r cu m stan ces ,  however, English law was 
to be p re fe red  to  Hindu law (C o l l e c t o r  o f  Masulipatam v. Caval.y Ven- 
c a ta  N ar ra inapah , c i t e d  s u p r a ) .
The use o f  B r i t i s h  law forms in th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  cases  in v o lv ­
ing Anglo-Hindu law a l s o  brought about  the  general  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  of  
the  indigenous law.
At th e  touch o f  th e  Judge o f  th e  Supreme Cour t ,  who 
had been t r a i n e d  in  th e  Engl ish  school of  sp e c ia l  
p le ad in g ,  and had probably  come to  th e  East  in th e
m a tu r i ty  o f  l i f e ,  the  r u l e  o f  n a t iv e  law d i s so lv ed
and,  with  o r  w i th o u t  h is  i n t e n t i o n ,  was to  a g r e a t  
e x t e n t  rep laced  by r u le s  having t h e i r  o r ig i n  in Eng­
l i s h  law books. Under t h e  hand o f  the  judges  of  the  
Sudder c o u r t s ,  who had l i v e d  s in c e  t h e i r  boyhood 
among th e  people  of  t h e  co u n t ry ,  the  n a t iv e  ru le s  
hardened and c o n t r a c t e d  a r i g i d i t y  which they never 
had in rea l  n a t iv e  p r a c t i c e .  (Maine, 1895, p. 45)
As a consequence o f  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  Hindu law in Engl ish  Common
Law c o u r t s ,  the  d o c t r in e  o f  s t a r e  d e c i s i s  served to p reserve  the
n a t i v e ,  r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  in  the  form o f  p reced en ts .  In t h a t
way, some o f  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  th e  n a t iv e  r u l e r s  were l o s t .
The im posi t ion  o f  English law forms c e r t a i n l y  l im i t e d  Hindu law 
in c e r t a i n  very rea l  r e s p e c t s ;  but  l e g i s l a t i o n  a l s o  played a key ro le
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in  ab ro g a t in g  p a r t s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  law t h a t  a f f e c t e d  pu b l ic  o r d e r ,  such 
as cr iminal  law and evidence (Vasdev, 1961). L e g i s l a t i o n  a l s o  su p e r ­
seded most o f  t h e  Hindu law a f f e c t i n g  c o n t r a c t s .  Hindu law was p re ­
se rv e d ,  however, in m a t te r s  o f  r e l i g i o n  where i t  was r e l e v a n t  to  p e r ­
sonal r e l a t i o n s  o f  lega l  importance.
The a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  Hindu law in  Engl ish  law forms, by B r i t i s h  
c o u r t s ,  and s u b je c t  to  Common Law p r i n c i p l e s ,  then  formed th e  Anglo- 
Hindu law. This law developed on a g r a d u a l ,  p iecemeal ,  and loca l  
b a s i s .  The Common Law techn ique  i s  t h a t  of  a system t h a t  proceeds on 
the  b a s i s  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  case to  i t s  e l a b o r a t i o n  as a general  p r i n ­
c i p l e  and r e q u i r e s  a c lo s e  c o n t a c t  between th e  law in books and law 
in p r a c t i c e ;  such a s t a t e  was approached by d i f f e r e n t  j u d i c i a l  t e c h ­
niques  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p laces  th roughou t  B r i t i s h  India  (Maine, 1895).
The development o f  Hindu law in  t h e  Engl ish  Common Law c o u r t s  was 
not  w i thou t  d i s t o r t i o n .  D i s to r t i o n  o f  Hindu law p r i n c i p l e s  occurred  
in th e  a b s t r a c t i o n  o f  Hindu law r u l e s ,  in  the  forms req u i red  by the  
Engl ish  Common Law, and by th e  use o f  th e  Engl ish  language (G a la n te r ,  
1966; McCormack, 1965; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1965).
The C o n s t i t u t io n  of  1950 e s t a b l i s h e d  a s e c u l a r ,  f e d e ra l  r e p u b l ic  
in p o s t - c o lo n i a l  I n d ia .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  Hindu law su rv ived  as p a r t  o f  
the  na t io n a l  mmon aw system and by l e g i s l a t i o n  apply ing  to  s p e c i ­
f i c  s u b je c t s .  The Hindu Succession Act of  1956 (Sec. 5 ) ,  f o r  i n s t n a c e ,  
dec la red  t h a t  a l l  e s t a t e s  were to  de sc en t  accord ing  to  p r i v a t e  law and 
be p a r t i b l e ,  d e s p i t e  s t a t u t a r y  p r o h ib i t i o n  of  e x cess iv e  f ragm en ta t ion  
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  land .  The Succession  Act p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f f e c t e d  land 
t e n u re  and success ion  in the  Punjab (B a n s a l , 1967, pp. 165-82).  The 
p r a c t i c e  o f  d iv id in g  landed p ro p e r ty  among h e i r s  so as to  g ive to
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each a p r o p o r t i o n a t e  sh a re  o f  each item o f  the  e s t a t e  had r a t h e r  d r a ­
matic  consequences.  Each succeding g en e ra t io n  not  only  i n h e r i t s  a 
sm a l le r  p o r t io n  o f  th e  t o t a l  l a n d ,  but  a l so  land broken in to  more 
s c a t t e r e d  p l o t s .  Such severe  su b d iv i s io n  and f ragm enta t ion  l i m i t s  
the  i n t r o d u c t io n  of  in n o v a t iv e  methods of  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  due to the  
small s i z e  o f  a v a i l a b l e  t r a c t s .  In th e  Punjab, i t  has been es t im a ted  
t h a t  more than f i v e  pe r  c e n t  o f  th e  land t h a t  would u s u a l ly  be c u l ­
t i v a t e d  l i e s  u s e le s s  as a r e s u l t  o f  ex cess iv e  f ragm en ta t ion  (ILiver- 
sage ,  1945, pp. 56-68) .
During th e  p o s t - c o lo n ia l  e r a ,  the  Indian P ar l iam en t  determined 
to  r e p la c e  th e  system o f  personal  laws p r e v a le n t  in the  co lo n ia l  
t imes  with  a uniform p r i v a t e  law. Apar t from a few a t tem pts  a t  cod­
i f i c a t i o n  o f  Hindu law in 1955 and 1956 (prompted by s e c u l a r  motives 
presumably aimed a t  u n i f i c a t i o n  and c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of  th e  law) and the  
r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  c a s t e  autonomy, however, th e  sen t im en t  had l i t t l e  p rac ­
t i c a l  e f f e c t  on th e  common law j u d i c i a r y  (Kothari  and Maru, 1965-66).
Under th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1950, the  j u d i c i a r y  was c a s t  as the  
in te rm ed ia ry  between th e  i d e a l s  of  so c ia l  j u s t i c e  expressed in the  
o rgan ic  c h a r t e r  and th e  a c tu a l  c i rcum stances  of  Indian s o c ie ty  (Gal­
a n t e r ,  1963). The C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  1950 d id ,  however, e l im in a t e  c a s t e  
as anyth ing  o t h e r  than  s o c ia l  a s s o c i a t i o n  coupled with  i d e n t i f y i n g  
r e l i g i o u s  a s p e c t s .
L i t t l e  f u r t h e r  development of  Hindu law w i th in  th e  na t io n a l  sy s ­
tem can be expected because o f  th e  immense growth of  Anglo-Hindu law 
dur ing  the  Common Law exper ience  o f  t h e  co lo n ia l  p e r iod .  Indeed,  only 
one in twenty cases  i s  r e p o r t e d ,  becoming thereby  p a r t  o f  the  body of
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preceden t  ( G a la n te r ,  1967).
Today, the  n a t io n a l  lega l  system o f  Ind ia  i s  c l e a r l y  a Common 
Law system. "So has been b u i l t  up on a b a s i s  of  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  of 
Engl ish  law the  f a b r i c  o f  modern Indian law which no tw i th s tan d in g  i t s  
fo re ig n  roo ts  and o r i g i n  i s  unmistakably  Indian in i t s  ou t look  and 
o p e ra t io n "  (S e ta lv a d ,  1960, p. 225).
Anglo-Hindu Law Outs ide  Ind ia
Hindu law a l so  fu n c t io n s  as a customary law o u t s id e  I n d ia ,  in 
Malaysia and S ingapore ,  fo rm er ly  B r i t i s h  A f r i c a ,  and the  B r i t i s h  West 
Ind ie s  (Guyana, Jamaica ,  and T r in id a d ) .  In those  p l a c e s ,  Hindu law 
i s  sometimes adm it ted  by th e  c o u r t s  as  an excep t ion  to  t h e  g e n e r a l ­
i t y  o f  the  common law, u s u a l ly  in m a t te r s  o f  family  law. In t h e  West 
I n d i e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Hindu law i s  only  recognized  in cases  of  
marr iage  and d iv o rc e .  In former  B r i t i s h  A f r ic a  (Kenya, Tanganyika, 
and Uganda), Hindu law i s  only pe rm it ted  as a loca l  customary law 
through enab l ing  s t a t u t e s  o r  by c i t a t i o n  o f  p receden ts  from var ious  
Indian j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  mostly  Bombay ( D e r r e t t ,  1963a).  Hindu law has 
th e  s t a t u s  o f  customary law a l s o  in Malaysia; u n t i l  1961, i t  had t h a t  
s t a t u s  in Singapore where i t  i s  adm it ted  on th e  b a s i s  o f  eq u i ty  and 
n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and th e  in h e re n t  r easonab leness  o f  a loca l  Hindu cus ­
tom ( i . e . . ,  c l e a r ,  d e f i n i t e ,  and r easonab le  in t h e  view o f  the  Hindu 
community) (Hooker, M.B., 1971a).
Common Law and Buddhist Law 
Prophets  a r e ,  indeed ,  o f te n  w i thou t  honor in t h e i r  own lan d s .  The
116
Buddha gained more adhe ren ts  o u t s id e  I n d ia ,  no tab ly  in China, Japan,  
and Burma. Buddhist law was th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  lega l  system of  Burma.
As r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  i t  was based on th e  Dhammathats (a c o l ­
l e c t i o n  of  e x p la n a t io n s ,  customs,  manners,  and mores) and the  Vinaya 
(which concerned e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  m a t t e r s ) ,  as well  as l o c a l ,  r e l i g i o u s ­
ly-grounded custom (Wigmore, 1928). The B r i t i s h  Common Law c o u r t s  
s e l e c t e d  v a r io u s  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t e x t s  o f  Buddhist  law to  be ap p l ie d  
as personal  law in Burma and i n t e r p r e t e d  th e  indigenous law w i th in  
the  Common Law j u d i c i a l  p rocess .  In t h a t  way, and Anglo-Buddhist  law 
came i n t o  be ing .
This Anglo-Buddhis t  law developed in phases as v a r ious  wars r e ­
s u l t e d  in B r i t i s h  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  a reas  o f  Burma: Arakan
and Tenasser im in  1824; Pegu, Rangoon, B asse in ,  and Prome in 1852; 
and th e  ba lance  o f  Burma in 1886. The lega l  h i s t o r y  o f  Burma as  a 
Common Law j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of  I n d ia .  The p o l i cy  with 
r e s p e c t  to  indigenous laws in  Burma was expressed  in th e  Burma Laws 
Act (1898, Sec. 13) ,  which e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e , c o u r t s  would apply:  
a) th e  Buddhist law in cases  where th e  p a r t i e s  a re  B uddh is t s ,  b) the  
Mohammedan law in  cases  where the  p a r t i e s  a re  Mohammedans, and c) the  
Hindu law where the  p a r t i e s  a re  Hindus s h a l l  form the  r u l e  o f  d e c i ­
s io n ,  excep t  i n s o f a r  as such law has by enactment been a l t e r e d  or  
a b o l i s h e d ,  o r  i s  opposed to  custom having th e  f o r c e  of  law. The pur­
pose o f  the  Act was to  p re se rv e  personal  laws o f  i n d iv id u a l s  who were 
Buddhis t ,  Moslem, o r  Hindu.
In th e  development o f  Anglo-Burmese law, the  c o u r t s  de f ined  the  
Dhammathats as “th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  Buddhist law" (U. Pe v. Maung Maung
Kha, I .L .R .  10 Ran. 261, 1932). However, th e  language o f  th e  d e c i s io n
rendered in Tan Ma Shwe Zin v. Tan Ma Nqwe Zin ( I .L .R .  10 Ran. 97,
1932, a t  103),  i s  a l s o  very i n s t u r c t i v e :
The language in which th e  s e c t io n  i s  couched i s  u n fo r ­
t u n a t e ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  no law by which a l l  Hindus o r  a l l  
Mohammedans a r e  governed,  and in a s t r i c t  sense  o f  the  
term no Buddhis t Law a t  a l l .  The system of  law a p p l i ­
cab le  to  Sunni Mohammedans d i f f e r s  from t h a t  to  which 
Shia Mohammedans a re  s u b je c t ;  Hindus who fo l low  the  
Benares School a re  governed by th e  M itakshara ,  those  
who fo l low  th e  Bengal School by th e  Dayabhaga; w hi le  
in th e  r e l i g i o u s  system known as Buddhism no r u l e s  of  
law concern ing  s e c u l a r  m a t t e r s  a r e  l a i d  down o r  p re ­
s c r i b e d .  Bearing in  mind the  o b j e c t  t h a t  the  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  had in view, however,  the  meaning and the  e f f e c t  
o f  the  ex p ress io n s  "Buddhist  Law", "Mohammedan Law" 
and "Hindu Law" in S. 13(1) must be cons trued  as l a y ­
ing down t h a t  in "any qu es t io n  rega rd ing  s u c c e s s io n ,  
i n h e r i t a n c e ,  marr iage  o r  c a s t e ,  o r  any r e l i g i o u s  usage 
o r  i n s t i t u t i o n "  where th e  p a r t i e s  p ro fe s s  th e  Buddhis t ,  
Mohammedan o r  Hindu r e l i g i o n  th e  r u l e  of  d ec i s io n  
s h a l l  be the  personal  law t h a t  governs th e  community 
o r  r e l i g i o u s  denomination to  which th e  p a r t i e s  be long,  
excep t  in so f a r  as t h e i r  personal  law in Burma has 
"by enactment  been a l t e r e d  o r  a b o l i sh ed  o r  i s  opposed
t o ' a n y  custom having th e  f o r c e  o f  law".
T h e re fo re ,  where s p e c i f i c  r u le s  of  Burmese law a r e  found in  the  
Dhammathats o r  in the  decided c a s e s ,  th e  co u r t s  a r e  bound to  d e t e r ­
mine the  case  in accordance with  the  modern Burmese customary law (Ma
Hnin Zan v. Ma M.yainq, RAn. 31, 1936). Also ,  where the  customary,
r e l i g i o u s  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  does not  address  an i s s u e  o f  c o n te n t io n ,  the  
c o u r t s  a r e  to  dec ide  accord ing  to " j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty ,  and good con­
s c i e n c e , "  which has been i n t e p r e t e d  to  mean th e  English law i f  a p p l i ­
cab le  to  t h e  c i rcum stances  ( Dr. Tha Mya v. Ma Khin Pu, A . I .R .  Ran. 81, 
1941). In p a s s in g ,  i t  may be f u r t h e r  noted t h a t  Burmese customary 
law may be a p p l ie d  as th e  lex  f o r i , law o f  th e  forum, in  such cases  
as marr iage (Ma Kyin Mya v. Maung S i t  Han, R.L.R. 103, 1937).
In p o s t - c o lo n ia l  Burma, Burmese customary law has con t inued  to
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be th e  c e n t e r p i e c e  of  th e  n a t io n a l  Common Law system. The law r e ­
mains v i r t u a l l y  unchanged d e s p i t e  the  r e v o lu t io n  of  1962, which placed 
a s e c u l a r  m i l i t a r y  government in power. Burmese Buddhist law c o n t i n ­
ues to  have the  s t a t u s  and e f f e c t  t h a t  i t  had during the  B r i t i s h  r e ­
gime; t h a t  i s ,  an a p p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  is  l im i te d  to family m a t te rs  and 
p rope r ty  (Maung, 1961). The m i l i t a r y  government has made l i t t l e  
change in the  p r i v a t e  law because the  very l i m i t e d ly  id e o lo g ic a l  c h a r ­
a c t e r  of  the  regime leaves  i t s  concerns p r i n c i p a l l y  in the  area  of  
pub l ic  law.
B r i t i s h  Common Law and Native Customary Law 
Within the  realm of  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  i n f l u e n c e ,  t h r e e  g r e a t  assem­
blages  o f  l a r g e l y  un w r i t ten  law r u le s  were encountered ,  each forming 
a s e p a ra t e  ca tegory  w i th in  a co lo n ia l  system of  law and a subsequent  
n a t io n a l  Common Law system. We sh a l l  c o n s id e r  each o f  th e se  bodies  
o f  customary law s e p a r a t e l y  as Afr ican  law, Malay a d a t  law, and Chi­
nese customary law.
J u d ic i a l  Po l icy  Towards A fr ican  Law
The general  j u d i c i a l  p o l ic y  of  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n
towards Afr ican  law i s  summarized as :
The p o l ic y  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  Government in t h i s  and in 
o th e r  r e s p e c t s  i s  to  use f o r  purposes o f  the  adminis­
t r a t i o n  of  th e  country  the  n a t iv e  laws and customs in 
so f a r  as p o s s ib l e  and in so f a r  as they have not  been 
va r ied  o r  suspended by s t a t u t e s .  The c o u r t s  which 
have been e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  B r i t i s h  Government have 
the  duty o f  en fo rc in g  th e se  n a t i v e  laws and customs, 
so f a r  as they a r e  not  ba rba rous ,  as p a r t  of  the  law 
of  the  land .  (Oke Lanipekun Laoye and o r s .  v. Amao 
Ojetunde,  (A.C. 170, 1944)
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B r i t i s h  j u d i c i a l  po l icy  in A f r ica  embraces a sp e c t s  of  n a t iv e  
customary law. F i r s t ,  the  d e f i n i t i o n  of  customary law is  e s s e n t i a l l y  
j u d i c i a l  concern ( A l l o t t ,  1970, pp. 151-52).  Second, the  n a t iv e  cus­
tomary law i s  g e n e ra l ly  to  be admit ted  un less  repugnant  to  " j u s t i c e ,  
m o ra l i t y ,  o r  good conscience"  o r  "n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and m o ra l i ty "  (Al­
l o t t ,  1970, pp. 158-75).  Customs t h a t  breach n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e  and 
e q u i ty  cause judges  to  invoke th e  repugnancy c la u s e .  The payment o f  
a "b r id e  p r i c e , "  a n a t i v e  p r a c t i c e  in South A f r i c a ,  i s  deemed repug­
nant as being conducive to  the  purchase of  sex.  S i m i l a r l y ,  the  p rac ­
t i c e  in  A f r ica  o f  w i t c h c r a f t  as a l ega l  procedure n e s s i t a t e d  j u d i c i a l  
r ecourse  to  the  repugnancy c la u s e .  The enunc ia ted  c r i t e r i a  o f  repug­
nancy commonly amount to  a j u d g e ' s  apply ing  an English s tan d a rd  of  
m o ra l i ty ;  b u t ,  c e r t a i n  c l e a r  g u id e l in e s  were a v a i l a b l e .  I f ,  f o r  ex­
ample, a customary law al lows an a c t i o n ,  such as s la v e ry  o r  w i tc h ­
c r a f t ,  t h a t  i s  c l e a r l y  c o n t r a ry  to  English s u b s t a n t i v e  law, th e  cus­
tom would in a l l  l i k e l i h o o d  be cons ide red  repugnant .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  
an indigenous r u l e  o f  procedure  was c o n t r a ry  to  na tu ra l  j u s t i c e ,  such 
as a judgment by a n a t i v e  c o u r t  a g a i n s t  an in d iv id u a l  w i th o u t  having 
p rev io u s ly  informed t h a t  person o f  th e  charges  held a g a i n s t  him, t h a t  
r u le  would be r e j e c t e d .  Also d ec la red  as repugnant would be any 
punishment o r  s a n c t io n  determined to  be c ruel  and u s u a l ,  such as t o r ­
t u r e  o r  d i s f ig u re m e n t .
Beyond d e c l a r a t i o n s  of  repugnancy, th e  c o u r t s  tempered n a t iv e  
law with eq u i ty .  Genera l ,  fundamental no t ions  of  f a i r n e s s  u s u a l ly  
ap p l ied  to  a l t e r  customary ru le s  in o rd e r  j u s t l y  to  enfo rce  customary 
r i g h t  o r  a f f e c t  leng thy  possess ion  of  land ( A l l o t t ,  1970).  In th e se  
a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  English no t ions  of  eq u i ty  sometimes app l ied  to African
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law remedies t h a t  assumed a co n d i t io n  not  p rev io u s ly  p re se n t  in the  
n a t iv e  s o c i e ty .  In t h a t  way, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  English  concept of  
easements was in t roduced  to  the  t r i b a l  scheme of  land t en u re  in Uganda.
Assuming t h a t  a n a t i v e  customary law has not been found c o n t r a ry  
to  n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e  and e q u i t y ,  we sh a l l  now co n s id e r  th e  p lace  of  
Afr ican  law in th e  B r i t i s h  and n a t io n a l  Common Law c o u r t s .  In the  
dual c o u r t  systems t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  in c o lo n ia l  A f r i c a ,  Afr ican  law 
a u to m a t i c a l ly  a p p l ied  as customary law in n a t iv e  c o u r t s ,  w h i le  i t  had 
to  in the  B r i t i s h  c o u r t s ,  be s p e c i f i c a l l y  pleaded as a m a t t e r  of  f a c t .  
Even though the  c o u r t  would acknowledge th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a custom as 
f a c t ,  the  m a t te r  o f  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  and e f f e c t  remained w i th in  the  
d i s c r e t i o n  o f  th e  c o u r t s  (Angu v. A t t a h , Pr ivy Council Judgement,
1916).
As a q u es t io n  o f  law, the  c o u r t s  recognized A fr ican  law by ju d ­
i c i a l  n o t i c e  (cognizance)  o r  i t s  embodiment in p receden ts  (Angu v . 
A t tah ,  1916) .  Indeed,  c o u r t s  a re  r eq u i red  to  take  j u d i c i a l  n o t i c e  of  
custom where i t  i s  " n o to r io u s " ;  _i_._e., where i t  has rece ived  p r i o r  
j u d i c i a l  admiss ion o r  c o n s t i t u t e s  a p receden t .  There e x i s t s ,  however, 
a d e p a r tu re  from t h i s  general r u l e  in p o s t - c o lo n ia l  Ghana, S i e r r a
Leone, Tanzania ,  Uganda, and p a r t  of  N ig e r i a ,  where c o u r t s  co n s id e r
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customary law on an equal b a s i s  w ith  o th e r  law forms.
In m a t te r s  o f  land law, the  c o u r t s  have recognized t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  
v a r i e t i e s  o f  customary law m ain ta in  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of i n t e r e s t  in 
land.  For example, among the  Ibo, l i n e a g e  i s  paramount; while  among 
the  Yoruba, family  i n t e r e s t s  a re  dominant. At ano the r  leve l  of a n a l ­
y s i s ,  as the  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r e s t  vary ,  so do the  forms of  land i n t e r ­
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e s t s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  even though r i g h t  to  the  use and f r u i t  of  the  
land u su a l ly  reposes  in an i n d i v i d u a l ,  h i s  r i g h t  does not  end the  
t i t l e  to  th e  land i t s e l f  ves ted  in the  t r i b e  o r  community ( E l i a s ,  
1962), but  provid ing  the  i n t e r e s t  h o ld e r  with  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  ten u re  
t h a t  may be passed to  h e i r s  and a s s ig n e e s .
Customary i n t e r e s t s  may p e r s i s t  in a f a sh io n  l im i t e d  by th e  
co u r t s  and by l e g i s l a t i o n .  Land ten u re  i s ,  however,  u s u a l ly  ground­
ed in Engl ish  lega l  p r i n c i p l e s  because of  the  use o f  Engl ish  methods 
of  conveyance and the  i n t ro d u c t io n  of  w r i t t e n  documents record ing  
ownership and e f f e c t i n g  r ea l  e s t a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  ( A l l o t t ,  1960, pp. 
242-74).  In N ig e r i a ,  a claim of  t i t l e  " in  f e e  simple" (an Eng l i sh -  
concept)  was cons t rued  by th e  c o u r t  in th e  co n tex t  o f  i t s  conno ta t ion  
regard ing  customary land te n u re .  Thus, a term unknow in customary 
law was used to  r e f l e c t  an e q u iv a l e n t  idea  in Afr ican  law:
Now, in what b e t t e r  manner can i n t e n t i o n  to  convey 
an a b s o lu te  t i t l e  be m an ifes ted  than by th e  use of 
an exp ress ion  which d esc r ib ed  in lega l  terms an abso­
l u t e  t i t l e ?  T h e re fo re ,  where the  t o t a l i t y  o f  th e  i n ­
t e r e s t  o f  a family  under  Nat ive  Law and Custom i s  un­
l im i t e d  and u n r e s t r i c t e d  and where th e  t o t a l i t y  of  
t h a t  i n t e r e s t  i s  conveyed to  a p u rc h a se r ,  t h e r e  i s  
conveyed, in my view, an i n t e r e s t  o r  e s t a t e  equ iv ­
a l e n t  to  a f e e  s imple .  (Alade v. A bor ishade , W.N.L.
R. 74, 1962)
In th e  same c a se ,  th e  co u r t  went on to  a s s e r t  t h a t  p a r t i e s  to  a land 
t r a n s a c t i o n  may a l so  bind themselves by Engl ish  common law.
Engl ish  common law in f lu e n c e s  in m a t te r s  of  i n h e r i t a n c e  have 
a l so  c r e a te d  changes in  land te n u re .  In some communities of  the  
Gold Coast ,  f o r  example, many farmers  a t tem pt ing  to  avoid customary 
ru le s  o f  m a t r i l i n e a l  success ion  used Engl ish  law forms to  t r a n s f e r  
ownership of  t h e i r  farms to  t h e i r  wives .  In t h a t  way, t h e i r  sons ,
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r a t h e r  than t h e i r  s i s t e r ' s  sons ,  succeeded to  th e  p ro p e r ty  (Meek, 
1946, pp. 176-77).
Upon ga in ing  independence,  the  severa l  former ly  B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o ­
r i e s  r e t a in e d  t h e i r  Common Law systems t o g e th e r  with such a f  n a t iv e
customary law as th e  common law had absorbed.  The Engl ish  Common Law 
had, however, been in t roduced  with  numerous excep t ions  in de fe rence  
to  indigenous p o p u la t io n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in family  law and p ro p e r ty .
Nor was th e  i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  Engl ish  law been uniform among the  c o lo ­
n i e s .  In western  A f r i c a ,  the  Engl ish  law was rece iv ed  d i r e c t l y  from 
the  mother country .  But,  in e a s t e rn  and c e n t r a l  A f r i c a ,  English  law 
was o f  a type  borrowed from B r i t i s h  Ind ia .
Since  independence,  most of  the  former co lo n ie s  have a t tempted 
i n t e r n a l  lega l  u n i f i c a t i o n .  In 1961, Tanaznia began such a plan 
through c o l l e c t i o n  and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  of  customary laws based on 
t r a d i t i o n a l  l i n g u i s t i c  and so c ia l  g roupings .  With the  p o l i t i c a l  aim 
of  n a t io n a l  u n i ty  through uniform family  law and p ro p e r ty  law, a spe­
c i a l  commission in Kenya dec la red  (1967):
W hils t  our  C o n s t i t u t i o n  permits  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in 
t re a tm e n t  of  s e c t io n s  o f  the  community in  regard  to  
l e g i s l a t i o n  d ea l in g  with m ar r iage ,  d iv o rc e ,  and o th e r  
m a t te r s  of  personal  law, t h a t  i s  not  to  say t h a t  
such r a d ic a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  as e x i s t  a t  t h e  p re se n t  
t ime in Kenya a r e  d e s i r a b l e  i f  we a r e  to  i n t e g r a t e  
the  var ious  communities in the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  b u i ld in g  
one n a t io n ,  (quoted in A l l o t t ,  1968b, p. 63)
P o l i t i c a l  motives o f te n  s tand  behind a t tem pts  to  modernize the  
severa l  Afr ican  lega l  systems.  I t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  de­
mise o f  customary law with i t s  in h e re n t  p lu ra l i s m  would r e s u l t  in eco­
nomic p rogress  through more e f f e c t i v e  land use ( A l l o t t ,  1968b). S ig-  
n i g i c a n t l y ,  however, u n i f i c a t i o n  of  law has l a r g e l y  been l e f t  t o  the
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j u d i c i a r y .  Through th e  process  o f  s e l e c t i o n ,  a s tanda rd  body o f  l e ­
gal p receden ts  emerges through a u n i f i e d  Common Law procedure .  Such 
an approach tends s t r o n g ly  to  avoid the  ag g rav a t in g  t r i b a l  ten s io n s  
commonly a t t e n d a n t  o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  reform.
English  Law and Malay Adat Law
A romantic  q u a l i t y ,  which may stem from the  in f lu e n c e  o f  n in e ­
t e e n th  h i s t o r i c i s m ,  o f te n  surrounds th e  s tudy  o f  Malay ad a t :
When the  w e s te rn e r  looks a t  th e  customary law o f  the  
e a s t ,  he may see  i t  b l u r r e d ;  th e  k a t h i ,  t r a in e d  in 
th e  ways o f  r e l i g i o n  and immersed in Arabic  c u l t u r e ,  
may f in d  i t  f a r  too w or ld ly  f o r  h is  sympathet ic  un­
d e r s t a n d in g ;  and one does no t  l e a r n  th e  r u le s  of  
Naning games in London's L i n c o l n ' s  Inn F i e l d s .  The 
only  person who can be expected to  have a c l e a r  un­
d e r s tan d in g  and a proper  a p p r a i s a l  o f  customary law 
a r e  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  community. They 
a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in m a in ta in in g  th e  norms of  t h e i r  
community and to  them should  be e n t r u s t e d  th e  admin­
i s t r a t i o n  o f  customary law. They w i l l  know how to 
r e i n t e r p r e t  i t  to  keep pace with  so c ia l  changes,  
changes which t h e i r  own community has accepted  as 
being r e l e v a n t  to  i t  (M in a t tu r ,  1964, p. 352).
Such a view f a i l s  to  acknowledge th e  a c tu a l  demands o f  the  Malayan 
lega l  c u l t u r e .  The ten d en c ie s  toward r e c e p t io n  of  English Common Law 
a re  prompted by the  d e s i r e  to  ach ieve  modern s o c ia l  and economic con­
d i t i o n s .
Malay a d a t ,  which served as the  medium f o r  a fo rm al ized  j u d i c i a l  
p ro cess ,  i s  of  two k inds .  The f i r s t  i s  t h e  a u t o c r a t i c  ad a t  temenqgong, 
which embraced th e  r u l e r ' s  decrees  a g a i n s t  a c t s  t h a t  he cons trued  as 
in f r ingm ents  o f  h is  domain. The ad a t  temenggong was reduced to  w r i t ­
t e n ,  lega l  t e x t s ,  th e  Malayan Legal D ig e s t s ,  d a t in g  from the  seven­
t e e n th  to th e  n in e te e n th  c e n t u r i e s .  These d i g e s t s  inc lude  both ada t  
and Is lam ic  p r o v i s i o n s ,  plus  a t tem pts  to  r e c o n c i l e  th e  two. These
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a t tem pts  to  merge th e  two pre-European laws seem to c o n s t i t u t e  an 
at tempted  s y n th e s i s  o f  n a t iv e  b e l i e f s  concerning th e  "good" and 
" j u s t "  and th e  d o c t r in e s  o f  Islam (Hooker,  M.B., 1972).
The ada t  perpa teh  a re  more im por tan t .  They c o n s t i t u t e  a type of  
m a t r i l i n e a l  customary law and had a p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t ro n g  e f f e c t  on 
co lo n ia l  land a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  As w r i t t e n  d i g e s t s ,  they formed a body 
o f  ru le s  mainly a f f e c t i n g  land t en u re  and t r a n s f e r  in the  co n tex t  of  
a peasan t  s o c i e ty  o rgan ized  in m a t r i l i n e a l  descen t  groups.
The m a t r i l i n e a l  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  was most pronounced in Malacca 
and Negri Sembilan. The a d a t  a r e  t h e r e  o f te n  expressed  in "customary 
s a y in g s , "  o r  pe rb i langan  (C a ld e c o t t ,  1918).  Most perb i langan  concern 
m ar r iag e ,  d iv o rc e ,  k in s h ip ,  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  and land ownership.  Under the  
widespread  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  ada t  perpa teh  in the  mentioned a r e a s ,  the  
m a t r i l i n e a l  holding se rves  as the  b a s is  f o r  th e  primary l a n d - te n u re  
u n i t .  Land i s  held only  by women.
The so c ia l  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  th e  p e n i s u l a r  Malays i s  not s u b je c t  
to  the  ad a t  pe rpa teh .  Because equal s ig n i f i c a n c e  i s  given to  r e l a ­
t i o n s  on e i t h e r  the  f a t h e r ' s  o r  m o th e r ' s  s i d e ,  i n h e r i t a n c e  and owner­
sh ip  o f  land i s  g e n e ra l ly  d iv ided  eq u a l ly  as between male and female 
h e i r s .  Here, the  ad a t  temenggong a f f e c t s  i n h e r i t a n c e  and land t e n ­
ure w ith  s u b s t a n t i a l  Is lam ic  i n f lu e n c e s .  "Adat Temenggong [ i s ]  a 
form o f  p a t r i a r c h a l  custom which has now a s s i m i l a t e d  i t s e l f  almost  
e n t i r e l y  to  Muhammadan law" (Moubray, 1931, p. 5) .  Because t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  the  t i t l e  r e g i s t e r  book in th e  form of 
land ten u re  and success ion  r e c o rd s ,  i t  may be p o s s ib l e  to  use t h i s  
in form at ion  as h i s t o r i c  evidence concerning Malay m igra t ion  (Wilkin­
son, 1908).
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The r e l a t i o n s  between ada t  and Is lam ic  law were recognized by 
the  co lo n ia l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  in the  e a r l y  tw e n t i e th  c en tu ry .  The Cus­
tomary Tenure Enactment of  1926, f o r  example, looked to  the  ada t  p e r ­
pateh p r i n c i p l e  regard ing  primacy o f  female land ownership ,  in c a l l ­
ing f o r  th e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  land held by female members o f  " t r i b e s "  
as "customary land" in  th e  Negri Sembilan. The a c t  a l s o  l im i t e d  f u r ­
t h e r  t r a n s f e r  o f  land to  such person.  The Small E s t a t e s  D i s t r i b u io n  
Ordinance o f  1955 gave f u r t h e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  exp ress ion  to  t h e  1926 
a c t .  Unti l  th e  passage of  t h a t  law, th e  c o u r t s  had been confused as 
to  whether  th e  e a r l i e r  a c t  recognized as "customary lands"  any land 
held  by o th e r  than  female members o f  t r i b e s ,  as where t h e r e  had been 
I s lam ic  i n f lu e n c e .
The im posi t ion  o f  Engl ish  Common Law forms on the  s u b s t a n t iv e  
law in the  Malay Adat reduced much o f  th e  a d a t  to  a body o f  Malay 
common law. Cons iderab le  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  th e  Malay a d a t  law occurred  
through use of Engl ish  lega l  terms.  Engl ish  -terms were o f te n  app l ied  
to  express  unw r i t ten  Malay concep ts .  For example, the  ad a t  made no 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between law and eq u i ty  as does th e  English law.
As a r e s u l t  o f  B r i t i s h  j u d i c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  law 
became f ix e d  in  th e  form of  j u d i c a l  d ec i s io n s  and p reced en ts .  Judges 
app l ied  what the  n a t iv e  lega l  o rd e r  viewed as v a l i d ,  which became p re ­
cedents  f o r  use in dec id in g  f u tu r e  c a s e s .  The Common Law d o c t r in e  of  
precedents  caused some d i f f i c u l t y  in Malaya because of  the  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  o f  c o u r t s  m a in ta in ing  j u r i s d i c t i o n  over  d i f f e r e n t  
bodies  o f  customary law. This  was e s p e c i a l l y  apparen t  in cases  i n ­
volv ing  land d i s t r i b u t i o n .
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Before a l l  c o u r t s ,  however, cases  concerning land d i s t r i b u t i o n  on 
e i t h e r  dea th  or  d ivorce  were m a t te r s  o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  to determine 
whether ad a t  or  Is lam ic  law a p p l i e d .  This d e te rm in a t io n  was made in 
the  co n tex t  o f  a h ie ra rch y  o f  c o u r t s .  The lowest  j u d i c i a l  o f f i c e r  
was the  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  who determined and a p p l i e d  the  most appro­
p r i a t e  a d a t .  From t h i s  l e v e l ,  the  S t a t e  Appeal Committee took appeals  
on m a t te r s  o f  Malay custom. At the  lower two l e v e l s  t h e r e  was no 
a t tem pt  a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  preceden t .  Beyond the  Appeals Committee, t h e r e  
was th e  High Court ,  which was bound by e a r l i e r  p receden t  (T ay lo r ,  1929, 
p. 268).  Outs ide cases  o r i g i n a t i n g  in Negri Sembilan, judges  o f  the  
High Co'urt a lmost  always c i t e d  I s lam ic  law in cases  o f  formal d i s p u t e ,  
even though they  f r e q u e n t ly  ap p l ie d  ad a t  p r i n c i p l e s  in ach iev ing  the  
s e t t l e m e n t .
One o f  the  consequences o f  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  English  lega l  con­
cep ts  to  a d a t  was an a t tem pt  a t  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between e q u i ty  and com­
mon law in  a d a t .  In one c a s e ,  fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  judge precluded the  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  ada t  r u l e s  in a m a t te r  invo lv ing  the  devo lu t ion  o f  
land ,  the  t i t l e  o f  which was not  r e g i s t e r e d ,  as "customary la n d ,"  thus 
render ing  u n c e r t a in  the  s t a t u s  o f  the  l a n d .  The judge then cons ide red ,  
but d ism issed ,  an appeal to  I s lamic  law because the  de cu jus  ( t e s t a t o r )  
had " in tended  some customary law to  ap p ly ."  F i n a l l y ,  the  c o u r t  decided 
t h a t  the  law to be ap p l ied  was the  ada t  temmenggong o p e ra te s  to  lessen 
the  o the rw ise  harshness  o f  the  a d a t  perpa teh  ( Shafi  v.  L i j a k ,  M.L.J.  65, 
1949). Thus, on the  bas is  o f  English e q u i ty ,  the  judge denied the  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  ada t  pe rpa teh .
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Since independence,  Malayan lega l  d i g e s t s  have at tempted  to  c l a s s i ­
fy ad a t  m a te r ia l  by d e s c r ib in g  the  w r i t t e n  ada t  temmenggong and r e ­
c o n c i l in g  i t  through a comparison with the  ada t  pe rpa teh .  The d e f i c ­
i e n c i e s  in the  royal decrees  have been g e n e ra l ly  viewed as the  r e s u l t  
o f  a c o r ru p t io n  through Hindu in f lu e n c e s  on th e  once n a t iv e  Malay 
system. Nonethe less ,  th e  p r e p a ra t io n  and use o f  t h e i r  d i g e s t  has had 
a con t inu ing  in f lu e n c e  on the  a d a t  temmenggong of  th e  d i g e s t s ,  such 
as to  a f f e c t  most the  Malay peasan t  s o c i e ty  t h a t  i s  not  m a t r i l i n e a l .
This gradual encroachment o f  Anglo-Malay d ig e s t i n g  i s  a l l  the  more 
important  because the  a d a t  p e rp a teh ,  which is  dominant in Negri 
Sembilan, lays  a fo rm idable  o b s t a c l e  in the  way more economical ly  
e f f i c e n t  use o f  a v a i l a b l e  land .  The m a t r i 1i n e a l l y  o r i e n te d  ada t  
perpa teh  keeps t i t l e  to  land c a p i t a l  d i f f u s e d  in the  many hands of  a 
m a t r i 1ineage.  To the  e x t e n t  t h a t  the  c o u r t s  and the  d i g e s t  movement 
p e n e t r a t e ,  however,  land c a p i t a l  becomes f re ed  o f  encumbrances and 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  rap id  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  in terms o f  new oppor tu ­
n i t y .
Engl ish  Law and Chinese Customary Law
The lega l  b a s i s  f o r  ad m i t t in g  Chinese customary law d i f f e r e d  
from p lace  to  p lace  among the  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  where i t  was ap p l i e d .
The co lo n ia l  c o u r t s  in  Malaysia ,  S ingapore ,  and Hong Kong each had 
i t s  own procedures  f o r  handl ing  s u b s t a n t i v e  Chinese law. Even so ,  
Chinese customary law has g e n e r a l ly  been a p p l ied  in  c o n s i s t e n t  f a s h ­
ion .  Such law was e n t i r e l y  developed by th e  co lo n ia l  c o u r t s  in each 
of  the  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  in which i t  l o c a te d .
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In th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l em en ts  o f  Malacca, Penang, and S ingapore ,  
c h a r t e r s  of  j u s t i c e  i s sued  by th e  Colonial  O f f ic e  in 1807, 1826, and 
1855 provided th e  j u d i c i a l  framework by d e s ig n a t in g  the  co u r t s  t h a t  
should be e s t a b l i s h e d .  They a l s o  d ec la re d  t h a t  the  r u l e  of  d ec i s io n  
was t h a t  Engl ish  law was to  be a p p l ied  to  Europeans and n a t iv e s  "so 
f a r  as th e  s ev e ra l  r e l i g i o n s ,  manners,  and customs o f  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  
w i l l  admit" (B ra d d e l l ,  1931).
Chinese law was recognized  as a customary law in co n tex ts  i n v o lv ­
ing n a t iv e s  of  Chinese a n c e s t ry .  Chinese law was a l s o  rece ived  by 
use o f  p r i v a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law p r i n c i p l e s  in  cases  invo lv ing  po ly­
gamous m ar r ia g e s ,  a d o p t io n s ,  and l e g i t i m a t io n s  ( Chulas v. Kolson, 1877). 
In an e a r l y  case  the  p r i n c i p l e  was noted t h a t  " t h e i r  own laws o r  usages 
must be a pp l ied  to  them on th e  same p r i n c i p l e s  and with th e  same l i m i ­
t a t i o n s  as fo re ig n  law i s  a p p l ie d  by our c o u r t s  to  fo r e ig n e r s  and 
f o re ig n  t r a n s a c t i o n s "  (Chulas v. Kolson, L .R . ,  1877, p. 462).  The 
English common-1 aw r u l e  fav o r in g  monogamous marr iage was thus s e t  a-  
s id e  in the  case  o f  Chinese in th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t lem en ts  because i t  was 
lawful f o r  a Chinese domici led  in China to  p r a c t i c e  polygamy ( a t  
l e a s t  u n t i l  1931, when the  Chinese C iv i l  Code a t tempted  to  p r o h i b i t  
th e  p r a c t i c e ) .  In some m a t t e r s ,  the  c o u r t s  in th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e ­
ments a l so  adm it ted  Chinese customary law on grounds of  n a tu ra l  j u s ­
t i c e  ( Cheng Ee Mun v.  Look Chun Henq, M.L.J .411,  1962). Chinese law 
no longer  has any e f f e c t  in S ingapore ,  but  th ese  common law accomo­
d a t io n s  of  Chinese law in the  S t r a i t s  S e t t l em en ts  remain unchanged in 
Malacca and Penang.
In th e  Federated and Unfederated Malay S t a t e s ,  Chinese customary
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law was adm it ted  and given e f f e c t  by c o u r t s  through using cases  de­
c ided in th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l em en ts  as p receden ts  (Motor Emporium v. 
Arumugam, M.L.J.  276, 1933). Chinese law as a personal  law remains 
as i t  i s  embodied in  case  d e c i s io n s .  In Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei ,  
the  sources  of  law have been j u d i c i a l l y  d esc r ib ed  as app ly ing  Engl ish  
law in so f a r  as i t  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  and,  t h e n ,  " c e r t a i n  law and custom of  
races  indigenous . . . in c lu d in g  th e  Chinese ."  "Whether o r  no t  Chi­
nese law i s  to  be adm it ted  i s  a q u es t io n  which must be determined 
accord ing  to  th e  r u l e s  of  Engl ish  law" (Kho Leng Guan v. Kho Eng Guan, 
S .C .R.60 ,  1928-41).  The c o u r t s  have a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  they  would 
apply Chinese custom "where the  custom i s  recognized  e x p re s s ly  o r  im­
p l i e d l y  in a Sarawak Ordinance" ( Chan Bee New and ors  v. Ee Siok Choo, 
S .C .R . l ,  1947).
As f o r  Hong Kong, Chinese Law and Custom in Hong Kong, a r e p o r t  of  
a committee appoin ted  by the  governor in 1948, d e l i n e a t e d  th e  lega l  
b a s i s  f o r  ad m i t t in g  Chinese customary law. F i r s t ,  i t  was recognized  
t h a t  Engl ish  law, as o f  1843, was the  general  law of  the  co lony ,  ex­
cep t  when i n a p p l i c a b l e  to  loca l  c i rcum stances  o r  to  th e  customs of  
the  i n h a b i t a n t s .  Engl ish  law i s  a l s o  to  be l im i t e d  i f  i t  would cause 
i n j u s t i c e .  Chinese law may be ap p l ie d  when done in  a way so as not 
to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  any fundamental d o c t r i n e  Engl ish  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  (Ho 
Tsz Tsun v. Ho Au Shi & o r s . , 10 H.K.L.R. 69,  1915; Chan Shun Cho v. 
Chak Hok P in g , 20 H.K.L.R. 1, 1928).
Chinese customary law having been abo l i shed  in Singapore (Freed­
man, 1968) and r e s t r i c t e d  in Hong Kong in m a t t e r s  of  d iv o rc e  and i n ­
h e r i t a n c e  (Evans, 1973), i t  seems t h a t  the  Engl ish  Common Law, with
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i t s  A ngl ic ized  Chinese Law j u d i c i a l  p r e c e d e n t s ,  w i l l  i n c r e a s i n g l y  p re ­
v a i l  in those  a r e a s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Chinese customary law i s  not  l i k e l y  
to  e x e r t  much in f lu e n c e  in Malayasian c o u r t s .  In t h i s  r ed u c t io n  of 
Chinese customary law i n f lu e n c e ,  l i k e  the  a d u l t e r a t i o n  of  Malay ada t  
law, in evidence of  th e  decided t re n d  toward f u l l  r e c e p t io n  of  Eng­
l i s h  Common Law as th e  b a s i s  f o r  modern lega l  systems.
Mixed J u r i s d i c t i o n s  (Common and C iv i l  Law)
Although a l l  l eg a l  systems a r e  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  "hybrid"  in t h a t  
every lega l  system c o n s i s t s  o f  seve ra l  l a y e r s ,  each l a y e r  being a t t r i b ­
u t a b l e  to  a d i f f e r e n t  per iod  o f  i t s  h i s t o r y ,  th e  mixed c h a r a c t e r  of  
systems r e s u l t i n g  from th e  r ec e p t io n  o f  Common Law through ex te rn a l  
p o l i t i c a l  means i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  pronounced. The f a c t o r s  involved in 
such a r e ce p t io n  a r e  b e s t  observed w i th in  th e  c o n te x t  of  systems con­
t a i n i n g  both Common Law and Romano-Germanic Civ i l  Law, which a re  
h e r e i n a f t e r  c a l l e d  "mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s . "  Mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s  a re  
u s u a l ly  formed by the  a b so rp t io n  of  a Civ i l  Law system by a Common 
Law system (Smith, T .B . ,  1965). With only two e x c e p t io n s ,  E th iop ia  
and S co t lan d ,  th e se  systems have r e s u l t e d  from c o l o n i z a t i o n  by a 
s t a t e  with  a C iv i l  Law system (such as France,  The N e th e r lan d s ,  o r  
Spain)  o f  an a rea  t h a t  was subsequen t ly  acqu i red  by a sovere ign  with  
a Common Law system (such as Great  B r i t a i n  o r  the  United S t a t e s ) .
When an a rea  w ith  a C iv i l  Law system i s  thus  brought  under the  
r u l e  o f  a Common Law s t a t e ,  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  the  Common Law i s  gen­
e r a l l y  implemented by e s t a b l i s h i n g  an a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t  j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
c o n t r o l l i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  in t ro d u c in g  English as the  o f f i c i a l  language
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(which f a c i l i t a t e s  use of  th e  voluminous case  r e p o r t s  and commentaries 
used in the  Common Law), and by in v e s t in g  judges  with  t h a t  spec ia l  
p r e s t i g e  t h a t  so impressed de To q u e v i l le  (Smith,  T .B . ,  1975). Accord­
in g ly ,  procedure  and s t y l e  o f  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  b a s i c a l l y  fo l low  the  
Common Law p a t t e r n ,  whi le  much o f  the  p r i v a t e ,  s u b s t a n t i v e  law of  the  
former C iv i l  Law regime su rv iv e s  by i t s  in c o rp o ra t io n  in to  the  j u d i c i a l  
law o f  the  newly imposed system. As th e  r o l e  o f  judges  and judge-made 
law gain  dominance, th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  j u r i s t s  and l e g a l - l a w  school 
d o c t r in e  d e c l in e .  The ongoing t r e n d  i s  then  to  reduce th e  s u b s tan ­
t i v e  p r iv a t e  law of  t h e  e a r l i e r  C iv i l  Law to  a form p a r t i a l l y  p re ­
served in the  case  law and j u d i c i a l  p receden ts  of  th e  Common Law.
This  gradual a b so rp t io n  i s  not  p o s s i b l e ,  however,  where th e  Com­
mon Law sovere ign  does no t  have the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  apply i t s  lega l  
p r in c ip l e s  through th e  c o u r t s .  As an example o f  t h i s ,  one may ob­
se rve  t h a t  B r i t i s h  l eg a l  thought  has had r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e  
in Egypt, d e s p i t e  t h e  long occupat ion  o f  t h e  country  by Great  B r i t a i n .  
The lack  of  B r i t i s h  Common Law c o u r t s  and a bench and bar  t r a in e d  in the 
Common Law allowed th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  the  e a r l i e r  French law with 
l i t t l e  m o d i f i c a t io n .  F u r th e r ,  those  mixed systems t h a t  have a co d i ­
f i e d  p r i v a t e  law o r  a language o t h e r  than Engl ish  tend to  p rese rve  
more of  t h e i r  C i v i l i a n  Law.
The C iv i l  Law in  mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s  i s  u s u a l ly  confined  to  the  
area  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  p r i v a t e  law. C i v i l i a n  t r a d i t i o n s  (as d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
form s u b s t a n t iv e  law r u l e s )  a r e  p reserved  through lega l  educa t ion  
and lega l  l i t e r a t u r e .  The importance o f  d o c t r in e  as a secondary 
source o f  law in C iv i l  Law systems a r i s e s  l o g i c a l l y  from t h i s  r o l e .
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The p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  a C i v i l i a n  t r a d i t i o n  in a mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  
o f ten  a s s o c i a t e d  with  an emergence of  c u l t u r a l  consc iousness  and n a t ­
i o n a l i s t i c  f e r v o r  among the  an te ce d en t  people .  The a s s e r t i o n  of  the  
C iv i l i a n  lega l  t r a d i t i o n  i s  an a s p ec t  o f  the  a s s e r t i o n  o f  c u l t u r a l  
t r a d i t i o n  (Smith,  T .B . ,  1965). Such an a t t i t u d e  i s  obvious in such 
mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s  as  Quebec (Canada),  Scot land (Great  B r i t a i n ) ,  
and Puer to  Rico (United S t a t e s  t e r r i t o r y ) .
Conversely ,  lega l  educa t ion  and lega l  l i t e r a t u r e  may a l so  play  
a c e n t r a l  r o l e  in undermining th e  C i v i l i a n  t r a d i t i o n  by the  Common 
Law. " I t  w i l l  never  be found t h a t  an adequate  c i t a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
i s  made un less  the  a u t h o r i t y  f in d s  i t s  p lace  in th e  p r i v a t e  l i b r a r y  
of  the  p r a c t i c i n g  lawyer" (Smith, T .B.1965).  The books in the  p rac ­
t i c i n g  la w y e r 's  l i b r a r y  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  r e f l e c t  th e  lega l  outlook r e ­
ce ived  by him when he was a law s tu d e n t .  As a r e s u l t ,  th e  a v a i l a b i l ­
i t y  o f  the  Common Law casebooks,  r e p o r t s ,  and commentaries has i n ­
f luenced  the  p r a c t i t i o n e r  from law school to  bar  to  bench. More im­
p o r ta n t  than th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  law books i s  the  t r a i n i n g  of  lawyers 
which u s u a l ly  de termines  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  towards th e  sources  of  law. 
Indeed, the  a u t h o r i t i e s  c i t e d  in c o u r t  w i l l  u s u a l ly  be those  t h a t  the  
lega l  t r a i n i n g  of  th e  judge p red isposes  him to  recognize  with f a m i l i ­
a r i t y .
In those  mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s  where English i s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  e s ­
t a b l i s h e d  as th e  language o f  the  c o u r t s ,  C iv i l i a n  t r a d i t i o n s  and doc­
t r i n e s  a r e  f u r t h e r  subver ted  by the  use o f  t e c h n ic a l  terms of  the  
Common Lawyers as e q u iv a le n t s  of  C iv i l  Law concep ts .  "A t o r r e n t  of  
a l i e n  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  can pour through the  breaches  thus  made" (Smith,
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T .B . ,  1965). This i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n  in mixed j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n s  (such as Guyana, S co t lan d ,  and South A f r ica )  where the  Civ i l  
Law was u ncod i f ie d  ( u s u a l l y  Roman-Dutch o r  S c o t t i s h ) .  There i s  a 
s t ro n g  tendency o f  Common Law a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t s  to  t r a n sp o se  a C iv i l  
Law problem in to  Common Law lega l  terms and then  to  so lve  i t  accord­
ing to  t h e i r  own Common Law background. The lack  o f  a code exposes 
th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  C iv i l  Law to  c o n t in u in g  a b so rp t io n  by the  Common Law 
o f  th e  dominant p o l i t i c a l  power (Smith, T .B . ,  1965). To i l l u s t r a t e  
t h i s  concep t ,  we s h a l l  b r i e f l y  review th e  format ion o f  mixed j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  in L o u is ian a ,  an a rea  t h a t  reveived  a C iv i l  Code a f t e r  having 
rece ived  th e  Common Law, in an e f f o r t  to  p re se rve  i t s  C i v i l i a n  h e r i ­
t ag e ;  in South A f r i c a ,  an a rea  where the  Civ i l  Law was never c o d i ­
f i e d ;  and in the  Phi H i  p in e s ,  an area  where the  C iv i l  Law had been 
c o d i f i e d  p r i o r  to  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  Common Law.
The Lou is iana  Experience 
"The Kulturkampf between th e  ancienne popu la t ion  and the  Anglo- 
Americans f o r  supremacy in  Lower Louis iana m anifes ted  i t s e l f  most 
sh a rp ly  as a c o n f l i c t  o f  lega l  t r a d i t i o n s "  (Dargo, 1975, p. 11) .  As 
one C i v i l i a n  s t a t e d ,  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  the  Engl ish  Common Law in to  
Louis iana was "more f a t a l  to  us than th e  invas ion  o f  Goths and Van­
da ls  was to  the  Roman Empire" ( I n s t r u c t i o n s , 1805, p. 5 ) .  For more 
than a cen tu ry  p r i o r  t o  United S t a t e s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  the  Louis iana 
T e r r i t o r y ,  th e  land was under th e  bovernance o f  e i t h  French o r  Span­
i sh  Civ i l  Law. By th e  c h a r t e r s  o f  Crozat  in 1712 and John Law's 
Western Company in 1717 the  customs of  P a r i s  and th e  o rd inances  of
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the  kingdom o f  France were extended to  the  French colony.
By the  Trea ty  of  Foun ta inb leau ,  Louis iana was ceded to  Spain in 
1762. Upon ac tua l  occupat ion  o f  Louis iana  by th e  Spanish under Alex- 
andro O 'R e i l l y ,  the  governor by proclamation  abo l i sh ed  th e  a u t h o r i t y  
of  the  previous  French laws and rep laced  them with  the  laws of  Spain.  
This  1769 proclanimation d id  no t  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e v o lu t io n  in lega l  
t r a d i t i o n  because o f  th e  s u b s t a n t i a l  s i m i l a r i t y  between th e  laws o f  
France and Spain on account  o f  t h e i r  shared Roman Law h e r i t a g e .  Even 
though Louis iana  was re t ro ce d e d  to  France in 1801, th e  law of  L o u i s i ­
ana remained unchanged. E f f e c t i v e  French occupat ion  l a s t e d  no longer  
than  th e  twenty days between November 30 and December 20, 1803, a t  
which time th e  Louis iana  Purchase brought  th e  a rea  under  th e  dominion 
o f  th e  United S t a t e s .  By a Congressional  Act o f  March 26, 1804, the  
"laws in fo rce"  a t  t h e  t ime o f  t r a n s f e r  o f  Louis iana  to  th e  United 
S t a t e s  were r e t a i n e d .
One o f  the  e a r ly  a c t s  by the  American t e r r i t o r i a l  governor,  W. C. 
C. C la ibo rne ,  was the  e s t a b l i s h i n g  o f  Common Law c o u r t s  in th e  Louis­
iana T e r r i t o r y .  The problem now emerged as to  what law was to  be 
a p p l i e d ,  C iv i l  o r  Common Law. Cla iborne  wrote  to  P r e s id e n t  Thomas 
J e f f e r s o n  in 1805, t h a t  he was f e a r f u l  o f  sudden innova t ion  and thus 
encouraged " the  gradual i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  American system o f  j u r i s ­
prudence" ( C a r t e r ,  1934-62, v o l .  IX, p. 366) .  As a consequence,  a 
Congressional Act o f  March 2,  1805, extended th e  common law p ro v is io n s  
o f  the  Northwest Ordinance to  apply to  the  T e r r i t o r y  of  Orleans but  
with  e x cep t io n s .  The common law a p p l i c a t i o n  was not to  cover  m a t te r s  
rega rd ing  the  success ion  o f  p ro p e r ty ,  and loca l  s u b s t a n t i v e  laws were
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to  remain in fo rc e  u n t i l  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a l t e r e d .  The Common Law c o u r t s  
o f  Louis iana  j u d i c i a l l y  recognized th e  Civ i l  Law, thereby  prov id ing  a 
second avenue f o r  the  fu s io n  o f  the  two systems i n t o  a mixed j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  Louis iana C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  1812 p r o h ib i t e d  
the  l e g i s l a t i v e  r e c e p t io n  by general  r e f e r e n c e  o f  any " a l i e n "  system 
of law, thus  p rec lud ing  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  complete i n t r o d u c t io n  
of  th e  American common law a t  one t ime.
To p reven t  the  complete  i n t ro d u c t io n  of  th e  Common Law, the  
C i v i l i a n s  of  Louis iana  sought a code to  p re se rve  t h e i r  lega l  t r a d i t i o n :  
"Now, what i s  th e  f i r s t  law, th e  most im portan t  law in the p r e se n t  s i t ­
u a t io n  o f  t h i s  coun t ry ;  what i s  the  fundamental b a s i s  o f  the  g r e a t  ed­
i f i c e  o f  i t s  f u tu r e  l e g i s l a t i o n ?  I t  cannot  be denied t h a t  i t  i s  the  
m a t t e r  o f  g iv ing  to  i t  a c i v i l  code" ( C a r t e r ,  1934-62, v o l .  IX, p. 653).  
On March 31, 1808, t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  o f  Orleans adopted a 
"code" d r a f t e d  by Louis Moreau L i s l e t  and James Brown, th e  Diges t  of  
th e  C iv i l  Laws Now in  Force in the  T e r r i t o r y  o f  O r l e a n s . P r in te d  in 
both English and French,  and modeled a f t e r  th e  p r o j e t  o f  th e  Code Na- 
po leon , th e  1808 com pi la t ion  was a c t u a l l y  a d i g e s t :  j_.e . , a compila­
t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  law, r a t h e r  than  a d e f i n i t i v e  and f i n a l  s ta tem en t  of  
the  law, a code. Unlike the  French code upon which i t  was p a t t e r n e d ,  
the  Diges t  o f  1808 was not enacted in r e v o lu t io n a r y  t im e s ,  nor was i t  
in tended to  e f f e c t  a n a t io n a l  l ega l  u n i f i c a t i o n  o r  e x te n s iv e  so c ia l  
t r a n s fo rm a t io n s .  I t  was not  a break with the  p a s t  in  t h a t  i t  d id  not 
ab roga te  the  preceding law. Many of  the  r a d i c a l  motives t h a t  prompt­
ed the  r e d a c to r s  of  th e  French code were among the  o b j e c t s  Louis ianas  
sought to  p reven t .  "L o u i s i a n a ' s  f i r s t  d i g e s t ,  th e  p re c u r s o r  of  i t s
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famous codes ,  was the  product  o f  a c o n f ro n ta t i o n  between competing 
c u l t u r e s  as much as i t  was the  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  problem 
of  lega l  confusion"  (Dargo, 1975, p. 173).
The a c t  promulgating the  D iges t  o f  1808, f u r t h e r  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  
"whatever in the  a n c i e n t  c i v i l  laws of  t h i s  t e r r i t o r y  . . .  i s  con­
t r a r y  to  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  con ta ined  in the  s a id  d i g e s t ,  o r  i r r e c o n ­
c i l a b l e  w ith  them, i s  hereby a b ro g a ted ."  In t h i s  c l a u s e ,  i t  i s  e v i ­
den t  t h a t  th e  e a r l i e r  law was not n e c e s s a r i l y  ab roga ted .  As the  Su­
p e r i o r  Cour t o f  Louis iana  observed in  1812: "What we c a l l  the  Civ i l
Code, i s  bu t  a d i g e s t  o f  th e  c i v i l  law which r e g u la te d  t h i s  country  
under th e  French and Spanish monarchs" (Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Martin 
[O .S . ]  138, a t  140).  Moreover, u n l ik e  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o s i t iv i s m  
a s s o c i a t e d  with  C i v i l i a n  c o d i f i c a t i o n  movements a t  t h e  t im e ,  th e  
Louis iana  "code" gave lega l  e f f e c t  t o  custom. Spanish law surv ived  
in Louis iana  as  custom. (The Spanish had p re v io u s ly  abrogated  by 
code v i r t u a l l y  a l l  o f  the  former  French law . )  The two major sources  
o f  Spanish law in  Louis iana  had been the  Reco,pilacion de Ind ia s  and 
th e  S i e t e  P a r t i d a s .  Indeed,  t h e  d i g e s t  o f  1808 was l a r g e l y  a d i g e s t  
o f  Spanish law.
Annotated e d i t i o n s  o f  th e  d i g e s t - t h e  de la  Vergne m anuscr ip t  and 
a n o th e r  in  th e  hand o f  Moreau L i s l e t - r e v e a l  the  predominance o f  Span­
i sh  law in  L o u i s i a n a ' s  C i v i l i a n  h e r i t a g e .  As one s c h o la r  concluded:  
"Both documents . . . help  demonstra te  t h a t  the  r e d a c to r s  o f  the  Diges t  
o f  1808 did  indeed c o n s id e r  i t  a d i g e s t  o f  the  Spanish laws then in 
f o r c e  in Louis iana  even though they  c a s t  i t  in  the  mold o f  th e  new 
French Code C i v i l " (P a s c a l ,  1965, pp. 25-27).  Another l ega l  s c h o l ­
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a r  cla imed t h a t  the  1808 l e g i s l a t i o n  was 85 pe rcen t  French, with 
70 per  c e n t  o f  t h i s  t o t a l  corning from the  French p r o j e t  o f  1800 and 
the  Napoleonic Code ( B a t i z a ,  1971-72).  Although th e  l a t t e r  study 
has been p ro p e r ly  c r i t i c i s e d  on th e  b a s i s  of  l i n g u i s t i c  e r r o r s  and 
s t a t i s t i c a l  f a l l a c i e s  t h a t  led  to  a p p a re n t ly  i n c o r r e c t  conc lus ions  
reg a rd in g  th e  p lace  o f  French law, the  a n a l y s i s  i s  he lp fu l  in sup­
p o r t in g  th e  s p e c u la t io n  t h a t  much of  th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  law o f  France 
and Spain was so s i m i l a r  as to  permit  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y .
Although not  a p roper  code, th e  Diges t  of  1808 did  se rve  the  
purpose o f  p rev en t in g  the  e ro s io n  of  C i v i l i a n  law dur ing  th e  e a r ly  
high t i d e  o f  the  Common Law in Lou is iana .  I t  remained f o r  Edward 
L iv in g s to n ,  sometimes c a l l e d  th e  "Bentham o f  American j u r i s p r u d e n c e , "  
to  awaken in Louis iana  a zeal  f o r  t r u e  c o d i f i c a t i o n .  L iv in g s to n ,  
with Moreau L i s l e t  and P i e r r e  Derbigny,  d r a f t e d  a c i v i l  code t h a t  was 
enacted by th e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  by an a c t  o f  March 25, 1828, and 
t h a t  rep ea led  a l l  c i v i l  laws d a t in g  from befo re  th e  promulgat ion of  
th e  Louis iana  Civ i l  Code o f  1825. I t  was a s s e r t e d  t h a t  " in  the  Na­
poleon code we have a system approaching n e a re r  than any to  p e r f e c ­
t i o n . "  Even so ,  some Spanish laws main ta ined  p e r su a s iv e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  
by being recognized by the  c o u r t s  as d o c t r i n e  and custom.
Thus, th e  Civ i l  Law was preserved  in Louis iana  as  a mixed j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  in  th e  midst  o f  a l a r g e l y  Common Law j u d i c i a r y  and in the  
face  o f  r e c e p t io n  o f  Anglo-American p u b l ic  law. Among the  sources  of  
law r u l e s ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  remains primary (La. C iv i l  Code, A r t .  1 ) .  Cus­
tom may be a p p l ie d  where the  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  s i l e n t  (La. C iv i l  Code, 
A r t .  3 ) .  And, perhaps in de fe rence  to  the  Common Law, "In a l l  c i v i l
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m a t t e r s ,  where t h e r e  i s  no express  law, the  judge i s  bound to  pro­
ceed and decide  accord ing  to  e q u i ty .  To dec ide  e q u i t a b l y ,  an appeal 
i s  to  be made to  n a tu ra l  law and reason ,  o r  rece ived  usages ,  where 
p o s i t i v e  law i s  s i l e n t " .  (La. C iv i l  Code, A r t .  21)
By way of  c o n c lu s io n ,  we can b r i e f l y  compare th e  lega l  s i t u a t i o n  
in o th e r  s t a t e s ,  most no tab ly  Texas,  where an u ncod i f ie d  C iv i l  Law 
p re v a i led  p r i o r  to  t h e  r e c e p t io n  o f  th e  Common Law. In Texas, much 
of  th e  s u b s t a n t iv e  Spanish law gained from Spanish and Mexican r u le  
has surv ived  through i n c o r p o ra t io n  in to  th e  j u d i c i a l  common law and 
by j u d i c i a l  r e c o g n i t io n .  No concer ted  a t tem p t  to  p rese rve  the  Civ i l  
Law t r a d i t i o n  occurred  in Texas. Although, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Texas w ater  
law d r iv e  from Spanish sources  (Dobkins, 1958; G l ick ,  1972), i t  was 
adm in is te red  through th e  Common Law c o u r t s .  Also,  land law was o f  
primary importance to  th e  incoming American s e t t l e r s ;  t h u s ,  Common 
Law d o c t r in e s  o f  p ro p e r ty  r i g h t s  g e n e r a l ly  p r e v a i l e d  (Will iams,  1949). 
The excep t ion  to  Common Law land r i g h t s  e x i s t s  in a reas  where land 
t i t l e s  d e r iv e  from Spanish o r  Mexican g r a n t s  (such as a re  found p r i n ­
c i p a l l y  in  th e  v i c i n i t i e s  o f  San Antonio, Gol iad ,  and Nacogdoches, 
and along the  lower Rio Grande).  The p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  C i v i l i a n  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  in such cases  has been d esc r ib ed  by the  c o u r t s ,  as fo l low s :
Lands in Texas have been g ran ted  by fo u r  d i f f e r e n t  
governments,  namely, the  Kingdom o f  Spa in ,  th e  Repub­
l i c  of  Mexico, the  Republ ic  o f  Texas , and th e  S t a t e  of 
Texas. Many m i l l i o n s  of  ac res  o f  land were g ran ted  
by Spain ,  Mexico, and Republic of  Texas p r i o r  to  the  
adopt ion by th e  l a t t e r  o f  the  common law of  England as 
th e  r u le  o f  d ec i s io n  in 1840 . . . the  v a l i d i t y  and 
lega l  e f f e c t  o f  c o n t r a c t s  and o f  g r a n t s  o f  land be­
f o re  the  adopt ion  o f  the  common law must determined 
accord ing  to  th e  c i v i l  law in e f f e c t  a t  the  time of  
the  g r a n t s ,  i t  i s  p l a i n ,  we t h i n k ,  t h a t  whatever
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t i t l e ,  r i g h t s ,  and p r i v i l e g e s  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  Tex­
as rece iv ed  by v i r t u e  o f  land g ra n t s  from the  Spanish 
and Mexican government,  which were a p a r t  o f  th e  r e a -  
ty  i t s e l f  o r  were easements o r  s e r v i t u d e s  in connect­
ion th e r e w i th ,  remained i n t a c t ,  n o tw i th s tan d in g  the  
change in  sovere igny  and th e  subsequent  adopt ion  of  
th e  common law as the  r u le  of  d e c i s io n .  ( M i l l e r  v.
L e tz e r i c h ,  121 Tex. 248 [1932])
Thus, a l though th e  common law i s  c l e a r l y  the  r u l e  o f  d e c i s io n  in  terms 
of  Texas land law, an excep t ion  i s  made to  recogn ize  c e r t a i n  a sp e c t s  
o f  previous  Spanish o r  Mexican g r a n t s .  This  r e s u l t  was c o n s i s t e n t  
with  the  general  n a tu r e  o f  th e  Common Law t r a d i t i o n  to  recogn ize  p re ­
e x i s t i n g  law.
S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  su rv iv a l  o f  C i v i l i a n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  i s o l a t i o n  
may be found in o t h e r  s t a t e s  o f  former  Spanish o r  French dominion.
For i n s t a n c e ,  the  C iv i l  Law matrimonial  regime o f  community p ro p e r ty  
p r e v a i l e d  in Arkansas ,  F l o r i d a ,  Iowa, M i s s i s s i p p i ,  and M issou r i ,  be­
f o r e  i t  was abo l i sh ed  by s t a t u t e .  This  w ide-sp read  presence  i n d i c a t e s  
th e  former e f f e c t i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  France and Spain in  a re a s  c u r r e n t ­
ly  p a r t  of  th e  Common world.
The Example o f  th e  P h i l i p p in e s  
The P h i l ip p in e s  were under  Spanish j u r i s d i c t i o n  from 1565 to  1898. 
During t h i s  t im e ,  th e  governor a t tempted  to  en fo rce  the  laws of  Spain . 
Spanish c o lo n ia l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  however,  o c c a s io n a l ly  t o l e r a t e d  l o ­
cal  laws as custom, as long as they did  not  v i o l a t e  S p an ish -C h r i s t i a n  
p recep ts  of  m o ra l i ty .  The b a s ic  law was t h a t  o f  th e  Nueva Recopilac ion  
o f  1567, the  Recopilac ion  de Ind ia s  of  1680 and the  Novisima Recop i l ­
ac ion of 1805. A f t e r ,  1889, the  Spanish Codigo c i v i l  a p p l i e d .
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By the  Trea ty  of  P a r i s  o f  1898, the  P h i l i p p in e s  was ceded to  the  
United S t a t e s .  However, e f f e c t i v e  American occupat ion did  not com­
mence u n t i l  1901. At t h a t  t im e ,  th e  United S t a t e s  co u r t  system was 
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  and Spanish c i v i l  procedures  were r ep ea led .  Never the­
l e s s ,  Spanish laws and codes l a r g e l y  cont inued to  be the  law a p p l i e d .  
The f u r t h e r  j u d i c i a l  i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  common law ru le s  assured  the  
mixed c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  l ega l  system of  th e  P h i l i p p i n e s .  The i n t r o ­
duc t ion  of  the  common law was expressed  by th e  c o u r t s  in Alzua v. John­
son (21 P h i l .  308, 1912):
[M]any o f  th e  r u l e s ,  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and d o c t r in e s  of  
the  common law have, to  a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes ,  
been imported in to  t h i s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  as a r e s u l t  
o f  th e  enactment o f  new laws and th e  o rg a n iz a t io n  
and e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  by the  Con­
g ress  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  under i t s  a u t h o r i t y ;  
f o r  i t  w i l l  be found t h a t  many o f  th e se  laws can 
only be cons trued  and a p p l ied  through the  a id  o f  
th e  common law from which they  a r e  d e r iv e d ,  and 
t h a t ,  to  be had to  the  r u l e s ,  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and doc­
t r i n e s  o f  t h e  common law under  whose p ro te c t in g  
aeg is  th e  p ro to ty p es  o f  t h e se  i n s t i t u t i o n s  had 
t h e i r  b i r t h .
In ano the r  c a s e ,  In Re Shoop (41 P h i l .  213, 1920), t h e  co u r t  no­
ted  the  r e l i a n c e  upon American j u d i c i a l  p rec ed e n t ,  which mixed with 
t h e  Spanish s u b s t a n t i v e  law to  form a " P h i l i p p in e  common law", which 
in tu rn  complimented th e  p e r s i s t e n t  Spanish C iv i l  Code. On account  o f
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American p o l i t i c a l  supremacy, th e  Common Law p rev a i l e d  in m a t te r s  o f  
procedure  (F ran c i s co ,  1951; Gamboa, 1969), i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  s t a t u t e s  
(L ob ing ie r ,  1905; 1908; U. S. v.  Cuna, 12 P h i l .  242, 1908), and c e r ­
t a i n  p r in c ip l e s  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  law ( In Re Shoop, 1920).
A f te r  independence in 1946, a new c o d i f i c a t i o n  process  was i n s t i ­
gated t h a t  r e s u l t e d  in a P h i l i p p in e  C iv i l  Code in 1949. This code com-
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p r i s e d  p ro v is io n s  taken  from the  c i v i l  codes o f  Spain ,  France,  Ger­
many, S w i tze r la n d ,  I t a l y ,  Mexico, A rgen t ina ,  and Lo u is ian a ,  as well  
as th e  s u b s t a n t i v e  law of  the  United S t a t e s .  M atters  of  c i v i l  p ro­
cedure remained l i k e  t h a t  of  the  United S t a t e s .
By c o n t r a s t ,  the  French exper ience  in India  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e .  The 
p r in c ip a l  French s e t t l e m e n t  of  Pondicherry  was founded as  e a r l y  as 
1674. The then  uncod i f ied  French c i v i l  law ap p l ied  in t h i s  s e t t l e ­
ment. With th e  promulgat ion o f  th e  French Code c i v i l  o f  1804, th e  
c o d i f i e d  French C iv i l  Law ap p l ied  to  those  op t in g  f o r  French r a t h e r  
than Hindu law u n t i l  t h e  French t e r r i t o r y  was t r a n s f e r e d  to  Ind ia  in 
1956. However, because o f  i t s  l im i te d  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  the  former French 
c i v i l  law su rv iv es  only  as i t  has been in co rp o ra ted  in to  th e  Anglo- 
Hindu Corranon Law o f  Ind ia  through th e  j u d i c i a l  p receden ts  t h a t  r e ­
l i e d  upon French cases  (The C o l l e c t o r  o f  Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga 
Sathupathy (12 M.I.A. 397, 1868).
The South A fr ican  Development
The mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  South A fr ica  i l l u s t r a t e s  the  outcome 
of  a rece p t io n  o f  an u n co d i f ie d  C iv i l  Law by Volk m ig ra t ion  and i t s  
subsequent submersion in a sea o f  Common Law r e s u l t i n g  a l s o  from Volk 
m ig ra t io n .  The w r i t t e n  h i s t o r y  o f  South A f r ica  began in 1652 with 
the  a r r i v a l  o f  th e  F i r s t  Dutch s e t t l e r s .  These e a r ly  c o l o n i s t s  brought 
with them th e  Roman-Dutch C iv i l  Law, which o th e r  Dutchmen had a l so  
c a r r i e d  to  Ceylon, Indones ia ,  Surinam, Guyana, and t h e i r  o th e r  c o lo ­
n i e s .  Roman-Dutch c i v i l  law was a system developed in Holland from 
th e  f i f t e e n t h  to  th e  e a r l y  n in e te e n th  c e n t u r i e s ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a fu-
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ion o f  Germanic custom with  Roman law. Holland was annexed in  1433 
to  the  Duchy of  Burgundy and thereby  to  Spain.  Roman-Dutch law in 
th e  Nether lands  was superceded by th e  r e c e p t io n  o f  t h e  Napoleonic 
Code in 1809. The o l d ,  Roman-Dutch law g e n e r a l ly  p e r s i s t e d ,  however,  
as the  law o f  the  c o lo n ie s .
Even i f  th e  Dutch c o lo n ia l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had extended t h e i r  cod­
i f i e d  C iv i l  Law to  t h e i r  co lo n ie s  and t e r r i t o r i a l  p o s s e s s io n s ,  the  
Roman-Dutch law o f  South A f r i c a  would have remained u n a f f e c t e d .  The 
G r i t i s h  had taken the  colony from Holland by f o r c e  dur ing  th e  Napole­
onic  wars when th e  Dutch were a c t i v e  a l l i e s  of  France.  Thus, by 1806, 
t h r e e  y e a r s  be fo re  t h e  new code in th e  N e th e r lan d s ,  th e  Cape Colony 
was under B r i t i s h  r u l e  and th e  Engl ish  Common Law. Roman-Dutch law 
cont inued  as th e  personal  law o f  th e  descendents  o f  th e  e a r l y  Dutch 
and o f  th e  French and German s e t t l e r s .  For ty  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  in an e f ­
f o r t  to  escape B r i t i s h  r u l e ,  n ea r ly  twelve thousand Dutch-descended 
A fr ican e rs  marched northward in the  Great  Trek,  and t h a t  r e s u l t e d  in 
the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  Roman-Dutch law to  N a ta l ,  Zulu land ,  Bechuanaland, 
the  Republic of  T ra n s v a a l ,  the  Orange Free S t a t e ,  and Swaziland. 
A f r ik a n e r  fo r tu n e s  reached a low ebb in the  Boer War o f  1899-1902.
I t  was a war f o r  independence t h a t  f a i l e d ,  w ith  th e  consequence t h a t  
r e c e n t l y  s e t t l e d  Dutch t e r r i t o r i e s  were u n i te d  in  the  South A f r ic a  
Act of  1909 (9 Edw. VII ,  c.  9) as th e  Union o f  South A fr ica  and the  
subsequent independence to  the  p r e se n t  (Lee, R.W., 1953). Engl ish  
law was imported ,  and c o u r t s  a p p l ie d  Engl ish  p r e c e d e n t s ,  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
and d o c t r i n e s .  Roman-Dutch law g e n e r a l ly  p r e v a i l e d  in m a t te r s  o f  
family  law, and Engl ish  law in commercial r e l a t i o n s .  G en e ra l ly ,  a
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f u s io n  r e s u l t e d  from th e  Engl ish  r e c o g n i t io n  and j u d i c i a l  in co rp o ra ­
t i o n  o f  th e  previous  Roman-Dutch law. J u r i s p r u d e n t i a l  a l l e g i a n c e  and 
p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  allowed th e  Afr ikaans  lawyers to  remain e s s e n t ­
i a l l y  C i v i l i a n ,  in th e  p resence  o f  Eng l i sh -speak ing  South Afr ican  
Common Law lawyers (Smith,  T .B . ,  1965, p. 35) .  This South A fr ican  
"Common Law" g e n e r a l ly  extends to  th e  newly independent  Bantus tans  of  
sou thern  A f r i c a :  T ra n sk e i ,  Kwazulu, and Bophuthatswana ( B u t l e r ,  1977).
SUMMARY
Mixed j u r i s d i c t i o n s  can be d iv id e d ,  we now se e ,  on th e  b a s i s  of  
th e  n a tu re  o f  t h e i r  a n te ce d en t  C i v i l i a n  h e r i t a g e s .  With t h i s  b reak­
down, two primary c a t e g o r i e s  emerge: Those with  Roman-Dutch Civ i l
Law i n f l u e n c e s ,  which tend to  be u ncod i f ie d  (such as th e  Republic of  
South A f r i c a ,  Rhodesia,  Lesotho,  Botswana, and Ceylon) ,  and those  
w ith  La t in  C iv i l  Law i n f l u e n c e s ,  which tend to  be c o d i f i e d  (such as 
th e  P h i l i p p in e s  and S e y c h e l l e s ) .
CHAPTER IV
THE CULTURE HISTORY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS BASED ON HUMAN DESIGN:
ROMANO-GERMAN IC CIVIL LAW
The Romano-Germanic Law family  of  lega l  systems c o n s i s t s  of  
those  n a t io n a l  lega l  systems formed in  Cont inen ta l  Europe, t o g e th e r  
with  those  p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  th e se  Con t inen ta l  systems.  Cont inen ta l  
Europe, th e  c u l t u r e  h ea r th  o f  Romano-Germanic Civ i l  Law, remains the  
c e n t e r  o f  th e  C iv i l  Law world .  However, c o lo n iz a t io n  and overseas  
s e t t l e m e n t  by such Cont inen ta l  c o u n t r i e s  as France,  Belgium, Spain ,  
P o r tu g a l ,  Germany, I t a l y ,  and The Nether lands  expanded th e  global 
e x t e n t  o f  th e  C iv i l  Law beyond Europe. "The techn ique  o f  c o d i f i c a ­
t i o n  adopted in th e  n in e t e e n th  and tw e n t i e th  c e n t u r i e s  a l so  favored 
i t s  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  in many o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s "  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, 
p. 69) .
The Civ i l  Law i s  found today ,  bes ide s  in Cont inen ta l  Europe, in 
La t in  America (where i t  was rece ived  p r im a r i ly  from Spain and Po r tu ­
g a l ) ;  t h e  former French co lo n ie s  in  A f r i c a ,  Sou theas t  A s ia ,  Oceania,  
and th e  Americas; th e  former Belgian and Spanish co lo n ie s  in A f r i c a ;  
the  former Dutch colony o f  Indones ia ;  and p laces  of  v o lu n ta ry  recep ­
t i o n ,  such as Turkey,  I r a n ,  much o f  the  Middle E a s t ,  I s r a e l ,  Tha i land ,  
and Japan.  In a form mixed with  t h e  Common Law, i t  i s  a l s o  found in 
Guyana, L ou is iana ,  Quebec, South A f r i c a ,  Rhodesia,  S co t lan d ,  and e l s e ­
where in  a reas  i n i t i a l l y  under  th e  C iv i l  Law, but  subsequen t ly  in  a ’ 
Common Law j u r i s d i c t i o n .  In E th io p ia ,  the  C iv i l  Law was imported 




The d i f f u s i o n  o f  Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law through volk m ig ra t ion  
was p r im a r i ly  a consequence o f  overseas  imperia l  expans ions .  In t h a t  
way, f o r  example, the  C iv i l  Law o f  Spain and Portugal  was t r a n s p l a n t e d  
throughout  L a t in  America. In souch a reas  where only poorly  organized  
o r  o the rw ise  non-com pet i t ive  indigenous law r e s i d e d ,  th e  law o f  t h e  
mother c o u n t r i e s  n a t u r a l l y  p r e v a i l e d .  "At no time was t h e r e  eve r  any 
sugges t ion  of  r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n "  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p. 
70) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Dutch s e t t l e m e n t  in sou thern  A fr ica  r e s u l t e d  in the  
r e l o c a t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  o f  th e  C iv i l  Law to  t h a t  a r e a ,  complete and a lone  
u n t i l  the  advent  o f  B r i t i s h  r u l e .
Of c o n s id e ra b ly  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  the  C iv i l  
Law was massive  immigrat ion w i th o u t  th e  c o lo r  o f  some imperia l  power. 
The most n o ta b le  example being t h a t  of  I s r a e l ,  whose r e c e n t  lega l  h i s ­
to ry  i l l u s t r a t e s  a d r a s t i c  change o f  lega l  s t r u c t u r e  because o f  ex ten ­
s iv e  immigration.
Imperial  Expansions
Although the  t r a n s f e r  o f  Romano-Germanic Civi l  Law by means of  
r e l o c a t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  occurred  through French s e t t l e m e n t  in  A lger ia  
and Dutch s e t t l e m e n t  in  South A f r i c a ,  th e  most n o ta b le  examples of  im­
p e r i a l  expansion o f  C iv i l  Law r e s u l t e d  from Spanish and Portuguese 
c o lo n iz a t io n  of  La t in  America. In L a t in  America, th e  s e t t l e r s  found 
l i t t l e  com pet i t ion  in  th e  n a t i v e ,  indigenous laws. At the  same t ime,  
Spanish and Portuguese  c o lo n ia l  p o l i c i e s  t r e a t e d  th e  newly s e t t l e d  
t e r r i t o r i e s  as though they were p a r t s  o f  m e t ro p o l i t an  Spain o r  Por­
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t u g a l .
The laws o f  th e  Spanish s e t t l e r s  included the  numerous Fueros of  
Spain ,  as wel l  as th e  S i e t e  P a r t i  das and th e  p r in c ip a l  bodies  o f  Span­
i sh  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  Nueva Recopilac ion  o f  1567, the  Recopi lac ion  de 
I n d i a s , and th e  Novisima Recopilac ion  o f  1805. In B r a z i l ,  va r ious  
Portuguese  l e g i s l a t i o n  composed the  bulk o f  t h e  imported law. Unti l  
th e  1917 c o d i f i c a t i o n ,  the  Ordenacoes F i l i p i n a s  (pub l ished  in 1603, 
confirmed in 1643) served  as th e  general  law o f  B r a z i l .  This l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  was a p p l ied  t o g e t h e r  w ith  the  Lei da Boa Razao (Law o f  Good 
Sense) o f  1769. This  law req u i re d  th e  judge to  apply Roman Law to  
f i l l  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  gaps ,  when c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  "good human s e n s e . "
The e f f e c t  was an approximation o f  n a tu ra l  law: jL e i . , “th e  e s s e n t i a l ,  
i n t r i n s i c  and u n a l t e r a b l e  t r u t h s  which Roman e t h i c s  had e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
and which were given formal r e c o g n i t io n  by d iv in e  and human laws to 
se rve  as moral o r  lega l  r u l e s  o f  C h r i s t i a n i t y "  (Gomes, 1959, p. 332) .
The m ix tu re  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and custom imported from the  mother 
country  remained th e  b a s ic  law o f  the  severa l  co lo n ie s  u n t i l  th e  ad­
ven t  o f  t h e  c o d i f i c a t i o n  movement dur ing  the  n in e te e n th  c en tu ry .  At 
t h a t  t im e ,  most o f  th e  newly independent  c o u n t r i e s  of  La t in  America 
adopted some form o f  th e  French Code c i v i l , which was b a s i c a l l y  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  Roman, Spanish ,  and Portuguese le g a l  h e r i t a g e  o f  the  
people .
In vo lun ta ry  Receptions
Colonial a d m in i s t r a t i o n  by one of  th e  Romano-Germanic c o u n t r i e s  
o f  Con t inen ta l  Europe a lmost  always r e s u l t e d  in th e  t r a n s p l a n t  and r e ­
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cep t io n  o f  th e  C iv i l  Law; but  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  C i v i l i a n  t r a n s p l a n t  
d i f f e r e d  from t h a t  o f  th e  Common Law in severa l  c r u c i a l  r e s p e c t s .  
Complete a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  C iv i l  Law to  a co lony ,  r a t h e r  than  a j u d i c i a l  
m a t t e r  as under  Common Law, was an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f i a t  s u b j e c t  to  the  
p o l i t i c a l  p o l icy  o f  the  mother coun t ry .  The implanat ion  o f  C iv i l  Law 
a l so  f a i l e d  to  blend European and indigenous laws in th e  fo rmat ion  o f  
new n a t io n a l  l eg a l  systems t h a t  a re  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Common Law as a 
u n i t a r y  l ega l  system grounded in p receden t  and app ly ing  to  i n d iv id u a l s  
on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  personal  law, which was determined on th e  b a s i s  
o f  domici le  and r e l i g i o u s  a f f i l i a t i o n .  By c o n t r a s t ,  th e  C iv i l  
Law was e s t a b l i s h e d  on a t e r r i t o r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  wherein th e  c i v i l  
code ap p l ie d  as an a c t  o f  th e  s t a t e .  N a t i o n a l i t y ,  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
c o nnec t ion ,  was a m a t t e r  of  p lace  where p u b l ic  law as to  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a t u s  determined p r i v a t e  law j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The C iv i l  Law p r e v a i l e d  
as rece ived  from th e  mother c o u n t ry ,  even though s u b s t a n t i v e  p ro v i ­
s ions  may vary somewhat from p lace  to  p lac e .  A c o lo n ia l  m i s t r e s s ,  
having gained overbear ing  and e f f e c t i v e  con t ro l  of  a co lony ,  the  com­
mon law power asked what the  e x i s t i n g  laws were,  whereas a c i v i l  law 
m e t ro p o l i t a n  announced what—by w r i t  o f  m ight—th e  law was hen ce fo r th  
to  be.
As in th e  Comnon Law c o u n t r i e s ,  i n v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n  was u s u a l ly  
the  consequence of  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s  by conques t  o r  c o lo n i z a ­
t io n  in  the  c i v i l  sense  o f  th e  term. The laws o f  France,  Spa in ,  Po r tu ­
g a l ,  Germany, I t a l y ,  and,  to  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  t h e  N e th e r lan d s ,  were 
in t ro d u ced ,  in t o t a l i t y ,  to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  dependencies ,  exc luding  
e x p l i c i t ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  re c o g n i t io n  o f  customs and usage of  the  people
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whom they r u le d .  I f  the  n a t iv e s  could be overawed, th e  C i v i l i a n ,  
code-based law o f  th e  donor c o u n t r ie s  could be imposed on r e c i p i e n t s  
with  r e l a t i v e  ease .  Such a code c o n ta in in g  s p e c i f i c  r u l e s ,  r a t h e r  
than p r i n c i p l e s  de r ived  from case  law, could f u l f i l l  an immediate 
assu rance  o f  s e c u r i t y  in lega l  r e l a t i o n s  because they " c o n s t i t u t e  an 
expose o f  law s u f f i c i e n t  in i t s e l f ,  which i s  th e  p o in t  o f  d e p a r tu re  
f o r  a new development o f  j u r i d i c i a l  r u l e s "  (David, 1963). The i n f l u ­
ence of  C a r te s ia n  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  r a t i o n a l i s m  in viewing l e g i s l a t i o n  
as the  dominant source  o f  law and the  C iv i l i a n  concept ion  o f  th e  code 
as a model f o r  the  o r g a n iz a t io n  of c i v i l  s o c i e ty  makes l a r g e - s c a l e  
im posi t ion  and r ec e p t io n  of  a legal  t r a n s p l a n t  by the  f o r c e  o f  e x t e r ­
nal p o l i t i c a l  power com para t ive ly  easy ,  even ac ro ss  s t a r k  c u l t u r a l  
and l i n g u i s t i c  b a r r i e r s .  Upon ga in ing  independence, the  former Con­
t i n e n t a l  European t e r r i t o r i e s  r e t a in e d  the  law and lega l  systems o f  
t h e i r  c o lo n ia l  m i s t r e s s e s ,  e x c ep t ,  o f  c o u r se ,  th o se  t h a t  f e l l  under 
communist r u l e .
French Colonial  Law 
There a re  no v i a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r e ce p t io n  t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h  
among the  seve ra l  C i v i l i a n  lega l  systems formed from the  French 
c o lo n ia l  law. Where, in th e  Common Law c o u n t r i e s ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  in r e ­
cep t ion  may be exp la ined  in terms o f  the  r e l i g i o u s  and customary laws 
t h a t  a r t i c u l a t e d  with  Engl ish  co lo n ia l  law to  form new na t io n a l  Com­
mon Law systems,  d i f f e r e n t  lega l  p o s i t i o n s  among the  former French c o l ­
onies  r e s u l t e d  from m o d i f i c a t io n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c y ,  r a t h e r  than  
from j u r i d i c a l  even ts .
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The French system o f  d i r e c t  r u l e  s t r o n g l y  a s s e r t e d  th e  a u t h o r i t y  
o f  th e  P a r i s i a n  imperium, an i n t e r g r a l  a s p e c t  of  t h e  French co lo n ia l  
po l icy  of  a s s i m i l a t i o n ,  which had l i t t l e  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  n a t i v e ,  custom­
ary domestic law. " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m  and empire a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a 
growing accep tance  o f  p o s i t i v e  law and a b e l i e f  in the  s t a t e  as the  
u l t im a te  source  o f  a l l  v a lue  and law" (Marina, 1975). The co lo n ia l  
p o l ic y  o f  a s s i m i l a t i o n ,  which cu lminated  in  th e  m e t ro p o l i t a n  c e n t r a l ­
i z a t i o n  o f  the  p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p e r io d ,  r e q u i red  lega l  and adminis­
t r a t i v e  conformity  w i th  t h e  French Code Napoleon, such as t h e  c i v i l  
codes o f  A lge r ia  and Cochin-China.  The p o l ic y  o f  a s sm im i la t ion  ab a ted ,  
somewhat, only by th e  e a r l y  tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  when i t  was g e n e r a l ly  
rep laced  by th e  c o lo n ia l  p o l i c y  of  a s s o c i a t i o n .
Under th e  a s s o c i a t i o n  p lan ,  th e  French conceived t h e i r  duty as 
one to  develop co lo n ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  so as to  secu re  th e  general  wel­
f a r e  of  th e  i n h a b i t a n t s .  Such a view allowed both c o lo n ia l  and metro­
p o l i t a n  p e r s p e c t i v e s  on lo c a l  government.  This  was th e  f i r s t  r ea l  
allowance f o r  l o c a l ,  indigenous custom. In the  environment o f  the  
French c o lo n ia l  p o l i c y  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  the  c i v i l  codes o f  Tonkin and 
West A f r ica  were promulgated.
Throughout French c o lo n ia l  p o l i c i e s  o f  both a s s i m i l a t i o n  and 
a s s o c i a t i o n ,  the  French system o f  d i r e c t  r u l e  p r e v a i l e d .  Under d i r e c t  
r u l e ,  law was cons ide red  a branch o f  n a t i v e  p o l i c y ,  i t s  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  
a m a t t e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c y ,  and i t s  goal to  evolve ind igenour  peo­
p les  toward th e  h ig h e r  s tan d a rd s  o f  French c i v i l i z a t i o n .  "Colonial 
peoples  were to  absorb French c u l t u r e  so t h a t  they might become French­
men and French c i t i z e n s ;  th e  c o lo n ie s  were to  become overseas  p a r t s
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of  France" (Robinson, 1950, p. 37) .
The French system was t h e r e f o r e ,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a high degree 
o f  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  in i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The fundamental p r i n c i p l e  
o f  French l e g i s l a t i o n  was th e  supremacy o f  P a r l iam en t .  French P ar ­
l iam en ta ry  l e g i s l a t i o n  a p p l i e d  to  a l l  c o l o n i e s .  Even when co lo n ia l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  was s p e c i f i c a l l y  p e r m i t t e d ,  th e  French P ar l iam en t  r e t a in e d  
a veto  power.
Upon ga in ing  independence,  most of  th e  former  French c o lo n ie s  
and t e r r i t o r i e s  adopted th e  Napoleonic Code and r e a d i l y  embraced th e  
French C iv i l  Law system comple te ly  as th e  p a r t i c u l a r  loca l  c i rcu m stan ­
ces al lowed (S a la cu se ,  1969). The "ex-French t e r r i t o r i e s ,  a lmost  
w i thou t  e x ce p t io n ,  have adopted no t  only t h e  t e x t  bu t  a l s o  th e  machin 
ery  and the  p rocedures  o f  th e  Code Napoleon and o th e r  French laws" 
( E l i a s ,  1965, p. 192).
’ French and I s lam ic  Legal P lu ra l i sm  in North A f r ica
The French use o f  law and the  lega l  process  as a means o f  imple­
menting p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c y  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  pronounced in  the  I s lamic  
realm o f  n o r the rn  A f r i c a  ( A lg e r i a ,  Tun isa ,  and Morocco).  The general  
c o lo n ia l  p o l icy  o f  d i r e c t  r u l e  underscored s i g n i f i c a n t  j u r i d i c a l  d i f ­
f e re n c e s  between French c i v i l  law and I s lam ic  j u r i s p r u d e n c e .  This 
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  e v id e n t  in th e  French c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and 
a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  land .  The French c i v i l  law co n s id e rs  th e  o r ig i n  
o f  any p roper ty  r i g h t  in o rd e r  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  r i g h t ' s  e x i s t e n c e  
in both f a c t  and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with  the  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  France.  By 
c o n t r a s t ,  I s lam ic  law emphasized loca l  custom concerning o c cupa t ion ,
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p o s se s s io n ,  and use in de te rm in ing  such land r i g h t s .
Many of  the  problems encountered in the  i n i t i a l  c l a s h  o f  French 
and Is lam ic  laws r e s u l t e d  from the  c o n ta c t  o f  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  c u l ­
t u r e s .  Misunderstandings  were many, because the  F re n c h - t r a in e d  law­
y e r s  f a i l e d  to  comprehend th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  custom in the  v a r i a t i o n s  
o f  S h a r i ' a t  a p p l i c a t i o n .  However, i t  was in the  a rea  o f  land admin­
i s t r a t i o n  t h a t  French and I s lam ic  law were f u l l y  r e c o n c i l e d  as dom­
in a n t  and s e r v i e n t  systems,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The t r a n s f e r  o f  land from th e  p u b l ic  domain to  incoming s e t t l e r s  
was of  paramount p o l i t i c a l  importance to  th e  c o lo n ia l  government du­
r in g  th e  n in e t e e n th  c e n tu ry .  The land had been acqu i red  by Franch 
through i t s  powers o f  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  and e x p r o p r i a t i o n .  This  i s  no t  
to  imply t h a t  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  occurred  only  in  t e r r i t o r i e s  under Civ i l  
Law j u r i s d i c t i o n ;  i t  a l so  happened in  t h e  Common Law realm and e l s e ­
where. This p o l i t i c a l  process  of  land a c q u i s i t i o n ,  however,  f a i l e d  
to r e a l i z e  problems o f  land c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  in A lg e r ia  and elsewhere  
in  French no r th e rn  A f r i c a ,  where d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  had f o r  long had 
d i f f e r e n t  I s lamic  and customary laws (Ruedy, 1967, pp. 4 -1 2 ) .  In i t s  
a t tem pt  to  r e c o n c i l e  French and I s lam ic  law in th e  land t r a n s f e r  pro­
c e s s ,  France e r r e d  in assuming t h a t  a l l  Moslems adhered to  Is lam ic  
law as t h e i r  personal  law. A survey o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  land c l a s s i f i ­
c a t i o n s  in A lg e r ia  c l a r i f y s  th e  i s s u e s  of  c o n te n t io n .
The F i r s t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  land was t h a t  o f  milk land .  This 
was la n d ,  th e  r i g h t s  to  which an in d iv id u a l  has the  i n a l i e n a b l e  r i g h t  
o f  d i s p o s i t i o n .  Land c l a s s i f i e d  as milk land r e s u l t e d  from a s a l e  o r  
g r a n t  made by the  loca l  r u l e r .  In French law, r e c o rd a t io n  o f  land
t r a n s f e r  i s  formal and e x p l i c i t .  However, th e  law p r a c t i c e  in the  
ru ra l  Maghrib, f o r  example, r equ i red  no j u d i c i a l  or  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
documentation to  e f f e c t  v a l id  t r a n s f e r .  Evidence o f  ownership de­
pended upon the  mere possess ion  of  a deed, upon which th e r e  may be 
found in sc r ib e d  t ra n sm is s io n s  extending back in time f o r  g e n e r a t io n s .  
Obviously ,  problems emerged when the  French t r i e d  to  r e c o n c i l e  the 
two lega l  systems as regards  the  v a l id  t r a n s f e r  o f  such land.
The French a u t h o r i t i e s  could only a t tem pt  land a d m in i s t r a t i o n  
under such c i rcum stances  a f t e r  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  the  u l t im a te  so v e re ig n ­
ty  over  milk land was ves ted  in the  s t a t e  and t h a t  such land was sub­
j e c t  to  the  c o l l e c t i v e  ownership of  i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s .  A f t e r  s e t t l i n g  
upon t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  r e s o l u t i o n  of  the  d i f f i c u l t y ,  the  French could 
then  e f f e c t  th e  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  and t r a n s f e r  of  milk land to  the  Eur­
opean c o l o n i s t s .
Lands t h a t  had belonged to  the  Bey of  A lg ie r s  and to  the  Beys 
o f  C ons tan t ine  and Oran f e l l  to  the  pub l ic  domain in as much as the  
French s t a t e  became by r i g h t  o f  conquest the  h e i r  and su ccesso r  to 
th e  de fea ted  Beys. These were termed as "Beylik l a n d ."  These lands 
o r ig i n a t e d  from d y n a s t i c  i n h e r i t a n c e s  and f o r f e i t u r e s  to  the  pre 
French r u l e r .  Before the  a r r i v a l  of  the  French, the  ru ra l  bey l ik  
was sub-d iv ided  and c l a s s i f i e d  according to  use; f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  some 
land was gran ted  to  t r i v e s  in r e tu rn  f o r  the  r e g u l a r  payment of  a 
t a x ;  some land was leased  to  t e n a n t  fa rm ers .  Because i t  was p a r t  of  
th e  pub l ic  domain of  the  Beys, t h i s  land t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  pub l ic  
domain to  the  c o lo n ia l  government on the  assumption o f  power by the 
French.
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A t h i r d  c l a s s  of  l a n d ,  a r sh  l a n d s ,  were a c t u a l l y  t r i b a l  lands .  
Inasmuch as  t h e r e  e x i s t e d  n e i t h e r  r i g h t  o f  a l i e n a t i o n  nor w r i t t e n  
land t i t l e s ,  French a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  viewed th ese  lands  as a r e se rv e  
t h a t  th e  government was f r e e  to  d ispose  of  a t  w i l l .
The v a r ious  means o f  s eq u e s te r in g  th ese  severa l  types  of  land 
a l l  r e f l e c t e d  a t tem pts  by French j u r i s t s  to  apply French legal  con­
cep ts  to  Is lam ic  customary p r a c t i c e s ;  y e t  th e se  French law concepts  
d id  not a c t u a l l y  apply .  In t h a t  way, the  government a t  A lg ie r s  s e ­
cured lands f o r  French s e t t l e m e n t ,  thereby  f u l f i l l i n g  domestic p o l i t ­
i c a l  p o l i c y .  In the  case  of  milk l a n d s ,  customary forms of  land 
t r a n s f e r  d id  not meet with the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  French law and were 
thus  s u s c e p t i b l e  to  government a c q u i s t i o n .  Beylik lands  were a l read y  
in the  pub l ic  domain to which the  French c o lo n ia l  government succeed­
ed. Arsh lands were i n t e r p r e t e d  as pub l ic  r e se rv e  lands  because they  
belonged to  no i n d i v i d u a l s .
Apart from land m a t t e r s ,  th e  French g e n e r a l ly  allowed the  old 
K a t h i ' s  t r i b u n a l s  to  p e r s i s t  and to  apply Is lamic  law among Moslems. 
This concess ion was s u b j e c t ,  however, to  con t ro l  by the  co lo n ia l  au­
t h o r i t i e s ;  and d e c i s io n s  could be appealed to  the  c i v i l  c o u r t s  where­
in French law would be a p p l i e d .  An excep t ion  to t h i s  nominal admin­
i s t r a t i o n  of  Is lamic  law in A lger ia  was an area  c a l l e d  the  Grande 
Kaybylie.  In t h i s  a r e a ,  the  c o lo n ia l  government pe rm it ted  f o r  a t ime 
the  e x e r c i s e  of  local  customary law, which was n o ne the les s  a d m in i s t e r ­
ed by a French m a g i s t r a t e .
Despi te  the  d o c t r in e s  of  the  Civ i l  Law, severa l  laws did  in f a c t  
e x i s t  in A lg e r i a ,  and i t  i s  in the  manner of  d ea l in g  with an teceden t
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laws t h a t  some of  the  spec ia  c h a r a c t e r  of  the  C iv i l  Law becomes mani­
f e s t .  The f a c t  o f  lega l  p lu ra l i s m  emerges in t h a t ,  except  f o r  land 
m a t t e r s ,  persons o f  th e  Moslem f a i t h  might appeal to  I s lamic  law as 
t h e i r  personal  law. Unlike Common Law realms where success fu l  appeals  
to  personal  law in c o r p o ra t e  t h a t  law in to  th e  general  common law, the  
French C iv i l  Law recogn izes  only those  Moslem r u le s  t h a t  have been 
adopted by the  French Par l iam ent  f o r  French Moslems o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
t e r r i t o r y .  This  in t ro d u c e s  an o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  two Euro­
pean law f a m i l i e s .  Under the  Common Law, an in d iv id u a l  enjoys  p e r ­
sonal law as a consequence of  membership in some community o r  as a 
consequence o f  r e l i g i o u s  adherence ;  in the  C i v i l i a n  c o n te x t ,  personal  
law may only be invoked by an in d iv id u a l  by v i r t u e  o f  h is  i n d e n t i f i -  
c a t i o n  w i th  some t e r r i t o r y  f o r  which the  l e g i s l a t o r  has ex p re s s ly  
s t a t e d  t h a t  the  customary law a p p l i e s .
In Tun is ia  and Morocco, French C iv i l  Law a d m in i s t r a t i o n  was 
l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  o f  A lg e r i a .  Although Is lamic  law was l e g ­
i s l a t i v e l y  pe rm it ted  to  con t inue  in i t s  r e l i g i o u s  a s p e c t s ,  land law 
was brought  e x c lu s iv e ly  under French c i v i l  law. The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
Is lam ic  law, where p e rm i t t e d ,  was s u b j e c t  to  the  in f luence '  of French 
d o c t r in e  and j u r i s p r u d e n c e .  F i n a l l y ,  even the  l e g i s l a t i o n  der ived  
from Is lam ic  law was adm in is te red  by s e c u l a r  c o u r t s ,  a f t e r  the  French 
model.
In c o n c lu s io n ,  t h e  French Civ i l  Law, with  i t s  d i s t i n c t i o n  be­
tween pub l ic  law and p r i v a t e  law, f in d s  t e r r i t o r i a l  express ion  in t h a t  
a c i v i l  code, promulgated as an a c t  of  s t a t e ,  a p p l i e s  only w i th in  c e r ­
t a i n  a r e a s .  T h e re fo re ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  in French North A f r i c a ,  f o r  the
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c i v i l  codes to  d i f f e r  as to  what p r i v a t e  law s h a l l  be a p p l i e d ,  even 
in d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  the  same colony.  This t e r r i t o r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  
has been r e t a i n e d  in t h e  v a r ious  n a t io n a l  codes t h a t  se rve  as the  
bases  f o r  the  modern, p o s t - c o lo n ia l  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  Thus, c e r t a i n  
co lo n ia l  laws, e s p e c i a l l y  fam ily  law, con t inue  to  be t e r r i t o r i a l l y  
based.
French Law in  West A f r ic a
In French West A f r i c a ,  c e r t a i n  a sp e c t s  o f  French co lo n ia l  po l icy  
and, by way o f  e x te n s io n ,  French c o lo n ia l  law a r e  p resen ted  in t h e i r  
most pronounced form. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  apply ing  the  French Civ­
i l  Law to  th e se  c o lo n ie s  was grounded in th e  p r e ro g a t iv e  o f  a t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  sove re ign .  Indeed,  th e  f a i l u r e  to  impose the  C iv i l  Law would 
have been cons trued  as  a d e ro g a t io n  o f  t h a t  s o v e re ig n ty  ( D e la v ig n e t t e ,  
1968). In cases  where th e  p u b l ic  o r d e r  was not  a f f e c t e d ,  customary 
law was o f te n  allowed to  p e r s i s t  in th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  c o n t i n u i t y  in 
n a t iv e  l i f e  as regards  such m a t te r s  as m arr iage  and land te n u re .  Cod­
i f i c a t i o n  o f  customary law was not  even a t tem pted ,  as  i t  had been in 
the  case  of  I s lam ic  law in French North A f r i c a .  Indeed, in m a t te rs  
o f  p r iv a t e  law th e  French c o lo n ia l  a u t h o r i t i e s  d id  not  recognize  the  
presence o f  an tec ed en t  customary law. "We p r e f e r  to  c r e a t e  a r t i f i c i a l  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s  which a r e  n a t i v e  only in name" (D e la v ig n e t t e ,  1968, 
p. 89) .
Because the  Civ i l  Law system i s  a b a s i c a l l y  c losed  system, t h e r e  
e x i s t s  no to l e r a n c e  f o r  n a t i v e ,  customary law when i t  c o n f l i c t s  with 
French l e g i s l a t i o n .  The Civ i l  Code i s  an express ion  of  so v e re ig n ,
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l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l .  As such ,  i t  a p p l i e s  as th e  w i l l  o f  the  s t a t e  in 
any and a l l  t e r r i t o r y  where i t  i s  sovere ign  (Smith,  T .B . ,  1965).
Two c o lo n ia l  f e d e r a t i o n s  comprised th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x t e n t  of  
the  French Civ i l  Law in  West A f r i c a .  The Afr ique  O cc id en ta le  Fran-  
c a i s e  (A. 0. F . ) ,  French West A f r i c a ,  included the  modern s t a t e s  o f  
Dahomey, Ivory Coas t ,  Mali ,  Guinea,  M au r i t an ia ,  N iger ,  Senega l ,  and 
Upper Volta .  The A fr ique  E q u a to r i a l e  F a ranca ise  (A. E. F . ) ,  French 
Equa to r ia l  A f r ica  comprimes th e  p r e s e n t  s t a t e s  o f  Centra l  A fr ican  
Republ ic ,  Chad, Gabon, and th e  Republic o f  the  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e ) .
Reception of  French Civ i l  Law u s u a l ly  began with the  enactment 
o f  a s t a t u s  app ly ing  t h e  laws o f  France as th e  laws o f  th e  colony.
In only a s i n g l e  i n s t a n c e ,  French c i v i l  law was rece ived  on l e s s  than 
a complete  and comprehensive b a s i s .  The f i r s t  o f  th e  French Afr ican  
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  Senegal ,  rece ived  i t s  French law through a s e r i e s  o f  
s t a t u t e s  enacted  a t  s ev e ra l  d a te s  (S a la c u se ,  1969). When the  o th e r  
c o lo n ie s  o f  French West A f r ic a  were formed in the  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  the  
n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry ,  t h e  French law as i t  a pp l ied  in Senegal was l e g i s ­
l a t i v e l y  rece iv e d .  As an example, th e  p ro v is io n  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h e d  the  
c o lo n ia l  c o u r t s  in French Guinea d e c l a r e d ,  "In any m a t t e r ,  the  co u r t s  
o f  French Guinea s h a l l  conform to  the  c i v i l ,  commercial,  and cr iminal  
l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  Senega l ,  i n s o f a r  as  i t  i s  not  c o n t r a ry  to  th e  p re se n t  
decree :  (quoted in  S a la cu se ,  1969, p. 23) .  In 1901, enactment  o f  a 
s in g l e  r e c e p t io n  s t a t u t e  s ta n d a rd iz e d  th e  Senegal law in f o r c e  in 
Dahomey, th e  Ivory  Coas t ,  and Senegal (S a la cu se ,  1969). The l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  as i t  a p p l ie d  to  Senegal was a l s o  ap p l ied  to  th e  co lo n ie s  of 
French Equa to r ia l  A f r ica  p r i o r  to  i t s  format ion in 1910. L a te r ,  French
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l e g i s l a t i o n  was e i t h e r  promulgated f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o lo n ia l  f e d e r ­
a t i o n  o r  rece ived  as French law o f  general  a p p l i c a t i o n .
Although th e  laws and lega l  systems of  the  French Afr ican  c o lo ­
n ie s  were th o se  o f  th e  French Civ i l  Law system and the  m e t ro p o l i t an  
s u b s t a n t i v e  law of  France,  customary law was sometimes pe rm it ted  to  
s tand  when th e  French l e g i s l a t i o n  was s i l e n t  on th e  p o in t  in q u e s t io n .  
Indeed,  French l e g i s l a t i o n  was o f te n  i n a p p l i c a b l e  to  a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  
the  p o p u la t io n .  Although as e a r l y  as 1830, th e  d e c l a r a t i o n  was prom­
u lg a ted  t h a t  "any in d iv id u a l  born f r e e  and in h a b i t i n g  Senegal o r  i t s  
dependencies  w i l l  en joy in th e  colony th e  r i g h t s  accorded by the  Civ­
i l  Code to  French c i t i z e n s , "  customary law could be p reserved  f o r  na­
t i v e s  through sp ec ia l  French l e g i s l a t i o n ,  so long as no French law 
ap p l ie d  (S a la cu se ,  1969, p. 45) .
Customary law was recognized as e a r l y  as 1857 by l e g i s l a t i o n  
p e r t a i n in g  to  Senegal .  The enactment  d e c la red  the  r i g h t  o f  Senegal­
ese Moslems to  be governed by I s lam ic  law only  in m a t te r s  concerning 
m ar r iage ,  su c c e s s io n ,  and dona t ion .  The law was a l so  extended to  the  
o th e r  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  West A f r ica  and Equa to r ia l  A f r ic a  w ith  sp ec ia l  
cognisance taken o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  A fr ican  Islam d i f f e r e d  from p lace  
to  p lace  accord ing  to  loca l  custom. Of co u r se ,  custom could never  be 
a p p l ied  i f  i t  was determined to  be " c o n t ra ry  to  the  p r i n c i p l e s  of  
French c i v i l i z a t i o n . "
Since independence,  th e  general  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c i v i l  and 
customary law has remained v i r t u a l l y  unchanged, but f o r  a few no tab le  
excep t ions  where the  new n a t io n s  have succumbed to  such p o l i t i c a l  r e ­
l i g i o n s  as n a t io n a l i sm  and s o c ia l i sm  (S a la c u se ,  1969; Bedie,  1961;
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Farnsworth ,  1964; Farnsworth ,  1969; and Opoku, 1970). In those  j u r ­
i s  d i c t i o n s  d r i f t i n g  toward l e f t i s t  i d e o l o g i e s ,  customary law has 
g e n e r a l ly  been r e j e c t e d .  Mali ,  f o r  example, has dec la red  t h i s  r e l a ­
t i o n  to  e x i s t  (Hazard, 1967).
Elsewhere in  French A f r i c a ,  in M au r i ta n ia ,  an u n c e r t a in  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  p e r s i s t s  between the  C iv i l  Law and Is lam ic  law (S a la cu se ,  1969). 
However, the  in h e r e n t  n a tu r e  o f  the  C iv i l  Law and c o d i f i c a t i o n  e f f o r t s  
have assu red  the  higemony o f  the  European system.
French Law in  Indo-China
The Union Indochinese  comprised th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  of  Annam, Cam­
bod ia ,  Cochin-China,  Laos,  and Tonkin. Cambodia and Laos were a c t u ­
a l l y  only p r o t e c t o r a t e s  w ith  F rench-recognized  s o v e re ig n s .  Annam and 
Tonkin were p r o t e c t o r a t e s  o f  Vietnam (Cochin-China) .  Only Cochin- 
China was a f u l l  colony o f  France.  With th e  excep t ion  o f  Cochin- 
China, th e  French Colonial  p o l i cy  o f  d i r e c t  r u le  was n o t i c e a b ly  ab­
s e n t .
In Cochin-China,  by l e g i s l a t i v e  decree  of  1883, some o f  th e  a r ­
t i c l e s  of  the  French C iv i l  Code were a p p l ied  to  th e  general  popu la t ion  
and a p r e c i s  o f  Vietnamese p ro v is io n s  p e r t a i n in g  to  m ar r iag e ,  d iv o rc e ,  
and i n h e r i t a n c e  was e n u n c ia te d .  In 1931, th e  lega l  p lu ra l i s m  of  
French and Vietnamese law c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Cochin-China was l e g i s l a ­
t i v e l y  d ec la red  in  Tonkin in the  form o f  a c i v i l  code. C iv i l  code was 
promulgated f o r  Annam in the  p e r io d ,  1936-39. Tha a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  
th ese  codes was conf ined  only to  n a t iv e s  of  th e  reg ion .  Desp i te  the  
codes t h a t  embraced both French and Vietnamese s u b s t a n t i v e  law, an
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in d iv id u a l  could s t i l l  r e s o r t  to  th e  law o f  th e  French C iv i l  Code.
The severa l  Vietnamese c i v i l  codes were p repared  in  t h e  French 
manner, w ith  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  law of  th e  n a t iv e s  se rv in g  as p a r t  o f  a 
s e r v i e n t  system. As could be expected in a popu la t ion  o f  most ly  
p e a s a n t s ,  most c o u r t  d i s p u te s  a r i s i n g  under th e  codes were e i t h e r  
family  law m a t te r s  o r  land  d i s p u t e s .  Vietnamese r u le s  o f  land owner­
sh ip  and occupat ion  u s u a l l y  p e r s i s t e d  (Adams and Hancock, 1970). This 
was a n a tu r a l  consequence o f  s e r io u s  i n t e r e s t  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  c o l ­
on ia l  government concern ing  an e x te n s iv e  c a d a s t r a l  survey.  S t i l l ,  
th e  French C iv i l  Code g e n e r a l ly  a p p l i e d  to  such land t r a n s a c t i o n s  as 
mortgages and a l i e n a t i o n s .  Where c o n f l i c t  r e s u l t e d  between th e  V ie t ­
namese Law and th e  French,  th e  French c i v i l  law r u l e  p r e v a i l e d .  In 
th e  C i v i l i a n  t r a d i t i o n ,  a t tem pts  were made to  d r a f t  a c i v i l  code com­
posed o f  n a t i v e  laws f o r  th e  Bahnar, one o f  the  highland peoples  o f  
th e  Kontum prov ince  o f  c e n t r a l  and south  Vietnam (Lebar and Hickey, 
1964). The o b j e c t  was to  co d i fy  th e  l eg a l  custom o f  the  Bahnar.
This e f f o r t  a t  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  n a t iv e  law in the  forms o f  the  French 
C iv i l  Law was never  s u c c e s s f u l l y  implemented.
The French C iv i l  Law was rece ived  in a l l  French t e r r i t o r i e s  as 
a m a t t e r  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l .  This  system regarded French law as the  
r u l e  of  law and n a t i v e  law as an e xcep t ion .  This  arrangement was 
thought  to  be th e  b e s t  way to  a s s i m i l a t e  indigenous peoples  i n t o  the  
mainstream o f  French c i v i l i z a t i o n  (K ol lw e i jn ,  1929).
Dutch Colonial  Law
Dutch c o lo n ia l  law d i f f e r e d  from French c o lo n ia l  law j u s t  as
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Dutch c o lo n ia l  p o l i c y  d i f f e r e d  from French c o lo n ia l  p o l i c y .  Indone­
s i a  provided th e  ground in which th e  Dutch c o lo n ia l  law in te r tw in e d  
with indigenous systems and f lowered i n t o  a c o lo r fu l  lega l  p lu ra l i s m .  
For t h a t  r e a so n ,  th e  l ega l  systems o f  Indones ia  w i l l  be used to  ex­
p la in  th e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  Dutch law.
The t r a n s p l a n t i n g  o f  Dutch law in Indonesia  r e s u l t e d  in p lu ra l  
lega l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s e p a r a t e  bodies  o f  law on a 
r a c i a l  b a s i s .  For t h e  f i r s t  cen tu ry  o f  Dutch East  Ind ia  Company's 
rul in Java (j_.e_., u n t i l  1798),  th e  colony was adm in is te red  p a r t l y  
through an indigenous e l i t e .  The p lu ra l  j u d i c i a l  system provided sep­
a r a t e  law c o u r t s  f o r  Europeans and n a t i v e s .  In th e  European c o u r t s ,  
Dutch law was a p p l i e d ;  in  t h e  n a t i v e  c o u r t s ,  n a t i v e  law held  sway in  
so f a r  as i t  was no t  i n h e r e n t ly  o f f e n s iv e  to  European ideas  o f  j u s t i c e .  
At the  end o f  th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry ,  th e  c o lo n ia l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  was 
t r a n s f e r r e d  from th e  East  Ind ia  Company to  th e  Nether lands  (van de r  
Kroef ,  1951). Although some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  reform t r a n s p i r e d ,  the  
dual system o f  c o u r t s  remained. As a consequence o f  th e  Napoleonic 
Wars, Java came t e m p o ra r i ly  B r i t i s h  con t ro l  in 1811. The only  s i g n i f ­
icance  o f  th e  b r i e f  B n ' t i s h  r u l e  was th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  land as 
s t a t e  p ro p e r ty  so as to  form th e  b a s is  of  a n a t iv e  j u d i c i a l  system 
t h a t  c en te red  on n a t i v e  v i l l a g e s  and land systems.
A f t e r  t h e  Napoleonic wars ,  Java was r e tu rn e d  to  t h e  Dutch Crown. 
The Dutch r e t a i n e d  th e  B r i t i s h - i n t r o d u c e d  land system and r e i n t r o ­
duced t h e i r  b a s ic  c o lo n ia l  p o l icy  of  r a c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n .  By 1848, 
co lo n ia l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had s e t t l e d  on a n a t i v e  land c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
and v i l l a g e  system and a dual a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  law t h a t  would remain
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f o r  th e  ba lance  o f  th e  c o lo n ia l  p e r iod .
The next  im por tan t  event  in th e  e a r l y  lega l  h i s t o r y  o f  Indones ia ,  
was t h e  enactment  o f  t h e  Agraian Law o f  1870, which guaranteed  e x i s t ­
ing customary r i g h t s  over  land .  By Crown Ordiance in 1875, n a t iv e s  
were fo rb idden  to  a l i e n a t e  land to  f o r e i g n e r s .  I t  was not  u n t i l  1885 
t h a t  i t  was p o s s i b l e  t o  conver t  n a t iv e  land t e n u re  i n to  p r i v a t e  owner­
sh ip  under  t h e  Dutch c i v i l  law.
By th e  tu rn  o f  t h e  tw e n t i e th  c e n tu ry ,  Dutch c o lo n ia l  p o l i c y  t o ­
ward Indonesia  began to  take  t r u e  C i v i l i a n  form. Unlike th e  French, 
th e  Dutch did  not have a p o l ic y  o f  e i t h e r  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o r  d i r e c t  r u l e .  
Unlike th e  B r i t i s h ,  t h e  Dutch did  not a c t u a l l y  have a p o l i cy  o f  i n ­
d i r e c t  r u l e .  Dutch c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  p r i o r  to  t h e  tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  
a l t e r n a t e d  between e i t h e r  c o lo n ia l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o r  benign n e g le c t .
But now, th e  Dutch fo rm ula ted  a co lo n ia l  p o l icy  of  s u b s t a n t i a l  dimen­
s io n s ,  th e  "E th ica l  P o l i c y . "  This  p o l i cy  r e s u l t e d  from a perce ived  
moral o b l i g a t i o n  to  n a t i v e  w e l f a r e .  The in t r o d u c t i o n  of  th e  E th ica l  
P o l icy  occurred  s im u l taneous ly  with  th e  r i s e  o f  n a t i o n ! i s t  s en t im e n t s ,  
much o f  which was i n s p i r e d  by European ideas  on th e  m a t t e r ,  but  f o r ­
mulated in I s lam ic  p h ra se s .  These two events  were s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  th e  
f u t u r e  development o f  l eg a l  p lu ra l i s m .  As a consequence, a c o d i f i e d  
Dutch C iv i l  Law system was in t ro d u c e d ,  and th e  n a t i v e ,  v i l l a g e  lega l  
system developed an a s c e r t a i n a b l e  body o f  a d a t ,  whose gradual  s o c ia l  
ev o lu t io n  accompanied t h e  growth o f  s t a b l e  a d a t  communities in the  
Outer  Provinces  (Bisschop,  1934; Ter Haar, 1948). The r e s u l t  o f  
t h e s e  developments was th e  formation  o f  a new school o f  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  
whose under ly ing  phi losophy p o s i t e d  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  laws of
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v a r io u s  races  and whose p r i n c i p l e  concern la y  in e l a b o r a t i n g  an 
approach to  th e  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t  of  " r a c i a l  law".
I t  i s  importan t  t h a t  th e  j u r i s t - f o r m u l a t e d  th e o ry  o f  c o n f l i c t
o f  laws,  which i s  now a widely  recognized a s p e c t  o f  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  i s
based on Dutch c i v i l  law p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p rocedure .  Even the  n a t i v e
c o u r t s  adopted Dutch p rocedure ,  as wel l  as many Dutch le g a l  concepts
o f  a s u b s t a n t i v e  n a t u r e .
In a l l  cases  where—owing to  t h e  p resence  o f  th e  
Dutch group o f  th e  popu la t ion  in th e  In d ie s  and as 
r e s u l t  o f  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  government over  
t h e  Indonesians  by Dutchmen— ready-made Western law 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  j u r i d i c a l  i n t e r d i c t i o n s  and i n j u n c ­
t i o n s  appear  t o  have been inc luded  in th e  law o f  th e
n a t i v e  popu la t ion  in such a manner t h a t  th e  a d a t  law
would not  have a r r i v e d  a t  t h a t  s ta g e  by independent  
development,  i n  a l l  t h o se  cases  we can speak o f  Wes­
t e r n  in f lu e n c e  on th e  a d a t  law (Ter  Haar ,  1929, p.
165).
Dutch law in f lu e n c e d  n a t i v e  law in f i v e  ways: 1) The in f lu e n c e  o f
formal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p rocedures  a f f e c t s  a d a t  r u le s  o r  p r i n c i p l e s  by 
reducing th e  ad a t  to  w r i t i n g ;  2) t h e  c a s t i n g  o f  a d a t  r u l e s  in terms
imported from th e  Dutch c i v i l  law; 3) Dutch lega l  adv ice  and th e  use
o f  formal documents r e q u i r i n g  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  
imported law; 4) m iss io n a ry  inf luences-  in t h e  breakdown o f  t r a d i t i o n ­
al a t t i t u d e s  o f  which a d a t  forms a p a r t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  as concerns th e  
a b o l i t i o n  o f  polygamy; and 5) i m i t a t i o n  o f  Dutch law forms in commer­
c i a l  and fam ily  t r a n s a c t i o n s  by th e  educated n a t iv e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
urban a re a s  (Ter  Haar,  1929).
Ear ly  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  of  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  the  Dutch Ind ie s  had 
grouped in d i v i d u a l s  i n t o  fo u r  c l a s s e s :  Europeans, th o se  a s s i m i l a t e d
to  Europeans, f o re ig n  o r i e n t a l s  (Arabs and C h inese ) ,  and n a t i v e s .  Af-
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t e r  1898, t h e s e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  p e r s i s t e d  w i th  t h e  excep t ion  t h a t  the  
f i r s t  two c a t e g o r i e s  were combined and inc luded  not only Europeans; 
but  a l s o  Japanese  and persons whose family  law was e s s e n t i a l l y  the  
same as  th e  European. Foreign O r i e n t a l s  cont inued  to  be governed by 
t h e i r  own personal laws u n t i l  the  e a r l y  tw e n t i e th  c e n tu r y ,  when th ey ,  
t o o ,  were s im i l a t e d  to  th e  European group. These c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  
were th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  m u l t i r a c i a l  l ega l  system t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  in 
Dutch East  In d ie s .
P re fe re n c e  f o r  one r a c i a l  law r a t h e r  than a n o th e r ,  was determined 
by what was the  p roper  law o f  each case .  There was no o v e r r id in g  
view in f a v o r  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  system ( K o l le w i j in ,  1951). The doc­
t r i n e  o f  lex  f o r i  could not  prov ide  a p l a u s i b l e  s o lu t i o n  to  t h e  problem 
of  t h e  choice  o f  law because a l l  laws were e q u a l ly  v a l i d .  I t  was thus  
l e f t  to  th e  j u d i c i a r y  to  r e so lv e  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  cho ice  o f  law. The 
c o u r t s  de te rm ined ,  f o r  example, t h a t  as to  s u c c e s s io n ,  the  t e s t a t o r  
governs i n h e r i t a n c e .  T h e re fo re ,  immovable p rope r ty  c l a s s i f i e d  as 
European land bu t  l e f t  by a n a t i v e ,  was i n h e r i t e d  under  th e  ru le s  o f  
th e  a d a t .  Native land l e f t  by a Chinese was i n h e r i t e d  accord ing  to  
European law. In t h e  case  o f  immovable p ro p e r ty  th e  law a p p l i c a b l e  
to  t h e  land as c l a s s i f i e d  "European" o r  "N at ive" ,  remained th e  same 
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  r a c i a l  group o f  th e  owner ( S c h i l l e r ,  1942-43).
Concerning th e  r o l e s  o f  a d a t  in  such lega l  p l u r a l i t y ,  Ter Haar 
argued a g a i n s t  th e  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  systems o f  law and th e  u n c r i t ­
i c a l  adopt ion  o f  Dutch law. Such lead in g  j u r i s t s  as van Vollenhoven 
and Ter Haar p r e v a i l e d .  They advocated a "judge-made law f o r  the  
Indonesian  f i rm ly  based on f o lk  law" (Ter Haar, 1948). But,  th e  prob-
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lem o f  i n t e r - r a c i a l  law p e r s i s t e d ,  S c h i l l e r  (1942-43, p. 40) provided
a summary of  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  such a law in  t h e  Dutch East  In d ie s :
I n t e r r a c i a l  law i s  not  founded upon a l im i t e d  num­
b er  o f  general  maxims, bu t  i s  formed of  as g r e a t  
number o f  sh a rp ly  de f ined  r u le s  which s p e c i fy  what 
i s  t o  be th e  lega l  r u l e  in p a r t i c u l a r  c i rcum stances .
The source  o f  th e  r u le s  o f  i n t e r r a c i a l  law i s  v a r i e d ,  
many of  them a r e  to  be found in l e g i s l a t i v e  e n a c t ­
ments.  F u r th e r ,  i n t e r r a c i a l  c h a r a c t e r  i s  given to
s t a t u t e  by j u d i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  a t t r i b u t i n g  to  
th e  l e g i s l a t o r  an i n t e n t i o n  o f  p rov id ing  f o r  s i t u a ­
t i o n s  invo lv ing  more than one r a c i a l  group. Then 
t h e r e  i s  th e  occas iona l  drawing upon r u l e s  o f  p r i ­
v a te  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law by way o f  analogy,  more o f te n  
r e f e r e n c e  to  customary law, and in a few cases  the  
r e c o g n i t io n  o f  j u r i s t i c  s c ie n c e  as t o  t h e  source .
But,  above a l l ,  i n t e r r a c i a l  law r u l e s  flow from 
j u d i c i a l  d i c i s i o n ,  the  u l t i m a t e  source  t h e r e o f  not 
being mentioned. There i s  a danger o f  "judge-made" 
law h e r i n ,  bu t  i t  cannot  be d i sp u ted  t h a t  in  r e ­
c e n t  y e a r s  decions  o f  th e  c o u r t s —and th e  r e l i a n c e  
upon p reced en t  t h a t  accompanies such a c t i v i t y —play 
a major  r o l e  in  th e  forming o f  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r ­
r a c i a l  law.
A somewhat d i f f e r e n t  c o n f l i c t  e x i s t e d  between ada t  and Is lamic
law. G en e ra l ly ,  a d a t  law would p re v a i l  over  any r e l i g i o u s  law un less
l e g i s l a t i o n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s e t  ou t  th e  p r e fe ren c e  f o r  one o f  them on 
some p o in t .  The c o n f l i c t  i s  here  s i g n i f i c a n t  because most o f  the  
i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  Indonesia  a r e  Moslems. The s t r o n g e s t  c e n t e r  o f  Islam 
in the  country  i s  the  c o a s t a l  t r a d in g  a rea  o f  nor th  Sumatra.  By con­
t r a s t ,  th e  in land  a g r i c u l t u r a l  communities tend no t  to  be I s lam ic .  
This p a t t e r n in g  has an obvious e f f e c t  on th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  personal  
laws. A1thought th e  boundar ies  between a d a t  and Is lam ic  law have 
never  been a c c u r a t e l y  de te rm ined ,  a cont inued  dual lega l  p lu ra l i sm  
p e r s i s t s  between th e  two. I s lam ic  law i s  adm in is te red  by a c o l l e ­
g i a t e  t r i b u n a l  c a l l e d  th e  p r i e s t e r r a a d e n , t h a t  has j u r i s d i c t i o n  only
over  m a t te r s  o f  m ar r iag e ,  d iv o rc e ,  and in h e r i t a n c e  (Lev, 1972).
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As concerned the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  a d a t ,  th e  general  compe­
tence  of  a d a t  as a v i a b l e  lega l  system in any a rea  i s  determined by 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s io n s .  In th e  a rea  o f  d i r e c t  j u d i c i a l  admin is­
t r a t i o n ,  th e  general  r u l e  was t h a t  s u b s t a n t i v e  a d a t  law remain v a l i d  
f o r  n a t iv e s  in so f a r  as i t  i s  not  rep laced  by s t a t u t e  o r  by Euro­
pean law; o rd inances  r e g u l a t i n g  a d a t  enac ted  p r i o r  to  January  1, 1920, 
must be d ec la red  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  n a t i v e s ;  o rd inances  made a f t e r  January  
1, 1920, may d e p a r t  from a d a t  law i f  the  p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t  o r  so c ia l  
needs o f  th e  n a t iv e s  so r e q u i r e ;  and,  th e  a d a t  r u l e  may be a p p l ied  
even i f  in c o n f l i c t  w ith  a g e n e r a l ly  recognized  r u l e  o f  e q u i ty  or  
j u s t i c e .  In n a t iv e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  Adat c i v i l  procedural  r u l e s  apply 
in so f a r  as they  have not  been rep laced  by general  o rd in a n c es ;  the  
ord inance  on n a t i v e  j u s t i c e  in  d i r e c t l y  governed lands  de termines  the  
e x t e n t  o f  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a d a t  law; and,  a d a t  law a lone  a p p l i e s  in the  
v i l l a g e  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  of  j u s t i c e .  F i n a l l y ,  in t h e  a rea  o f  n a t iv e  
a d m in i s t r a t i o n  of  j u s t i c e  in  s e l f - g o v e rn in g  t e r r i t o r y ,  ad a t  c i v i l  
and procedural  law a p p l i e s  in so f a r  as i t  i s  not  r ep laced  by o r d in ­
ances rendered e f f e c t i v e  by t r e a t y  o r  agreement (Ter Haar,  1948, p. 
32) .
Maintenance o f  a d a t  and th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  th e  p o l i cy  of  lega l  
p lu ra l i sm  were p e ro g a t iv e s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y .  However, the  
scope o f  a d a t  was g r e a t l y  reduced by th e  promulgation in  19 of  C iv i l  
and Commercial Codes. In a d d i t i o n ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  de r ived  from European 
models and made d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  th e  n a t iv e s  imported a d d i t io n a l  
Dutch lega l  concep ts .
A f te r  1945, Dutch c o lo n ia l  law y i e ld e d  to  th e  fo rmation  o f  a
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n a t io n a l  law in th e  newly independent s t a t e  o f  Indones ia .  S h o r t ly  
a f t e r  independence,  indigenous j u s t i c e  in th e  severa l  t e r r i t o r i e s  
was rep laced  by government a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  except  a t  th e  v i l l a g e  l e v ­
e l .  In a d d i t i o n ,  both a d a t  judges  and r e l i g i o u s  judges  were recog­
n ized  ( S c h i l l e r ,  1955).
Among th e  problems f a c in g  those  hoping to  guide th e  growth o f  
t h e  emerging n a t io n a l  l e g a l  system was the  c o n f l i c t  between u n i f i c a ­
t i o n  and p lu r a l i s m .  Indonesians  viewed c o d i f i c a t i o n  and u n i f i c a t i o n  
as necessa ry  t o  ach ieve  a u n i f i e d  na t io n  (Lev. 1965). Reform e f f o r t s  
a t  e l im in a t in g  th e  o ld  c o lo n ia l  law were s e t  in motion. One o f  t h e  ob­
j e c t s  o f  t h i s  reform was th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  law groups based on race  o r  
a r e a s .  The Agrarian  Act o f  1960, f o r  example, r ep laced  th e  Dutch 
land systems w i th  r i g h t s  to  p ro p e r ty  based in " so c ia l  fu n c t io n "  and 
on "na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  and n a t io n a l  u n i t y . "  The ideology o f  n a t i o n a l ­
ism a l s o  e l im in a te d  many o f  th e  a d a t  p rope r ty  r i g h t s  by f av o r in g  in ­
d iv idua l  r i g h t  to  ownership and d i s p o s i t i o n .  The i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e se  
reforms was to  c r e a t e  a uniform land law th roughout  Indones ia .
In th e  s e t t i n g  o f  p a r t l y  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  n a t io n a l i s m ,  th e  Dutch
Civ i l  Code was d e c la re d  by th e  Supreme Court  no lo n g e r  to  be in f o r c e
a f t e r  1963. The reason  was enunc ia ted  as fo l low s :
From th e  beginning  i t  has been f e l t  s t r a n g e  t h a t  in 
In d o n es ia ,  even though now independent ,  many laws 
s t i l l  apply  which in c h a r a c t e r  and o b je c t  . . . can­
n o t  be f r e e d  from th e  t h in k in g  o f  the  c o l o n i a l i s t s  .
. . . who sought to  s a t i s f y  Dutch i n t e r e s t  . . .  In 
view o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Dutch c o l o n i a l i s t s  d r a f t e d  
t h e  c i v i l  code wholly in im i t a t i o n  o f  the  Dutch c i v ­
i l  code,  and,  moreover,  t h a t  i t  was a p p l ie d  only to  
Dutchmen (and th o se  a s s i m i l a t e d  to  them) in Indones­
i a ,  t h e r e f o r e  th e  q u es t io n  a rose  whether  in independ­
e n t  Indones ia  . . .  i t  was proper  to  regard  t h e  c i v ­
i l  code as fo rm a l ly  v a l id  . . . Thus t h e  idea occurred
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to  c o n s id e r  th e  c i v i l  code not  as a law, bu t  r a t h e r  
only as a document d e s c r ib in g  a p a r t  o f  t h e  unw r i t ten  
laws . . . [on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  view] th e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  j u d g e s ,  a re  f r e e r  to  d i s r e g a r d  var ious  
a r t i c l e s  t h a t  a r e  no longer  in harmony with t h i s  per iod 
o f  Indonesian indpendence.  (Lev. 1965, p. 239n)
Although judges  con t inued  to  r e l y  upon Dutch-made l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the  
c o lo n ia l  law with  i t s  c i v i l  code was r e l e g a t e d  approximate ly  to  the  
le v e l  o f  a customary law (Damian and Hornick,  1972). Even though the  
o f f i c i a l ,  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  independent  S t a t e  r e j e c t e d  
th e  idea  o f  s e p a r a t e  lega l  systems had e x i s t e d  in  c o lo n ia l  t imes and 
embraced th e  no t ion  o f  l eg a l  u n i f i c a t i o n  through c o d i f i c a t i o n ,  th e  
government s u b s t a n t i a l l y  n u l l i f i e d  th e  Dutch c i v i l  code and provided 
judges  w ith  a c loak  o f  a u t h o r i t y  vaguely resembling t h a t  found in the  
Common Law. I n t e r e s t i n g  enough, c o d i f i c a t i o n  has been e n t h u s i a s t i ­
c a l l y  c a r r i e d  f o r t h ;  t h e  move towards development o f  a n a t io n a l  law 
has proceeded on an e c l e c t i c  and piecemeal b a s i s .
Toge the r ,  th e  Supreme Court  d e c i s io n  o f  1963 and th e  e a r l i e r  
Agrar ian  Act o f  1960, removed th e  primary p o in t s  o f  c o n t a c t  t h a t  had 
determined th e  cho ice  o f  law when c o n f l i c t s  a ro se  in th e  co lo n ia l  con­
t e x t ;  i . e . ,  a) t h a t  th e  popu la t ion  group o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  was no t  the  
same; b) where, i f  land  m a t t e r s  were in  i s s u e ,  t h e  land had been c l a s ­
s i f i e d  in va r ious  ways; c) where th e  cho ice  o f  law in an i n t e r n a l  r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p  was in p o i n t ,  as  in a c o n t r a c t  between two n a t i v e s ,  and i t  
was d e c la re d  t h a t  Dutch law i s  to  app ly ;  and d) th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  
lex  f o r i  in p rocedure ,  th e  p resence  o f  d i f f e r e n t  systems of  c o u r t s  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  popu la t ion  groups in the  same a r e a .  A c o n ta c t  a t  any one o f  
th e se  p o i n t s ,  products  o f  j u r i s t i c  energy ,  in t roduced  a c o n f l i c t - o f -  
laws q u es t io n  as concerned i n t e r - r a c i a l  law (Gouwigioksiong, 1965).
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Once the  q u e s t io n  o f  i n t e r - r a c i a l  law was answered,  th e  c o u r t s  then 
cons ide red  th e  secondary p o in t  o f  c o n t a c t ,  the  a c tu a l  cho ice  o f  law. 
Although the  c o u r t s  tended to  fo l low  t h i s  c o lo n ia l  arrangement as 
l a t e  as  th e  1950s, th e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  reforms o f  th e  e a r l y  1960s e f f e c t ­
i v e ly  a s c r ib e d  to  a l l  c i t i z e n s  of  Indones ia  a common s t a t u s .
A consequence o f  change f in d s  ex p re s s io n  in  land law. Indeed, 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t t a c k  on th e  Civ i l  Law system with  i t s  lega l  p lu ra l i s m  
a c t u a l l y  began with  th e  enactment  o f  th e  a g r a r i a n  law. The b a s ic  p re ­
mise o f  th e  a s s a u l t  he ld  t h a t  th e  c o lo n ia l  dualism in  t h e  f i e l d  of 
land ownership should be ended (Wirjono,  1959). The u l t i m a t e  aim o f  
the  l e g i s l a t i o n  was s t a t e d  to  be th e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  land through 
law reform. Indeed,  t h e  whole program o f  land reform in Indonesia  was 
o f te n  d iscu s se d  in  terms o f  communism (van d e r  Kroef,  1963).
In pr imary p o in t s  o f  c o n ta c t  from c o lo n ia l  t imes were thus  e l im ­
i n a t e d ,  t h e  p o pu la t ion  was viewed on a u n i t a r y  b a s i s ,  and land under­
went a rap id  u n i f i c a t i o n  as to  e t h n i c  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  The Agrarian  
Act o f  1960 had c r e a te d  new land r i g h t s  a p p l i c a b l e  to  a l l  e th n ic  groups,  
s u b je c t  only to  r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed by " so c ia l  f u n c t i o n . "  Although 
th e  land  reform was supposed to  be grounded in  a d a t ,  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  
custom was r e s t r i c t e d  in  t h a t  th e  a d a t  was re q u i re d  to  be f r e e  from 
"feudal  and c a p i t a l i s t i c  p r i n c i p l e s . "
Apart  from th e  s p e c i f i c  reforms o f  th e  Agrarian  Act ,  ad a t  c o n t i n ­
ued to  p lay th e  c e n t r a l  r o l e  in th e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  a n a t io n a l  law. The 
development o f  a uniform law based on ad a t  d id  not  lend i t s e l f  to  cod­
i f i c a t i o n .  I t  has t h e r e f o r e  taken  p lace  by means o f  j u d i c i a l  a p p l i c a ­
t i o n s  and d o c t r in a l  w r i t i n g s .  According to  Ter Haar, law was any ada t
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t h a t  occurred  in th e  d e c i s io n  o f  a judge (Ter Haar, 1948). This view,
however, has been opposed by a n o th e r  lead in g  j u r i s t :
I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  and l i b e r a l i s t i c  views do not  l i v e  in 
t h e  minds o f  Indones ians .  We a r e  s o c io -  and t r a d i t i o n -  
bound people ;  everyone o f  us has to  be common b ia sa  
(Javenese  lumrah) .  Being d i f f e r e n t  from o th e r s  i s  be­
ing s t r a n g e ,  a s t o n i s h i n g ,  wicked, condemnable. In 
t h i s  course  o f  ideas  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  s t a t e  o f  mind 
and an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  p a t t e r n  o f  behav io r  and a c t io n  
w i l l  a rouse  o p p o s i t i o n ,  d isapprova l  and condemnation.
Freedom o f  c o n t r a c t i n g  and com pe t i t ion  i s  o u t  o f  p l a c e ,  
as a r e  d e f i n i t e  a c t i o n s  in law, c o n ta in in g  d e f i n i t e  
c la im s .  (D jo jod igoeno ,  1952, p. 13)
Under such a view, law, i f  not  w r i t t e n ,  i s  a d a t  when i t s  source  o f  
a u t h o r i t y  i s  the  government.  An i n h e r e n t  c o n t r a d i t i o n  emerges in t h a t  
a d a t  i s  so v a r ied  and lo c a l  t h a t ,  w i thou t  being rendered s t a t i c  in  th e  
form o f  code o r  s t a t u t e  o r  p rec e d e n t ,  a d a t  can s c a r c e ly  be conceived 
o f  as forming a uniform n a t io n a l  law a p p l i c a b l e  to  a l l .  I t s  loca l  
c h a r a c t e r  may not  be capab le  o f  s a t i s f y i n g  th e  requirements  o f  a m u l t i ­
e th n i c  lega l  c u l t u r e .  Only time w i l l  t e l l  whether  a d a t  can be adapted 
to  f i t  a uniform Indonesian concept ion  o f  lega l  o b l i g a t i o n  (Damian 
and Hornick,  1972).
B e lg ian ,  German, Spanish and Por tuguese  Colonial Law 
The c o lo n ia l  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  seve ra l  C i v i l i a n  Cont inen ta l  powers 
g e n e r a l ly  v a r i ed  l i t t l e  as to  l e g a l  outcome from th e  French p o l i cy  of  
a s s i m i l a t i o n .  They t r e a t e d  c o lo n ia l  t e r r i t o r i e s  as i n t e g r a l  p o r t io n s  
o f  the  m e t ro p o l i t a n  mother co u n t ry ,  r e g a rd l e s s  o f  whether  those  lands 
were s e t t l e d  by n a t i o n a l s  o r  gained by c e s s io n .  The laws o f  th ese  
c o u n t r i e s  were i n t ro d u c e d ,  in  t o t a l i t y ,  to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  dependen­
c i e s ,  exc luding  e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  th e  customs and usage o f  the
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people  whom they  r u le d .  Like th e  former  French c o l o n i e s ,  th e  Belg ian ,  
Por tuguese ,  and Spanish t e r r i t o r i e s  r e t a i n e d  th e  law and lega l  sy s ­
tems. o f  t h e i r  mother c o u n t r i e s .
The most n o ta b le  Belgian C iv i l  Law t r a n s p l a n t  occurred  in cen­
t r a l  A f r i c a ,  in th e  Congo (Kinshasa) .  From th e  former  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A sso c ia t io n  o f  th e  Congo c o n t r o l l e d  by Leopold I of  Belgium, the  Con­
go Free S t a t e  was e r e c t e d  and p laced  under  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  Leopold 
by th e  B e r l in  Conference o f  1885. By decree  in  1891, th e  Congo Free 
S t a t e  rece ived  th e  "general  p r i n c i p l e s  of  Belgian law" and r e t a in e d  
" loca l  custom i n s o f a r  as  t h e s e  customs a re  no t  c o n t r a ry  to  t h e  h igher  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  o rd e r  and c i v i l i z a t i o n "  (S a la cu se ,  1969; Crabb, 1970). 
F u r th e r ,  the  r u l i n g  power o f  th e  Congo Free S t a t e  began th e  process  
o f  developing  a d i s t i n c t  c i v i l  code based in  p a r t  on th e  Napoleonic 
Code.
The Congo Free S t a t e  was annexed to  Belgium and became th e  Bel­
g ian  Congo in  1908. Under Belg ian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  c i v i l  c o d i f i c a t i o n  
was completed.  The d i s t i n c t  Congo Code c i v i l  cont inued  the  laws of 
th e  Congo Free  S t a t e .  There was f u r t h e r  r e ce p t io n  o f  Belgian l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  by a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  enactments in Belgium f o r  th e  Congo and by 
im por ta t ion  o f  Belgian law by locjil  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Native custom was 
f r e q u e n t ly  allowed to  co n t in u e  where i t  d id  no t  c o n f l i c t  with  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  and was not  cons trued  as c o n t r a ry  to  t h e  o rd re  p u b l i c . All un­
occupied lands  r e v e r t e d  to  the  s t a t e  and thus  came under the  d i r e c t  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  Belgian law. Occupied, t r i b a l  lands were g e n e ra l ly  
pe rm it ted  to  remain s u b je c t  to  loca l  customs.
In Ruanda-Urundi, th e  Germans annexed t e r r i t o r y  to  German East
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A fr ica  a t  th e  end o f  the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  ( K j e l l e n ,  1916). There 
was, however, no e f f e c t i v e  occupat ion  o r  i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  German law. 
The a rea  was occupied by th e  Belg ians  in 1916, and rece ived  by Bel­
gium as a mandate in 1923. Legal adm in is t  a t i o n  o f  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  
was u n i f i e d  w i th  th e  Belgian Congo and made s u b je c t  to  the  laws of  
t h e  Belgian Congo a f t e r  1925.
A f t e r  ga in ing  independence in  1962, th e  Republic o f  Ruanda r e ­
t a in e d  th e  Be lg ian . law  to g e t h e r  w ith  lo c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n .  A p o l ic y  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  to  a b o l i s h  customary law and to  cod i fy  a l l  law, w ith  the  
sp ec ia l  exemption to  a l low p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  custom in land law where 
l e g i s l a t i o n  was a b s e n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  Kingdom o f  Burundi (formed in
1962), subsequen t ly  t h e  Republic o f  Burundi ( in  1967), r e t a i n e d  th e  
rece ived  Belgian law and loca l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  in c lu d in g  th e  Congo Code 
c i v i l . Burundi s t a r t e d  a program to  co d i fy  a l l  custom. In 1966, a l l  
land law was p laced  under  t h e  Congo Code c i v i l .
German A f r ic a  was bu t  a b r i e f  encoun ter  by Germany with  overseas  
empire.  German c o lo n ia l  e f f o r t s  were conf ined  to  th e  l a t e  n in e te e n th  
cen tu ry  and ended by fo rced  r e n u n c ia t io n  a t  the  end o f  World War I .  
Colonial  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was never  e f f e c t i v e  by in t roduced  German law. 
The few in f lu e n c e s  t h a t  su rv iv e  a r e  the  r e s u l t  o f  subsequent  i n c o r ­
p o ra t io n  in to  Engl ish  common law o f  e lements  o f  t h e  seve ra l  former ly  
German j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  In 1884, Kamerun was e s t a b l i s h e d  as a German 
p r o t e c t r a t e .  I t  so remained u n t i l  1922, a t  which time th e  western  
t e r r i t o r y  r e v e r t e d  to  a League o f  Nat ions mandate. The n o r the rn  por­
t i o n  was adm in is te red  by N iger ia  (a Common Law j u r i s d i c t i o n ) .  The 
sou thern  p o r t io n  passed to  United Nat ions con t ro l  in 1946. This p a r t
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was fo rm al ly  u n i te d  w ith  th e  e a r l i e r  French t r u s t  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  the  
Cameroons in  1961, and f e l l  under French Law. In e a s t e r n  A f r i c a ,  the  
Germans e s t a b l i s h e d  a p r o t e c t o r a t e  over  Zanzibar  in 1885 and ex e rc i sed  
cla ims over  Tanganyika. However, th e se  a re a s  too were soon l o s t  to 
th e  B r i t i s h  (1887-1890). There was a l s o  minimal German in f lu e n c e  in 
South West A f r i c a ,  which absorbed the  South A fr ican  common law.
Elsewhere,  t h e  Germans e s t a b l i s h e d  a colony in  New Guinea and 
held i t  u n t i l  i t  was cap tu red  by the  B r i t i s h  in 1914. A f t e r  World 
War I ,  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  B r i t i s h  and adm in is te red  
by th e  A u s t r a l i a n s .  The a rea  rece ived  no German law t h a t  su rv ived  
th e  i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  th e  Common Law, excep t ,  pe rhaps ,  as  p receden t .
The C iv i l  Law o f  Spain was rece ived  in Spanish Sahara and o th e r  
a rea s  along th e  e a s t  c o a s t  o f  A f r i c a .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  Civ i l  Law of 
Por tugal  was rece ived  in i t s  e n t i r e t y  in Angola, 'Mozambique, and to  
l e s s e r  e x t e n t  in Goa and o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  Por tuguese  In d ia .  The law 
rece ived  in th e se  p laces  was e s s e n t i a l l y  th e  same as t h a t  t r a n s p l a n t ­
ed to  th e  s e t t l e d  c o lo n ie s  by Volk m ig ra t io n s ,  wi th  th e  f u r t h e r  recep­
t i o n  o f  th e  c i v i l  codes a f t e r  the  mother c o u n t r i e s  underwent the 
process  o f  c o d i f i c a t i o n  in the  l a t e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry .
Voluntary Receptions
L a rg e - s c a le ,  v o lu n ta ry  r e ce p t io n  l ik ew ise  r e s u l t s  in th e  d i f f u s io n  
o f  C i v i l i a n  lega l  systems.  A c o d i f i e d  system can be e a s i l y  t r a n s p l a n t ­
ed to  th e  r e c i p i e n t  country  and gran ted  i t s  e f f e c t i v e  l e g i t im a cy  as 
t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  w i l l  o f  th e  sovere ign .  The C i v i l i a n  concept ion  of a 
code c l e a r l y  p r e v a i l s  in th e  f ace  o f  e x i s t i n g  law. For th e se  C iv i l i a n
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codes to  be e f f e c t i v e ,  they  need only be: 1) th e  work of  an " e n l i g h t ­
ened" s o v e re ig n ,  one unhampered by the  p a s t  and w i l l i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  
new p r i n c i p l e s  o f  " j u s t i c e i "  and 2) e s t a b l i s h e d  in  a country  having 
a government powerful enough to  e x e r c i s e  an in e sc a p a b le  in f lu e n c e  ov­
e r  i t s  s u b je c t s  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1968). Such e x te n s iv e  v o lu n ta ry  
rec e p t io n  o f  C iv i l  Law i s  u s u a l ly  prompted by a d e s i r e  f o r  r ap id  mod­
e r n i z a t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  systems o f  law ( f o r  example, Turkey o r  I r a n ) .  
S u b s tan t iv e  domestic law which i s  no t  e a s i l y  c o d i f i a b l e  o r  o the rw ise  
r e d u c ib le  to  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l l y  has l i t t l e  chance o f  e f f e c t i v e l y  
r e s i s t i n g  a C iv i l  Law t r a n s p l a n t ,  un le ss  s p e c i a l ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  exemp­
t i o n  as  to  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r .
Voluntary r ec e p t io n  o f  C iv i l  Law need no t  be complete  where th e  
t r a n s p l a n t  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  s u b s t a n t i v e  law. However, i f  th e  C i v i l i a n  
view as to  th e  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  supremacy o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  imported ,  a 
complete C iv i l  Law system w i l l  emerge. An e x c e l l e n t  example o f  sweep­
ing r e c e p t io n  r e s t r i c t e d  to  s u b s t a n t i v e  C iv i l  law i s  p resen ted  in the  
lega l  ex per ience  of  E th io p ia ,  which, in  t h e  1950s, imported a mixed 
C iv i l  and Common Law j u r i s d i c t i o n  ( S e d le r ,  1867). Much o f  th e  p r i v a t e  
s u b s t a n t i v e  law o f  E th iop ia  was s t r u c t e d  in t h e  form o f  Cont inen ta l  
C i v i l i a n  codes ,  bu t  t h e  procedural  law was p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  t h e  j u d i ­
c i a l  Common Law.
C i v i l i a n  C o d i f i c a t i o n  and Reform Movements
I n t e l l e c t u a l s  and j u r i s c o n s u l t s  may in any p lace  o r  t ime d e s i r e  
c o d i f i c a t i o n  e i t h e r  in the  hope o f  a n a t i o n a l ,  r a t i o n a l  system o f  law 
o r  because they  see  in  a code th e  s u p e r l a t i v e  manner o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g
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proper  o r d e r .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  e f f e c t i v e  r e c e p t io n  o f  th e  code depends 
upon p l a u s i b l e  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e .  The p o l i t i c a l  impetus f o r  c o d i f i c a ­
t i o n  and lega l  reform d i f f e r s  from p lace  to  p la c e .  Whatever th e  r e a ­
son,  a lmost  a l l  r e s u l t a n t  r e c e p t io n s  import  a law based on some v e r ­
s ion  o f  th e  Napoleonic Coce and th e  French C iv i l  Law system. In t h a t  
way, th e  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  p lan o f  o r d e r  becam m a n i fe s t  in th e  lega l  
systems o f  Turkey, I r a n ,  and th e  Middle E a s t ,  and to  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  
E th io p ia .  The a c t u r a l  r e c e p t io n s  reveal  something o f  th e  under ly ing  
causes  o f  so c ia l  and economic reforms.
The "Enl ightened"  Sovereign and Centra l  Government Power
We a re  no t  here  i n t e r e s t e d  in  th e  l e g a l  h i s t o r y  o f  those  systems 
t h a t  f o r  whatever  reason  imported th e  C iv i l  Law. R a th e r ,  we a r e  con­
cerned  with  t h e  a c tu a l  r e c e p t i o n .  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c  g e o j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  surround t h e  moments o f  a c tu a l  r e c e p t i o n ,  and th e se  t y p i c a l  
co n d i t io n s  f u r t h e r  e n l ig h t e n  us as t o  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  form, per  
s e , in  th e  c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y  o f  laws.  The form o f  t h e  law i s  a f a c t o r  
in i t s  own o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  be imported .  As an example, we examine the  
case  o f  Turkey where an im p o r ta t io n  by th e  c e n t r a l  government r e l a t e d  
to  i t s  involvement in a fundamental s o c ia l  p o l i t i c a l  r e v o lu t io n .
Although some c o d i f i c a t i o n  on French p r i n c i p l e s  had been i n t r o ­
duced in to  Turkey dur ing  the  l a t e  n in e t e e n th  c e n tu r y ,  t h e  events  s u r ­
rounding l a r g e - s c a l e  v o lu n ta ry  r ec e p t io n  occurred  a f t e r  World War I 
(Hamson, 1957). About t h a t  t im e ,  a Turk ish  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r ,  Mustafa 
Kemal, l a t e r  c a l l e d  t h e  A ta tu rk ,  came to  power by f o rc e  o f  arms and 
s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  ab o l i sh e d  th e  s u l t a n a t e  and th e  c a l i p h a t e  and s e t
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about  to  "modernize" th e  coun try  (Kuehnel t -Leddihn ,  1979). By proc­
lamation in 1924, I s lam ic  law was ab o l i sh e d  f o r  m a t te r s  o f  personal 
s t a t u s .  In 1926, I s lam ic  law was rep laced  by th e  im p o r ta t io n  of  the
Swiss C iv i l  Code and Code o f  o b l i g a t i o n s .  The purpose o f  t h i s  revo­
l u t i o n a r y  r e c e p t io n  was to  use th e  law as a v e h ic l e  f o r  modern iza t ion  
and reform (V el idedeoglu ,  1957).
The law a p p l i c a b l e  to  c i v i l  d i s p u t e s  became the  law der ived  from 
the  Swiss codes . The p lace  o f  I s lam ic  law and customary law was c l e a r ­
ly  i n d i c a t e d  in A r t i c l e  1 o f  th e  imported codes:
Where no p ro v is io n s  [ i n  w r i t t e n  law] a r e  a p p l i c a b l e ,  
th e  judge  should  d ec id e  accord ing  to  e x i s t i n g  c u s t ­
omary law and in  d e f a u l t  t h e r e o f ,  accord ing  to  the
Rules which he would lay  down i f  he had h im se l f  to  
a c t  as l e g i s l a t o r .  In t h i s  he must be guided by 
approved l eg a l  d o c t r i n e  and case  law.
Thus, t h r e e  C i v i l i a n  a t t r i b u t e s  were th e reb y  in t roduced  i n t o  th e  form­
e r l y  r e l i g i o u s - b a s e d  law of  Turkey: 1) w r i t t e n  law ( i . e > , l e g i s l a t i o n
was the  supreme, a u t h o r i t a t i v e  source  o f . t h e  law ) ,  2) t h e  use o f  cu s ­
tom only in t h e  absence o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  on th e  m a t t e r ,  by j u d i c i a l  recog­
n i t i o n ,  and 3) an equal fo o t in g  f o r  l eg a l  d o c t r i n e  and case  law and 
t h e i r  r e l e g a t i o n  to  the  s t a t u s  o f  p e r su a s iv e  sources  o f  law. Under such 
a concept ion  o f  law, t h e  c i v i l  and r e l i g i o u s  forms a r e  s e p a r a t e d ,  and 
only th e  c i v i l  has any le g a l  a u t h o r i t y .
A f t e r  1926, a t e n s io n  e x i s t e d  a t  th e  v i l l a g e  leve l  between Is lamic  
law and v a r ious  a r t i c l e s  and p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  Civ i l  Code. Peasant  
land t e n u re  and i n h e r i t a n c e  remained l a r g e l y  under  the  co n t ro l  o f  loca l  
custom (which only in some s i t u a t i o n s  embraced I s lam ic  t e n e t s )  was a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  c e n t r a l  bureaucracy  o f  t h e  s t a t e  and loca l
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v i l l a g e  p r a c t i c e  ( S t i r l i n g ,  1957). The rece ived  c i v i l  law provided 
a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  a b s o lu t e  r u le s  and did no t  accep t  any d e v ia t i o n  not  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  al lowed in  i t s  own terms.
The f r e q u e n t  i r r e l e v a n c e  o f  th e  c i v i l  code in th e  peasan t  v i l l ­
ages i s  underscored by the  absence o f  an adequate  land r e g i s t r a t i o n  
system. R e g i s t r a t i o n  i s  n ecessa ry  to  suppor t  r i g h t s  in  land under 
th e  code. Accurate  and r e g i s t e r a b l e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  land h o ld in g s ,  
t o g e th e r  with p roper  su rv ey s ,  were no t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e  as l a t e  as 1957 
(Vel idedeoglu ,  1957). In t im e ,  i t  i s  b e l ie v e d  by some, th e  new lega l  
system through t e c h n ic a l  e f f i c i e n c y  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r u th l e s s n e s s  
w i l l  p re v a i l  in land t e n u r e  over  v i l l a g e  p r a c t i c e  thus  a s s u r in g  r e ­
form in y e t  a n o th e r  a r e a  o f  t h e  s e c u l a r i z e d  s o c i e ty  o f  Turkey (Kubal i ,  
1957; L i p s t e i n ,  1957; Ulken, 1957).
That t h i s  p rocess  o f  land reform i s  well  under  way i s  evidenced 
in l e g i s l a t i o n  promulgated s in c e  th e  im pos i t ion  o f  t h e  C iv i l  Code. For 
example, th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1961 r e q u i r e s  th e  s t a t e  to  su p e rv i s e  the  
p roduc t ive  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  land and in d e f a u l t  to  e x p r o p r i a t e  
(Szy l iowicz ,  1963). This  p ro v is io n  was implemented us ing  previous  
l e g i s l a t i o n  as i t s  in s t ru m en t  o f  reform. A 1929 law c a l l e d  f o r  d i s t r i ­
bu t ion  to  l a n d le s s  peasan ts  o f  land e x p ro p r ia t e d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r ea so n s ,  
and a n o th e r  law o f  1934 provided f o r  th e  r e s e t t l e m e n t  o f  l a n d le s s  
peoples .  These laws account  f o r  th e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  an es t im a ted  
more than  one m i l l i o n  h e c t a r e s  o f  land dur ing  th e  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  
o f  the  Republ ic (Aktan, 1966).
From 1947 to  1962, t h e  government had d i s t r i b u t e d  an o th e r  1.8  
m i l l i o n  h e c ta re s  o f  land to  some 360,000 f a m i l i e s  (an average o f  12
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ac re s  per  family)  under  the  c o lo r  o f  a p iece  o f  paper  of  1945 l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  e n t i t l e d  the  "Law Making th e  Farmer a Landowner" (Atkan, 1966). 
That law e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  procedures  by which land was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  
th e  l a n d le s s  peasan t .  All o f  th e se  land reforms were minimized in 
t h e i r  e f f e c t ,  however, because c a d a s t r a l  surveys  f o r  land r e g i s t r a t i o n  
were inadequa te ;  v a r io u s  loca l  forms o f  land t e n u r e  p r a c t i c e  c o n t i n ­
ued on a cus tomary,  informal  b a s i s .  Excess ive  f ragm en ta t ion  of  prop­
e r t i e s  f u r t h e r  e x ace rb a te s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  surrounding land reform, 
because ,  perhaps as many as a t h i r d  o f  a l l  farms in  Turkey inc lude  
t h i r t e e n  o r  more s e p a r a t e  p l o t s  (Aktan, 1966).
I t  has been e s t im a te d  t h a t  in  excess  o f  h a l f  o r  t h e  4 ,000,000 
cases  t h a t  come be fo re  th e  c o u r t s  each y e a r  invo lve  problems emerging 
from th e  government 's  a t tem pts  a t  land reform under th e  C iv i l  Code 
and v a r io u s  l e g i s l a t i o n  (Aktan, 1966). Most o f  th e se  d i sp u te s  r e s u l t  
from th e  lack  o f  adequate  c a d a s t r a l  surveys and th e  inadequacey of  
th e  r e g i s t e r s  o f  t i t l e  (Aktan, 1966). On th e  one hand, th e  C iv i l  Code 
provides  t h a t  a r i g h t  in  immovable p ro p e r ty  i s  dependent  upon r e g i s ­
t r a t i o n ,  in d e f a u l t  o f  which, a bona f i d e  purchase r  f o r  va lue  may take  
th e  t i t l e  (A r ts .  633 and 910).  Opposi te  th e  coda! p r o v i s io n s ,  loca l  
p r a c t i c e  has encouraged a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in which many lands e i t h e r  
have no r e g i s t e r e d  t i t l e  or  i n a c c u ra c ie s  as  to  l o c a t i o n  and boundar ies .
Despi te  th e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  customary and r e l i g i o u s  law in l im i t e d  
in s ta n c e s  where th e  t e c h n ic a l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
to  en fo rce  th e  w i l l  o f  th e  so v e re ig n ,  I s lamic  law as r e l i g i o u s  law had 
been a lmost complete ly  e l im in a ted  from the  lega l  systems o f  Turkey and 
many o f  the  former I s lam ic  c o u n t r i e s  in f a v o r  of  a s e c u l a r ,  C i v i l i a n
178
code o f  laws.  What has been s a id  o f  Turkey could a l so  apply to  th e  
o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  th e  Middle East  t h a t  have imported th e  C iv i l  Law 
in an a t tem p t  to  s e c u l a r i z e  t h e i r  fo rm er ly  I s lam ic  law and to  modern­
i z e  t h e i r  lega l  systems so as to  f a c i l i t a t e  v a r ious  so c ia l  and econo­
mic reforms.  C i v i l i a n ,  code-based systems have a l so  been v o l u n t a r i l y  
rece ived  by Egypt,  I r a n ,  I r a q ,  and,  p a r t l y  through French c o lo n ia l  
r u l e ,  A lg e r i a ,  Morocco, and Tun is ia  (Anderson, 1958a; 1958b; 1959b; 
1963a; 1970; L iebesny,  1953).
Crea t ion  o f  a New S oc ie ty  on E x i s t in g  O b l iga t ion  Systems
The E th iop ian  Empire embraced a v a r i e t y  o f  d iv e r se  peo p le s ,  e s ­
p e c i a l l y  in  terms o f  language and r e l i g i o n .  From th e  1930s onward, 
i t  has been a primary o b j e c t i v e  o f  the  c e n t r a l  sovere ign  to  u n i fy  and 
modernize th e  cou n t ry .  Not having been su b je c te d  to  any co lo n ia l  
r u l e  by a European power, the  country  had not  i n v o l u n t a r i l y  rece ived  
any Western l ega l  system. P r i o r  to  1930, th e  only a u t h o r i t a t i v e  lega l  
document was the  Fetha Nagust , a com pi la t ion  o f  va r ious  laws taken 
from Moslem and o t h e r  so u rce s .  I t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  was very l im i t e d  in 
t h a t  most law remained lo ca l  and customary (Perham, 1969). This s i t ­
ua t io n  was e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  o f  land  t e n u r e ,  where the  law t h a t  app l ied  
depended upon p lace  and form o f  ownership, JL e_., i n d i v i d u a l ,  k indred ,  
o r  v i l l a g e  (N adel , 1946). In 1930, th e  Fetha Nagust was supplemented 
by a number o f  Imperial  E d ic ts  aimed a t  land reform, but  t h e s e  remained 
l a r g e l y  i n e f f e c t u a l .
In an e f f o r t  to  remedy th e  confused s t a t e  o f  t h e  law and to  pro­
v ide some un i fo rm i ty  in th e  lega l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  E th io p ia ,  th e  E th i ­
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opian C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  1955 e s t a b l i s h e d  a n a t io n a l  system o f  c o u r t s  
p a t te rn ed  a f t e r  th e  Common Law and c a l l e d  f o r  th e  r e ce p t io n  o f  c o d i ­
f i e d  laws based on th e  C iv i l  Law t r a d i t i o n  o f  modern codes .  (Mark- 
ak is  and Beyenne, 1967). By 1957, a number o f  lega l  codes p a t te rn ed  
a f t e r  European models had been d r a f t e d .  The E th iop ian  P ar l iam ent  
promulgated a C iv i l  Code in 1960 (David, 1967b). This  code was to  
o p e ra te  in a reas  o u t s i d e  of  th e  towns only t o  t h e  e x t e n t  loca l  admin­
i s t r a t i o n  a l lowed.  N e v e r th e le s s ,  E th iop ia  had a modern Civi l  Code, 
der ived  p r im a r i l y  from French sou rces .  Under the  new Code, personal  
laws were superceded by t h e  laws p e r t a i n in g  to  dom ic i le  (p la ce  o f  
r e s i d e n c e ) .
The new Civ i l  Code met n a t io n a l  requierements  f o r  lega l  u n i f i c a ­
t i o n ,  and accord ing  to  t h e  eminent s c h o la r  o f  comparat ive  law who 
d r a f t e d  th e  code,  Rene David, the  government 's  d e s i r e  was a l s o  s a t i s ­
f i e d  by r e c e iv in g  a C i v i l i a n  code-based body o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  law to  
c o u n te r a c t  Anglo-American in f lu e n c e  in th e  c o u n t r y ' s  a f f a i r s  (David,
- 1963). The code c o n s i s t e d  o f  3,367 a r t i c l e s ;  t h e  leng th  was thought
necessary  in  t h a t  the  l a c k  of  Western lega l  exper ience  r eq u i red  l e g ­
i s l a t i o n  to  d e t a i l .
As f o r  th e  r e l a t i o n  between custom and th e  C iv i l  Code, David
(1963, p. 193) exp la in ed :
While s a feg u a rd in g  c e r t a i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  va lues  to  which 
she remains profoundly  a t t a c h e d ,  E th iop ia  wishes to  
modify her  s t r u c t u r e  com ple te ly ,  even to  the  way o f  
l i f e  o f  he r  peop le .  Consequently ,  E th iop ians  do not  
expect  th e  new code to  be a work of  c o n s o l i d a t i o n ,  the  
methodical  and c l e a r  s ta tem en t  o f  a c tu a l  customary
r u l e s .  They wish i t  to  be a programme envisag ing  a
t o t a l  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  o f  s o c i e ty  and they  demand t h a t
f o r  th e  most p a r t ,  i t  s e t  out  new r u l e s  a p p r o p r i a t e
180
f o r  th e  s o c i e t y  they  wish to  c r e a t e .
Accordingly ,  th e  code ex p re s s ly  provides  t h a t  un le ss  o the rw ise  s t a t e d ,
a l l  p revious  r u le s  concerning m a t te r s  covered in th e  code were r e ­
pea led .  The major  excep t ion  to  th e  general  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  code
was in  th e  m a t t e r  o f  land te n u re .  I t  was l e g i s l a t i v e l y  provided t h a t  
u n t i l  adequate  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  land was accomplished,  customary 
law r e l a t i n g  to  a l i e n a t i o n  and l i m i t a t i o n s  on ownership were to  r e ­
main in f o rc e  ( S c h i l l e r ,  1969).
Custom surv ived  in o th e r  a rea s  o f  law as w e l l .  Sanct ioned  cus ­
toms, f o r  example, which were no t  c o n t r a ry  t o  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  and eco­
nomic p rogress  were allowed to  p e r s i s t  in th e  c e n t r a l  h ighlands  (Krzec- 
uzunowicz, 1963). A lso ,  customs was pe rm it ted  by express  in c o rp o ra t io n  
i n to  t h e  code,  e s p e c i a l l y  c e r t a i n  p o in t s  o f  personal  and family  law. 
There were a l s o  s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e s  to  custom in t h e  C iv i l  Code. For 
i n s t a n c e ,  loca l  custom was e x p l i c i t l y  de termined to  be th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  
law in m a t te r s  in v o lv ing  r i g h t s  o f  way, p r e d ia l  s e r v i t u d e s ,  and the  
communal e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  land;  a l s o ,  customary p r a c t i c e  p r e v a i l e d  
concerning t r a n s f e r s  o f  p rope r ty  r i g h t s  in  lands  no t  y e t  r e g i s t e r e d .  
Where the  code was s i l e n t ,  custom was th e  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  source  o f  law 
to  f i l l  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  lacunae .  F i n a l l y ,  the  c o u r t s  were commanded 
to  a s s ig n  customary meanings in the  process  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  th e  co d e ' s  
p ro v is io n s  (Krzecuzunowicz, 1965). In almost  every i n s t a n c e ,  however, 
custom su rv iv es  by v i r t u e  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  and only u n t i l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
addresses  th e  s u b je c t  covered by th e  custom.
The implementation o f  the  Civ i l  Code o f  E th iop ia  thus  r e p re s e n t s  
an in t ro d u c t io n  o f  Western lega l  p r i n c i p l e s  in  an e f f o r t  to  provide
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a minimal s e c u r i t y  in  lega l  r e l a t i o n s .  This o b j e c t  was accomplished 
through the  r e s u l t a n t  lega l  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  a country  p rev io u s ly  f r a g ­
mented by d iv e r se  customary laws.
Voluntary Receptions in the  Far East
Varying degrees  o f  v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n  o f  C iv i l  Law c h a r a c t e r i z e s  
a number o f  lega l  systems in  e a s t e r n  As ia .  Such r e c e p t io n s  were promp­
ted  by the  d e s i r e  f o r  land reform (T h a i l a n d ) ,  because o f  f o re ig n  i n f l u ­
ences ( Jap an ) ,  and because of  p o l i t i c a l  r e v o lu t io n  ( N a t i o n a l i s t  China) .  
Although th e  "W es te rn iza t ion"  of  th e  Thai lega l  system da tes  to  the  
Bowring T rea ty  of  1855, which r e s u l t e d  in r e o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  adminis­
t r a t i o n  o f  law and process  o f  n a t io n a l  u n i f i c a t i o n  of  law, the  much 
more im portan t  r e c e p t io n  o f  C iv i l  Law probably began with  land reforms 
in the  e a r ly  tw e n t i e th  c en tu ry .  The ac tua l  beginning  o f  modern land 
law in Thailand was a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a Land Reg­
i s t r a t i o n  O f f ic e  in 1901, which had the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
o f  land ownership, t h e  i s suance  o f  land t i t l e s ,  and the  c a d a s t r a l  s u r ­
vey of  s e l e c t e d  a r e a s .
During the  e a r l y  y ea r s  o f  t h i s  c e n tu r y ,  c o d i f i c a t i o n  commissions 
were s e t  up to  d r a f t  v a r ious  codes along French l i n e s .  The p r o j e t s  
o f  th e  severa l  prepared  codes g e n e ra l ly  gave e f f e c t  to  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
laws o f  Siam, e s p e c i a l l y  as they concerned land ten u re  and the  r e t e n t ­
ion o f  Is lam ic  law in  fam ily  m a t t e r s  among th e  Moslems o f  southern  
Tha iland (D a r l in g ,  1970).
In 1935, a C iv i l  and Commercial Code was promulgated with the  
s t a t e d  i n t e n t i o n  o f  r e p la c in g  the  p r e e x i s t i n g  laws and former code
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form ula t ions  with t h e i r  r e t e n t i o n  of  t r a d i t i o n a l  law f e a t u r e s .  This 
new code was d r a f t e d  on the  French C iv i l  Code model. I t s  p ro v is io n s  
were e s p e c i a l l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  land reform. Pub l ic  p o l i cy  sought  a 
land law t h a t  encouraged the  economic development of  r u r a l  land .  Af­
t e r  a l l ,  more than 75 pe rce n t  of  th e  popu la t ion  was engaged in some 
form o f  a g r i c u l t u r e .  In t h e  n o r th e a s t e r n  and sou thern  p o r t io n s  of  
the  c o u n t ry ,  most land was o w n e r -c u l t iv a te d .  In the  c e n t r a l  p l a i n s ,  
most land was farmed by cash o r  sha re  t e n a n t s ;  61 p e rcen t  o f  a l l  farm­
land in t h i s  c e n t r a l  reg ion  i s  c u l t i v a t e d  by f u l l  o r  p a r t - t i m e  t en an t  
fa rm ers .  These v a r io u s  forms o f  land t e n u re  p resen ted  d i f f e r e n t  legal  
problems a r i s i n g  ou t  o f  th e  occupat ion  and land use.  T r a d i t i o n a l  land 
law concepts  were found inadequa te  to  r e g u l a t e  th e  d i f f e r e n t  types  of 
land t en u re  t h a t  might r e s u l t  in a lega l  t i t l e  o f  a c tu a l  ownership.
Thus, th e  1936 C iv i l  and Commercial Code provided th e  process  f o r  a l i e n ­
a t i o n  and t r a n s f e r  of  r i g h t s  to  land .
P rov is ions  o f  t h e  1936 l e g i s l a t i o n  were rep laced  by a Land Code 
in 1954. The Land Code provided f o r  land a l lo tm e n t  f o r  th e  people ,  
th e  d e l i m i t a t i o n  of  r i g h t s  in l a n d ,  and c a d a s t r a l  survey.  The r e q u i r e ­
ments o f  th  Land Code as to  t i t l e  o f  ownership,  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  t i t l e ,  
and ac tu a l  survey were p a r t i c u l a r l y  im portan t  in view of  th e  i n c r e a s ­
ing f ragm enta t ion  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  land as a consequence o f  the  p rac ­
t i c e  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  in equal sh a re s .
The lega l  s i t u a t i o n  in China o f f e r s  a d i f f e r e n t  conc lus ion  con­
cern ing  the  vo lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n  of  the  Civ i l  Law. In T ha i land ,  the  
in c r e a s in g  C iv i l i a n  in f lu e n c e  has r e s u l t e d  in th e  complete rece p t io n  
of  a C iv i l  Law system. In China,  the  e a r ly  r e ce p t io n  o f  Romano-Ger-
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manic law proved a b o r t i v e .  From 1644 to  1911, a lega l  t r a d i t i o n  
b lending  indigenous  concepts  of  law and m o ra l i ty  developed and p re ­
v a i l e d  under Ch ' ing (Manchu) Dynasty. A f t e r  the  r e v o lu t io n  o f  1911, 
th e  new government s e t  about  to  d r a f t  a s e r i e s  of  codes modeled a f t e r  
th e  C iv i l  Codes o f  Germany and Japan.  Though b r i e f l y  involved with  
Romano-Germanic Civ i l  Law, China was only  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  and i n e f f e c t ­
u a l l y  in f luenced  by C i v i l i a n  leg a l  s c i e n c e ,  and t h a t  l a r g e l y  r e s t r i c t ­
ed to  th e  a rea  of  f o r e ig h  t r a d e  ( S c h le s in g e r ,  1970). Before th e  ad­
vent  o f  communism, C i v i l i a n  in f lu e n c e s  were no t  well  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
However, th e  Civi l  Code promulgated in 1929-1931, the  Code of  C iv i l  
Procedure of  1932, and th e  land Code o f  1930 surv ived  th e  fo rced  mi­
g ra t io n  to  Formosa to  form th e  b a s ic  law o f  t h e  Republ ic o f  China.
In a way, th e  C iv i l  Law went to  Taiwan as a Volk m ig ra t io n ,  bu t  th e  
i n t e n s i t y  and comple teness o f  th e  c o d i f i c a t i o n  was enhanced by the  
m i l i t a r y  c h a r a c t e r  of  th e  m ig ra t io n  exper ience .
Japan enjoyed a p a r t i a l  r e c e p t io n  o f  C iv i l  Law a f t e r  t h e  Meiji  
R e s to ra t io n  on 1868, which p reco n d i t io n e d  the  country  to  f u r t h e r  r e ­
cep t ion  by the  end o f  th e  n in e te e n th  ce n tu ry .  During th e  1880s, law 
s tu d e n ts  pursued s tu d i e s  o f  French and German Civi l  Law. Many of  
J a p a n ' s  lead ing  j u r i s t s  and law te a c h e r s  had rece ived  t h e i r  degrees  
from c o n t in e n ta l  European law schoo ls .  Under th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  the  
French j u r i s t ,  G. Boissonade,  a s e r i e s  of  d r a f t  codes had been pre ­
pared by 1872, along with  th e  1869 t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  the  v a r ious  French 
codes ,  These fo rce s  o f  i n f l u e n c e ,  lega l  educa t ion  and e a r l y  c o d i f i c a ­
t i o n  e f f o r t s ,  played a key r o l e  in th e  f i n a l  r e ce p t io n  o f  th e  Civ i l  
Law.
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In 1898, th e  Japanese  promulgated a Civ i l  Code based on t h a t  of  
Germany. In many r e s p e c t s ,  the  new code was an a d a p ta t io n  o f  Boisson-  
a d e ' s  code of  1891, though r e c a s t  in co n ten t s  b e t t e r  adapted to  J apa­
nese i n s t i t u t i o n s  of  family  law and s u cc e ss io n s .  The purpose of  the  
new Civ i l  Code was n o t  to  c r e a t e  a new lega l  system, but  to  r e v i s e  
an e x i s t i n g  one (Wigmore, 1928). The t r a d i t i o n a l  law was t h e r e f o r e  
l a r g e l y  r e s t a t e d  in th e  language and a f t e r  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  French and 
German Civ i l  Law.
SUMMARY
Viewing th e  whole c u l t u r e  h i s t o r y  o f  the  C iv i l  Law, d i f f u s i o n  
occurred  through m ig ra t io n ,  in v o lu n ta ry  r ec e p t io n  as a consequence of  
conquest o r  c o l o n i z a t i o n ,  o r  v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n  on e i t h e r  a l a r g e -  
s c a l e  o r  an e c l e c t i c  b a s i s .  Volk-m ig ra t io n  d i f f u s e d  C iv i l  Law as a 
r e s u l t  o f  th e  imperia l  expansion o f  a C i v i l i a n  power. In vo lun ta ry  r e ­
cep t io n  was u s u a l ly  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s  by C i v i l ­
ian powers,  with subsequent  c i v i l  c o l o n i z a t i o n .  The French system o f  
" d i r e c t  r u l e , "  f o r  example, s t r o n g ly  a s s e r t e d  the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  
P a r i s i a n  imperium, an i n t e g r a l  a sp e c t  o f  French co lo n ia l  p o l i c y .  Like­
wise ,  Portuguese and Spanish co lo n ie s  were u s u a l ly  t r e a t e d  as i n t e g r a l  
p a r t s  o f  m e t ro p o l i t an  Portugal and Spain ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The in f lu e n c e  
o f  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  a t t i t u d e s  toward l e g i s l a t i o n  and the  C i v i l i a n  con­
cep t io n  o f  th e  code as  a model f o r  the  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  c i v i l  s o c i e ty  
made r e c e p t io n  com para t ive ly  easy ,  even ac ro ss  severe  c u l t u r a l  and 
l i n g u i s t i c  b a r r i e r s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  vo lun ta ry  r e ce p t io n  was encouraged by 
the  r e l a t i v e  ease  by which a c o d i f ie d  lega l  system can be t r a n s p l a n t e d
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to  a r e c i p i e n t  coun t ry  and g ran ted  i t s  le g i t im a cy  as t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
w i l l  o f  th e  so v e re ig n .  The former c o lo n ia l  possess ions  of  the  sev ­
e ra l  C iv i l  Law c o u n t r i e s  o f  Europe have g e n e r a l l y  r e t a i n e d  the  law 
and lega l  systems o f  t h e i r  c o lo n ia l  m i s t r e s s e s ,  excep t  those  t h a t  
f e l l  under  Communist r u l e  upon independence.
CHAPTER V
CULTURE HISTORY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS BASED ON HUMAN DESIGN:
SOVIET CIVIL LAW
The realm o f  S o v ie t  Law came in to  e x i s t e n c e  with  the  October Rev­
o lu t io n  of  1917. S h o r t l y ,  t h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  newly formed S o v ie t  Union 
assumed both th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  th e  former  Russian Empire and, in  many 
r e s p e c t s ,  th e  forms o f  t h e  prev ious  Russian C iv i l  Law system. The 
e a r l i e r  Russian lega l  system, o f  c o u r se ,  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  modified 
to se rve  M a r x i s t - L e n in i s t  ideo logy .  Although many o f  th e  law forms 
were c i v i l i a n  in  o r i g i n ,  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  law r u le s  was s o c i a l i s t .
A f t e r  World War I I ,  the  S o v ie t  Law o r b i t  was extended to  inc lude  
the  newly e s t a b l i s h e d  S o v ie t  " s a t e l l i t e  c o u n t r i e s "  in Eas te rn  and 
Sou theas te rn  Europe. In more r e c en t  y e a r s ,  S o v ie t  Law has been r e ­
ceived  in  Cuba, p a r t s  o f  former French and Portuguese A f r i c a ,  and the  
former  French Indochina .
D if fus ion  o f  S o v ie t  Law i s  p r im a r i l y  th e  r e s u l t  of  l a r g e - s c a l e ,  
in v o lu n ta ry  r e c e p t io n  prompted by e f f o r t s  a t  u n i f i c a t i o n  o r  " S o v ie t i z -  
a t io n "  o f  "p eo p le s '  democracies"  and of  v o lu n ta ry  r e ce p t io n  motivated  
by express ion  o f  g e o p o l i t i c a l  a lignment  due to  common id e o lo g ic a l  com­
mitment.  "Law has become a key weapon in th e  S o v ie t  a r sena l  with which 
th e  Communists o f  th e  U. S. S. R. hope to  i n f lu e n c e  the  f u r t u r e  of  
the  world" (Hazard, 1964). Accordingly ,  the  European s a t e l l i t e  c o u n t r i e s  
were made to  submit  to  th e  a b s o lu te  d i c t a t e s  of  th e  S t a l i n i s t  regime 
and to  conform t h e i r  l e g a l  systems to  uniform p a t t e r n s  (S lapn icka ,
1963). Even though th e  le g a l  systems of  the  peop les '  democracies  of
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e a s t e rn  and s o u th e a s te r n  Europe r e f l e c t  th e  f o r c e  o f  S o v ie t  i n f l u ­
ence and o f  communist ideo logy ,  they r e t a i n  much o f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
C i v i l i a n  code s t r u c t u r e  and techn iques  of  the  pre-Communist systems.
I t  should be remembered, however,  t h a t  a C i v i l i a n  tech n iq u e  used in 
a Sov ie t  lega l  system f r e q u e n t ly  undergoes a s u b t l e  change o f  pur­
pose. N e v e r th e le s s ,  a lawyer t r a i n e d  in th e  Civ i l  Law may d i s a g re e  
with  the  ideology t h a t  permeates the  t e x t ,  in l i e u  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  Nat­
ura l Law, o r  with  th e  implementation o f  th e se  codes ,  but  t h e i r  s t r u c ­
t u r e ,  te rm ino logy ,  and techn ique  w i l l  be reasonably  f a m i l i a r  to  him 
(S c h le s in g e r ,  1970, p. 267).  The S o v ie t  law systems have a "grammar" 
i n s p i r e d  by the  C i v i l i a n  systems,  bu t  a r e  d i s t i n c t i v e  in t h a t  they 
have been imbued with  th e  S o v ie t  ideology of  so c ia l i s m  (Hazard, 1968). 
S i m i l a r l y ,  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i a l i s t s  in  A s ia ,  A f r i c a ,  and La t in  America 
have accepted  th e  S o v ie t  lega l  model to  emphasize t h e i r  g e o p o l i t i c a l  
a l ignment w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union and th e  ideology t h a t  i t  r e p re s e n t s  
(Hazard, 1964; Hazard, 1968).
In a n eg a t iv e  way, th e  ex per ience  o f  Communist China evidences  
t h i s  t r e n d .  When China became a p e o p le ' s  r e p u b l ic  on October 1, 1949, 
i t s  r u l e r s  embraced t h e  M a rx i s t -L e n i s t  ideo logy .  Unti l  1957, China 
appeared to  be p a t t e r n i n g  i t s  lega l  system a f t e r  the  S o v ie t  model. At 
t h a t  t im e ,  however,  Chinese communists t e rm ina ted  the  work o f  t h e i r  
c o d i f i c a t i o n  commission and r e j e c t e d  the  Sov ie t  ideas  o f  s o c i a l i s t  
l e g a l i t y  and humanis t ic  so c ia l i s m  as c o n t r a ry  to  th e  Chinese i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  o f  t r u e  Marxis t  d o c t r i n e .  Judges were then subord ina ted  to  the  
loca l  s o v i e t s ,  r a t h e r  than to  the  p o s i t i v e  law. Decis ions  were t h e r e ­
by made on the  b a s i s  o f  expediency in s t e a d  of  l e g i s l a t e d  p r i n c i p l e s .
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This  i s  compatib le  with  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  Chinese concepts  o f  c o n c i l i ­
a t i o n  and lack  o f  r i g i d i t y  in law (Voegel in ,  1940; Voegelin ,  1974).
The p r e s e n t  lega l  regime in China i s  to  t h i s  e x t e n t  not  a d e p a r tu re  
from th e  p a s t  but  r a t h e r  a c o n t in u a t io n  of  e a r l i e r  lega l  t r a d i t i o n s  
(Marina, 1975).
Except f o r  some lo c a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  r e c e p t io n  of  S o v ie t  Law i s  
a lmost  always complete .  Only where the  id e o lo g ic a l  commitment i s  
weak o r  only the  r e s u l t  o f  s h o r t  term ex p ress io n  o f  g e o p o l i t i c a l  a -  
l ignment ,  o r  where t h e r e  remain p l a u s i b l e  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  f o r c e ,  w i l l  
r e c e p t io n  not  be complete .  E f f e c t i v e  r e c ep t io n  o f  the S o v ie t  lega l  
model evidences  no t  only  the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  S o v ie t  Law through complete 
r e c e p t i o n ,  but  a l so  t h e  ex ten s io n  abroad o f  S o v ie t  p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e ,  
o r  domination (hegemony) No s t a t e  t h a t  has taken th e  Sov ie t  model 
f a i l s  in unswerving suppor t  o f  S o v ie t  fo re ig n  p o l i c y .
Invo lun ta ry  Receptions
The g r e a t e s t  expansions o f  S o v ie t  Law occurred  as a consequence 
o f  e i t h e r  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  fo rm er ly  C z a r i s t  empire ,  in which S o v ie t -  
s o c i a l i s t  law was in t roduced  in to  c e n t r a l  A s ia ,  o r  s o v i e t i z a t i o n  of  
the  p e o p le ' s  democracies  of  e a s t e r n  Europe. All o f  th e se  in v o lu n ta ry  
r e c e p t io n s  r e s u l t e d  from t e r r i t o r i a l  march of  Sov ie t  empire through 
conques t .  In 1920, t h e  S ov ie ts  extended t h e i r  domination over  the  
fo re ig n  peoples o f  Caucasus and th e  Ukraine . The S o v ie t  conquest  of  
the  "Far  Eas te rn  Republic"  and o f  Turkes tan  occurred  in 1922; and So­
v i e t  in f lu e n c e  in Outer  Mongolia in 1924. In 1940, t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s  
f e l l  to  the  S o v ie t  Russ ians ;  and by 1945, p a r t s  o f  Germany, Poland,
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F in lan d ,  as wel l  as much o f  e a s t e rn  and so u th e a s te rn  Europe were 
added to  th e  S o v ie t  " o u te r  empire ."  With p o l i t i c a l  expans ion ,  S o v ie t  
law extended i t s  f r o n t i e r s .  A f te r  a l l ,  law was cons ide red  an i n s t r u ­
ment to  d e c i p l i n e  new s o c i e t i e s ;  an ins t rum ent  o f  the  "con t inu ing  
r e v o lu t io n "  by en fo rc in g  th e  aims o f  Marxis t-Leninism and suppress ing  
the  old  o rd e r .
S o v i e t - s o c i a l i s t  law in  c e n t r a l  Asia was both a means and a r e ­
s u l t  o f  the  s u b je c t io n  o f  p a r t  of  th e  Is lam ic  realm to  S o v ie t  Russian 
r u l e .  This  a rea  included th e  Moslem S. S. R. of  Turkmenistan,  Uzbek­
i s t a n ,  T a d z h ik i s t a n ,  K i r g iz iy a ,  and Kazakhstan, as well  as Mongolia.
The p r e -S o v ie t  Moslem s o c i e ty  was p a t r i a r c h a l  in c h a r a c t e r .  S e t ­
t l e d  p o p u la t io n s  g e n e r a l ly  followed Is lam ic  law, which nomadic peoples  
adhered to  customary law p r i n c i p a l l y  de r ived  from the  t e n e t s  of  the  
I s lam ic  j u r a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Islam was proclaimed by the  S o v ie t  power to  
be an " in s t rum en t  in th e  hands o f  th e  e x p l o i t i n g  c l a s s e s . "  Thus, the  
S o v ie t s  e f f e c t e d  a fo rced  u n i f i c a t i o n  of  laws th rough t  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of  S o v ie t  l e g i s l a t i o n  using the  medium of  comprehensive codes .  Is lam ic  
law, t h e  S h a r i ' a t ,  which r e g u la te d  th e  p r i v a t e  l i v e s  of  Moslems, was 
a b o l i s h e ,  t o g e t h e r  with  r e l i g i o u s  t r i b u n a l s  and o th e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  supported  I s lamic  l i f e .  The Sov ie ts  a l s o  e l im ina ted  th e  t r a d i t i o n ­
al c o u r t  s t r u c t u r e s  p re v io u s ly  recognized under the  C z a r i s t  " c o lo n ia l "  
approach o f  dual lega l  c u l t u r e s .  Some s u r v i v a l s  of  Is lamic  and custom­
ary  law were allowed f o r  a b r i e f  t ime.  For example, I s lamic  c o u r t s  
were no t  a c t u a l l y  a b o l i sh e d ,  bu t  s e v e r ly  l i m i t e d ,  in Turkestan  u n t i l  
the  l a t e  1920s. Customary law was a l s o  l a r g e l y  e l im in a te d  th ro u g h t  the  
f o r c i b l e  denomadizat ion o f  the  Kazakhs, which reduced t h e i r  number by
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more than a t h i r d .  A f t e r  World War I I ,  S t a l i n ' s  p o l i c i e s  of  d e p o r t ­
ing from the  Caucasus th e  Kalmyks, Crimean T a r t a r s ,  and o th e r  Moslem 
peoples  had the  same e f f e c t .
The in v o lu n ta ry  r ec e p t io n  of  S o v ie t  Law in c e n t r a l  Asia was p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  s t ro n g  in  th e  s u b je c t  a reas  o f  land and w a te r  reforms.  The 
core  of  Marxis t  ideology i s  s t a t e  ownership o f  th e  means o f  p roduc t ion .  
T h e re fo re ,  th e  i n h e r e n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  p ro p e r ty  law i s  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  of  
S o v ie t  s u b s t a n t i v e  law. In 1917, Lenin sought th e  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  of  
p rope r ty  belonging to  l a n d lo rd s  only ;  Peasant  p l o t s  were a llowed.
Then, in 1918, landownership was denied th e  p e a s a n t s .  The p r i n c i p l e  
o f  s t a t e  ownership was extended to  the  Mongolian P e o p le ' s  Republ ic in 
1924.
Outer  Mongolia was th e  f i r s t  a rea  under  Sov ie t  dominance beyond 
th e  bounds o f  th e  o ld  Russian empire.  Since i t s  formation  as  a peo­
p l e ' s  r e p u b l i c  on Ju ly  11, 1921, t h i s  former  p a r t  o f  China followed 
the  S o v ie t  p a t t e r n  o f  law and p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n iz a t io n .  The presence 
o f  S o v ie t  Russian leg a l  a d v i s e r s  a ssu red  th e  success fu l  r e c e p t io n  of  
the  S o v ie t  lega l  model.  The Sov ie t  formula o f  s t a t e  ownership and 
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  use in p e r p e t u i ty  to  herdsmen f o r  t h e i r  p r i v a t e l y  owned 
herds o f  c a t t l e  became th e  p r e v a i l i n g  po l icy  in Outer  Mongolia.
In c e n t r a l  A s ia ,  t h e  Sov ie ts  e f f e c t e d  a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  plowing 
r i g h t s  and the  c o n f i s c a t i o n  o f  c a t t l e .  In U sbek is tan ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
laws in t roduced  in 1925 l im i t e d  landho ld ings  to  a maximum o f  40 hec­
t a r e s  (98 .8  a c r e s )  in i r r i g a t e d  d i s t r i c t s .  In the  1930s land and wa­
t e r  r i g h t s  were removed from lan d lo rd s  and ku laks ,  with the  r e s u l t i n g  
d isappearance  of  in d iv id u a l  i n i t i a t i v e .
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Another  t re n d  induced by S o v ie t  law and p o l i t i c a l  i n f lu e n c e  was 
t h a t  of  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  lan d s .  The Sov ie ts  claimed 
t i t l e  to  a l l  lands  and a l l o c a t e d  them to  i n d iv id u a l s  and the  kolkhozes 
in perpe tua l  use.  P r i o r i t y  in a l l o c a t i o n  o f  lands  was given to  peas­
a n t s  organized  in c o o p e r a t iv e s .  In 1929, the  p o l ic y  of  fo rced  c o l l e c t ­
i v i z a t i o n  o f  farms was en fo rced .  The p e r p e tu a l -u s e  farms were i n h e r ­
i t e d  lands  placed in th e  p ossess ion  of  an extended fam ily .  They could 
not  be a l i e n a t e d  and have p e r s i s t e d  to  th e  p r e s e n t .  However, in c e r ­
t a i n  i n s ta n c e s  t h i s  process  tended to  p re se rv e  t h e  e f f e c t  of  Is lamic  
and customary law r a t h e r  than  ach ieve  i t s  a b ro g a t io n .  The co n t inu ing  
in f lu e n c e  o f  Islam i s  roo ted  in th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  law o f  family  l i f e .  
Although r e l i g i o n  was suppressed  and many r e l i g i o u s  p r a c t i c e s  p e r se ­
c u te d ,  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e s ,  known as rodovy ko lkhoz , 
based on k insh ip  tended to  p re se rv e  l in e a g e  and c lan  groups which r e ­
t a in e d  t r a d i t i o n a l  famil customary law.
The " S o c i a l i s t  c u l t u r a l  t r a n s fo rm a t io n "  was in l a r g e  p a r t  due to  
th  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  the  o l d e r  feudal  bey and the  d i f f u s i o n  of  a new s t a ­
tu s  c o n d i t i o n ,  t h a t  o f  th e  Kolkhoz. S o v ie t  law de f in ed  th e  Kolkhoz as  
th e  b a s ic  lega l  u n i t  in p lace  of  the  fam ily .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h i s  c o l l e c t ­
i v i z a t i o n  p a r t i c i p a t e d  with  the  e x te n t io n  o f  Russian s o c i e ty  to  e th n ic s  
by se rv ing  as the  b a s i s  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the  S o v ie t  codes designed to  
e r a d i c a t e  u n d e s i r a b le  n a t io n a l  t r a i t s  t h a t  r e t a r t e d  th e  fo rmat ion  of  
th e  new s o c i a l i s t  man. Like the  a r c h a ic  s e r f s ,  th e  member of  a kolkhoz 
"belongs" to  th e  land .  The u l t im a te  success  of  th e  kolkhoz has r e s t e d  
on the  maintenance o f  a g r a r i a n  c a p i t a l i s m ,  which se rv es  as a major  p re ­
co n d i t io n  f o r  the  su rv iv a l  of  Sov ie t  s o c ia l i s m .  Thus, " p r iv a t e  farming"
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by peasan ts  o f  p l o t s  r e s t r i c t e d  by l e g i s l a t i o n  to  between .25 and .5 
h e c ta r e s  (0 .6  to  1.3 a c r e s )  a r e  the  most p ro d u c t iv e  s e c t o r  (Possony,
1974, pp. 221-23).  Although compris ing l e s s  than 5 per  cen t  o f  the  
t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  ac re ag e ,  th e se  " p r i v a t e  p l o t s "  w i th in  th e  kolkhoz 
produce 21 p e rcen t  o f  th e  wool,  39 p e rce n t  o f  th e  v e g e t a b l e s ,  60 p e r ­
c en t  of  th e  p o t a to e s ,  74 p e rcen t  o f  th e  eggs. F u r th e r ,  th e se  peasan ts  
m ain ta in  41% o f  t h e  cows, produce 43 p e rce n t  of  th e  milk and provide  
42 pe rcen t  o f  the  Sov ie t  meat;  th en ,  thus  prov ide  n ea r ly  two t h i r d s  
o f  the  t o t a l  p r o te in  o f  th e  Sov ie t  d i e t  (Possony,  1974, p. 224) .
The p a t t e r n  o f  land use in c e n t r a l  Asia was not  repea ted  in e a s t ­
ern Europe. There ,  e x te n s iv e  c o d i f i c a t i o n  was e f f e c t e d  a f t e r  the  Com­
munists  came to  power in Poland, Czechoslovakia ,  Yugoslavia ,  and e l s e ­
where. This c o d i f i c a t i o n  was aimed a t  the  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  law on a 
n a t io n a l  s c a l e  a f t e r  th e  Sov ie t  model. The movement had dec ided r e ­
s u l t s  concerning th e  m a t t e r  o f  land use .  G e n e ra l ly ,  only l a r g e  e s t a t e s  
were n a t i o n a l i z e d ,  with  peasan t  hold ings  remaining exempt. The Yugo­
s l a v s ,  f o r  example, d e c la re d  t h a t  " land belongs to  those  who c u l t i v a t e  
i t "  (Hazard, 1968). I n d iv id u a l s  could  r e t a i n  25 to  35 h e c ta re s  (61.7  
to  86.4 a c r e s ;  Hazard, 1968). This a l l o c a t i o n  was reduced to  10 hec­
t a r e s ,  in 1953, on lands  de r ived  from th e  p u b l ic  domain. By law in 
1957, land use rs  were r eq u i red  to  c u l t i v a t e  t h e i r  land in  th e  same manner 
as o t h e r  lands  in the  general a r e a .  C u l t i v a b le  land no t  t i l l e d  w i th in  
one y e a r  o f  th  l a s t  h a r v e s t  was to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  to  o th e r  f a rm ers ,  
with  "co o p e ra t iv es"  being g ivern  p r i o r i t y .  In 1959, every land use r  
was commanded to  use h i s  land f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  purposes in accordance 
with  an approved p lan .  F a i lu r e  to  comply r e s u l t e d  in f o r f e i t u r e  of
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a l lo tm e n t .
The s i t u a t i o n  in Poland was s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of  Yugoslavia .  In 
1944, a l i m i t  on p r i v a t e  hold ings  was s e t  a t  50 h e c ta r e s  (123.5 a c re s )  
in f e r t i l e  lands  in c e n t r a l  and e a s t e r n  Poland,  and 100 h e c ta re s  in 
l e s s  f e r t i l e  wes tern  p a r t s  o f  the  coun t ry .  All su rp lu s  lands  " r e v e r t ­
ed" to  th e  s t a t e .  Emphasis was placed on i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p roduct ion  r a t h e r  than th e  c o l l e c t i v i s t i c  c o o p e r a t iv e s .  By 1961, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  th e  t o t a l  a r e a  under c u l t i v a t i o n  by in d iv id u a l s  accounted 
f o r  86.8 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  land and n ea r ly  90 pe rcen t  of  the  t o t a l  pro­
d uc t ion  (Hazard, 1968). In o rd e r  t o  p reven t  th e  f ragm enta t ion  of  
fa rmland,  in 1964 a l e g i s l a t i v e  requ irem ent  d i c t a t e d  a minimum l i m i t  
to  the  s i z e  o f  farms d i s t r i b u t e d  in success ions  such t h a t  th e  r e s u l t ­
ing land was not  to  be l e s s  than  2 h e c ta r e s  in sou thern  Poland, 3 hec­
t a r e s  in c e n t r a l  Poland,  and 4 o r  4 h e c ta r e s  e lsewhere .  Beyond t h a t ,  
h e i r s  had to  q u a l i f y  as exper ienced fanners  according  to  the  Civi l  
code (1964, A r t s .  160-167).
In Rumania by c o n t r a s t ,  th e  s t a t e  ap p ro p r i a t e d  a l l  land and r e ­
a l l o c a t e d  i t  to  th o se  who a c t u a l l y  t i l l e d  the  l a n d ,  with  ownership 
o f te n  ves ted  in a c o o p e ra t iv e .  Peasan ts  were g e n e r a l ly  exempted from 
t h i s  a p p r o p r i a t i o n ,  bu t  were fo rced  in to  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  a process  
completed by 1958. In East  Germany, peasan t  land remained p r i v a t e .
From 1952 to  1960, peasan ts  were brought under c o o p e r a t iv e s ,  but  i n ­
d iv id u a l s  r e t a i n e d  ownership o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p l o t s .  "On complet ion 
of  th e  land reform th e  peasan ts  a r e  guaranteed  the  p r i v a t e  ownership 
of  t h e i r  land" ( C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  th e  German Democratic Republ ic ,  A r t i ­
c l e  24, as quoted in Hazard, 1968).
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Voluntary Receptions
To term th e  r e c e p t io n  of  Sov ie t  Law in any in s t a n c e  "vo lun ta ry"  
i s  to  s t r a i n  t h a t  labored  term. The r e ce p t io n  of Sov ie t  Law in a l l  
a reas  has and does invo lve  a t o t a l i t a r i a n  d i c t a t o r s h i p  t h a t  imposes 
t h a t  law on the  land by b ru te  f o r c e .  I t  i s ,  n o n e th e l e s s ,  customary 
to  d e s ig n a te  i t  "vo lun ta ry"  i n s o f a r  as no fo re ig n  power imposed i t .  
Voluntary r e c e p t io n  o f  S o v ie t  Law i s  u s u a l ly  a consequence o f  geo­
p o l i t i c a l  a l ignm en t ,  as  in Cuba and Vietnam, o r  id e o lo g ic a l  committ­
ment,  as in Mali,  Senega l ,  and Guinea.
In Mali ,  independent  s in c e  1960, i t  was th e  s t a t e d  i n t e n t  of  the  
government " to  o rg an ize  t h e  c o n d i t io n s  necessa ry  to  th e  harmonious 
ev o lu t io n  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  and the  family  w i th in  th e  bosom o f  modern 
s o c i e ty  and with  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  A fr ican  p e r s o n a l i t y "  (Hazard, 1967).
To r e a l i z e  t h i s  g o a l ,  Mali tu rned  to  th e  S o v ie t  model and rece ived  the  
Sov ie t  Law and r e l a t e d  l ega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Again, law r e l a t i n g  to  land 
formed the  b a s i s  f o r  s o c i a l i s t  reform. By decree  of  a c q u i s i t i o n  and 
r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  a l l  customary lands  became the  p rope r ty  o f  th e  s t a t e .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  a l l  abandoned lan d ,  even though p roper ly  r e g i s t e r e d  r e v e r t e d  
to  th e  s t a t e .  Fur thermore,  a l l  subso i l  (m inera l )  r i g h t s  belonged to 
the  s t a t e .  In the  1960s, programs were i n i t i a t e d  to  encourage the  form­
a t i o n  of c o o p e r a t iv e s .  In 1966, i t  was d ec la re d  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  land 
must be t r a n s f e r r e d  from a rc h a ic  in d iv id u a l  and family  p roduct ion  to  
l a r g e  c o l l e c t i v e  farms. The C iv i l  Code cont inued as i t  had been r e c e i v ­
ed from France,  with some m o d i f ic a t io n s  as to  family  law. Thus, th e  land 
laws o f  France were s t i l l  a p p l i e d ,  but the  l i g h t  of  Sov ie t  s o c i a l i s t  
p r i n c i p l e s .  C o l l e c t i v e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  were t r e a t e d  as in d iv id u a l s
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under  th e  code. The r e s u l t  was a cu r ious  blend o f  French C iv i l  Law 
with  Sov ie t  lega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and s o c i a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c y .  The 
s t y l e  o f  procedure remained e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  of  France.  As in  most 
o t h e r  S o v ie t  c o u n t r i e s ,  a formerly  C i v i l i a n  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  has been 
remolded to  ach ieve  th e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  a Sov ie t  s o c i e ty .
SUMMARY
Taken as a whole,  th e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  S o v ie t  Law i s  a lmost always 
complete .  Only where the  id e o lo g ic a l  commitment i s  weak o r  only  the  
r e s u l t  o f  s h o r t  term e x p ress io n  o f  g e o p o l i t i c a l  a l ignm en t ,  o r  where 
t h e r e  remains p l a u s i b l e  c o u n t e r v a i l in g  f o r c e ,  w i l l  the  r e ce p t io n  not 
be comple te .  E f f e c t i v e  r ec e p t io n  of  t h e  Sov ie t  lega l  model evidences  
no t  only th e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  Sov ie t  Law through complete r e c e p t i o n ,  but  
a l s o  t h e  ex tens ion  o f  S o v ie t  p o l i t i c a l  i n f lu e n c e  abroad.
CHAPTER VI
CULTURAL PREADAPTATION AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
Having reviewed th e  spread of  laws around the  w or ld ,  we can r e ­
c a p i t u l a t e  the  general  shape o f  t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s id e ra t i o n  by de­
l i n e a t i n g  c e r t a i n  genera l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  g eo ju r i sp ru d e n ce .  I d e a l l y ,  
th e se  general  p r i n c i p l e s  should  accord with  th e  f in d in g s  o f  a t  l e a s t  
some o t h e r  s tu d i e s  so t h a t  an i n c r e a s in g ly  comprehensive view of  man- 
land r e l a t i o n s  can e v e n tu a l ly  emerge. S im u l tan eo u s ly , where they  a re  
reasonably  c l e a r ,  we sh a l l  not shy away from normative s ta tem en ts  
t h a t  seem to  a t  l e a s t  some rea sonab le  men to be supported  by f a c tu a l  
m a te r ia l  ga thered  here .
Lawfulness and Geojur isprudence  
When any s c i e n t i f i c  endeavor d isc o v e rs  a r e g u l a r i t y  in p a t t e r n ,  
p l a c e ,  o r  p ro cess ,  we w i l l i n g l y  e n t e r t a i n  d i s c u s s io n  o f  p o s s ib le  
"laws" - -  in th e  sense  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  laws. We a r e  not  c o n te n t ,  how­
ev e r ,  with r e g u l a r i t i e s  a lone ;  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  no proof  of  
any th ing .  We must i n s i s t ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  some f u r t h e r  c o n d i t io n s  be 
met be fo re  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  a casual  r e l a t i o n  e x i s t s  behind the  r e g u l a r ­
i t i e s ,  behind th e  c o r r e l a t i o n s .  One means o f  a s su r in g  us t h a t  a c a s ­
ual r e l a t i o n s h i p  has been found i s  to  p r e se n t  a mechanism (p rocess )  by 
which one element  of  the  r e g u l a r i t y  r e l a t e s  to  the  o th e r  element.  Once 
i d e n t i f i e d ,  th e  process  must work ( t h a t  i s ,  have demonstrable  e f f e c t )  
in a l l  co n te x t s  where i t s  co n d i t io n s  a re  met.  For t h e  geographer ,  
t h i s  t e s t  takes  the  form: Where C, t h e r e  E; t h a t  i s ,  where we f in d  the
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supposed cause ,  t h e r e  we must f in d  th e  expected e f f e c t ,  provided 
t h a t  the  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  the  cause inc ludes  a s ta tem en t  o f  the  pro­
cess  by which the  cause b r ings  about  th e  e f f e c t .
I f  th e  primary,  a c t i v e  elements  p o s tu l a t e d  in a th e o ry ,  no mat­
t e r  what the  o r ig i n  o f  the  idea of  th e se  elements  (Popper,  1928, pp. 
131-41),  do in f a c t  r e c u r  as expected accord ing  to  th e  process  t h a t  
i s  coupled with  the  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  the  e lem ents ,  then we have to  
g ive  t h a t  theory  a t t e n t i v e  c o n s id e ra t i o n .  C e r t a i n l y ,  we would avoid 
the  p o s i t i v i s t  p i t f a l l  of presuming t h a t  even a p e r f e c t  c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o n s t i t u t e s  "proof" in  the  sense  of  g iv ing  us p o s i t i v e  knowledge 
(Popper,  1928). Lacking competent "d isconf i rm ing"  t e s t s ,  however, 
r easonab le  men may form a presumption in f a v o r  o f  the  a s - y e t - n o t -  
d isconf irmed th eo ry .
We c e r t a i n l y  a l s o  recogn ized ,  t h a t ,  in g eo ju r i sp ru d en ce  and c u l ­
t u r e  h i s t o r y ,  no l e s s  than p h y s ic s ,  any one law o p e ra te s  in con junc t ion  
with  o th e r s  (Popper,  1957, pp. 131-32; Newton and Pul 1iam-DiNapoli , 
1977, pp. 366-68).  Any law o r  l a w - l ik e  s ta tem en t  may have g r e a t e r  or  
l e s s  e f f e c t ,  depending upon whether i t  i s  supplemented or  opposed by 
processes  desc r ib ed  under o th e r  laws.  In o th e r  words, severa l  cause-  
p r o c e s s - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s  may impinge in d i f f e r e n t  degrees upon d i f ­
f e r e n t  p lac e s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  when dea l in g  with  elements of  c u l t u r a l  geo­
graphy,  invo lv ing  q u i t e  o f te n  b e l i e f s  o f  v a r i a b l e  i n t e n s i t y  and p u r i ­
t y ,  the  g r e a t e s t  ca re  must be given to  t r a c i n g  p ro ce ss ,  because i t  i s  
upon t h a t  mechanism t h a t  th e  t r u t h  of  any p o s tu la t e d  connect ion  ( i n ­
f luence)  depends. Despi te  the  p o s s ib le  involvement of y e t  unknown 
casual f a c t o r s  and as long as the  p o s tu l a t e d  c a u s e - p r o c e s s - r e l a t i o n
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r e cu r  in each (or  n e a r ly  a l l )  p lace  where i t  i s  p r e d i c t e d ,  we w i l l  
a ccep t  the  p o s tu l a t e d  r e l a t i o n  u n t i l  some new account  uncovers o t h e r ,  
more c r i t i c a l  casual  r e l a t i o n s .
In a d i f f e r e n t  mood, th e se  c a u s e - p r o c e s s - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
a re  c a l l e d  " t e r r e s t r i a l  l o c a l i z a t i o n "  (Sauer ,  1941) and, f o r  our  spec­
i a l  purpose,  " the  impress o f  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y "  (W h i t t l e s ey ,  1935).
For th e  geographer ,  one importan t  t a sk  s h a l l  always be to  account  f o r  
why th in g s  a re  where they a re  in the  world ,  th e  p r o j e c t  o f  account ing  
f o r  a rea l  a s s o c i a t i o n  (Sauer ,  1925). S im ul taneously ,  but  s e c o n d a r i ­
l y ,  t h e r e  may r e s u l t  as well  an account  o f  a re a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
(H ar tshorne ,  1939), an ex p lan a t io n  of  why some p laces  a re  d i f f e r e n t  
from o t h e r s .  I t  i s  t h e  c a u s e - p r o c e s s - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n  t h a t  i s  i d e n t i ­
f i e d  and t r a c e d  in t h e  e f f o r t  to  d e s c r ib e  a rea l  a s s o c i a t i o n  t h a t  nec­
e s s a r i l y  a l so  produces  an a rea l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s  o f  th e  e a r t h  in to  two camps, one of  Human 
Action and one of  Human Design, a ro se  in f a c t  in th e  world on account 
of  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  two fundamental ly  opposed views o f  what c o n s t i t u ­
ted  the  " t ru e  o rder"  o f  man's world.  The a rea l  a s s o c i a t i o n  of  v a r i ­
ous phenomena with  Human A c t ion ,  whi le  o th e r s  a s s o c i a t e  in a re a s  of  
Human Design i s  what a c t u a l l y  cause the  secondary ,  d e r i v a t i v e  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n .  This  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  t r a n s p i r e d  dur ing  th e  ex tens ion  of  
the  i n f lu e n c e  and hegemony o f  North Sea c o u n t r i e s  p r o g r e s s i v e l y ,  and 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ,  and in n e a r ly  p e r f e c t  conformity  with the  process  im­
p l ie d  in th e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  the  elements .
The s e v e r i t y  o f  th e  e a r ly  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  th e  world i n to  Ac­
t i o n  and Design a reas  was d imin ished by a d d i t io n a l  c a u s i t i v e  f a c t o r s .
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The most im portan t  o f  th e se  was th e  s u b s c r i p t i o n  of  both th e  Engl ish  
and th e  French and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o - l e g a l i s t s  to  the  d o c t r in e s  of 
Natural Law, C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  and o th e r  o n c e - s e t t l e d  unders tand ings  of  
European c i v i l i z a t i o n .  These j o i n t  s u b s c r i p t i o n s ,  indeed ,  kept  Euro­
pean Action and Design regimes more a l i k e  t h a t  u n a l ik e .
I t  remained fo r  subsequent  even ts  to  f e r r e t  ou t  th e  im p l i c a t io n s  
o f  th e  fundamental d i f f e r e n c e ,  im p l ic a t io n s  t h a t ,  sad to  say ,  u l t i m a t e ­
ly  r e q u i r e  normative t r e a tm e n t .  Inasmuch as th e  two systems r e a c t  
d i f f e r e n t l y  under  c e r t a i n  c i r cu m stan ces ,  t h e r e  i s  again  credance f o r  
th e  o r ig i n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  the  two systems.  The n a tu re  o f  t h i s  r e ­
a c t io n  i s  b e s t  d e s c r ib e d  as lega l  p reven ience ,  a term t h a t  d e s ig n a te s  
a c e r t a i n  advance p reparedness  to  accep t  an in nova t ion .
Legal Prevenience :  From Civ i l  Law to  C iv i l  Code
C u l tu ra l  p r e a d a p ta t io n  ex p la in s  t h e  success  of  c e r t a i n  leg a l  sy s ­
tems o r  lega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in becoming e s t a b l i s h e d  in a new country .
In c u l t u r a l  p r e a d a p t a t i o n ,  the  preadapted " fe a tu re "  i s  some c u l t u r a l  
form or  s t r u c t u r e .  Some geographers  may p r e f e r  the  term p re v e n ien ce , 
which denotes  coming b e fo re  o r  an tecedence ,  r a t h e r  than  the  term p re ­
a d a p ta t io n  when r e f e r r i n g  to  th e  p lace  of  r e c ep t io n  r a t h e r  than th e  
f e a t u r e  rece iv ed .  Because numerous examples of  c u l t u r a l  p r e a d a p ta t io n  
a r e  provided e lsewhere  (Newton, 1974; Newton, Newton, and E a s t e r l y ,  
1976), our  concern can be r e s t r i c t e d  to  what may be c a l l e d  " lega l  p re ­
ven ience ."
P re ad a p ta t io n  i s  a un iv e rsa l  a s p ec t  of  ev o lu t io n  (Bock and Wah- 
l e r t ,  1965).  I t  has been b i o l o g i c a l l y  def ined  as fo l low s :
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A s t r u c t u r e  i s  s a id  to  be p readapted  f o r  a new func­
t i o n  i f  i t s  p r e se n t  form which enab les  i t  to  d i s ­
charge i t s  o r i g i n a l  f u n c t io n  a l s o  enab les  i t  to  a s ­
sume the  new f u n c t io n s  whenever need f o r  t h i s  fu n c ­
t io n  a r i s e s .  (Bock, 19 59, p. 201)
Laws, o r  lega l  systems,  can be s a id  to  be p readapted  when t h e i r  
p re se n t  forms al low one o f  t h e i r  f a c u l t i e s  ( fo rm -func t ion  complex) to  
a c q u i re  a new r o l e ,  th e reb y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a new l i n k  with  some p lace  in 
th e  world when t h e r e  appears  a t  t h a t  p lace  a s e l e c t i v e  f o r c e  f o r  t h a t  
f a c u l t y ' s  adop t ion .  Legal forms t h a t  f u n c t io n  in t h a t  co n te x t  may 
p repare  th e  way f o r  an easy r e c e p t io n  o f  new lega l  systems.  Under such 
c o n d i t i o n ,  those  old  forms assume new f u n c t i o n s ,  perhaps with  new r o l e s .  
When the  t r a i t s  possessed  by a p a r t i c u l a r  lega l  system g ive  i t  a com- 
p e t iv e  advantage in a new a r e a ,  then  t h a t  le g a l  system i s  p readapted  
to  be a su ccess fu l  l eg a l  t r a n s p l a n t .  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  r e c e p t io n  of  
f o re ig n  law i s  f u r t h e r  enhanced i f  t h e r e  i s  no need to  d e s t ro y  many 
of  th e  e x i s t i n g  forms o r  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  new ones . When th e  ex­
i s t i n g  forms provide  a h o s p i t a b l e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  incoming fo re ig n  forms,  
the  r e c e iv in g  system i s  in a c o n d i t io n  o f  lega l  p reven ience .
A co n d i t io n  of  l eg a l  preven ience  e x i s t s  when e i t h e r  a l ega l  s y s ­
tem o r  o th e r  c o n d i t io n s  o f  a country  make t h a t  country  e s p e c i a l l y  hos­
p i t a b l e  to  some law o r  law system to  e n t e r  th e  coun try .  For the  a t t r i ­
bu t ion  o f  lega l  preven ience  to  have any s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  im­
p o r tan ce ,  we must l i s t  s p e c i f i c  co n d i t io n s  t h a t  by some knowable mech­
anism enable  the  rece ived  law s u c c e s s f u l l y  to  e n t e r  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  
Most commonly, i t  i s  the  form o f  the  a n tec e d e n t  law t h a t  prov ides  the  
mechanism by matching in severa l  im portan t  regards  the  forms o f  the  
rece ived  law. I t  f u r t h e r  in c re a se s  the  degree  o f  preven ience  i f  the
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fundamental concept ion  of  the  n a tu re  o f  law i s  l a r g e l y  a l i k e  in both 
th e  an teced en t  and r ece iv ed  law systems.  This advanced degree of  p re ­
venience a l lo w s ,  th e n ,  the  an teced en t  forms to  f u n c t io n  as be fo re  and 
f o r  s i m i l a r  rea sons .  C e r t a i n l y ,  th e  rece ived  system i s  d i f f e r e n t  
from the  a n te c e d e n t ,  o r  t h e r e  would have been l i t t l e  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  
in n o v a t io n ;  in the  d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  th e  e f f e c t  o f  the  new system. The 
p re v e n ie n t  a t t r i b u t e s  of  th e  old law become apparen t  and t a n g i b l e  as 
i t  a d j u s t s  to  th e  new law by tak in g  on new f u n c t io n s .  How a form
f u n c t io n s  now does no t  ex p la in  how i t  came in to  being in the  f i r s t
p la ce ;  a f a c u l t y  may a r i s e  in one s i t u a t i o n ,  bu t  fu n c t io n  in an o th e r .
Underlying the  mechanics o f  lega l  preven ience  i s  the  p r e v a i l i n g  
phi losophy among those  who form pub l ic  o p in io n .  That th e  educated 
men, e s p e c i a l l y  th o se  concerned with th e  law, b e l i e v e  t h a t  human i n ­
s t i t u t i o n s  r e s u l t  from des ign ing  w i l l ,  o r  Human Design, accounts  f o r  
the  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  seek a new le g a l  system, o r  law form, based upon 
the  same presumption.  This  p h i lo so p h ic a l  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  with 
the  an te ce d en t  forms, e s p e c i a l l y  in a land o f  d iv e r s e  language,  custom,
and r e l i g i o n ,  c r e a t e s  an optimal c o n d i t io n  of  preven ience .
We can b e s t  see  t h e  o p e ra t io n  of lega l  preven ience  by b r in g in g  t o ­
g e th e r  va r ious  d e t a i l s  of  lega l  r e c e p t io n  and p lac in g  them in an h i s ­
t o r i c a l  flow.
Legal Prevenience and the  Napoleonic Code
The h i s t o r i c  d i f f u s i o n  o f  th e  French Code c i v i l  ( th e  Napoleonic 
Code) th roughout  L a t in  America dur ing  the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  can be 
exp la ined  in terms o f  lega l  preven ience .  All La t in  America c o u n t r ie s
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had th e  C iv i l  Law, in  i t s  e a r l i e r ,  uncod i f ied  form befo re  th e  French 
Revolut ion of  1789 and befo re  the  Napoleonic Code of  1804. The Civ­
i l i a n  systems o f  the  seve ra l  L a t in  American c o u n t r i e s  were p re v en ie n t -  
ly  adapted to  the  r e c e p t io n  of  the  French code o r  indeed any code 
t h a t  c a r r i e d  the  a d d i t i o n a l  w ar ran t  o f  an ascen d en t ,  "wave-of- the-  
f u tu r e "  power. Before focus ing  a t t e n t i o n  on La t in  America, however, 
th e  e a r l i e r  expansion o f  th e  Napoleonic Code in Europe r e v e a l s  the  
p rocesses  t h a t  enabled d i f f u s io n  of  law to  t r a n s p i r e .
The Napoleonic Code, f i r s t  promulgated in France (1804),  was r e ­
ceived  in t h r e e  p r in c ip a l  ways (Limpens, 1956): 1) by conques t ,  2)
through p e r su a s io n ,  and 3) by i n s p i r a t i o n .  By conques t ,  the  code was 
extended to  a l l  those  a reas  under French con t ro l  a t  th e  time of  French 
promulgation.  Thus was the  code rece ived  by Belgium, Luxembourg, Ger­
man t e r r i t o r i e s  west o f  the  Rhine, t h e  P a l a t i n e ,  th e  Rhenish provinces  
of  P r u s s i a ,  Hesse-Darmstadt ,  Geneva, Savoie ,  the  duchies  o f  Parma 
and P l a i s a n c e ,  Blemont, and Monaco. The p r e s t i g e  of the  Napoleonic 
expans ion ,  supported  by the  armies o f  Napoleon, r e s u l t e d  in  th e  recep ­
t i o n  through conquest in I t a l y  (1805-1820),  the  Hanseat ic  t e r r i t o r y  
(1810),  the  Nether lands  (1811) (which did not  n e c e s s a r i l y  extend the  
code to  her  c o lo n ia l  p o s s e s s i o n s ) ,  and th e  Duchy o f  Berg (1811).
By means o f  p e r su a s io n ,  the  Napoleonic Code was adopted in West­
p h a l ia  (1808),  Hanover (1810),  and s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r ,  in  th e  duchies  
of  Baden, F ra n k fo r t ,  and Nassau, and in Danzig, Warsaw, c e r t a i n  Swiss 
can to n s ,  and th e  I l l y r i a n  Prov inces .  Through i n s p i r a t i o n ,  the  code 
was rece ived  by much o f  the  remainder of  Europe, even though d i r e c t  
expansion had come to  a h o l t  in 1814. In 1827, th e re  was a b r i e f  a t -
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tempt to  r e ce p t io n  in Greece. In 1841, the  code was adopted in the  
Ionian I s l a n d s .  A Dutch Code was promulgated in 1838 p a t t e rn e d  a f t e r  
th e  Napoleonic Code. The codes o f  the  I t a l i a n  s t a t e s  de r ived  from 
th e  French code: the  Two S i c i l i e s  (1812),  Parma (1820),  Modena (1842),
and the  A lb e r t in e  code o f  S a rd in ia  (1837). A f t e r  I t a l i a n  u n i f i c a t i o n  
in 1861, a n a t io n a l  C iv i l  Code based on the  Napoleonic Code was adop­
ted  in 1865. In the  same y e a r  th e  I t a l i a n  n a t io n a l  c i v i l  code was 
promulgated , Rumania adopted a t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  th e  Napoleonic Code.
The p r in c ip a l  c o lo n ia l  powers over  L a t in  America, did no t  r e c e iv e  the  
French based c i v i l  code u n t i l  r e l a t i v e l y  l a t e  in th e  n in e te e n th  cen­
t u r y ,  Portugal  in 1867 and Spain in  1889.
Among the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  d e f in e  an h i s t o r i c  s i t u a t i o n  in 
which p r e a d a p ta t io n  played a ro le  i s  th e  s p e c t a c l e  of  a sudden and 
e x te n s iv e  spread  o f  a phenomenon. When a new law i s  seen to  have 
spread  suddenly and w ide ly ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when t h a t  spread  was by volun­
t a r y  r e c e p t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  a s t rong  presumption t h a t  a p readapted  new 
law was spread ing  through a reg ion  o f  p reven ience .  Recognizing t h a t  
such c o n d i t io n s  ob ta ined  provides  a n a l y t i c a l  l i g h t  f o r  d i sco v e r in g  
some o f  the  c a u s e - p r o c e s s - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s  of  the  ac tua l  h i s t o r i c  s i t ­
u a t io n .  The Code Napoleon spread by v o lu n ta ry  r e ce p t io n  in j u s t  60 
y e a r s  over  the  th r e e  m i l l i o n  square  miles  of  Europe; in  the  next  40 
y e a r s ,  i t  was embraced by much of  the  r e s t  o f  th e  world.
The rap id  expansion o f  the  Napoleonic Code throughout  much of  
Europe in the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  was l a r g e l y  p recond i t ioned  by the  
p r e v a i l i n g  Z e i t g e i s t , a cur ious  blend o f  lega l  p o s i t iv i s m  and lega l  
n a t io n a l i sm  t h a t  sought express ion  as a "na t iona l  law" through c o d i f i ­
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c a t i o n .  The code, w ith  i t s  a t t i t u d e  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o s i t iv i s m  em­
bodied the  leg a l  framework o f  th e  emergent n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  "Law ceased 
to  be i d e n t i f i e d  with  j u s t i c e  and was now a s s o c i a t e d  with th e  l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  so v e re ig n ty  o f  each n a t io n "  (David and B r i e r l e y ,  1978, p . 63 ) .  
The expansion o f  th e  code in  Europe was favored  by the  very techn ique  
o f  c o d i f i c a t i o n ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o s i t i v i s m ,  and th e  emergent n a t io n a l i sm  
o f  c o u n t r i e s  v o l u n t a r i l y  r e c e iv in g  th e  Napoleonic Code.
Another reason f o r  th e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  code was th e  compro­
mise o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  law in h e re n t  from i t s  very i n c e p t io n .  The French 
Code c i v i l  o f  1804 was a compromise between a Romanized body o f  c i v i l  
law and th e  p r e v a i l i n g  customary law of  the  r eg ion .
This aura  o f  compromise was e x a c t ly  what gave the  
Code i t s  s t r e n g t h .  For th e  nothern  n e ighbors ,  the  
B e lg ia n s ,  t h e  Dutch, th e  Rhenish,  recognized  in i t  
t h e i r  own customs;  c o n v e r se ly ,  th e  sou the rn  coun t ­
r i e s  of  I t a l y ,  Spa in ,  P o r tu g a l ,  and Roumania recog­
nized i t  i t  t h e i r  own laws so f a r  as th e se  were de­
r iv ed  from Roman law (Limpens, 1952, p. 104).
Of c o u r se ,  upon r e c e p t io n  by a c o lo n ia l  power, th e  Code was a lmost  by 
d e f i n i t i o n  rece ived  in t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  c o lo n ie s  and t e r r i t o r i a l  p o sse s ­
s ions  .
France seems to  have been e s p e c i a l l y ,  a l b e i t  f o r t u i t o u s l y ,  q u a l i ­
f i e d  to  promulgate th e  modern is t  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  to  Europe. S i tu a te d  
upon th e  North Sea focus  o f  modern Europe, embracing La t in  and Teutonic  
h e r i t a g e s ,  and p a r tak in g  in  n ea r ly  equal degrees  o f  sea and land power, 
France indeed could s e rv e  as th e  g r e a t  compromiser of  the  severa l  
s t r a n d s  o f  Western h e r i t a g e .  Having brought  C a tho l ic i sm ,  P r o te s t a n t i s m ,  
and Secular ism in to  exped ien t  r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  pu b l ic  purposes ,  France 
provided a means f o r  th e  then  emerging n a t i o n - s t a t e s  to  surmount the
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d i f f i c u l t i e s  in h e re n t  in the  emergent i n d u s t r i a l  o rd e r .  In any even t ,  
once the  French s o lu t i o n  was on th e  map, a l l  o th e r  s t a t e s  must s u r ­
v ive  o r  f a i l  in t h a t  sp ec ia l  c o n te x t .
As in Europe, t h e  primary Roman elements  in the  c i v i l  codes of  
La t in  America (F ig .  7) f a c i l i t a t e d  r e c e p t io n .  Apart from in d iv idua l  
s u b s t a n t i v e  law r u l e s ,  the  f a c u l t i e s  t h a t  were common to  the  French 
and the  La t in  American codes inc luded  th e  a s p e c t s  o f  u n i v e r s a l i t y  
( th e  codes ap p l ied  to  a l l  pe r so n s ,  not  merely  to  var ious  c l a s s e s  or  
l o c a l i t i e s ) ,  a p reoccupa t ion  with  movement and change ( t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  
r a t h e r  than s t a t u s ) ,  a d i v i s i o n  as to  types  o f  a c t i o n ,  and an " i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l ,  l e t e r a r y  q u a l i t y "  (Lawson, 1953).
In La t in  America, as in o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  Romano-Germanic Civ i l  
Law, the  very essence  o f  p r i v a t e  law i s  expressed  in th e  c i v i l  code. 
The c o d i f i c a t i o n  model used by those  j u r i s t s  charged with  d r a f t i n g  the  
var ious  L a t in  American codes dur ing  th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  was almost  
i n v a r i a b ly  the  French Code c i v i l  o f  1804.
The r e v o lu t io n s  a g a i n s t  Spanish r u l e  in La t in  America began in
1810, only s ix  y ea rs  a f t e r  th e  promulgation o f  the  Napoleonic Code in
France.  That code was in many r e s p e c t s  symbolic of  th e  French Revolu­
t i o n  o f  1789. I t  was a l s o  emblematic o f  th e  emergence of  a new, s e c ­
u l a r  o rd e r  grounded in Human Design. The nove l ty  of  the  code,  i t s  
r a t i o n a l i t y  and c l a r i t y  of  s t y l e ,  and th e  g e o p o l i t i c a l  ascendency of 
France,  encouraged r e ce p t io n  in th e  La t in  American c o u n t r i e s .  As one 
s c h o la r  has noted:
All the  o r ig i n a l  codes have been in c o u n t r i e s  which 
have j u s t  undergone a r e v o lu t io n  and wish to  r e c a s t  
t h e i r  law qu ick ly  from top to  bottom, o r  in c o u n t r ie s  
which had in th e  p a s t  s u f f e r e d  from a d i v e r s i t y  of  
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p o s i t i o n  because they  had in co rp o ra te d  new t e r r i t o r ­
i e s  governed by d i f f e r e n t  laws . . .  In th e  Republ ic  
o f  L a t in  America, the  c i v i l  codes a re  th e  e f f e c t s  of  
r e v o lu t io n .  Revolu t ion  not  only marked th e  s u cc e ss ­
fu l  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  wish to  secu re  and c o n se c ra te  
t h e i r  v i c t o r y  by g iv ing  i t  dogmatic form in a code, 
not only  a r e  t h e  f o rce s  o f  r e s i s t e n c e  weakened, bu t  
th e  lawyers themselves may f in d  i t  l e s s  t roublesom e,  
and even more co nven ien t ,  to  accep t  a new and r a t i o n ­
al system than  to  p ick up again  th e  broken th re ad s  
of  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  law (Lawson, 1953, pp. 49-51).
The La t in  American codes r e f l e c t e d  th e  r a t i o n a l i s t ,  u to p ia n ,  and hu­
m a n i s t i c  va lues  o f  th e  Englightenment and th e  French Revolut ion t h a t  
p r e v a i l e d  a t  th e  time of  t h e i r  promulgation (Rodriguez,  1978).
Desp i te  the  o v e rb ea r in g  in f l u e n c e ,  in p r i v a t e  law, o f  France in 
her  Napoleonic ascendancy,  t h a t  i n f lu e n c e  was not  una l loyed .  The o th ­
e r  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h a t  of  th e  United S t a t e s ,  a l s o  hera lded  a newly emer­
g en t  power t h a t  c o n t r ib u t e d  to  t h e  Z e i t g e i s t  o f  reform in La t in  Amer­
i c a .  North American in f l u e n c e ,  which spread  mainly dur ing  th e  n in e ­
t e e n th  c e n tu ry ,  was f o r  g eo ju r i sp ru d en ce  l i m i t e d  mainly to  laws of  
p u b l ic  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  and to  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n te n t  o f  new c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Inasmuch as our  concern i s  with p r i v a t e  law, we d e f e r  c o n s id e ra t i o n  of  
p u b l ic  law to  an o th e r  occas ion .
The r e c e p t io n  o f  the  French C iv i l  Code in La t in  America (F ig .  7) 
occurred  a f t e r  the  independence o f  th e  r e s p e c t i v e  n a t io n s  and was o f ­
ten  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  th e  s p i r i t  o f  r e v o lu t io n  and a corresponding  r i s e  
o f  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f e r v o r .  The f i r s t  country  t o  accep t  the  Napoleonic 
Code was the  former French colony o f  H a i t i .  This was accomplished by 
s imple  means o f  adopt ion  in  1825. Then, in  th e  1830s, Guatemala be­
gan the  process  of  c o d i f i c a t i o n  as p a r t  o f  a n a t io n a l  reform e f f o r t  
d i r e c t e d  a t  l e g i s l a t i v e  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  laws; one o f  th e  o b j e c t s  of
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which, was to  p reven t  th e  f ragm en ta t ion  o f  th e  Central  American Re­
p u b l i c .  For gu idance ,  Guatemala looked to  th e  Louis iana  Civil  Code 
o f  1825, which had been modelled a f t e r  th e  Napoleonic Code (Rodr iguez,  
1955). Upon ga in ing  i t s  independence in  1844, the  Domincan Republic ,  
which had been f o r c i b l y  annexed to  H a i t i  in 1822, r e t a in e d  th e  French- 
H a i t ian  C iv i l  Code. This  code was no t  even t r a n s l a t e d  i n to  Spanish 
u n t i l  1884. B o l iv ia  adopted a t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  th e  Napoleonic Code in
1831. The Chilean C iv i l  Code was promulgated in 1865. I t  was e s sen ­
t i a l l y  borrowed from th e  French,  w ith  a few i n s e r t e d  p ro v is io n s  from 
the  S i e t e  P a r t i d a s . In t u r n ,  the  French-based  Chilean code was r e ­
ce ived  in Ecuador in  1861 (based upon Andres B e l l o ' s  p r o j e t  o f  1846- 
1855),  in Columbia (1873) ,  and,  w ith  some m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  in El S a lva ­
d o r ,  Nicaragua ,  and Panama ( u n t i l  1917). The Chilean Civ i l  Code a l so  
served  as  the  model f o r  th e  C iv i l  Code o f  Uruguay (1867) and Velez 
S a r s f i e l d ' s  p r o j e t  f o r  the  A rgen t ine  C iv i l  Code (1863-1869).  The Ar­
g e n t in e  Civi l  Code came in to  f o r c e  in Paraguay in 1876.
Also having i t s  r o o t s  in th e  French C iv i l  Code, the  German Civi l  
Code was adopted by most L a t in  American j u r i s d i c t i o n s  where a C on t i ­
nen ta l  European code was rece ived  in th e  tw e n t i e th  c en tu ry .  Braz i l  
rece ived  in 1916 ( a c t u a l l y  adopted in  1917) a c i v i l  code t h a t  r e f l e c t ­
ed th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  German and Swiss codes .  (T e ix e i r a  de F r e i t a s  had 
p rev io u s ly  d r a f t e d  a c i v i l  code f o r  B raz i l  dur ing  the  y ea rs  1856-1865, 
based on the  Napoleonic Code, but  i t  was never  adop ted) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
a f t e r  a profound s o c ia l  r e v o l u t i o n ,  Mexico promulgated an o th e r  German- 
modelled c i v i l  code in 1936. Of a l l  th e  La t in  American c o u n t r i e s ,  only 
Cuba (which did not  ga in  ac tu a l  independence u n t i l  1902) and Puer to
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Rico rece ived  th e  Spanish C iv i l  Code o f  1889. Cuba and Puer to  Rico 
had remained a t ta c h e d  to  t h e i r  c o lo n ia l  m i s t r e s s  long enough to  ex­
p e r ience  S p a in ' s  adopt ion  of  a new c i v i l  code based on the  Napoleonic 
Code.
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  French C iv i l  Code was h ea v i ly  in f luenced  by 
Roman laws and lega l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  which had formed the  b a s i s  o f  the  
Spanish and Por tuguese  law rece iv ed  by th e  La t in  American c o u n t r i e s  
as c o l o n i e s ,  recommended i t s  adopt ion  in t h a t  i t  d id  not  r e q u i r e  a 
complete break with t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  leg a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The a n te c e d e n t ,  
imperia l  m e t ro p o l i t a n  forms o f  the  c o lo n ia l  law served new fu n c t io n s  
in newly independent  rep u b l ic an  s t a t e s ;  t h e i r  presence  made La t in  Amer­
ica  p r e v e n ie n t ly  h o s p i t a b l e  to  the  French and German codes .
Elsewhere, t h e  German v e r s io n  o f  th e  c i v i l  code was p a r t i a l l y  r e ­
ceived  in Japan in 1898. Japan had been much in f luenced  by the  French 
Civ i l  Law dur ing  th e  y e a r s  1880 to  1896. China a l so  rece ived  p a r t s  o f  
the  German c i v i l  code in th e  per iod  o f  1929 to  1931. This in f lu e n c e  
was uprooted by subsequent  events  in p a r t  because th e  t r a n s p l a n t  occurred  
in  i n f e r t i l e  l ega l  ground. The r e c e p t io n  of  t h e  Napoleonic Code by th e  
then r e c e n t ly  s e c u la r i z e d  lega l  c u l t u r e  o f  th e  Middle East  f u r t h e r  ev­
idences  the  r o l e  o f  lega l  p reven ience .  Turkey adopted the  Swiss Civ i l  
Code in 1925, having p re v io u s ly  been in f luenced  by a c i v i l  code of  1869 
t h a t  was s i m i l a r  to  th e  Napoleonic Code. Egypt,  to o ,  had rece ived  in
1876 and 1883 c i v i l  codes p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  the  Napoleonic Code. In
1948, Egypt adopted a modern code r e l a t e d  to  th e  French code. Syr ia  
adopted a 1949 c i v i l  code e s s e n t i a l l y  borrowed from t h a t  of  Egypt. In 
1934, Lebanon promulgated the  Napoleonic Code as the  core  o f  i t s  p r iv a t e
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law. All t o t a l e d ,  th e  Napoleonic Code was in t roduced  in t h i r t y - f i v e  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s  and adapted as th e  c i v i l  code o f  an o th e r  t h i r t y - f i v e  
(Limpens, 1956). A pparen t ly ,  Napoleon was p r o p h e t i c a l l y  c o r r e c t  when 
he t o l d  Montholon a t  S t .  Helena: "My t r u e  g lo ry  i s  not  to  have won
f o r t y  b a t t l e s  . . . .  Waterloo w i l l  e r a se  the  memory o f  so many v i c ­
t o r i e s  . . . .  But what noth ing  w i l l  d e s t r o y ,  what w i l l  l i v e  f o r e v e r ,  
i s  my Civi l  Code."
CHAPTER V I I
TOWARD A NEW GEOJURISPRUDENCE:
GLOBAL PATTERNS OF CULTURAL ORDER
Take up th e  White Man's burden—
Have done with  c h i l d i s h  days—
The l i g h t l y  p r o f f e re d  l a u r e l ,
The easy ,  ungrudged p r a i s e .
Comes now, to  search  your  manhood 
Through a l l  th e  t h a n k le s s  y e a r s ,
Cold-edged with  dear -bough t  wisdom 
The judgement o f  your  peers!
— Rudyard K ip l in g ,  The White Man's Burden, 
1899
The o rd e r in g  f o r c e s  o f  Human Action and Human Design m an i fe s t  
themselves in th e  lega l  r u le s  governing the  behavior  o f  t h e  i n d iv id u ­
a l s  who form th e  o r d e r s .  The Anglo-American Common Law family  of  l e ­
gal systems and th e  Romano-Germanic C iv i l  Law family  of  lega l  systems 
r e f l e c t  th e  o rd e r in g  f o r c e s  of  Human Action and Human Design, r e s p e c t ­
i v e l y .  N onethe less ,  both o f  t h e se  systems sha re  a c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e  
o f  Natural Law which l a r g e l y  determines  the  subs tance  of  the  law, and 
both o f  th e se  f a m i l i e s  have been in f lu en ced  in vary ing  degrees by the  
ideology of  lega l  p o s i t i v i s m .  The S o v i e t .C i v i l  Law i s  probably the  
most v i o l e n t  exp ress ion  of  a lega l  system c a p t iv e  to  a Gnostic  i d e o l ­
ogy. These t h r e e  Western f a m i l i e s  o f  l ega l  systems today cover very 
n ea r ly  a l l  o f  th e  e a r t h ' s  s u r f a c e .  T h e i r  global expansion c o n s t i t u t e s  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of  what Russell  and Kniffen (1951) term the  "New 
World Revo lu t ion ."
The New World Revolution i s  a process  t h a t  took p lace  beginning 
about  the  s ix t e e n t h  c e n tu ry ,  as Europeans embarked on waves o f  domina-
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t i o n ,  conques t ,  and c o l o n i z a t i o n ,  and con t inues  to  the  p r e s e n t .  The 
"New World" comprises those  p a r t s  of  the  e a r t h ' s  su r f a c e  t h a t  had ex­
per ienced  the  in fu s io n  o f  European c u l t u r e s  a t  the  expense of  n a t iv e  
or  indigenous c u l t u r e s .  As each c u l t u r e  tends  to  assume i t s  own land ­
scape c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  th e  general  e f f e c t  o f  th e  New World Revolut ion 
was t h a t  of  modifying th e  e a r t h ' s  reg ions  i n to  forms c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  European c u l t u r e  (Russe l l  and Knif fen ,  1951).
The p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  lega l  r e c e p t io n s  o f f e r s  new i n s i g h t  i n to  the  
r e c u r r in g  p a t t e r n  of  t h e  New World Revolu t ion .  In i t s  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s ,  
th e  i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  European commercial law becomes im portan t  among 
Europeans and between Europeans and n a t i v e s .  The i n t ro d u c t io n  o f  the  
idea  o f  permanent p o sses s io n  encourages  investment  of  c a p i t a l  s u f f i ­
c i e n t  to  engage in  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  n a tu r a l  re sou rces  and in the  
form o f  commercial a g r i c u l t u r e .  In t h i s  way, a reas  develop more po ten t  
commercial and economic l an d scap es ,  d e s p i t e  any d e s t r u c t i o n  o r  d i s a p ­
pearance o f  a n t e c e d e n t ,  n a t i v e  groups and c u l t u r e s .  A c q u is i t io n  and 
permanent possess ion  o f  land a re  u s u a l ly  d i r e c t  consequences of  the  
lega l  e f f e c t s  o f  land  t e n u r e  t r a n s p l a n t e d  by the  co lo n ia l  m i s t r e s s .  
C o lon iza t ion  through s e t t l e m e n t  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f u r t h e r  advances the  
expansion of  the  European systems of  law.
From th e  vantage p o in t  o f  g eo ju r i sp ru d e n c e ,  the  New World Revolu­
t i o n  i s  g e n e r a l ly  completed when mere c o lo n ia l  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  cease .  By t h i s  t im e ,  t h e r e  has been a thorough e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  European i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The New World Revolut ion has run i t s  
course  when the  newly independent  country  has rea f f i rm ed  i t s  assumption 
of  the European c u l t u r e  p a t t e r n .  In terms of  law, t h i s  r e a f f i r m a t io n
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t r a n s l a t e s  to  more than  mere r e t e n t i o n  o f  the  co lo n ia l  o r  rece ived  
law; i t  commonly means th e  e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  su rv iv in g  n a t iv e  customary 
and r e l i g i o u s  j u r i s p ru d e n c e  in f a v o r  o f  a u n i t a r y  n a t io n a l  system 
modelled a f t e r  t h a t  o f  i t s  former European sovere ign .
Landscape t r a n s fo rm a t io n s  ( land  p a r c e l i z a t i o n s  and d i v i s i o n s )  as 
a r e s u l t  o f  th e  impress o f  sovere ign  lega l  a u t h o r i t y  o f te n  c h a r a c t e r ­
iz e  th e  v a r i e t y  o f  r e ce iv ed  law. This  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  c l e a r  when one 
c o n s id e rs  th e  u n i fo rm i ty  g e n e r a l ly  imposed by a n a t io n a l  system o f  law. 
In the  Common Law w orld ,  the  t r a n s p l a n t e d  law has g e n e r a l l y  in t roduced  
a concept  o f  p r i v a t e  ownership o f  land which has r e s u l t e d  in th e  en­
couragement o f  landed e s t a t e s .  From the  e leven th  c e n tu r y ,  Engl ish  gen­
t r y  had in c o rp o ra te d  as an e s t a t e ,  the reby  lay in g  the  groundwork f o r  
the  p e r p e tu a t io n  o f  t h e i r  lands  by e n t a i l  and p r im ogen i tu re .  Although 
th e r e  was an abandonment o f  e n t a i l  and p r im ogen i tu re  in  th e  l a t e  e i g h t ­
eenth  and e a r l y  n in e t e e n th  c e n t u r i e s  due in p a r t  to  th e  i n f lu e n c e  o f  
independent  ru ra l  fa rm ing ,  o th e r  Common Law in f lu e n c e s  in land ten u re  
l i n g e r  in p a t t e r n s  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  where th e  Common Law p r e v a i l s .  The 
Common Law t r a d i t i o n  o f  land i n h e r i t a n c e  i s  roo ted  in i n d iv id u a l i sm ,  
where th e  mature a d u l t  i s  cons ide red  t h e  p r in c ip a l  lega l  u n i t .  I t  i s  
thus not s u p r i s in g  t h a t  one can i n h e r i t  o r  d isp o se  o f  " i n t e r e s t s "  and 
" e s t a t e s "  in rea l  p ro p e r ty  accord ing  to  o n e ' s  d e s i r e s .  This p r a c t i c e  
f r e q u e n t ly  encourages th e  su rv iv a l  o f  landed e s t a t e s .  A consequence 
o f  th e  concept of  p r i v a t e  land ownership i s  th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t e r r e s ­
t r i a l  l o c a l i z a t i o n  through su rv ey s ,  such as  B r i t i s h  metes and bounds 
( H i l l i a r d ,  1973), o r  long p ossess ion  evidenced by ac tu a l  landscape  f e a ­
t u r e s ,  such as bounding fences  o r  th e  p l a n t in g  o f  permanent t r e e s
214
(James, 1971, pp. 263-64).
B r i t i s h  co lo n ia l  law r e c e p t io n  a l so  gave r i s e  to  ab sen tee  l an d ­
lo rd ism .  In Ind ia  as of  1950, f o r  example, "about  80 p e rc e n t  o f  the  
land was in the  hands o f  absen tee  l a n d l o r d s ,  or  in o t h e r  words, fo u r -  
f i f t h s  of  the  land was c u l t i v a t e d  by people  who do not  own i t "  (W it t -  
f o g e l , 1957, p. 433) .  Land a l i e n a t i o n  a l s o  followed Common Law pro­
c e d u re s ,  with i t s  emphasis on a c tu a l  occupancy. This  requ irement  
n e c e s s i t a t e d  th e  use o f  c a d a s t r a l  p lans  and land r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f te n  
d e s c r ib in g  "general  b o u n d a r i e s , "  i_.e_, boundar ies  d esc r ib ed  in terms 
o f  topograph ic  f e a t u r e s .
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  r e c e p t io n  and t r a n s p l a n t i n g  of  C iv i l  Law a f f e c t e d  
the  landscape  o f  th e  c o u n t r i e s  invo lved .  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  Civ­
i l  Law in A lg e r i a ,  f o r  example, provided the  v e h ic l e  f o r  the  e x p r o p r i ­
a t i o n  o f  n a t i v e  land f o r  use in encouraging French s e t t l e m e n t .  A con­
sequence was an in c re a se d  concern with  the  importance o f  surveys and 
p r i v a t e  p roper ty  d i v i s i o n s  no t  p r e se n t  under  th e  prev ious  I s lam ic  and 
customary law pe r io d .  The in t r o d u c t io n  elsewhere  o f  land survey s y s ­
tems was a l s o  a r e s u l t  o f  le g a l  t r a n s p l a n t .  The C i v i l i a n  r ec e p t io n  
a l s o  f r e q u e n t l y  r e s u l t e d  in th e  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  n a t iv e  l a n d s ,  which r e ­
s u l t e d  in s h i f t s  in th e  n a t i v e  p o p u la t io n s .  Large land g ra n t s  in 
French Equa to r ia l  A f r i c a  and th e  Belgian Congo enhanced th e  p o s s i b i l i ­
t i e s  f o r  p l a n t a t i o n  a g r i c u l t u r e .
Another s i g n i f i c a n t  i n t r o d u c t io n  of  the  C iv i l  Law was th e  idea  
o f  fo rced  h e i r s h i p ,  a l im i t e d  t e s tam en ta ry  freedom. The C i v i l i a n  view 
o f  the  fam ily  as the  primary lega l  u n i t  f o r  land ownership supported  
t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n .  Forced h e i r s h i p  was cons ide red  to  be a " p i l l a r  of
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fam ily  r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " C i v i l i a n  concepts  o f  p roper ty  favored  commer­
c i a l i s m ,  thus  r e f e r e n c e  was o f te n  made to  "ownership" and "complete 
t i t l e "  to  land .  But, fo rced  h e i r s h i p  m anifes ted  i t s e l f  in th e  l a n d ­
scape through the  f ragm en ta t ion  of  l a r g e  l an d h o ld in g s .  In Is lamic  
r e g io n s ,  th e  previous  system of  "Koranic h e i r s , "  which encouraged 
equal d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r ty ,  was p reco n d i t io n e d  to  be r e c a s t  in terms 
o f  C iv i l  Law te rm ino logy .  I n h e r i t a n c e  law which p re sc r ib e d  th e  p e r ­
io d ic  d i v i s i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p roper ty  had landscape  e f f e c t s :  one of
which,  was even s m a l le r  farms. Under the  p r i n c i p l e  of  fo rced  h e i r s h i p ,  
t ime i t s e l f  becomes a s t ro n g  d i s i n t e g r a t i v e  f o r c e  in l andho ld ing .  A 
r e l a t e d  e f f e c t  o f  fo rced  h e i r s h i p  i s  th e  d e c l in e  o f  landed w eal th  as 
an e f f e c t i v e  co u n te rb a lan ce  to  c e n t r a l  p o l i t i c a l  power. In Roman- 
Dutch C iv i l  Law j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  such as  South A f r i c a ,  t h e  f ragmenting 
of  K af i r  farms r e s u l t e d  in th e  growth o f  a l a n d le s s  ru ra l  fo lk  who 
e v e n tu a l ly  d r i f t e d  in to  th e  c i t i e s  as p a r t  o f  th e  u n s k i l l e d  la b o r  
f o r c e .
The t r a n s f e r  o f  t h e  Spanish lega l  p a t t e r n  to  th e  Americas had th e  
f u r t h e r  e f f e c t  o f  r e p la c in g  l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  i r r i g a t i o n  farming with 
l a b o r - e x t e n s i v e  c a t t l e - b r e e d i n g  ( W i t t fo g e l ,  1957, p. 218).  The pro­
mulgation o f  th e  Leyes de Toro e f f e c t e d  the  " su b je c t io n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  
to  l a r g e  s c a l e  p a s tu r a g e . "  A d i r e c t  s i  d e - r e s u l t  was a g r e a t  r ed u c t io n  
in n a t iv e  farming popu la t ions  in many in s ta n c e s  (W i t t fo g e l ,  1957, p. 
218).
The r e c e p t io n  of  S o v ie t  Law, t o o ,  had i t s  landscape  e f f e c t s .  The 
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p rope r ty  and the  fo rced  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  of 
peasan ts  a r e  among th e  most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  The n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of
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a g r i c u l t u r e  through a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l i s t  reforms i s  evidenced by the 
c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  o f  v i l l a g e s  in to  kolkhozes and the  format ion o f  
sovkhozes.
These examples o f  landscape m a n i fe s t a t io n  o f  law a re  d i r e c t  con­
sequences o f  the  expansion o f  European c u l t u r e  through lega l  t r a n s p l a n t s .  
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  laws and legal  systems and th e  p rocesses  by which 
they i n t e r r e l a t e  w i th  the  land a re  proper  s u b je c t s  o f  concern fo r  the  
s p e c i a l i z e d  a rea  o f  p o l i t i c a l  geography, which i s  here c a l l e d  "geo­
j u r i s p ru d e n c e . "
In Goethe 's  Faust ( P a r t  I ,  Scene IV), an i n s t r u c t i v e  d ia logue  i s  
held  between the  s tu d e n t  and M ephis tophe les . The s tu d e n t  remarks ,  "I 
do not take  any fancy to j u r i s p r u d e n c e . "  To which Mephis topheles  r e ­
p l i e s :  "I do no t  blame you fo r  t h a t .  I know what kind o f  a sc ien ce  i t  
has become. All r i g h t s  and laws a re  t r a n s m i t t e d  l i k e  an e t e rn a l  d i s e a se  
from g ene ra t ion  to gene ra t ion  and c a r r i e d  from p lace  to  p l a c e .  Reason 
becomes nonsense ,  and w e l fa re  i s  tu rned  in to  a p lague .  A m ise rab le  l o t  
i s  yours  to  f in d  y o u r s e l f  h e i r  to a l l  t h i s !  As fo r  the  law which i s  
born with u s ,  nobody, a l a s !  ever  in q u i r e s  a f t e r  i t . "
N a tu r a l l y ,  Goethe 's  render ing  employs an a r t i s t i c  ex ag g e ra t io n .
What i s  t r u e ,  however, i s  the  r e l a t i o n  between Natural Law and p o s i t i v e  
law t h a t  serves  as a measure f o r  t r u e  o r d e r .  In having even Mephisto- 
pheles  p o in t  ou t  t h a t  "law . . .  i s  born with u s , "  Geothe recognizes  
with S ocra tes  t h a t  t ru e  law i s  an ex tens ion  o f  man's n a tu re  amidst  the  
na tu res  o f  a l l  surrounding  t h i n g s .  I f  t r u e  law i s  p a r t  o f  man's na­
t u r e ,  as geometry was p a r t  o f  S o c r a t e s '  s l a v e - p u p i 1 ' s  n a t u r e ,  then i t  
e x i s t s  w i thout  being cap tu red  or  f ixed  in a code. Indeed, a p r o j e c t  to 
f i x  law in a code must in j u s t i c e  be preceded by a showing t h a t  a l l  o f
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man's n a tu r e  in r e l a t i o n  to  a l l  p o s s ib le  co n t in g e n c ie s  has been r e ­
v ea le d .  That no such showing has been made i s  m an i fe s t  to  proponents  
o f  both Common and C iv i l  Law; they both make allowance f o r  cont inued  
r e v e l a t i o n  of  a d d i t i o n a l  a sp ec t s  o f  Natural  Law. Between th e se  two 
Natural  Law h e i r s ,  however, a d i f f e r e n c e  in form - -  based upon a d i f ­
f e re n c e  in fundamental concept (philosophy)  — conduces to  f u r t h e r  
change in th e  g e o j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l  landscape .  The nea r  homology between 
th e  form o f  th e  C iv i l  laws and th e  Code Napoleon led  to  t h a t  Code's 
sudden spread  around th e  world;  a s i m i l a r  homology between l e g i s l a t e d  
codes and S o v ie t  law form led  to  a s i m i l a r l y  sudden and f a r  f lu n g  d i f ­
f u s i o n .  "Reason becomes nonsense,  and w e l f a re  i s  tu rned  in to  a p lague.  
A m ise rab le  l o t  i s  yours  to  f in d  y o u r s e l f  h e i r  to  a l l  t h i s ! "  Thus 
spoke Goethe sometimes between 1798 and 1833. As embraced in lega l  
systems,  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  th e se  r e l a t i o n s  from " g en e ra t io n  to  genera ­
t i o n "  and from "p lace  to  p lace"  c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  b a s i s  f o r  a new geo­
ju r i s p ru d e n c e .
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APPENDIX
A SURVEY OF PREVAILING NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Many a u t h o r i a t a t i v e  and secondary sources  were co n su l ted  in d e t e r ­
mining th e  types  of  lega l  system to  be found in th e  r e s p e c t i v e  n a t io n s  
and t e r r i t o r i e s .  These d e te rm in a t io n s  as to  type  o f  lega l  system were 
then  compared with  s i m i l a r  e v a lu a t io n s  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  Centra l  In­
t e l l i g e n c e  Agency of  the  United S t a t e s ,  in o rd e r  to  ach ieve  a d d i t i o n a l  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  (National  Basic  Factbook. J anuary ,  1979. O f f ic e  o f  Geo­
g raph ic  and C ar tograph ic  Research,  Central  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Agency. Washing­
to n ,  D. C . ) .
R = R e loca t ion  D if fus ion  (Volk Migrat ion)
E = Expansion D if fus ion  ( In v o lu n ta ry  Reception)  
S = Stimulus  D if fus ion  (Voluntary  Reception)
The Common Family
P o l i t i c a l  National  Source Type of  P r in c ip a l  S e rv ie n t
J u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  Common Law Recept ion System
Great  B r i t a i n  
( excep t  Scot land)
Rep. o f  I re l a n d
Cyprus
G i b r a l t a r
Brunei
Hong Kong
Ind ia  (with Nepal)
P ak is tan
Malaysia
Yemen (Aden)
United Arab Emirates 







Eng. E Hindu, I s lamic
Eng. E Is lam ic
Eng. E Adat ,  Is lam ic
Eng. E Is lam ic
Eng. E Is lam ic






B e l ize  ( B r i t i s h  Honduras) Eng.
Canada (excep t  Quebec) Eng.
Antigua,  Barbados,
Cayman I s l a n d s ,  Dominica 
Grenada, M ontser ra t  Eng.
S t .  Chr is topher -N evis  
A n g u i l l a ,  S t .  Vincent 
T r in idad  and Tobago,
Turks and Caicos I s lan d s  
Virg in  I s lan d s  Eng.
Jamaica Eng.
Falk land I s lan d s  Eng.
United S t a t e s  Eng.
(excep t  Louis iana  and 
Puer to  Rico)
Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Eng.
Tanzania Eng.
The Gambia Eng.
Ghana (Gold Coast) Eng.
L ib e r i a  U.S.
N iger ia  Eng.
S i e r r a  Leone Eng.
S t .  Helena,  Ascension 




A u s t r a l i a  Eng.
Ashmore and C a r t i e r ,
Christmas I s l a n d s ,
Cocos, Heard, Nauru,
Norfo lk ,  Papua and 
New Guinea, Cook I s l a n d s ,
Ross, Tokelau, F i j i  (Tuvalu) 
McDonald, Western Samoa 
G i l b e r t  and E l l i c e ,
B r i t i s h  Solomans, P i t c a i r n
Tonga Eng.
New Zealand Eng.
Republic o f  Minerva Eng. /U.S.
Bhutan Eng . / Ind i
Malta Eng.











E Afri  can
E A fr ican  (German)
E A fr ican
E Afr ican
R
E A f r i c a n ,  Is lam ic
E A fr ican
E
E/s Is lam ic









P o l i t i c a l  National  Type o f  S e rv ie n t  P r in c ip a l  Source
J u r i s d i c t i o n  Source Reception System of  C iv i l  Codes
Djibout i Fr. E Fr.
(Afars and I s s a s )
A lger ia Fr. E/R Is lam ic Fr.
Guinea-Bissau P o r t . E P o r t .
Angola P o r t . E P o r t .
Argent ina Sp. R Fr.
A u s t r ia Fr.
Belgi urn Fr.
B o l iv ia Sp. R Fr.
Braz i l P o r t . R Ger.
Burundi - E G e r . /F r
Centra l  Afr ican
Republic Fr. E Fr.
Chad E Fr.
Channel I s lan d s Fr.
Chi le Sp. R Fr.
N a t i o n a l i s t  China S
Congo (B r a z z a v i l l e ) E Fr.
Columbia Sp. R Fr.
Costa Rica Sp. R Fr.
Benin (Dahomey) E Fr.
Denmark
Dominion Rep. Fr. R Fr.
Ecuador Sp. R Fr.
Egypt Fr . S Is lam ic  (Eng.) Fr.
El Salvador Sp. R Fr.
E q u i to r i a l  Guinea Sp. E Sp.
E th iop ia S Is lamic /Eng . Fr .
Finn!and Swed.
France (and a l l
French t e r r i t o r ­
i e s ) Fr. Fr.
Gabon Fr. E Fr.
Germany, West Ger. Ger.
Greece Swiss
Guatamala Sp. R Fr.
Hai t i S p . / F r . R Fr.
Honduras Sp. R
Ice land Dan.
Indonesia Dutch E Adat ,  I s lamic
Iran Fr. S Is lam ic Fr.
I raq Fr. s Is lam ic Fr.
I s r a e l R English
I t a l y Fr.










Portuguese t e r ­
r i t o r i e s ) P o r t .
South Korea Jap .
Kuwait Fr .
Lebanon Fr.
Libya I t a l .




M auri tan ia Fr.
Mexico Sp.
Monaco Fr.
Macao P o r t .
Madagascar Fr.
Morocco F r . /S p .




















Andorra F r . /S p .
Comoros Fr.
Sao Tome &
P r in c ip e P o r t .
S Japanese  Ger.




R G e r .
Fr.
E Japanese  Jap .
S Is lam ic
S I s lam ic  Fr.
I s lam ic  Fr.
Fr.
Fr.
E I s lam ic  Fr.
R Ger.
Fr.
P o r t .
Malagasy Fr.
E I s lam ic  Fr.
E P o r t .
Fr.
R Fr .  .
R Fr.
E Belg.




S I s lam ic  Fr.
S Fr.
Fr.
E I s lam ic  Fr.




E I s lam ic  Fr.
P o r t .
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Mixed Common and Civ i l Law J u r i s d i c t i o n s
P o l i t i c a l Source o f Source o f Source o f
J u r i s d i c t i o n Common Law Civi l  Law Civi l  Code
Basutoland Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Bechuanaland Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Botswana Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Guyana Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Cameroon Eng. F r . /G e r .
Ceylon (Sr i  Lanka) Eng. Rom.-Dutch
Lesotho Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Louis iana U.S. Sp. Fr.
Puer to  Rico U.S. Sp. Sp.
M auri t ius Eng. Fr. Fr.
P h i l i p p in e s U.S. Sp. Sp.
Quebec Eng. Fr . Fr .
Rep. o f  South A f r ica Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
Rhodesia Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
S t .  Lucia
Scot land Eng. (Rom.-Dutch) none
The Seyche l les Eng. Fr. Fr .
Namibia (Southwest  A f r i c a )  Eng. /S .  Af. G e r . /S .  Af. none
Swaziland Eng. Rom.-Dutch none
New Hebrides Eng.
Bophuthatswana Eng. /S .  Af. S. Af. none
KwaZulu Eng. /S .  Af. S. Af. none
The S o c i a l i s t  Group
P o l i t i c a l  
J u r i s d i c t i o n C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
P re -S o v ie t  







B ye lo russ ia
Cambodia (Kampuchea)
China ( P e o p le ' s  R ep . )
Cuba
Czechoslovakia 













P o r t .
Russian [ I s l a m ic ]  









Guinea S o v ie t French
Kirghiz S ov ie t Russian [ I s l a m ic ]
North Korea (S ov ie t ) Japanese  (German)
Laos (S o v ie t ) French
L a tv ia S o v ie t Yes
L i th u an ia S ov ie t Yes
Mali S ov ie t French
Moldavia S ov ie t Russian [ I s l a m ic ]
Outer  Mongolia S o v ie t Russian [Chinese]
Poland S o v ie t Yes (French)
Rumania S ov ie t Yes
Mozambique S o v ie t Portuguese
Senegal Sovi e t French
S o v ie t  Union S ov ie t Russian
Tadzhik Sov ie t Russian [ I s l a m ic ]
Ukraine S o v ie t Russian
Hungary S o v ie t Yes
Yugoslavia S o v ie t Yes
Vietnam Sov ie t French
Other  Systems
Afghanis tan  I s lam ic
Maldives I s lam ic
Saudi Arabia  I s lam ic
Yemen (Sana) I s lam ic
Vatican C i ty  Canon
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